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THE DOCTRINE OF GRACE

UP TO THE END OF THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY

HISTORICALLY AND DOGMATICALLY CONSIDERED

By

ERNEST JAUNCEY, M.A., B.D.

VICAR OF BROTHERTON, YORKS

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY NEW YORK

LONDON
SOCIETY FOR PROMOTING
CHRISTIAN KNOWLEDGE
NORTHUMBERLAND AVENUE, W.C.
NEW YORK AND TORONTO: THE MACMILLAN CO.
Printed in Great Britain.
1925

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PREFACE

WHEN reading for his baccalaureate of Divinity in the University of Durham, the present writer found that, while there existed a really first-class work upon the Doctrine of the Incarnation, viz. the book by Canon Ottley bearing that title, giving a historical and doctrinal outline of the whole dogma, yet there was no corresponding work on the subject of Grace, although that doctrine also was set for special study by candidates for the above-mentioned degree. As the subject, or rather some portion of the subject, has also for some time formed part of the prescribed study in the Honours School of Theology at Oxford, he determined that he would endeavour to supply, in some measure, such an obvious want, and the result of his efforts is here presented to the reader, with the hope that it may be found to meet the case. The author is fully conscious that his work cannot be placed on an equality with such works as that referred to above, or with the dogmatic works of Liddon, Swete, Illingworth, or Hall, but he claims that it is at least comprehensive, if not scholarly; and exact, if not original.

A word must be said as to the class of readers for whom the work is intended. As will be gathered from the foregoing remarks, it is written primarily for the use of the rather advanced theological student; but it has been represented to the author that it would meet with more acceptance if the information herein contained were made accessible to the ordinary English reader seeking knowledge upon the doctrines of our Holy Faith; he has, therefore, ventured to add translations of quotations from original texts, and to give explanations of technical terms and references, which are not really necessary to the professed student, in the hope that it may be perused by a larger circle than he originally intended.

An explanation is, perhaps, necessary of the dispropo tionate amount of space devoted to the consideration o the Anti-Pelagian treatises of St. Augustine, and the tenet of the "Semi-Pelagian" party; but the writer offers n apology, since they are the special subject-matter of th university courses to which he has already alluded.

It is hoped to complete the work by a second volum which will extend the treatment to modern times.

Some acknowledgment is needed of the great assistanc in the preparation of this work obtained from Cano Bright's admirable introduction to his edition of th *Anti-Pelagian Treatises*. Besides this, the author offer his grateful thanks to the many writers, too numerous t mention particularly, from whom he has culled man ideas, and from whose works he has extracted man quotations, and trusts that they will pardon him for no obtaining any formal permission to make use of thei words.

ERNEST JAUNCEY.

BROTHERTON VICARAGE,
September, 1924.

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Actiones nostras, quæsumus, DOMINE, et aspirando præveni et adjuvando prosequere: ut cuncta nostra operatio et a Te semper incipiat, et per Te cæpta finiatur. Per JESUM CHRISTUM DOMINUM nostrum.

THE DOCTRINE OF GRACE

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

IT is conducive to exact knowledge for the student of any one particular doctrine to know its precise position in the whole scheme of theology, just as in geography we find it necessary to know the position and boundaries of the tract of the earth's surface under consideration at the moment. This is but to say that the theologian, above all men, must see things in due proportion, and if called upon to specialise on one point, must not overpress that point to the neglect of others equally, if not more, important. He must have, therefore, a *system* of theology, though not necessarily a "cast-iron" one, and must endeavour to arrange all his theological knowledge according to that system. Theology is usually classed as either (i) Fundamental, *i.e.* Apologetic, (ii) Positive, or (iii) Speculative. Positive Theology has four subdivisions: (1) Exegetical or Expository, which includes such subjects as Biblical "Introduction," and Criticism both "Higher" and "Lower," and also the Principles of Interpretation, as well as Exegesis proper; (2) Historical; (3) Doctrinal or Dogmatic; (4) Practical, including Liturgiology, Catechetics, Homiletics, Hymnology, Polemics, and Pastoralia, as well as Moral Theology (Casuistry). It is the third of these subdivisions with which we are immediately concerned, viz. Doctrinal or Dogmatic Theology, but at the same time it is worthy of note that the history of doctrine may as rightly be considered as included in (2) Historical Theology as in (3) Doctrinal. However, for the present we are to view it as mainly dogmatic and only in a secondary sense historical.

Dogmatic Theology, then, is concerned with the methodical study of doctrines as such, rather than as found embedded in the Scriptures, or as shown in the Church's life-story, or exemplified in her worship or the conduct of her members. It is further subdivided into: (*a*) Theology proper, the doctrine of the Being and attributes of God; (*b*) Christology, concerned with the Divinity and Incarnation of Our Lord Jesus Christ; (*c*) Anthropology, the study of the nature of man, and especially of its immaterial side [1]; (*d*) Ecclesiology, the doctrine of the Church and Sacraments; and (*e*) Eschatology, the doctrine of "the last things." Of these, the four latter together constitute what in patristic writings is called the οἰκονομία as contrasted with the former, called simply θεολογία. Another term—Soteriology (Active and Passive)—is frequently used, as a division of Dogmatics including the doctrine of the Atonement and its application to men, but it has this disadvantage—that it is likely to produce the logical fallacy of "cross-division." Many dogmas might at the same time be classed under Soteriology and Christology, or Soteriology and Anthropology, hence its use is to be avoided if possible; the doctrine of the Atonement (classed as Active Soteriology) may be subsumed under Christology, and that of its application, justification, predestination, election, grace, sanctification, etc. (classed as Passive Soteriology) considered under Anthropology, as being concerned with man. The doctrine, therefore, which is the subject of this treatise is a part of Anthropology, as a division of Dogmatic Theology. But no article of the Faith may arbitrarily be severed from the rest, for the Faith is one even as God is one.[2] Every dogma is in some manner connected with the others which, with it, constitute the Christian creed, and no one doctrine can be rejected without serious detriment to him who thus rejects it. Let us see, then, how this doctrine we are about to study dovetails in with the other articles of the Faith, how it forms with them one connected whole, and how great the mutilation were it rejected or even tacitly passed over.

[1] The use of the term "Anthropology" as a portion of Dogmatic Theology must not be confused with its use to denote one of the natural sciences. Its use in theology is but its extension upwards into the supernatural sphere of the use in the natural sphere.

[2] Eph. iv. 5, 6.

In the first place, this dogma is intimately connected with that of the Holy Trinity, for grace is the expression of the love and condescension of the Three Blessed Persons towards man, as man beholds it. It is the word which most aptly conveys to human ears and human hearts the relation which the Divine Trinity in Unity bears towards a world of sinful beings, and holds out to them "the hope of glory." It reveals to us the lovingkindness of God the Father, the condescension and self-sacrifice of God the Son[1] and His work for us, and the persistent loving inspiration of God the Holy Ghost and His work in us. The doctrine of Grace would lose its power and its certainty were it not most intimately connected with that of the Trinity, while if the doctrine of the Triune Godhead were absent from the Catholic creed, and the Christian God were but the Absolute or Supreme Being of the Pantheist or the Deist—a deity having no loving connection with mankind, *i.e.* conveying no grace to sinners—it would lose its comfort and sweetness, its practical bearing upon the life of humanity.

Again, the link which binds together the doctrines of the Incarnation and of Grace is a most firm and evident one. For the Incarnation is at once the greatest instance and example of grace and the very ground and source of the whole conception. So far as man can see, without the Incarnation the help of grace would be impossible. Without that meeting-point of God and man, the assistance coming from God could not reach mankind to help him, for there would be no contact, no intimate connection between the two. The Mystical Union, which is the crown of grace, its highest reality, its consummation as well as its condition and means, would not exist without an adequate beginning, and that beginning is found only in the Incarnation. Grace is the application to man of the benefits of the Incarnation, and the means of grace are the "extension of the Incarnation." On the other hand, the Incarnation was the example *par excellence* of the mercy and lovingkindness of God towards man in that He "so loved the world that He gave His Only-begotten Son,"[2] and that by this condescension of grace our Lord Jesus Christ, "though He was rich, yet for your sakes He became poor, that ye through His poverty might be rich."[3]

[1] 2 Cor. viii. 9. [2] S. John iii. 16. [3] 2 Cor. viii. 9.

Once more, the doctrines of Redemption and of Grace are mutually connected, for the whole process of Redemption is one concrete example of the working of Grace, while the final state of redemption is the ultimate end and object of all grace. The historic Redemption was the fruit of God's graciousness and the root of future grace; final Redemption is the fruit of the energy of Grace.

Grace is the antidote of sin, both original and actual, the means of retrieving the injury done to us and more especially *by* us in the Fall; it is the power whereby we are able to conquer the evil within us and without, to cultivate holiness and to attain to eternal glory; all of which we are unable to do apart from it. Again, it is the purpose and the result of election, and the means of the carrying out of God's eternal predestination, the subject of His unerring foresight, as well as the divine excitation of and co-operation with the freewill of man. Its normal means are prayer and the sacraments of the Church, but it is also imparted in countless other ways, often undiscerned by us, by unseen divine influences, in the almost imperceptible leadings and promptings of the Holy Spirit, in the twinges of conscience, and in innumerable methods known only to Him Who is likened by our Saviour to the wind which "bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the voice thereof, but knowest not whence it cometh, and whither it goeth." [1]

Having now discovered the situation of this dogma in the whole of our theology, we must proceed to the closer examination of the word itself, hoping by this means to shed some light on its true meaning. We must trace its usage before we venture on a definition, and not define it first and afterwards seek for evidence to bolster up a purely arbitrary meaning.

The English word "grace" is, of course, with its collateral verb "grant," derived from the Latin "gratia" (itself derived from "gratus"), which word seems to be cognate with and not derived from the Greek χάρις; this again being a derivative of χαίρειν "to rejoice." Once more, this seems to be connected with the Semitic root חנן (ḥanan) "to incline towards, to favour," though what is the precise nature of the connection has not been decided. Let it suffice to say that in the primitive speech there was

[1] S. John iii. 8.

ome root underlying these varied developments, none of hich have, however, wandered far from the exemplar and rototype. The closer resemblance between the Hebrew ontracted substantive חֵן (ḥēn) and the Greek accusative *χάριν* is probably but accidental, and not derived. It is ery worthy of note, on the other hand, that the words in ach of the three languages under consideration which have prung from the naturalised root, have been very few ndeed, only such, in short, as were demanded by the actual eeds of the language. In the Hebrew we have two verbs, ne substantive and one adjective; in the Greek, the verb *χαίρειν* with its derivatives *χαριτοῦν*, *χαρίζεσθαι* and *χαριεντίζεσθαι*, two substantives *χάρις* and *χάρισμα* and the djectives *χαρίεις* and *χαριστήριος*. In like manner, in atin there are but seven or eight words in all, springing rom this root, and the same observation applies to our nother-tongue. From these undoubted facts we draw the onclusion that the need was but little, and a few words ufficed to convey the whole meaning attached to the idea.

But if the extension of the idea be but small, its intension s, as usual, correspondingly large; in other words, there re many distinct meanings attached to the one word.[1] In he Hebrew tongue, the word has but two well-marked neanings.[2] The original idea seems to be that of a favour-ble inclination of one person towards another, goodwill, indly attitude, favour, or, more concretely, a favour or indness performed by one to another. From this springs he secondary meaning, of the charm, attractiveness or, as t would be expressed in English, the gracefulness, which is iewed as to some extent provoking the favour, causing the indly inclination, or, on the other hand, being called forth y it. These meanings will demand further consideration n the next chapter when we proceed to examine the eaching of the Old Testament on the subject.

[1] Habert, in *Theologiæ Græcorum Patrum Vindicatæ* circa niversam Materiam Gratiæ Libri III. i. 4 (ed. 1646), gives fourteen istinct senses, as does also Schleusner, *Novum Lexicon G.-L. in N.T.* s.v. *χάρις*. Pohle-Preuss gives four (*Grace Actual and Habitual*, p. 5–6). Liddell and Scott give four, besides special usages. remer (*Biblico-Theological Lexicon of N.T. Greek*, s.v. *χάρις*) may e regarded as giving a threefold division. Parkhurst (*Lexicon*) ives eight.

[2] See Briggs, Driver and Briggs' edition of Gesenius' *Lexicon* Oxford, 1906) and cf. Philo, *De Abrahamo*, 11.

With its transplantation into the Hellenic language received a great development of meaning. Strange enough, it seems to start from the opposite pole to th Hebrew, and to have primarily the objective sense "attractiveness," or "sweetness,"[1] which induces favou able notice, and then to pass on to the more subjectiv thought of the kindness and goodwill merited or at an rate evoked by it. This is to be noticed especially in th attitude of an Oriental sovereign towards his courtiers an dependents, or indeed of any petty chieftain to his inferior And so we find the word used of the relation between Go and man, and man seeks to "find favour" in God's sight Thus we pass almost imperceptibly to the third meaning o "unearned, undeserved favour," shown by God to man This is a distinctively Christian sense, and largely du indeed, to the influence of St. Paul and his theology upo the Christian Church, and through it upon the vocabular of the Greek language. Then, fourthly, it goes on to mea the abiding condition of favour, the "life of grace" o "state of salvation" in which the Christian lives;[3] or th gifts of God with which he is endued, a meaning subse quently expressed more commonly by the derived χάρισμ Lastly, by one more step, it comes to signify the sense o "thanks," or gratitude, which is brought about in th receiver by the favour and kindness of the giver.[4] On it passing into the Latin tongue in the form "gratia," th significance seems to be narrowed again to the more concret and particular idea of the divine gift and aid which alway precedes and helps any right thought or action, and ther is no doubt that in Western Church usage it means simpl "a free gift, a favour given and received."

In the English language all the meanings mentione above are more or less represented. Owing to the Vulgate translating all the senses of the word χάρις and also those o χάρισμα by the single word *gratia*, and the translators of ou English Bible and Prayer Book following their lead, th meanings of the word in this language are very much con fused, and vary with inexpressible vagueness. Neverthe

[1] See Homer, *Od.* viii. 175, and cf. *Church Quarterly Revie* October, 1907, p. 74.

[2] Gen. vi. 8, etc.

[3] Rom. v. 2, Gal. v. 4, 1 Pet. v. 12. Cf. Church Catechism fourth answer.

[4] Rom. vii. 25 (ℵ.B.C.D.).

ss it will be well for us to attempt some sort of a definition r the purposes of this investigation so that we may know r what we are searching, and not be like those who

> "apart sat on a hill retired,
> In thoughts more elevate, and reasoned high
> Of providence, foreknowledge, will, and fate,
> Fixed fate, free will, foreknowledge absolute;
> And found no end, in wand'ring mazes lost" [1]

Grace is, then, the free, undeserved favour of God to nankind, as we saw above; but the long controversies on he subject have taught us that this meaning is by no neans adequate as a definition, but that we must find somehing more definite, and more adapted to exclude error, nd guard the precious truths committed to the Church's uardianship. Grace, as Vossius has shown,[2] may be 1) natural, or (2) supernatural. Both are truly free, inasnuch as God can be bound by no necessity, except that of eing unable to contradict His own nature; but they differ n their relation to what we call "nature," and also in the emerits of the recipients. That grace which is called natural" consists in our very existence at all, and our adowment with such physical and moral powers as we enominate by the term "natural," but which "are not ue to a *person* or to *personal* merit, although they may in me sense be due to the *nature*, as, for instance, free-will elongs to human nature, and yet it is God's free gift and nerefore comes under the head of grace in this most general nse." [3] It is evident that God was under no necessity to ring into being this or that man, or indeed to create manind at all. And it is still more evident that neither the ace nor the individuals could be said to be either "worthy" "unworthy" of creation, when they were not in being; is grace is said, therefore, to be granted freely to the not-worthy." But "supernatural" grace, on the other and, which consists in those gifts and endowments over nd above the natural, which draw and assist man to his pernatural end (*i.e.* eternal bliss, the vision of God, etc.) granted by God with equal freedom to those who are

[1] Milton, *Paradise Lost*, Bk. II.

[2] Gerardi Ioannis Vossii, *Historiæ de controversiis quas Pelagius sque reliquiæ moverunt* (commonly referred to as *Historiæ Pelanæ*) (Amsterdam, 1655), p. 278. Cf. Pohle-Preuss, *Grace Actual d Habitual*, p. 7.

[3] Mortimer, *Catholic Faith and Practice*, i. 116.

neither "worthy" nor simply "not worthy," but utterly and entirely "unworthy," sinners and even "enemies."[1] But the latter is grace strictly and κατ' ἐξοχήν, and in patristic literature is always to be understood when the word "grace" appears without qualification, and particularly when opposed to "free-will" or to "nature." A third sense is sometimes added—"præternatural," meaning thereby that which is not due even to the *nature*, as immortality in the first man, or that help which God gives to pagans or non-Christians to assist weak nature to keep the natural law, and which is also termed "medicinal grace."

Again, in another way, grace is classified under three heads[2]:—

(1) *Grace of God's undeserved favour*, the well-spring of all good, which is that original goodness and favour by which God inclines to fallen man, with the consequent steps which in the counsels of God were necessary for man's salvation:[3] the grace of the Father, His first love and the gift of His Son; the "grace of our Lord Jesus Christ," Who, "though He was rich, yet for your sakes He became poor"[4]; the grace of the Holy Spirit, through Whose overshadowing the Saviour was conceived and born into the world.

(2) *Grace of outward instruction*, the appointed instrument of good, which is the revelation of this mystery, dimly foreshadowed by the Holy Spirit through the Prophets, perfectly manifested by the Incarnate Word, and committed by Him to the Church in her ministry of Word and Sacraments.

(3) *Grace of inward sanctification*, the working of the Holy Spirit on the hearts of men, giving effect to the instrument; that supernatural gift to man, whereby he is enabled to embrace the salvation provided and offered

[1] Rom. v. 10.

[2] J. H. Blunt, *Dictionary of Doctrinal and Historical Theology*, s.v. "Grace."

[3] "Grace is bestowed out of pure benevolence, from no other motive than sheer love." St. Augustine says it is "something gratuitously given . . . as a present, not in return for something else" (*In Joannem*, iii. 9): Pohle-Preuss, *Grace Actual and Habitual*, p. 7. "It would not in any sense be the grace of God were it not in every sense gratuitous": St. Augustine, *De Pecc. Orig.* xxiv. 28.

[4] 2 Cor. viii. 9.

whereby the sufferings and merits of Christ, which are sufficient for the salvation of the whole world, are made available and effectual to the salvation of the faithful.

In the first of these senses, all mankind may be said to be in grace, in the second sense all who hear the word of the Gospel, but in the third and strictest sense only those who have been baptised and who live and walk in the Spirit.[1] Grace, then, is not only "the free favour of God by which He has provided a way of salvation and enables man in Christ to embrace that way,"[2] or "the goodwill of God which from past ages had rested on the human race as a purpose of salvation,"[3] but "as the thoughts of God are their own fulfilment, so that when He speaks it is done, this goodwill is not only benevolence, it is also benefaction. Through the centuries before Christ it was made manifest in patient long-suffering towards sin and ignorance, in progressive revelations of the Divine character, in evangelical promises which were embraced by believing souls, in visions of Messianic days full of hope and gladness, as well as in secret light, comfort, strength, and cleansing. During the centuries which have followed Christ the Grace of God, stored in the person of the Lord and administered by the Holy Ghost, has poured into human souls, through the preaching of the gospel, through the sacraments of the Lord's Supper and Baptism, through many providences of joy and sorrow, and through the mystical fellowship of the soul with God."[4] It is, then, "a supernatural gift of God, freely bestowed upon us, through Christ's merits, for our sanctification and salvation,"[5] a gift "including all supernatural powers and abilities by which the work of Christ is carried on in the Church and in the heart of man, and comprehending all powers and operations of man,"[6] and by which the individual can acquire sanctification if he will co-operate and become a fellow-worker with Christ. Again, "that power whereby God works in the wills of His reasonable creatures is called grace"[7]; it is "a real and active

[1] Gal. v. 25; Rom. viii 1.
[2] Blunt, *l.c.*
[3] Dr. John Watson, *The Doctrines of Grace* (1913), p. 7.
[4] Watson, *l.c.*
[5] *A Catechism of Christian Doctrine* (Roman Catholic).
[6] Blunt, *l.c.*
[7] Mozley, *The Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination*, p. 302.

force; it is, as the Apostle says, 'the power that worketh in us' (Eph. iii. 20), illuminating the intellect, warming the heart, strengthening the will of redeemed humanity. It is the might of the Everlasting Spirit renovating man by uniting him, whether immediately or through the Sacraments, to the Sacred Manhood of the Word Incarnate." [1]

But what are we to understand by the word "supernatural" as used in such a context? Is it to imply only that which is above nature, in the sense of transcending it, or are we to take it as connoting some kind of opposition to nature? In short, what is the relation between "nature" and "grace"? Here we have the kernel of the whole problem, the very matter which has proved such a "bone of contention" throughout the centuries since Pelagius first brought it into prominence. Both extremes have undoubtedly been held, and with good reason, for both have some truth on their side, but as is so often the case (as we learnt in our schooldays from the old story of the two knights who fought about the colour of a shield), both are equally right and both equally wrong, the truth lying in the mean between the two extremes. Yet, on the whole, because nature as we know it is *fallen* nature, its opposition to grace has been emphasised—indeed, unduly so. As the Lutheran, Bishop Martensen, says: "Nature and grace have too often been so opposed to each other, that no point of union and harmony could be found, and the relation of grace to nature was made merely external and mechanical. The operations of grace have thus been looked upon merely as the operations of supernatural power, without at the same time recognising them as the eternal aspirations and deepest stirrings of human nature." [2] This opposition, this strife, "has repeated itself in various forms and modifications in every age, because it has to do with the deepest questionings of the human heart." [3] But, on the other hand, we are learning more and more that natural laws have their parallels, or rather, their continuation in the spiritual world, as Professor Henry Drummond reminded us, and that God's methods are uniform in their character, whatever may be the sphere of His work. The term "supernatural," in a very true sense, is a *relative* term; "things are natural or supernatural according to where one stands.

[1] H. P. Liddon, *University Sermons* (1st series), p. 44.
[2] *Christian Dogmatics*, § 203. [3] *Ibid.* § 200.

Man is supernatural to the mineral; God is supernatural to the man. When a mineral is seized upon by the living plant and elevated to the organic kingdom, no trespass against nature is committed. It merely enters a larger environment, which before was supernatural to it, but which now is entirely natural. When the heart of a man, again, is seized upon by the quickening Spirit of God, no further violence is done to natural law. It is another case of the inorganic, so to speak, passing into the organic." [1] So grace is the continuation upon a higher plane, or in a higher kingdom, of the laws of working of the One King and God, Whose laws in the lower kingdoms of the inorganic and organic worlds we know as Nature. Had this fact been borne in mind, much of the bitterness of controversy might have been avoided, many fulminations saved and anathemas averted, while many, if not all, of the conflicts waged on the subject would have been much mitigated if, indeed, they had ever come to light!

It is needful now to say a few words as to the plan of this work. As intimated on the title-page, its primary scheme will be the growth and development of the doctrine in question in the field of history. But this necessarily involves the incorporation of large portions of dogma, although, as far as possible, the dogmatic statements will be postponed to the last chapter of the whole work. We shall therefore begin by tracing the ideas current in the heathen world and also among the Chosen People (chap. ii.). Then we shall proceed to examine the teaching of the New Testament (chap. iii.) and of the Early Church (chap. iv.). After this the rise of Pelagianism will attract our attention in chap. v. In the succeeding volume we shall discuss its heir and successor, Semi-Pelagianism; and proceed to observe the fuller and more exact formulation of the different views during the Scholastic Age, until we are brought to the time of the Reformation. Its modern treatment by various systems of theology will then be noted and the consideration of its terminology will be left for us in a concluding chapter. Having done this, we trust the student of the subject will be put in the way of acquiring further information for himself, and given a wholesome thirst for the same, and if this be brought to pass, the author's work will not have been in vain.

[1] Hy. Drummond, *Natural Law in the Spiritual World*, "Eternal Life."

CHAPTER II

PAGAN AND JEWISH TEACHING

I. The Heathen World

WE have now to apply ourselves to the task of discovering what were the teachings on the subject of man's need of God and God's help to man, current in the world outside the sphere of revelation. It is axiomatic that we need not expect to find much in this period that shall throw any light on our researches, either in the world in general or even among the Jewish people. Grace is the peculiar property of the Christian religion; "it is of course this quickening communication of grace to nature, of God to man—this claim to an influx of ultimate reality, possible of assimilation by all—which constitutes the strength of the Christian religion,"[1] for "grace and truth came by Jesus Christ."[2] "That which absolutely differentiates Christianity from Judaism, and all other religions, is that it is the dispenser of grace. The Church claims not only to show man the way to Heaven but also to give him power to make the journey, to enlighten his intellect, and to strengthen his will, that he may be able to say with St. Paul, 'I can do all things through Christ which strengtheneth me.'[3] Grace is the fruit of the Incarnation and Atonement. For by the Incarnation and Atonement our Blessed Lord merited for man all forms of grace."[4] Therefore it is easy to understand that the references to grace in the ages preceding the Historic Incarnation are but few and far between; rather, the wonder is that the daring guesses of pious souls, both Jewish and pagan, who felt their need of

[1] Evelyn Underhill, *Mysticism*, p. 143.
[2] St. John i. 17.
[3] Phil. iv. 13.
[4] Dr A. G. Mortimer, *Catholic Faith and Practice*, vol. i. p. 114.

help, were so near the mark. We can only account for them as some traces of daylight before the dawn, as some isolated beams of that "True Light which lighteth every man, coming into the world."[1] God "left not Himself without witness"[2] in the works of nature; and can we wonder that in like manner He gave intimations beforehand of His mighty purposes for man in the realm of grace? We therefore approach the subject expecting to find these occasional gleams of that Light shining in the dark places of the earth.

On the whole, man's idea (apart from Revelation) of himself and his capabilities was extremely optimistic and of the type subsequently known as "Pelagian"; indeed, Bishop Hefele says, "To me their (*i.e.* the Pelagians) fundamental doctrine, that 'man is virtuous entirely of his own merit, not of the gift of grace,' seems to be a rehabilitation of the general heathen view of the world,"[3] and in proof of it he proceeds to quote a passage from Cicero (*De Natura Deorum*, Bk. III. chap. xxxvi.)[4] which sums up with great fairness the opinions of ancient philosophy on this subject. Socrates taught that man was able to be virtuous by his own powers, for "virtue is knowledge, vice is ignorance," and every one could attain to virtue by aspiration and practice; and yet he held, by a certain fatalism, that all was by the decree of the gods.[5] His disciple, Plato, taught the same general principles, but with a greater inclination towards the Christian view of the world and

[1] St. John i. 9.

[2] Acts xiv. 17.

[3] Hefele, *History of the Councils of the Church*, ii. § 118.

[4] "Atque hoc quidem omnes mortales sic habent, externas commoditates, vineta, segetes, oliveta, ubertatem frugum et fructuum, omnem denique commoditatem prosperitatemque vitæ a dis se habere; virtutem autem nemo unquam acceptam deo rettulit. Nimirum recte; propter virtutem enim jure laudamur et in virtute recte gloriamur; quod non contingeret, si id donum a deo, non a nobis haberemus. At vero aut honoribus aucti aut re familiari, aut si aliud quippiam nacti sumus fortuiti boni aut depulimus mali, tum dis gratias agimus, tum nihil nostræ laudi adsumptum arbitramur. Num quis, quod bonus vir esset, gratias dis egit unquam? at quod dives, quod honoratus, quod incolumis. Iovemque optumum et maxumum ob eas res appellant, non quod nos justos, temperatos, sapientes efficiat, sed quod salvos, incolumis, opulentos, copiosos."

[5] *θειᾷ μοίρᾳ φαίνεται παραγιγνομένη ἡ ἀρετὴ, οἷς παραγίνεται.*

man. He teaches clearly man's need of God,[1] and *godliness* [2] as man's highest aim. Plutarch, one of the greatest Platonist philosophers, expressly declares that we must ascribe certain phenomena to the concurrence of divine and human agencies and not to the divine or the human alone. But yet Plato held evil to be unavoidable and unconquerable, and maintains that man is not wicked nor does he commit any sinful action of his own free-will.[3] So Plato does not consistently hold either the opinion afterwards known as Pelagian, nor the Augustinian, although St. Augustine's philosophy was fundamentally Platonic, and he quotes Plato *verbatim*, and with approbation, at least once, if not more frequently.[4]

Another disciple of Socrates, Aristippus, laid the foundations of the Cyrenaic or Epicurean school. Their philosophy was deistic, hence they had no room for any idea of help proceeding from the gods to man, but held that all things proceed from either chance or human free-will.[5]

Antisthenes, also a pupil of Socrates, was the founder of the Cynic school, and Arcesilaus of the Academics [6]; these schools taught both a sceptical independence of all that was external to the self, whether that external being were divine or human, or even merely material. Stoicism, however, was of a different stamp. As opposed to Cynicism it was positive, not merely negative; as opposed to Epicureanism, it taught that virtue consisted in duty rather than sensual pleasure; in its theology it was frankly pantheistic. Hence it taught what Cicero puts into the mouth of Balbus, that all human greatness was the result of Divine inspiration.[7] A similar sentiment is expressed by Seneca, likewise a Stoic, when he says, "Nulla sine Deo mens bona est." [8] But since they held that all beings proceeded from and returned into God, it is questionable whether their view

[1] ἃ μὲν γὰρ διδόασι, παντὶ δῆλον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐστιν ἀγαθόν, ὅτι ἂν μὴ ἐκεῖνοι δῶσιν (*Euthyphro*, 14 E.).

[2] ὁμοίωσις τῷ Θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν (*Theætetus*, ii. 121.)

[3] Κακὸς μὲν ἑκὼν οὐδείς.

[4] Plato *Menon* in S. Augustine's *de Spiritu et littera*, chap. xxvii. § 48, "quæ secundum . . . recteque laudamus."

[5] ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τύχης, τὰ δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν (*Diog. Laertius*, x. 133).

[6] See quotation in Cicero, *supra*, p. 20.

[7] "Nemo igitur vir magnus sine aliquo adflatu divino unquam fuit": Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, ii. 66.

[8] *Epist.* 73.

night not be reduced to the Pelagian view of "grace" implanted at creation in man's free-will. Yet, again, Seneca acknowledges the weakness of the human will when he writes: "What is it which, while we are going one way, drags us another, and impels us thither, from whence we are longing to recede? What is it that struggles with our soul and never permits us to do anything? We vacillate between two opinions: we will nothing freely, nothing perfectly, nothing always."[1] But in another place he urges the superiority of man to God, in that God is wise and good by a property of His nature, but man is so *by his own will!*[2] Cicero also[3] taunts Epicurus with uprooting religion from men's minds by taking away "opem et gratiam" from the gods. He denies, says Cicero, that there is "gratiam" in God, which is pre-eminently essential to the highest and most excellent nature.

The poet Ovid, again, whose tendencies were towards Epicureanism, expresses his ideas in the oft-quoted lines:

> "Video meliora proboque,
> Deteriora sequor,"

acknowledging the infirmity of the will of man to order his conduct aright, even according to the low standard of pagan morality, and yet stopping short of the next step, the natural inference that some aid is necessary, coming from above, to counteract this evil bias and reinforce the weakened, depraved will, helping it to do what it, however imperfectly, approves of.

Aristotle, the illustrious pupil of Plato, succeeded to the heritage of his master's thought, and formally systematised it, but with certain alterations, even in the matter thereof. Amongst these, one in particular must be mentioned as bearing on our investigation: he denies the statement[4] that evil is not freely committed, and shows that it is a perfectly free act, and on this fact is founded the edifice of human laws, which, were it not so, would be futile.[5] He also formulates the opinion which afterwards contributed so much to the theology of "grace," that virtue becomes in time, through practice, a habit, *i.e.* it is an acquired

[1] *Epist.* 52.
[2] *Epist.* 53.
[3] *De Natura Deorum*, i. 43.
[4] *Vide supra*, p. 14.
[5] *Ethic. Nicom.* iii. 7.

habit, not implanted. (This, however, shall be considered in its proper place.)

Leaving philosophy and glancing for a moment at mythology, there come to mind at once the traditions connected with the words "ambrosia" and "nectar," respectively the food and drink of the gods, which had, when partaken of by men, the power of conferring immortality. These dim notions seem to show a longing of the human heart for some supernatural gift which shall give him the power to attain to some supernatural end; a destiny which was once in the power of man (in the form of the demi-gods), to attain, but was subsequently lost to him.

The world-wide rite of sacrifice, too, is another evidence of man's felt need of help from some Being more mighty than himself. Sacrifice, as Bishop Westcott shows,[1] is "essentially the response of love to love, of the son to the Father, the rendering to God in grateful use of that which has been received from Him." Sacrifices (1) recognise, to speak generally, "a relation of dependence on unseen powers; hence they bring (*a*) Regular offerings, from a common sense of obligation; or (*b*) Special offerings, in respect of particular occasions. (2) More particularly they necessarily connect joy and suffering with the unseen. Hence follow (*a*) Eucharistic offerings in acknowledgment of benefits; (*b*) Deprecatory offerings to obtain relief; (*c*) Impetratory offerings to obtain blessings; these are connected with prayer as a gift with a request." Thus we discover sacrifice to be connected with the idea of grace in three of its meanings as detailed above;[2] the second, the benevolence and kindness of the Deity; the fourth, the gifts granted by Him; and the fifth, the gratitude of the recipient.

Once more, the root idea of prayer and of the custom of making vows presupposes the natural benevolence of the Divine Being, and His power and willingness to grant gifts to His suppliants and to receive expressions of their grateful homage.

And so, to sum up, while on the one hand the general tendency of philosophy was to insist on the power of man to do by himself what was good and virtuous, and to attain to wisdom by the unaided powers of reason, on the other

[1] *The Epistle to the Hebrews*, note on ix. 9, p. 283.
[2] *Vide supra*, pp. 5, 6.

and the popular mythology and religion in practice sought or favours and gifts from the gods, and rendered thanks to hem for their largesses.

II. The Jewish People

When we proceed to trace the ideas of grace current among the Chosen People, we need to remind ourselves at he outset that we must not be mere slaves of a word, while gnoring the sense conveyed by it, but must be on the lert to perceive cognate ideas though expressed by a videly differing phraseology. We therefore note, at this oint, that the Hebrew word for grace has no special idea f *redemption* connected with it, but that חֶסֶד (LXX. ἔλεος) as! In the Old Testament, then, on the whole, "grace" enotes the Divine attitude of goodwill towards man in his eakness and humility; almost the same idea which we nply in our use of the word "condescension"; while the ord translated "mercy" carries with it the connotation hich we more usually attach to the word "grace," viz. od's forbearing and forgiving attitude towards human in.[1] This same remark applies equally to the LXX. ranslations of the Hebrew words in question, and thus ecomes the more marked when we pass from the Old estament to the New, and find these meanings well-nigh eversed! It is evident from this that we must, while eeping, as it were, one eye on חֵן and its derivatives, anage to keep the other upon חֶסֶד and its relatives, if we re to have a thorough grasp of the Hebrew ancestry of the hristian doctrine of Grace.

Now it has been aptly remarked that the Biblical eaching as to grace "cannot be exhausted by the analysis, owever minute, of any one word or expression."[2] Grace s to be seen in "the whole series of the divine dealings ith mankind," it is clearly manifested in the whole of iblical history. It is connected in different ways with he *compassion* of God shown to the needy, the oppressed nd the downtrodden; with His *patience* in not allowing e axe of a righteous vengeance to hew down the un-

[1] But it is rendered by ἔλεος in Gen. xix. 19; Num. xi. 15; y ἀρέσκεια in Prov. xxxi. 30; and by ἐπίχαρης (not used in N.T.) Nahum iii. 4.

[2] Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*, s.v. "Grace."

fruitful tree ere it be seen to be impossible any longer to withhold it; with His *long-suffering* towards the "vessels of wrath,"[1] or with His *goodness* to all His creatures, both good and evil, in giving to them "rain from heaven and fruitful seasons."[2] This is, of course, evident, since "God is Love," and His grace is really therefore but part of that all-embracing and most characteristic Divine attribute; one aspect, according to our imperfect and very limited human view, of that great whole which is nothing less than the Deity Himself.

But, after this generalisation, let us turn to the Old Testament itself and see what it has to teach us on this vast subject. We will follow the time-honoured custom of the threefold division into "the Law, the Prophets, and the Writings,"[3] and trace the general outlines of the teaching of each.

(1) *The Law.*—We are here "pitched headlong (to use a barbarism) into the thorn-bush" of the problem of man's original constitution, fresh from the hands of his Creator. The first two chapters contain the story of Creation, while the third narrates that of the Fall. We have, then, only this as the source of our knowledge of what man was, *as God made him*, and before he by his own act lost somewhat of his original endowment and seriously injured at least, if not altered, his nature, which he was to hand on to his posterity. Without reading into the passages more than they will bear, we may briefly state here that man is said to have been fashioned from "the dust of the ground," and "the breath of life breathed into his nostrils," so that "man became a living soul."[4] According to another account "God created man in His Own image (צֶלֶם Ṣelem) after His likeness" (דְּמוּת Demuth),[5] and gave him dominion over all living creatures, and he was, as the rest of the creation, "very good."[6] Clearly, then, man in his original unfallen condition had a dual kinship, on the one hand to the ground from which he was taken—"of the earth, earthy,"[7] and on the other hand with God, from the in-breathing of Whose Spirit he "became a living soul." And his kinship to his Maker is described by two distinct words, which are moreover introduced by different prepositions in

[1] Rom. ix. 22.
[2] Acts xiv. 17.
[3] The Hebrew title of the O.T.
[4] Gen. ii. 7.
[5] Gen. i. 26, 27.
[6] Gen. i. 31.
[7] 1 Cor. xv. 47.

e passage in question; he is "*in*" the image (בְּ), but *after*" or "*according to*" the likeness (כְּ). It seems fair, en, following the example of the older interpreters, to sume that *some* distinction between the two was intended. nd this difference has been upheld, not only by Roman eologians, though by them most consistently, but also by any Protestants, and, moreover, an exhaustive study of e Biblical use of the phrases seems to demand it. And e most satisfactory theory is that which sees in the image" the "dona naturalia," such as his intellectual owers, his dominion over the beasts, and his freedom of ill, powers which he did not and could not lose, while maining man; and in the "likeness," the "donum superaturale," consisting of immortality, grace, holiness, ghteousness, which were lost by the Fall, gifts which were is in his unfallen state, however, not absolutely but in ependence on his retention of his integrity, and in the ossession of which he would have been confirmed, had he ot fallen, but remained stedfast. Whether man was ndowed with the "dona supernaturalia" from the moment his creation or had been for a time in the condition of the pura naturalia" was the subject of much debate in the holastic period, but need not detain us here. But all greed that in the period immediately preceding the Fall, an was in possession of these superadded endowments, nd that, in spite of them, he fell. He was, *i.e.*, under the fluence of grace, but rejected it. "The grace thus given as 'sufficient,' but not compelling or 'irresistible.' It as capable of being forfeited by sin, and was only conitionally 'efficacious,' its result depending upon the free o-operation of man's will."[1] Adam, therefore, was not iginally righteous as having become so already, or as nable to avoid being so, but in the sense that there was othing in the way of his becoming perfectly established in ghteousness by the divine grace which he had.[2] That

[1] F. J. Hall, *Creation and Man*, p. 264.

[2] The words of Bishop Westcott on this matter are very valuble: "Man was not created in his ideal completeness, but such at he was in a position to attain to it by freely using the Divine p which was offered to him. He was not, as God's good work, ally perfect, but only potentially perfect. He was created in e image of God, and he had to gain progressively by co-operation h God the likeness of God for which he was made. The conution, the powers, are given: the character is wrought out in

Adam had the help of grace is evident in that he had to subject his animal passions to moral and spiritual control. God made him to need grace because his dependence upon God's help was to be an essential factor of his religious life, and yet his service of God was to be a voluntary, a moral one. God desired a service that should glorify Him, and therefore man must neither be a mere machine, nor yet an irrational being; yet he was a creature, and therefore his strength was to be from God and not from himself.

In the same way man was not immortal in the sense that he had already attained such fulness of immortality as to exclude the very possibility of dying, although Wisdom ii. 23, at first sight might seem to imply so, but was capable of both, according as he obeyed or disobeyed the commands given him by God.[1] In this sense, then, "God made not death," but "created all things that they might have their being," though "ungodly men with their works and words called it to them."[2]

By willingly succumbing to the temptation man brought upon himself (1) a loss of all grace, (2) loss of all those præternatural advantages and privileges with which he had been endowed, such as "integrity" of nature (by which is meant freedom from concupiscence, his whole nature being under the control of his rational will),[3] a very great knowledge of the creatures, and an enhanced domina-

life. Such a view brings to its ultimate antithesis and ultimate harmony finite freedom and an infinite and loving will. It reconciles the claims of human morality and of Divine grace in their last form. Man in and by himself is neither perfect nor capable of attaining perfection by using the gifts placed within his reach and by working with God": *The Gospel of Life*, chap. vi. § 2.

[1] See the very clear statement in Fulgentius: "Accepisset divino munere, si præcepta servasset, non solum perfectam, atque inamissibilem corporis immortalitatem: verum etiam in animalem gratiam sancte, justeque vivendi, ut peccare deinceps omnino non posset, si non peccaret donec peccare potuisset. Creatus ergo primus homo de terra terrenus, accepit quidem gratiam, qua posset non peccare, si peccare nollet: nondum tamen tantam acceperat gratiam, qua nec peccare vellet omnino, nec posset: ut scilicet a bono justoque Domine post esset illud munere largiendum, si voluntarie fuisset hoc a servo prius in opere custoditum": *De Incarnatione et gratia*, chap. xii. Cf. also St. Augustine's *De Civitate Dei*, lib. xiii. cxxiii., Faustus *de libero arbitrio*, lib. i. chap. i.

[2] Wisdom i. 13–16; ii. 23.

[3] "Ordinationem et rectitudinem inferiorum virium; et mentis sanitatem": G. J. Vossius, *Historiæ Pelagianæ*, lib. vii. p. 139.

on over them, also the gift of immortality. And these sabilities and privations did not affect himself alone, but ere handed on by him to his posterity, entailing upon em:

1. Suffering and death;
2. Concupiscence, *i.e.* desires or yearnings of the soul;
3. Loss of grace and holiness; [1]

otherwise—"consistit in privatione

(1) tum justitiæ originalis, cum homo nascitur,
  (*a*) omnes justitiæ expertes nascuntur et hoc vitium in liberos transmittunt.
  (*b*) effrenem inferiorum facultatum appetitum et rebellionem adversum rationem atque rationis aversionem a Deo.
  (*c*) cæcitatem intellectus et inde pullulantem inclinationem ad contemtum, odium et fugam Dei.
  (*d*) statu eo excidit, in quo Deo fuisset gratus et vires amisit ad statum gloriæ consequendum.
(2) tum vitæ temporalis, quando denascitur,
  nam homo quidem per naturam erat mortalis (*i.e.* as capable of dying): tamen nisi peccasset, per gratiam futurus erat immortalis.
(3) tum gloriæ æternæ, postquam erit denatus,
  sive æternæ a Deo separationis, nam uti Adamus e paradiso qui cœlorum typus erat, ejectus fuit: ita omnes propter primum delictum cœlestis gloriæ expertes vivere meremur, tanquam exules ac extorres." [2]

We observe, therefore, that man in his unfallen condition d grace as a supernatural addition to nature, and would ve been established in grace, but he lost it at the Fall and came subject to other evil consequences which make the ork of grace far more difficult and therefore the more cessary. It has likewise been the opinion of most eologians that the natural powers of the soul have ffered loss, the understanding darkened, the will weakened, d the memory enfeebled. The body of man also suffered rough the yielding to sin.[3]

[1] *Catholic Encyclopædia*, s.v. "Original Sin."
[2] Vossius, *l.c.* pp. 138–140.
[3] "The Fall influenced the body of man as well as his soul. It s originally created with a capacity for immortality, which pacity was to become a possession and reality by its participation

The next passage which intimately concerns the subject of our inquiry is Gen. vi. 3, where "Jahveh said, My spirit shall not strive with man for ever, for that he also is flesh" —a very difficult passage to interpret. (See Driver, *in loc.*) But whichever explanation be adopted, we may note that "the spirit of Jahveh" has been exerting some powerful influence upon man, now fallen and not having immortality any longer in his power, but that this influence is not to be an interminable one, but will at some time cease.

We may next note a phrase which occurs twice (Gen. vi. 5; viii. 21) and informs us "that every imagination of the thoughts of his (*i.e.* man's) heart was only evil continually (from his youth)." A term (יֵצֶר הָרָע, yēzer hā-rāʿ.) derived from these passages is frequent in later Jewish theology and passes into Greek as *φρόνημα σαρκός*,[1] quoted in our Article IX. Here is evidence, then, that the Jews believed in a deep-seated corruption of the springs of man's nature, *i.e.* his heart, from whence were "the issues of life."[2] But yet, in both passages, we find an exception immediately made in favour of Noah who "found grace in the eyes of the Lord."[3] This introduces us to a large group of passages wherein certain persons are said to "find grace" before God, a very ancient usage of the word, meaning "acceptance" with the Deity. Jahveh was grieved with the highest of His creatures and repented that He had made him, because "all flesh had corrupted his way upon the earth"; yet there were some exceptions, some who were righteous, and these "found favour" with God, were acceptable to Him, and therefore they receive mercy from Him. The offering of Abel was received, and God "had respect" unto him, but not to Cain; Enoch "walked with" God and "was translated," Noah "found acceptance" and

of some food spoken of as 'the tree of life' and of which traditions survived even outside of Revelation, in the 'ambrosia' and 'nectar' of the Grecian mythology. It appears as if even the *capacity* for immortality were destroyed by the Fall, but whether this were so or not, it is certain that the *means* of immortality ceased to be within its reach, for man was no longer permitted 'to put forth his hand and take of the tree of life and eat and live for ever' (Gen. iii. 22), but was driven out from its neighbourhood and prevented from returning thither by supernatural hindrances (v. 24)": J. H. Blunt, *Dictionary of Doctrinal and Historical Theology*, s.v. "Natural Body."

[1] Rom. viii. 7. [2] Prov. iv. 23. [3] Gen. vi. 8.

:s saved from the Flood (the LXX. says they were "well easing" to God [1]), Lot "found grace" and was delivered om the overthrow of Sodom. Not only is acceptableness fore God thus described, but also before man, as in the se of Jacob with Esau [2] and with Joseph,[3] and of Joseph th his master,[4] or the Egyptians with Joseph.[5] In all ses a certain magnanimity on the part of the one showing e favour is supposed, whether the recipient has proved nself worthy or the reverse. In two cases, at least,[6] the rm implies some positive gift of God, to render the person ceptable. A gift of God is also thus spoken of in en. xxxiii. 5. The choice of Abraham and of his descend-ts is an act of God's grace and mercy; [7] and because he s "found grace" in God's sight, Moses was designated be the leader of the Chosen People.[8] Abraham was the ther of Grace and is extolled as such by Jesus, the son of rach (Ecclus. xliv. 19–21), and by Philo; [9] the latter iter also terms the four great gifts of Moses—kingship, wer of legislating, prophecy, and sacerdotal virtue—the Virgin Graces." [10] The election of Israel to be His peculiar people" is attributed in the Law to God's free

1 [1] Cf. Ecclus. xliv. 16, 17, also Heb. xi. 5, εὐαρεστηκέναι.
2 [2] Gen. xxxii, 5, xxxiii. 8, 10.
3 [3] Gen. xlvii. 29.
4 [4] Gen. xxxix. 4, 21.
5 [5] Gen. xlvii. 25.
6 [6] Gen. xxxix. 21, xliii. 29.
7 [7] "There was, it is true, a divine congruity in the fact that raham—a Shemite—became the Father of the faithful; but as stands out among idolatrous polytheists of the same race we feel that the possession of the truth whereby he was a source of ssing to all nations came from a Divine gift and not from a ural 'instinct' shared by him with his fellow-Shemites. The l of Abraham and his obedience of faith is a fresh beginning in religious life of mankind, a true new creation. The later ory of the East is a signal commentary on this central revelation the world. The 'One God' of Judaism, of Christianity, and of hammedanism is proclaimed to be 'the God of Abraham.' ere is, as has been often pointed out, no historic monotheism ch does not start from this definite covenant which God made h him who still, after nearly four thousand years, is called in the l of his pilgrimage, the land of faith, 'the friend of God'": stcott, *The Gospel of Life*, chap. iv.
8 [8] Exod. xxxiii. 12–17; xxxiv. 6, 9.
9 [9] σύμβολον εἶναι διαθήκην χάριτος (*De mutatione Nominum*, 6). πασῶν χαρίτων ἀρχή τε καὶ πηγὴ αὐτός εἰμι ἐγώ (*Ibid.* 8).
10 [10] Philo, *De Vita Mosis*, ii. 1.

choice,[1] and not to any righteousness of their own, which claim (if made) is indeed most effectively discounted by their oft-recorded disobedience and unfaithfulness. To glance at another phase of the question for a moment, the election of Pharaoh to be the oppressor of God's people is attributed to the foresight and predestination of God, and "the Lord" is said to have "hardened Pharaoh's heart," although the monarch himself is said to have "hardened his heart," [2] and is held responsible for it and both reproved and punished for his hardness of heart. The antinomy, however, remains unsolved. The initiative in the covenant of law, as previously in the patriarchal covenant of promise, comes from God; it is an act of grace,[3] and hence not a *συνθήκη*, a bargain between two equal parties, but a *διαθήκη*, a divinely ordained agreement. The foundation of the idea is a divine act, following upon a divine choice, and with certain promises attached to it. This lays upon man certain obligations and duties, *e.g.* the Decalogue, and upon the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of these depends the divine retribution, which is, nevertheless, at the same time the perfect realisation of the purpose of election. In order to the working out of this purpose God has "chosen" (בָּחַר) His people and "known" them (יָדַע), and on this account lays down their duty,[4] and He also gives them strength to follow it and keep their part of the covenant.[5] God's "knowing" (יָדַע) His people implies more than our weakened sense of "know" does; His knowledge is not simply "nosse cum affectu" but "nosse cum effectu," and what He knows surely comes to pass, and by His very cognition He works the means of the accomplishment of His purpose. Thus in Gen. xviii. 19, God's "knowledge" of Abraham is an effectual one,[6] and in Exod. xxxiii. 12, the same knowledge of Moses is equivalent to "thou hast found grace in mine eyes." But God's knowledge has already had this result, that God has entered into a filial relationship with His people, He is their Father and Israel is His son, His firstborn;[7] it is also a "peculiar people

[1] Exod. xix. 5; Deut. vii. 7, 8; viii. 18; ix. 4–6; x. 15.
[2] Exod. ix. 16; x. 20; cf. viii. 15, 32.
[3] Exod. xx. 2; xix. 4.
[4] Exod. xx. 2; Deut. v. 6.
[5] Deut. viii. 18.
[6] Cf. also Amos iii. 2; Hos. xiii. 5; Ps. i. 6; xxxvii. 18.
[7] Deut. xxxii. 6; Exod. iv. 22, etc.

into Him," a "holy people," "a priestly kinghood," "a people that dwell alone," all terms expressing God's graciousness to the nation.[1] But there are slight hints, even in the Pentateuch, of something more than a favourable inclination of Jahveh towards His people, something approaching the objective sense of grace as a gift which shall change the heart of sinful man, *e.g.* Deut. xxx. 1–6, on which Oehler remarks: "The final restoration of the people is, according to this, an act of God; but is effected by ethical means, through the conversion of the people, for the order of God's kingdom excludes all magical means. This conversion is complete when, by the operation of divine grace, that renovation of heart is accomplished in virtue of which the law shall no longer be an external obligation on the people, but, by God's might, shall be a living will and purpose on their part. For 'Then the Lord thy God will circumcise thine heart, and the heart of thy seed to love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, that thou mayest live.' Thus, in spite of man's sin and faithlessness, the realisation of the divine decree of election, the perfecting of the people of God, are firmly based in God's faithfulness and mercy" (Rom. xi. 25–36).[2]

The climax of the Revelation of Grace in the Old Testament is to be found in its proclamation as part of "the name of the Lord" in Exod. xxxiv. 5–7. His being "full of compassion and gracious, slow to anger and plenteous in mercy and truth; keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin."[3] And, indeed, His graciousness and self-consistent freedom is part of the connotation of the Covenant-name "Jahveh," as it is interpreted by Exod. xxxiii. 19. "I will be gracious to whom I will be gracious and will show mercy on whom I will show mercy," which "express first, that God shows him grace to whom He will be gracious, and to no other, or the absolute freedom of God's grace; and, second, that He really shows him grace to whom He is gracious, that is, He is self-consistent in showing mercy, in reference to His grace agreeing with Himself."[4]

(2) *The Prophets.*—When we pass to the prophetic

[1] Deut. xiv. 2; Exod. xix. 6; Num. xxiii. 9.
[2] Oehler, *Theology of the Old Testament*, vol. i. p. 288.
[3] Cf. Joel ii. 13.
[4] Oehler, *Theology of the Old Testament*, vol. i. p. 140 (3).

period, we find a great development of the idea. "Whatever an earlier age may have thought of mutual pleasure and profit to be found in the communion of God and man, the age of the Prophets faced an apparently insoluble antimony. A consciousness of unworthiness sank deep into the minds of those to whom the holiness of God was becoming real, and so there was a tendency to attribute divine favours to the merely sovereign will of God; on the other hand, these favours implied worth in the recipient, or else the privileges of Israel were utterly unethical—nay, unjust." [1] They are perfectly certain that God has chosen Israel to be His people, and yet they feel as Isaiah expressed it, "I am a man of unclean lips and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips." [2] "The Lord hath spoken: I have nourished and brought up children, and they have rebelled against me." [3] The problem is a most perplexing one; how can they reconcile the fact of God's choice with the people's sin and the consequent divine punishment of their sin? The answer given is twofold, and may be briefly summarised as (1) the merit of the fathers, and (2) the doctrine of the remnant. Men were bidden "look unto the rock whence ye were hewn, and to the hole of the pit whence ye were digged. Look unto Abraham your father, and unto Sarah that bare you." [4] And so they did, most literally, and believed that they were accepted for the fathers' sakes; Abraham was the "Father of the faithful," and even if they were faithless, all would be well, since they "had Abraham to their father." [5] Abraham was "well-pleasing to God," and therefore God extends His favour to Abraham's seed; Abraham's merits are imputed to his children. That this is not an empty boast is shown by S. Paul's use of the argument; [6] that it was unable to bear the weight laid upon it is apparent from Our Lord's denial of the conclusion drawn therefrom.[7]

But there remains what is known as the "doctrine of the remnant," first unfolded by Isaiah (vi. 13; vii. 3, etc.; cf. 1 Kings xix. 18). "All are not Israel, who are of Israel," [8] but there is a kingdom within the kingdom, a

[1] T. A. Lacey in *Church Quarterly Review*, October 1907.
[2] Isa. vi. 5; xliii. 27; lxiv. 5.
[3] Isa. i. 2.
[4] Isa. li. 1, 2.
[5] St. John viii. 39.
[6] Rom. ix. 5.
[7] St. John viii. *passim*.
[8] Rom. ix. 6.

aithful remnant within the faithless nation, to whom the romises of grace shall be fulfilled, even though "the mass" nay forfeit them through disobedience and unfaithfulness. As a corollary of this, the possibility appears of God's urpose extending also to some who were not outwardly of srael, and that the heathen also might be brought, through he instrumentality of Israel indeed, in some undefined way, to share in some of the privileges of Israel. Thus we nd the Deutero-Isaiah announcing, "I am inquired of by hem that asked not for me; I am found of them that ought me not,"[1] or again, in perfectly general terms, in he passage applied by our Lord Himself to His Mission, "The Spirit of the Lord God is upon me; because the Lord ath anointed me to preach good tidings unto the meek; e hath sent me to bind up the broken-hearted, to proclaim iberty to the captives, and the opening of the prison to hem that are bound; to proclaim the acceptable year of he Lord, and the day of vengeance of our God."[2]

Leaving this, we must note also that the Prophets point ut that the distinctive gift of the New Era which they erald is to be "righteousness," and this a real, infused abit of virtue and not merely an imputed righteousness, a loke to cover, perhaps, a multitude of sins! No, it is to e a "law" and a "light," and that "*in the heart*"; and hose who have it "know righteousness";[3] a "way of oliness"[4] where God's people shall go. But yet it is God Vho works in them, and not they themselves,[5] as it was He Vho created them, originally, and He Who has forgiven heir many and great sins, for "they are indebted for every enefit they receive to the free grace of God (Isa. xliii. 24; lviii. 8–11).[6] He it is Who "turns them" by His grace nd then they repent, and Who gives them "a heart and a ay that they may fear Him for ever."[7] There is, indeed, othing which the mercy of God has not done for His eople; in spite of their unfaithfulness to Him, He has yet allured them," He has "betrothed them unto Him in ithfulness for ever," He has "drawn them with cords of

[1] Isa. lxv. 1. Cf. Jer. xviii. 5–12.
[2] Isa. lxi. 1–2.
[3] Isa. li. 4, 5, 7; Jer. xxxi. 33, 34.
[4] Isa. xxxv. 8.
[5] Isa. xxvi. 12.
[6] Oehler, *op. cit.*, vol. ii. p. 301.
[7] Jer. xxxi. 18; Lam. v. 21; Jer. xxxii. 39.

a man, with bands of love "[1]; but all this has failed, and now "to realise the purpose of their election, the perception forced itself on the mind that a *new dispensation of grace* was needed; in other words, that God must of His own free grace blot out transgression, and, as the passage Deut. xxx. 6, hints, effect by a new communication of life that conformity to His will which the law demands."[2] This is the *infusion* of righteousness referred to above and announced in such passages as Jer. xxiv. 7; xxxi. 31–34; Isa. xxix. 18; xxx. 20, 21; xxxii. 3; Ezek. xxxvi. 25–27; xi. 19, 20; xxxvii. 23–28, as the special grace of the New Covenant.

Before leaving the study of the Prophets in this connection, it is incumbent upon us to note the passage in Ezek. xviii. 19–21, with regard to the guilt of the righteous man's sin, and the merit of the sinner's late repentance. Taken by itself, the passage certainly seems to imply that if an otherwise godly man is overtaken by death in a temporary state of sin, his former righteous life is not counted to him, *i.e.* a temporary interruption of the state of grace by mortal sin, annuls entirely the life of grace in the soul, while the infusion of sanctifying grace into the heart of the sinner removes the guilt of former sins entirely and the sinner is justified wholly before God. This opinion must be modified somewhat, though true in the main, by the teaching of other passages of Holy Scripture and deductions therefrom.[3]

(3) *The Hagiographa.*—When we turn to the Psalter, the most important book in this section, we are dealing with a book of devotion, and shall, on this account, expect to find (1) allusions, not dogmatic statements, (2) individualistic, not collective expressions, and (3) expressions of varying intensity and of varying degrees of dependence or otherwise, according to the age in which the writers lived, or the difference of their temperaments. We have *e.g.* the use of the word "grace" to express the idea of beauty[4] and also that of favour,[5] though it seems in this latter instance (as also in the parallel adduced from Proverbs) to have some

[1] Hos. ii. 14, 19, 20; xi. 4.
[2] Oehler, *op. cit.*, vol. ii. p. 302.
[3] *Vide infra*, chap. x. (vol. ii.).
[4] Ps. xlv. 2; cf. Prov. i. 9.
[5] Ps. lxxxiv. 11; cf. Prov. iii. 34.

slight connotation of an active, objective gift of assistance. But whether this be so or not, in many passages where the phrase itself is not made use of, a definite gift of inward righteousness is either sought after and prayed for, or even definitely promised. This is particularly to be noted in Psalm cxix. where prayer is made for direction of ways, for enlargement of heart, for quickening, stablishing, looking for health and the word of righteousness, the gift of light and understanding, and many such like gifts.[1] It is also confidently expected or definitely promised in many passages in the Psalter, as God's "favourable kindness," "an uncorrupt life," "goodness and truth of heart," "righteousness and innocency that is in me," "the law of God in his heart."[2] But though the righteousness of God and His law are perfect,[3] yet man's righteousness, though real, can be but imperfect and weak,[4] and, as is most vividly expressed in that Psalm, which more than all breathes the spirit of the Gospel—the 51st—he always needs mercy, washing, cleansing, renewal, nay, even the creation of a clean heart and renewal of a right spirit within and to know wisdom in the inward parts. And all this is the operation of God,[5] Who doth "prepare the heart" by His Grace, and "causes His ear to hear" the crying of the heart thus awakened,[6] that is, it is all of God and not of man, though he has his share in it also.

In the Wisdom-literature, too, although the main question is that of external life and conduct, and the aim practical, yet the same truths are borne witness to, even if, as we should expect, less prominently. In the Proverbs, God's knowledge of human hearts is asserted,[7] and in Ecclesiastes the universality of the corruption of human nature is set forth,[8] while man is bidden both to "confess and forsake" his sins and to "keep his heart with all diligence.'[9]

[1] Ps. cxix. 5, 18, 25, 32, 35, 37, 38, 40, 80, 123, 130, etc.
[2] Ps. v. 13; xv. 2; cxxv. 4; vii. 8; xxxvii. 31; xl. 8.
[3] Ps. xi. 7; xix. 7–11; cxix. *passim.*
[4] Ps. xix. 12, 13.
[5] Ps. xvi. 7; xvii. 7–9; li. 6, 10, 12, 15; cxliii. 10.
[6] Ps. x. 17.
[7] Prov. xv. 11; xvi. 2; xvii. 3.
[8] Eccles. vii. 20.
[9] Prov. xxviii. 13; iv. 23.

But though the Hebrew Canon of Holy Scripture closes here, the Jewish theology continued to develop, as we discover from the additional treatises contained in the LXX., and which we are accustomed to denote under the name "Apocrypha." Whether these writings were, any or all all of them, penned B.C. or A.D. does not concern us here; it is sufficient for our purpose that they form a record of the legitimate development of the theological system of the Old Testament, in or about the time of our Lord. In these writings the problem of the Fall and of Original Sin had begun to engage the minds of the learned, and we find frequent considerations bearing on the subject. For example, in Ecclus. xv. 11–17, the son of Sirach deals with man's responsibility for his sins, and repudiates most strongly the idea that God is in any way the author of sin. The passage is quoted by St. Augustine, who adds: "Ecce apertissime videmus expressum liberum humanæ voluntatis arbitrium." [1] The passages on immortality found in the "Wisdom" have already been referred to.[2] When we come to Ecclus. xxv. 24, we seem at first sight to have come across the Church doctrine of Original Sin ready made, but Dr. Edersheim [3] tells us that this is not so. He says, "Here were two divergent opinions—the one ascribing death to personal, the other to Adam's guilt," [4] and "So far as their opinions can be gathered from their writings, the great doctrines of Original Sin, and of the sinfulness of our whole nature, were not held by the ancient Rabbis." [5] But the attribution of death to the sin of Adam seems to have the preponderance, and as Sanday and Headlam point out, in treating of this passage, it "points in the direction" of the doctrine of Original Sin, since "the writer deduces from Eve the death of all mankind, and in like manner he seems to deduce from her the *initium peccandi*." [6]

The treatise *Berakhoth* of the Talmud, compiled about

[1] In *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, c. ii.

[2] *Vide supra*, p. 20.

[3] *Speaker's Commentary*, ad. loc.

[4] *Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah*, i. p. 166. Cf. also the discussion in the Talmud (*Shabbath* 55a, b, cf. *Debarim Rabba* 9 and *Siphre* on Deut. xxxii. 49), where the former is supported by Ezek. xviii. 20 (and see Ecclus. xv. 11–17), the latter by Eccles. ix. 2 (and see Wisdom ii. 23, 24; iii. 1).

[5] *Ibid.* p. 165.

[6] *Epistle to the Romans*, p. 137.

his period, distinctly says that God made man with two ropensities (because of two "jods" in the word ויצר in Gen. ii. 7), the one to good (יֵצֶר טוֹב) and the other to evil (יֵצֶר הָרָע),[1] or "two reins," the former at his right, the atter at his left [2, 3]; the evil began to work in him immediately after birth, the good came gradually in course of time.[4] But there was no guilt to be attached to this evil inclination, or its existence is absolutely necessary if the world is to ontinue,[5] and, indeed, it was created by God Himself,[6] nd so sin is really due to causes for which no blame attaches o man! But it was within the power of every one to vercome sin and attain perfect righteousness by study nd good works,[7] and Israel at Mount Sinai had actually ttained this, as had Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, Aaron, Miriam, and others who were really righteous.[8] The Rabbins appear to have taught, generally, that a man's good deeds would be, at the last judgment, weighed against his bad ones, and according to the decision he would be ccepted and rewarded, or else rejected and punished.[9] Nevertheless, they did not altogether ignore the other side f the problem, but acknowledged "grace" in some manner.[10] The teaching of the Talmud is aptly summarised thus: "By the Fall, man came under a curse, is guilty of death, nd his right relation to God is rendered difficult. More han this cannot be said. Sin, to which the bent and eaning had already been planted in man by creation, had ecome a fact; the 'evil impulse' gained the mastery ver mankind, who can only resist it by the greatest efforts; efore the Fall it had had power over him, but no such scendancy. . . . According to the Rabbis, there is such a hing as transmission of guilt, but not such a thing as

[1] *Vide supra*, p. 22.
[2] According to Eccles. x. 2.
[3] *Berakhoth* 61a, *Targum Ps-Jon* on Gen. ii. 7.
[4] Talmudic Tractate *Sanhedrin* 91b, *Nedarim* 32b, *Midrash* on Eccl. iv. 13, 14; ix. 15.
[5] *Bereshith Rabba*, 9.
[6] *Berakhoth*, 61a; cf. Jerusalem Targum on Ex. xxxii. 22.
[7] *Abhodah Zarah* (Talmud), 5b; *Qiddushin*, 30b.
[8] *Yoma*, 28b; *Chagigah*, 4b.
[9] See Bull, *Harmonia Apost.* II. xvi. 8.
[10] "Everything is foreseen, and free-will is given. And the world is judged by grace, and everything is according to work": Rabbi Akiba in *Pirkê Abôth*, III. 24.

transmission of sin,"[1] this last opinion being due to the clearness with which they insist on free-will and direct individual responsibility.

During this time flourished Philo, the great Alexandrian Jew (b. *c.* B.C. 20, d. *c.* A.D. 40), who tried to combine the Jewish religion and Greek philosophy. He regards the soul of a child as a *tabula rasa*, which God desires to form, and mould into His own likeness. But this state of innocence ceases when "affection" presents itself to reason, and thus arises sensuous lust, which is the root of all sin. It is needful, therefore, to get rid of the sensuous and become spiritual, which is accomplished by three methods: study (*μάθησις*), discipline or practice (*ἄσκησις*), and (best of all) a natural good disposition (*εὐφυΐα*), which consists of the four Stoic cardinal virtues, Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance and Justice. These all, however, and all that is good, as well as all that help towards it, come to us ultimately from God Himself.[2] He dwells very strongly on the impotence of man apart from divine grace.[3] We find, then, among current Jewish teachings "an idea containing two disparate elements. There is the unethical conception of the covenanted favour of God, deriving from the merits of Abraham imputed to certain of his offspring; there is the ethical conception of a gracious gift from God to every individual man, which works in him a corresponding graciousness of character."[4]

But there yet remain two writings which cannot be passed without notice in this connection—the Fourth Book of Ezra, and the Apocalypse of Baruch, both written, it is generally allowed, somewhere between 80 and 100 A.D., and therefore perhaps influenced by Christian doctrine. They teach that the Fall brought death to Adam's descendants as well as to himself[5]; that it brought also the tendency

[1] Weber, *Altsyn. Theol.* p. 216.

[2] Edersheim, *op. cit.* II. 663–4.

[3] *ὁ θεὸς ἔγνω δεῖν εὐεργετεῖν ἀταμιεύτοις καὶ πλουσίαις χάρισι τὴν ἄνευ δωρεᾶς θείας φύσιν οὐδενὸς ἀγαθοῦ δυναμένην ἐπιλαχεῖν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς* (*De Opificio Mundi*, 6). *ἄνευ γὰρ θείας χάριτος ἀμήχανον ἢ λιποτακτῆσαι τὰ θνητὰ ἢ τοῖς ἀφθάρτοις ἀεὶ παραμεῖναι* (*De Ebrietate*, 36. Cf. also *Legg. Alleg.* I. 48, 55, 101).

[4] *Church Quarterly Review*, Oct. 1907, p. 81.

[5] *E.g.* "et huic (*i.e.* Adam) mandasti diligere viam tuam, et præterivit eam; et statim instituisti in eum mortem et in generationibus eius": 4 Esd. iii. 7. "(Adam) mortem attulit et abscidit

o sin to them as to him,[1] but that, however, individuals re still responsible for their own sins.[2] How far this is faithful portrait of the Jewish theology of the time, it is npossible to say, but Edersheim maintains that it is due ntirely to the influence of the New Testament[3]; certain is, however, that towards the end of the first Christian entury, the Christian doctrine of original sin was current, ven in Jewish circles.

We have now arrived at the very threshold of the New Dispensation, the "dispensation of grace," and, indeed, ave reason to think that we have taken one halting step ver it. But before changing the ground of our research o the New Testament, which we leave for another chapter, ve will briefly note the methods of Divine self-revelation,

nnos eorum qui ab eo geniti fuerunt": *Apoc. Baruch*, xvii. 3; quando peccavit Adam et decreta fuit mors contra eos qui gignerenur": *Ibid.* xxiii. 4.

[1] *E.g.* "Cor enim malignum (=*φρόνημα σαρκός*, יֵצֶר הָרָע) baiulans rimus Adam transgressus et victus est, sed et omnes qui de eo ati sunt: et facta est permanens infirmitas, et lex cum corde opuli, cum malignitate radicis; et discessit quod bonum est, et nansit malignum," 4 Esd. iii. 21, 22. "Quoniam granum seminis nali seminatum est in corde Adam ab initio, et quantum impietatis eneravit usque nunc, et generat usque dum veniat area," *Ibid.* v. 30. "O tu quid fecisti Adam? Si enim tu peccasti, non est actus solius tuus casus, sed et nostrum qui ex te advenimus," *Ibid.* vii. 48.

[2] *E.g.* "Non enim Altissimus voluit hominem disperdi, sed ipsi ui creati sunt coinquinaverunt nomen eius qui fecit eos," 4 Esd. iii. 59, 60. "Et deliquerunt qui habitabant civitatem, in omnibus acientes sicut fecit Adam et omnes generationes eius, utebantur nim et ipsi corde maligno," *Ibid.* iii. 25, 26. "Qui fastidierunt legem neam cum adhuc erant habentes libertatem," *Ibid.* ix. 11. "Si nim Adam prior peccavit, et attulit mortem super omnes immaturam; ed etiam illi qui ex eo nati sunt, unusquisque ex eis præparavit nimæ suæ tormentum futurum: et iterum unusquisque ex eis legit sibi gloriam futuram. . . . Non est ergo Adam causa, vivi nimæ suæ tantum; nos vero unusquisque fuit animæ suæ Adam," *Apoc. Baruch*, liv. 15, 19.

[3] He says: "The doctrinal part of 4 Esdras may be said to e saturated with the dogma of original sin, which is wholly foreign o the theology alike of Rabbinic and Hellenistic Judaism," *op. cit.* . 80, n. "There can be no question that, despite its strong polemical endency against Christianity, the Fourth Book of Esdras (2 Esdras n our Apocrypha), written at the close of the first century of our ra, is deeply tinged with Christian doctrine, *Ibid.* p. 167, n. The Apocalypse of Baruch is very closely allied to 4 Esdras, although ossibly a little later in date."

and their bearing on the matter. Revelation is "God's own testimony and communication of Himself to the world for the realisation of the end implanted in the universe at its creation, and directed to the establishment of perfected communion of life of man with God."[1] The original communion of man with God was torn asunder by sin, but yet God in His grace and mercy "left not himself without witness," but showed Himself to man in the works of nature (including the historical guidance of mankind), and the testimony borne by each man's conscience, even in the heathen world, showing the law of nature written in their hearts and bearing witness to His everlasting power and divinity.[2] So they are meant to "seek God, if haply they might feel after him and find him,"[3] as, moreover, we know He was found by some. And when this took place, it was evidence of the pre-Christian working of grace, of that "Light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world."[4] But besides this general revelation, God's good purpose included also a special revelation of Himself, a "stooping to man in personal testimony to Himself, and objective presentation of Himself" in "actual communion of life established between Him and man."[5] This took the form first of a covenant with a chosen nation and the choice of a "remnant" from among that race, then the appearance of God in human flesh, and, finally, His gathering to Himself a Church from among all nations, which should be the covenanted sphere of Grace as well as "the pillar and ground of the Truth." So, though the *dictum* of St. John[6] that "the law was given by Moses; grace and truth came by Jesus Christ" is perfectly true, yet, as it must not be pressed so as to deny that the Old Testament revelation was "truth," so it must not be made to imply that "grace" was not given to any individual before the Incarnation! That its universality and its efficacy are dependent upon the Incarnation we cannot deny, but we dare not make the callings of God impossible of response by an arbitrary interpretation of this sentence. Grace was working, but as it were a sojourner in a strange land; the Church, on the other hand, is "the home of Grace."

[1] Oehler, *op. cit.* i. 22.
[2] Rom. ii. 14, 15; i. 20.
[3] Acts xvii. 27.
[4] St. John i. 9.
[5] Oehler, *op. cit.* i. 23.
[6] St. John i. 17.

CHAPTER III

THE TEACHING OF THE NEW TESTAMENT

THE old "covenant" was a covenant of law, but it had been preceded by a covenant of promise, which, however, the law "doth not disannul, so as to make the promise of none effect." [1] But beneath it all lay concealed the plan of grace, which was afterwards "manifested" (ἐπεφάνη) [2] in the life and work of Jesus Christ, and laid up for all the generations to come in His Mystical Body, through the operation of the Holy Spirit. What was before hidden, and, as it were, spasmodic in its action, is now openly revealed, and of universal application, or, as St. Augustine remarks, it was "latent in the Old Testament, but patent in the New." So we have next to trace the growth of the Christian idea of grace, as it is revealed to us in the teaching of our Lord Himself, of His greatest follower St. Paul, and of the other New Testament writers, that is, roughly, as recorded in the three groups of writings, the Gospels, the Pauline Epistles, with which for convenience sake and on account of its great similarity, we shall group the Epistle to the Hebrews (without at all begging the question as to its authorship), and the Catholic Epistles; we shall, however, treat the Acts of the Apostles as a book by itself, lying, as its position in the Canon implies, midway between the Gospels and the Pauline writings.

(1) *The Gospels*

(*a*) *The Synoptists.*—We may remark at the outset that the word χάρις does not occur at all in St. Matthew's or in St. Mark's Gospel, but is to be found several times in those of St. Luke and St. John, though it does not become

[1] Gal. iii. 16–22.
[2] Tit. ii. 11; iii. 4. Cf. Eph. ii. 7; iii. 5, 6; Col. i. 26.

prominent until we reach the Acts. Yet, however, there is much teaching that has to do, more or less, with the idea. But we will first point out the occurrence of the word χάρις and its cognates, before we go on to draw out the theology of grace in the Synoptic Gospels. It is first to be found in the angelic salutation to the Blessed Virgin Mary in St. Luke i. 30, in combination with the verb εὑρίσκειν, and forming a little word-play on the perfect participle of χαριτοῦν two verses before. Here its sense is the purely Hebraistic one of favour, and it is a literal translation of מָצָא חֵן and seems to point to a parallel rendering of κεχαριτωμένη (ver. 28), as "highly favoured" or "much graced," although the fact of its being the *perfect* participle implies an abiding state, *i.e.* "fully endowed with abiding grace." We must digress here to remark upon the meaning of the derived verb χαριτοῦν, which only occurs in one other place in the New Testament,[1] though the exact part of the verb occurs twice in the Apocrypha.[2] The termination -τοω in Greek signifies a strong factitive sense, and hence it means "to endow with grace." From it is derived the theological term "gratia gratum faciens, grace which makes one acceptable," or as Fr. Rickaby, S.J., has suggested, "Grace constituting a state of grace." [3]

We next find it used in St. Luke ii. 40, 52, in making mention of the childhood of our Lord, but it is most probable that in the former as in the latter of these two, the meaning is simply the general sense of "favour" rather than that of special endowment, though of course we are not to be understood to deny the absolute fact. Passing on to iv. 22, we find it used here in the sense of "attractiveness." Plummer renders it "winning words," [4] the Vulgate translates "in verbis gratiæ," Wycliffe, the Rhemish and the

[1] Eph. i. 6; see p. 64, *infra*.

[2] Ecclus. ix. 8, κεχαριτωμένης, "a beautiful woman," but Vg. reads "compta"; xviii. 17, κεχαριτωμένῳ, "a gracious man"; Vg. "cum homine justificato"; Wycliffe and Douay, "with a justified man." Symmachus also uses κεχαριτωμένου, where the LXX. has ἐκλεκτοῦ in Ps. xviii. 26. E.VV.="pure."

[3] *Of God and His creatures*, p. 321.

[4] *Commentary on St. Luke*, in loc. He says: "The very first meaning of χάρις (χαίρω) is 'comeliness,' 'winsomeness'—Hom. *Od.* viii. 175; Eccles. x. 12; Ps. xliv. 3; Ecclus. xxi. 16; xxxvii. 21; Col. iv. 6—and in all these passages it is the winsomeness of *language* that is specially signified."

Revised Version read "words of grace." Its use in vi. 32, 33, 34; xvii. 9, is for "gratitude, thanks"; ἐχαρίσατο in vii. 21, is "granting a boon," and in vers. 42, 43, is more closely defined as the boon of forgiveness of a debt. In vii. 47, χάριν appears as a mere quasi-preposition "in favour of"="because of."

But the greatest profit will be found in considering the light thrown on the subject by mere chance phrases (if we may reverently use the term of Holy Scripture), or by sentences in the course of some narrative or discourse. This is particularly noticeable in the parables of our Lord recorded by the Evangelists, and above all, in the "Parables of the Kingdom" of St. Matthew xiii. and parallel passages. In that of "the Sower,' for example, we find that, though the seed sown is the same in all cases, the ground differs, evidently teaching that the human element, represented by the soil, makes some difference to the ultimate result, even while we still confess that the life-principle is in the divine contribution, *i.e.* the seed, and that divine influence is at work all through, for it is "God that giveth the increase."[1] In the parable of "the Tares" we are taught that even in the Kingdom of Heaven there will be both bad and good, the workings of sin as well as the influence of grace, and that both must continue until the end, before the final judgment may be made. In "the Mustard-seed" we learn that the working of grace may be but small at first, but will increase until it comes to considerable dimensions, stretching its branches in all directions. The secrecy of the work of grace is to be noted in the parable of "the Leaven," while that of "the Net" plainly indicates that all who come into the Kingdom, *i.e.* under the influence of grace, do not necessarily profit by it, but may perchance even be cast away as bad.

The like lesson also is to be deduced from the case of the "Unmerciful Servant"[2] who had both asked for and received the grace of forgiveness, but, by misuse of it, afterwards lost it, and was finally unforgiven. In "the Labourers in the Vineyard"[3] we are taught that God may "do what He will with His own," that He is answerable to no man with respect to His distribution of His gifts of grace, but that what He has promised He will most surely

[1] 1 Cor. iii. 6, 7. [2] St. Matt. xviii. 23-35.
[3] St. Matt. xx. 1-16.

give. In "the Great Supper"[1] we see that election to privilege does not necessarily ensure final enjoyment of rewards, while "the Wedding Garment"[2] shows that, after the response of man to God's call, addressed as it has been to "all sorts and conditions of men," the ground of acceptance is not anything of the man's own, but the divinely provided garment of righteousness, which must have been, in some sense, appropriated by man. In the very similar, though distinct, parables of "the Talents"[3] and "the Pounds"[4] we find that the servants are entrusted by their own Master (not someone else!) with certain gifts of grace, but that the use made of them differs widely, even to the extent of disuse, though in this last case there was plenty of opportunity given for a due and proper use. In "the Lost Sheep"[5] we find that St. Matthew implies the possibility of the wanderer *not* being recovered, *i.e.* the gifts of grace previously given (for it *was* one of His flock!) having been misused and lost; and that in spite of the Saviour's seeking, which is part of "His Grace," the stray sheep may *not* be found, grace not being absolutely "irresistible." The "Barren Fig-Tree"[6] shows that an individual may be tended by the Divine Vine-dresser and receive the assistance of grace, and yet bring forth no fruit for several years, though we may be sure that God would not expect to find fruit unless He had given the grace necessary to produce it. "The Prodigal Son"[7] also was a son and received the father's gifts, even his portion of his father's inheritance, but spent it "in riotous living" in "the far country," so that he could be described by the father as "dead." On his return in repentance he is graciously met by his father and given a welcome which was wholly undeserved, and restored to his privileges as a son, although protesting his unworthiness of it. The privileges of grace, then, may be suspended, but restored again on repentance. In the story of "the Pharisee and the Publican" we see that a concomitant of justifying grace, or rather an inseparable accident of it, is humility and penitence, so that only he who thus humbles himself is "exalted" to the state of grace, although it is not

[1] St. Luke xiv. 16–24.
[2] St. Matt. xxii. 2–14.
[3] St. Matt. xxv. 14–30.
[4] St. Luke xix. 11–27.
[5] St. Matt. xviii. 12, 13; St. Luke xv. 4–7.
[6] St. Luke xiii. 6–9.
[7] St. Luke xv. 11–32.

ategorically stated that the proud Pharisee remained bsolutely unjustified. We may learn also from the imile of salt,[1] which is a type of grace, that it is possible or the preserving principle of grace to be itself lost ("the salt osing its savour"), so that it is unable to exert its influence ffectively.

There are also, in addition, a few other allusions in these Gospels which must not be passed by without notice. For example, from St. Matthew vii. 8, 11, and St. Luke i. 13, we learn the fact that grace is to be had for the sking by every one, and that it is perfectly free and uniersal, provided that it be but desired and asked for. In t. Luke i. 74, 75, we find it stated by Zacharias, prophesying nder the influence of the Holy Ghost, that the gift of God, promised of old to Abraham and given under the new ispensation, is twofold, viz. deliverance from spiritual nemies, and power "to serve Him in holiness and righteousess, all the days of our life," *i.e.* an inward, objective gift, orming a habit of virtue in the soul. We must, lastly, otice the fact that our Lord, as well as His Apostles—llowing, indeed, the example of the prophets—exhort en to "strive" "to bring forth fruits worthy of repentnce," "to keep His sayings." "to hear and do" them, "watch," and many such things,[2] as if the work of lvation were to be accomplished by strenuous effort on e part of man, clearly showing that, even if the *operation* e of God, yet there is need of man's *co-operation*. But en faith itself, the internal instrument of grace, is itself e gift of God, and both in its inception and its increase, due to Him.[3]

(*b*) *The Gospel according to St. John.*—In this Gospel e have, as is but natural from its theological character, uch teaching on this very important subject; in fact may fairly be said to be a presupposition of the Johannine aching. So much is this the case that it is put in the ery forefront of the whole Gospel, occupying a prominent osition in the Prologue. We have first the statement that e Word was "the true Light, which lighteth every man oming into the world,"[4] assuring us that, even before

[1] St. Matt. v. 13; St. Luke xiv. 34, 35.
[2] St. Luke xviii. 24; St. Matt. vii. 13, iii. 8, vii. 24, xxiv. 42; St. Mark xiii. 35; etc.
[3] St. Luke xvii. 5. Cf. Eph. i. 19; Phil. i. 29. [4] St. John i. 9.

the historic manifestation of "the Word made flesh," the pre-existent Logos was at work upon the souls of men by His grace. He was the Agent in the work of creation, but yet when He became Incarnate to redeem the world, He was not recognised by His own. But some used the inchoate grace given, and "received"[1] Him, and to them He "gave the right to become children of God." As Dr. Westcott says: "This lies in union with the Son, whereby those who receive Him are enabled to realise their divine fellowship. They are adopted that so they may become children actually. God gives, but man must use His gift, which faith appropriates."[2] And so the gift is attributed entirely to the Divine Power (ver. 13), and is made possible by the stupendous fact of the Incarnation, whereby God the Word "tabernacled amongst us, full of grace and truth." The general sense of the passage forbids our taking this phrase as expressing merely that He is "gracious and true";[3] it must obviously mean that He brought with Him to men the objective gifts of Absolute Truth of teaching, and perfect assistance of enabling Grace. He was Himself fully endowed with these powers and graces, and "out of (ἐκ) His fulness we all received, and grace for (ἀντὶ, over against) grace." Grace used is grace gained, and "to have realised and used one measure of grace was to have gained a larger measure in exchange for it"[4]; the "first grace" used well receives as its reward the "second grace," and "this is because God loves to reward His grace in us by further gifts of that grace."[5] So the New Covenant is superior to the Old in that it brings the reality of Truth, and not its mere image or shadow; and grace or help from the Love of God, not only the Law of His Justice. It not only shows man the way, but gives him help for the journey.

Proceeding to iv. 10, we find the word δωρεά used for the "gift" of God; comparing other instances of its use,[6] we cannot avoid the conclusion that it is used for definite gifts, and those only the highest and the best,[7] such as are comprehended in the most objective sense of the word χάρις.

[1] Cf. St. John xvii. 8.
[2] Westcott, *in loc.*
[3] *Vide* Sanday and Headlam, *op. cit.* p. 10, s.v. χάρις.
[4] Westcott, *in loc.*
[5] H. Browne, *The Thirty-nine Articles*, p. 330.
[6] *E.g.* Acts ii. 38; Rom. v. 15, 17; 2 Cor. ix. 15.
[7] Sanday and Headlam, *op. cit.* p. 140.

v. 40 [1] we have one of the many passages which ascribe man "that freedom of determination which makes him sponsible;" all that stands in the way of men's salvation their lack of will to embrace the means pointed out to em. In order that we may not overpress this power of e human will, we find, in the next passages we intend to nsider, the emphasis laid upon the power of God. In . 44, 65, we find it written that our Lord said, "No man n come to me, except the Father which hath sent me aw him" (or "except it were given him of my Father"). is cannot be a merely *external* call, as the Pelagians were ont to argue, for the Jews, His hearers, had heard that ll, in its most effective presentation by His own lips, but d not been drawn by it, because they had not been taught of God," had not "learned of the Father" (ver.), and lacked that *inward* drawing which enabled them respond to the outward call.

We pass on next to vii. 17, which shows us that the work divine grace is dependent to some extent upon a man's llingness to do the will of God; not his unaided ability, mark, but his willingness to be acted upon. The words vii. 38 teach us that the distinguishing gift of the Gospel ὁ πιστεύων εἰς ἐμέ) is that there shall be a definite essing which shall dwell in the heart to such an extent as overflow to others also. And the Evangelist parentheti- lly informs us that this gift was the grace of the Holy irit infused into the soul. In viii. 32–36 we discover e nature of true freedom—*Deo servire est libertas*.[2] The bitual committing of sin stamps the doer as a slave; ancipation is obtained only through fellowship with the n, Who alone is essentially free—that emancipation which usists in perfect conformity to the Absolute—to That ich *is*, That which abideth unchangeable for ever. We all return to this when we come to the differentiation of rmal and real freedom. We next come to a very ficult passage, namely x. 27–30, a passage which has en taken to give an unqualified support of the doctrine the indefectibility of grace, that those who have once eived grace can never finally lose it. It is certainly e that protection is promised to the faithful from both

[1] Cf. also St. Matt. xxiii. 37; St. John iii. 19.

[2] Cf. Second Collect at Morning Prayer in the English Prayer ok, "cui servire, regnare est," "whose service is perfect freedom."

inward dissolution and external violence, but it is to *the faithful* who follow, and *while* they follow. It does not render effort unnecessary, but rather inspires it; none can, it is true, "pluck them out of the Father's hand," but God has willed to make man himself a moral being, and He has thereby limited Himself; man, therefore, can withdraw *himself* from the benign influences of grace, can "pluck" himself "out of the Father's hand"; it is noteworthy that St. Paul, in the list in Romans viii. 38, 39, does not include sin, which alone *can* separate finally from the love of God.

We proceed next to the consideration of the parable of "the Vine," in xv. 1–8. This represents the Christian deriving his life from a living intimate union with Christ, as a branch draws its life from the vine. To such an extent is this so, that our Lord says, "Apart from me ye can do nothing.[1] If a man abide not in me, he is cast forth as a branch and is withered" (vers. 5, 6). He also says, "*If* ye abide in me," showing that it is conceivable and possible that some who have once been "in Christ" and partakers of His grace, may be cut off, "cast forth," and lose grace. And so He continually exhorts men, "Abide in me" (vers. 4, 9, etc.). Thus we see that the life (*i.e.* grace) has its source in Christ, but flows into His members, and must be by them assimilated and used, so as to "bring forth much fruit" (ver. 9) to the glory of God the Father.

Here we will leave the Gospels, though there is much more that might be said, and pass on to the next section of the New Testament.

(2) *The Acts of the Apostles*

As the Acts is, historically, a record of the transition from the story of Jesus Christ to that of St. Paul, so, in its use of the word and the doctrine of grace, it stands midway between the Gospels and the Pauline Epistles. The word χάρις becomes rather prominent here, though by no means approaching to the frequency of its iteration in, *e.g.* the Epistle to the Romans. In ii 28 we do not find the word used, but δωρεά which, as we have before pointed out,[2]

[1] "Of these He does not say: 'Without me you can do but little,' but: 'Without me you can do nothing.' Be it therefore little or much, it cannot be done without Him without Whom nothing can be done": St. Augustine's *Tract. in Jo.* 81, 3.

[2] *Vide supra*, p. 40.

fers to a definite gift bestowed, and usually the gift of ace. The word χάρις occurs in ii. 47, but in its Hebraistic nse of "favour." From iii. 19 we perceive that man is horted to do his part, in repentance and conversion, and response a gift of God is promised, even the remission of ns and "seasons of refreshing" from the Lord. In iv. 33 e read that "great grace" was upon all the disciples, nsequent upon their being "filled with the Holy Ghost" er. 31). We have here, then, a most distinct case of gratia gratum faciens," for we see the donation of the ace of the Holy Spirit, and the fact of acceptability is finitely recorded as a result. A similar case is that of . Stephen, who in vi. 5 is said to have been "a man full faith and of the Spirit," and in ver. 8 is called "full of ace and power," *i.e.* he had a certain beauty and strength character ensuing upon the reception of, and co-operation th, the gift of the Holy Spirit's grace. In vii. 51 we see e resistance given by man to grace, and yet it is worthy note that one, at least, of these "stiffnecked and un-cumcised in heart and ears," viz. Saul of Tarsus, was terwards conquered by grace and became the Apostle of ace. In viii. 21–23 we have the case of Simon Magus, who rtainly received the grace of baptism and of faith (ver. 13), t failed to use it aright, and "his heart was not right the sight of God," but he was "in the gall of bitterness d the bond of iniquity"; he was, however, still bidden to ay, and had sufficient grace to desire the prayers of the postles on his behalf.

"Grace" was a visible quality or virtue of character, as s plainly evident to St. Barnabas at Antioch in xi. 23. Luke here plays upon the word, in saying that it made m glad (ἐχάρη). In xiii. 43 "the grace of God" is distinctly garded as a state of salvation, very much in the style of er Church usage. And it is also of no small significance t the persons thus spoken of are unbaptised Jews and wish proselytes, who had been moved by the "præ-nient grace" of God, but had not yet, on their first asion of hearing the Gospel, attained to Baptism. "The rd of His grace" in xiv. 3, xx. 32, is a synonym for "the spel," the good tidings of salvation through Jesus Christ, d is so used as being the distinguishing characteristic of t good news.[1] It is thus fully expressed in xx. 24.

[1] Cf. St. John i. 17.

In St. Paul's speech at Iconium in xiv. 17, God is shown to give His gifts of nature (sometimes referred to as "natural grace")[1] unrecognised, and to distribute them impartially to both good and evil men. The exhortation to perseverance in grace, addressed to the Galatian Christians in xiv. 22, shows that man has his part in the later stages of the spiritual life; and effort on his part is continually necessary.[2] In xiv. 26, xv. 40, the Apostles are "recommended to the grace of God," *i.e.* committed to His favourable safe-keeping. The use of the word in xv. 11 is extremely ambiguous, for in expressing hope of salvation "through the grace of the Lord Jesus," it might mean simply "through His graciousness, His favour," or the more concrete use, "through His active gift of help to us"; the use of the name of Jesus, instead of the common name of God, points to the latter usage.

Of Lydia, in xvi. 14, we have an interesting and instructive account. When she first heard the preaching of SS. Paul and Silas, she was a "God-fearing woman," she had been therefore already under the influence of "preventing grace"; she heard, and "the Lord opened her heart, to give heed to the things spoken by Paul"; this is, then, the active work of "prævenient grace," preparing for the reception of further "assisting grace." And it was effective, for she was baptised and immediately began to perform good works, the evidences of grace. The workings of pre-Christian grace are well set out by St. Paul in his speech on Mars' Hill to the philosophers of Athens, in xvii. 24–28. He shows how God is the giver of all natural benefits, including their very being, but, further, has placed it within the power of all to find Him, "if with all their hearts they truly seek Him,"[3] being "not far from each one of them" (ver. 27), by the operations of His grace. Chap. xviii. 27 distinctly ascribes their first believing in the Gospel to the grace of God; man does not receive grace because he believes, but he believes because he has received grace. Finally, it occurs in xxiv. 27 to denote "a boon," "a favour," granted by the retiring governor, Felix, to the Jews, having here no religious significance whatever.

[1] *Vide supra*, p. 7.
[2] Cf. St. Matt. x. 22.
[3] Jer. xxix. 13.

(3) *The Pauline Epistles*

There is no doubt whatever that we have now arrived a most important stage of our inquiry, for more material r the formulation of the great doctrine we are now engaged studying has been furnished by the Pauline Epistles an by any other portion of Scripture. It is perfectly true at "on the language of St. Paul, as interpreted by St. ugustine, was built up the great mediæval system of ace."[1] From whence, then, came this great Pauline ctrine of Grace? Did it take its origin in him, or did he mself learn it? Without dispute, he greatly developed but from whence did he get the germinal idea? Our evious investigation will have shown us that "Christianity always presented as the renovation of what was old. The ea of Grace was not one of the new elements imported. . . The Church sprang from the Synagogue fully armed this regard."[2] In other words, St. Paul took over the eas of Grace contained in the current Rabbinic and ilonian theology, resting, as they did, upon the doctrines the Old Testament, and fashioned and developed them his own religious experience, stamped like a brand, as at was, upon his heart and mind. "His doctrine of stification, of Predestination, of Free-will and Divine race, were influenced by his early education."[3] Again, As a Pharisee, St. Paul had learnt, in accordance with e fundamental teaching of Pharisaism, to recognise both te and free-will, both Divine foreknowledge and human eedom, as equally true interpretations of human life, hile as a Christian, and as a result of his own experience, he alised to the full the truth of this. He felt that he had en chosen by God for His work, and that he owed nothing himself, but everything to God; but yet he was equally nvinced that for all his actions he was personally respon- ble, for all his evil deeds he was personally to be blamed, at he must fulfil that for which God had called him. . This is the ultimate and final account which religion d philosophy can give of human free-will. There are o truths, both necessary beliefs for human life and

[1] A. C. Headlam, *St. Paul and Christianity*, p. 138.
[2] *Church Quarterly Review, loc. cit.*, p. 77.
[3] Headlam, *op. cit.* p. 15.

apparently inconsistent with one another. If we look at human life from the point of view of God's omnipotence or scientific speculation, or any philosophy of the absolute, human free-will seems an impossibility. If we look at it from the point of view of human consciousness, of human experience, of our moral judgments, of the basis of human society, human free-will must be an axiom. Both points of view are true, and they cannot be reconciled, or, rather, they cannot be reconciled from the limited outlook of humanity." [1] Before we pass on, I should like to crave the reader's indulgence to quote yet one more extract from the same writer, even at the risk of plagiarism; he points out that "it is one sign of the inexhaustible character of St. Paul's thoughts and system that different commentators are able to construct quite different systems of theology out of his writings. One may make justification, another the life in Christ, the centre round which he groups everything. . . . One sees predestination, another free-will. Each of these is merely selecting one side of the teaching, and St. Paul contains them all." [2] We may add that it is the mark of the great mind or of the great system, that it is able to hold on to an unsolved antimomy, to an evident paradox. The small mind and the false system are always afraid of the accusation of self-contradiction, and must therefore explain everything logically, and with clear-cut definitions, often at the expense of truth; it is ashamed to say, "I cannot explain that." The great thinker, on the other hand, knows and recognises his limitations, and is content to believe much that seems paradoxical, because he is but finite. Judged by this criterion, St. Paul is a great man, and the Church system is a great one also. He is "a debtor both to the Greeks and to the barbarians," [3] and to the Jews as well; he is influenced by all, and learns from all.

Before plunging into the investigation we have a few more general remarks to make. One is as to the large space devoted to this doctrine in the writings of St. Paul, as compared with those of St. James, St. Peter, or even St. John. The "Jacobo-Petrine" theology is extremely simple, and purely objective in character, and is comparable to the Gospels of St. Matthew and St. Mark. St. John

[1] Headlam, *op. cit.* pp. 192–193. [2] *Ibid.* p. 196.
[3] Rom. i. 14.

nd St. Paul (and to some extent St. Luke, among the Evangelists) are more subjective and more dogmatic; heir writings are the result of reflection upon the Gospel arrative and teachings. But even they differ widely among hemselves, for St. John "rather presents the outlines of heology and *Christology;* St. Paul those of *anthropology* and oteriology; nevertheless, the writings of John are also of he highest importance for anthropology, and those of Paul or theology and Christology." [1] We may notice also, that he Johannine ideas were predominant in the Eastern Church, nd consequently in the first period of the history of the Church; the Pauline doctrines, on the contrary, had their upremacy in the more practical Western Church, and came orward under the influence of St. Augustine at a later eriod.

We must also remark that St. Paul's doctrine of Grace s "the free and unmerited gift of God, by which the ndividual can acquire sanctification if he will co-operate nd become a fellow-worker with Christ" [2] is intimately nd inseparably connected with his doctrine of the Church nd Sacraments. The Church is the Body of Christ, and Ie Himself is the Head. From the Divine Head flows he grace by which every member of the body is nourished, nd enabled to grow with a growth which is of a divine haracter. Normally, therefore, this grace is given through he Sacraments, the divinely ordained means of grace. But besides this *mediate* conveyance of divine grace, there s an *immediate* inflow of grace to the soul, which takes lace in unusual circumstances, on occasions which seem ood to God Himself; or, as we are accustomed to say, "God is not tied to the means of grace, but man *is* tied to heir use." [3] Our investigation is, nevertheless, of a general haracter, and although we cannot avoid treating to some xtent (nor should we desire to do so!) of the grace conveyed sually through the appointed means, yet we intend to pply ourselves to actual operations of God's Spirit on the earts of men, in the widest sense.

[1] K. R. Hagenbach, *History of Christian Doctrine*, § 18 (3).

[2] "Biblical Notes" in *The Church Times*, May 1913.

[3] "The Holy Spirit is not so tied to the external rite that He annot withhold His grace when it is not sincerely desired, or bestow t when the Sacrament cannot be received": H. B. Swete, *The Holy Spirit in the Ancient Church*, p. 396.

We will go on now, without further delay, to the detailed study of the Pauline teaching on Grace. Before proceeding to the study of the different groups, we will remark on the use of χάρις in the salutation at the beginning of all the Epistles. χάρις καὶ εἰρήνη is the Pauline formula in all, but with the addition of ἔλεος in 1 and 2 Timothy. Χάρις here means "the favour of God" and is a heightened and deepened form of the customary Greek greeting χαίρειν.

(*a*) 1 *and* 2 *Thessalonians*.—These Epistles treat chiefly of eschatology, and therefore the subject does not come very much to the front, though obviously assumed all through. After the opening salutation, St. Paul makes allusion to his readers' election, which was proved by the fact that the gospel came to them "not in word only, but also in power and in the Holy Ghost and in much assurance" (1 Thess. i. 5), so that their calling had been effectual, they had received grace and responded to it. So he could give thanks because "the word of God" (*i.e.* the word of His Grace) "worketh in you that believe" (ii. 13). Next, he prays that God and the Lord Jesus Christ may make them "to increase and abound in love" and "stablish your hearts unblameable in holiness" (iii. 12, 13), which, though the word is not used, is the same as to say "cause you to grow in grace." He reminds them in iv. 8 that God gives "His Holy Spirit unto" them, for their sanctification, and concludes the epistle by praying that the "grace of our Lord Jesus Christ" may be with them, *i.e.* not merely God's favour, but the actual working of the inward gift to accomplish their perfecting in holiness.

Passing on to the Second Epistle, we notice that he first gives thanks for the evidence of the work of grace in them, shown by their faith and love (i. 3), and their sufferings (vers. 5, 6), and attributes it to "the grace of our God and the Lord Jesus Christ" (ver. 12), praying that grace may have its full fruition in the glory, both of Jesus Christ and of themselves (*ibid.*). In ii. 13–15 he expresses confidence that God had "chosen them from the beginning, unto salvation," and called them by the gospel, with the ultimate purpose of glorification, and has given them this "hope through grace" (ver. 16), and he exhorts them to stand fast, while he at the same time prays God to stablish them (ver. 17); thus plainly, at this early period, showing the co-operation of God and man, or grace and free-will. He

bids them to "be not weary in well-doing" (iii. 17), and prays, as before, for the grace of inward holiness to be with them (ver. 18).

So we may mark in this earliest group of his writings, the presence of all the essential elements of the doctrine, its freedom and universality, its efficacy and its purpose, their election and calling, as well as their final end, and the need for their own activity as well as that of God.

(*b*) 1 *and* 2 *Corinthians, Galatians, Romans.*—It is in this group that we shall find the greater part of our material for this subject, and particularly in the last member of the group. Owing to the exigencies of the situation, it was about this time that St. Paul developed most fully his teaching on the matter; the judaising party in the churches of Galatia, and their slighter influence at Rome, the practical questions of the Church of Corinth, as well as his own intense religious experience, help to fashion the theology of this group. We will take them singly and examine their various positions.

(i) 1 *Corinthians.*—In i. 4 we find "the grace of God which was given" them as the enrichment of all outward utterance and of all inward knowledge; in other words, it is here regarded as the illumination of intellect, though not without some influence on the life also (ver. 8). In i. 18, 24, we see "the word of the cross" (or Christ Himself) described as "the power of God," as well as "the wisdom of God"; so we advance to the thought of moral strength added to intellectual enlightenment. In vers. 26–31 we find the freeness of God's calling emphasised; it was not only those gifted by nature who were called to grace, though of course they *were* called also, but on the whole it was the unlikely ones who were called and had responded to the call; but (and here is the point) their defects were made good by the riches of grace stored "in Christ Jesus, who was made unto us wisdom from God and righteousness and sanctification and redemption" (ver. 30). This thought is continued in ii. 1–5, where the writer attributes his success not to his natural gifts, but to the grace and power of the Spirit, the power of God. In ver. 14 we have the difference portrayed between the natural man (ψυχικός) and the spiritual (πνευματικός); the man whose being is controlled by the ψυχή (not the σάρξ), although a supremely intellectual man, endowed possibly with great worldly wisdom, is unable

to appreciate and understand the things of God; his mind and understanding are darkened as far as regards spiritual truth, and if he is to have any spiritual discernment it must be given him from above and præternaturally. In iii. 6–9 he postulates that the real credit for all in the work of salvation is God's; it is true that one may really plant, another may really water, but still they are "not anything," but God is all; yet in spite of this, the human workers are "God's fellow-workers" and shall receive their own reward according to their own labour; nevertheless, all has been "according to the grace of God given unto" them (ver. 10). The Corinthian Christians are reminded in iii. 16, 17, that they are a "temple of God and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in" them, and *ipso facto* makes them holy; grace, then, is a dweller in the heart, not merely an outward cloak, hiding beneath it a multitude of sins; it is internal, not external; imparted not merely imputed. But none may glory on account of righteousness, grace and holiness received, for "what hast thou that thou didst not receive?" (iv. 7), and there is no room left for boasting, since we are nothing of ourselves.[1] That baptism is a means of the reception of justification and the beginning of the use of sanctifiying grace is evident from vi. 11, where all this is ascribed to the particular occasion (aorists) when they "put on Christ" in baptism.

It strikes us as paradoxical to see the stress laid in vii. 19 on "keeping the comandments of God," and some have, in their mistaken zeal, practically excised this passage, as un-Pauline and un-Christian. But its apparent harshness is somewhat modified by the consideration of the parallel passage,[2] where the equivalent phrase is "a new creation." We see that in one case we have the resultant state, and in the other the resultant conduct, following the effective reception of grace; he who has responded to grace will become "a new creation," and will naturally keep the commandments of God.

A very difficult passage is ix. 16, 17. St. Paul is referring to a work laid upon him which is not laid upon all, but he considers that this work of "preaching the Gospel" is, to him at least, a "necessity," and if he does it not, he is liable to punishment; if he does it, but unwillingly, he

[1] Cf. 2 Cor. iii. 5; St. John xv. 5.
[2] Gal. vi. 15.

merely executes his office, he fulfils the stewardship given to him; if, however, he does it willingly and cheerfully, he will receive a reward from God at the last. And he has to take care that what he preaches, he likewise practises, for no man is so certain of final perseverance as to neglect to use discipline and make painful effort, so as to be approved (δόκιμος) at the last (ix. 27). Even up to the last moment of our probation, grace *may* be lost by any one. And so it is necessary above all things to be watchful, for he "that thinketh he standeth" must always "take heed lest he fall" (x. 12). And no hint whatever is given that he is mistaken in thinking he stands, for, indeed, the Epistle is written to those who are "called," "saints," "God's husbandry," "God's building," "the temple of God," etc.,[1] and are assumed to have received grace. They will be tempted, he knows, but God always gives grace ("a way of escape") to bear it. In chapter xii. he discusses the subject of χαρίσματα. Χάρισμα is the substantive formed from χαρίζεσθαι, with the concrete passive termination -μα. It is a word peculiar to St. Paul, in the New Testament, with the one exception of 1 Peter iv. 10. It is defined by Dr. Wilhelm[2] as "any good gift that flows from God's benevolent love (χάρις) unto man, any Divine grace or favour, ranging from redemption and life eternal to comfort in communing with brethren in the Faith (Rom. v. 15, 16; vi. 23; xi. 29). The term has, however, a narrower meaning: the spiritual graces and qualifications granted to every Christian to perform his task in the Church (1 Cor. vii. 7, etc.). Lastly, in its narrowest sense, 'charisma' is the theological term for denoting extraordinary graces given to individual Christians for the good of others ('gratiæ gratis datæ'); see 1 Cor. xii. 8, 10, also 'apostles, prophets, teachers,' etc., etc., in ver. 28." A χάρισμα is therefore a definite power, virtue, faculty or talent committed to us. In 2 Cor. i. 11; 1 Peter iv. 10, it is used of an external gift or faculty, but elsewhere, as in this passage, an internal gift of grace, especially some extraordinary power Archdeacon Norris[3] points out that "grace" often has this meaning in the Prayer Book, *e.g.* in the prayer for the Royal

[1] Rom. i. 1, iii. 9, 16, 17.
[2] In *The Catholic Encyclopædia*, s.v. "Charismata."
[3] *Rudiments of Theology*, p. 122. He is, however, undoubtedly in error in confining the meaning of χάρις to "favour" in general.

Family, or for the clergy and people in Mattins and Evensong, or in the prayer for the Church in the Liturgy. These gifts, we see, are different in different individuals,[1] but all have this character in common, that they are "gifts freely given" by God. In this passage we may also note in ver. 3 that St. Paul lays down the need of the grace of God to confess the fact that "Jesus is Lord," *i.e.* the necessity of "preventing grace" for the exercise of faith. In ver. 3 he declares that "no man can say that Jesus is Lord, but by the Holy Ghost," *i.e.* by grace.

Proceeding to xv. 10, we remark that the Apostle attributes his conversion and all his spiritual advance and apostolic labours to the grace of God working in him, but yet acknowledges that he might have rendered that grace vain, he might have resisted grace, for it was not irresistible.

(ii) 2 *Corinthians*.—In i. 11, as we have already noticed above, χάρισμα refers to some external gift, viz. deliverance from danger and suffering; it thus approaches very nearly the more general sense of χάρις as "a favour." In the following verse, χάρις is used for the state of life, for the "supernatural sphere" in contrast to the "fleshly wisdom" in the sphere of nature.

In iii. 5 we have St. Paul's most unqualified statement of the weakness of human nature, and its entire dependence upon grace, man's natural incapacity for good and need of the succour of grace; it is his version of St. John xv. 5 *in fin.*[2] And St. Paul includes in this statement, of course, not only the unregenerate natural man, but also himself and all Christians *if considered apart from grace!* In the same passage (vers. 3–6) the contrast is pointed out between the commands of the law written "in tables of stone" and the laws of grace written "in tables that are hearts of flesh," the former laying down the absolute command, but giving no assistance towards its fulfilment, but rather condemning those who fail to do so ("the letter killeth," ver. 6); the latter giving the aid to fulfil the law by the imparting of a principle of life ("the spirit giveth life," ver. 6). We shall refer again to this in considering St. Augustine's treatise bearing that title.[3]

It is in this sense also that it is stated in ver. 17 that "where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty"; namely,

[1] 1 Cor. vii. 7. [2] *Vide also* Philo, p. 32, *supra*.
[3] *De Spiritu et littera.*

that the principle of spiritual life within, "working by love," gives liberty to obey the law and provides an effectual safeguard against the transgression of it. In ver. 5 he points out the goal of grace—glory, and also what it is—the earnest of the Spirit; it is the very indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the heart, and present grace is the pledge of future grace, if that already received be but utilised. The difference between the natural man and the man who has been raised into the supernatural order by grace is described in vers. 17–18 as a new creation, so vast is the change; all the old objects, old modes of life, old habits, etc., are passed away (in effect, if not always in actual fact) and new aims, new modes of thought, new desires have taken their place. And the energising power of it is God; He has caused it all to take place by "reconciling us to Himself through Christ," if we, on our part, but show ourselves ready to be reconciled.

In vi. 1 the Apostle "intreats" that they "receive not the grace of God in vain," but without throwing any shadow of a doubt on the fact that they *had* received grace. In ver. 16 he quotes the Old Testament,[1] but with a significant alteration, showing the vast difference between the Old Covenant and the New. The utmost the Old could promise was that God should tabernacle *among* His people; the distinguishing characteristic of the New is that He dwells *in* them!

In ch. viii. we find χάρις used no less than six times (vers. 1, 4, 6, 7, 9, 19) in connection with the matter of the collection for the poor saints at Jerusalem, and the play upon the varying meanings of the word is very subtle. In ver. 1 his main idea is the source of their liberality—it is due to the working of the grace of God *in* the churches of Macedonia; in vers. 4, 6, 7, the meaning is probably determined by the word κοινωνία, the καί being epexegetic; they desired an opportunity of a share in showing the grace of Christian charity. In ver. 9 the word seems to refer to the "condescending favour" of our Lord, evidenced by His Incarnation (cf. Phil. ii. 6–8), while in ver. 19 it seems to be used almost as a synonym of "good work."

St. Paul very nearly approaches the sense of "acceptable-

[1] Lev. xxvi. 12 (LXX.), with perhaps some recollection of Ezek. xxxvii. 27, and the substitution of ἐνοικήσω for ἔσται ἡ κατασκήνωσίς μου. See Plummer *in loc.*

ness" in ix. 8; he starts with the fact that God is able to make all the riches of His Divine assistance abound to them, in order that with this wealth of power at their disposal they may produce acceptableness of character and all good works as the result thereof. This moral beauty, producing such good works is observable by all, and referred back by them to its source—"the grace of God in you" (ver. 14). And so the Apostle breaks off with "Thanks be to God" (χάρις τῷ Θεῷ), using the very word in the sense of "gratitude" for "His indescribable boon" (δωρεᾷ).

We come next to xii. 9, where we find it used in the active sense of divine power, supplied to give assistance in some definite work, in this case to overcome some physical weakness—"the thorn in the flesh," *i.e.* "actual" grace, in ecclesiastical terminology; it is, we note further, vouchsafed in answer to prayer, though not itself the thing prayed for.

(iii) *Galatians.*—In the expansion of the opening salutation of this Epistle, grace is attributed to God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ as its source, and deliverance from "this present evil world, according to the will of God" as its aim and object. They are all assumed to have been made partakers of this grace, but some of them to have very quickly lost it (i. 6). Then, recounting his own experience, St. Paul feels certain that he was chosen and called from the very beginning, even before his birth, for his Apostleship, by God's grace (ver. 15). And this was proved by his work and life, so that the Apostles at Jerusalem, in spite of their initial hesitation, were convinced of it (ii. 9), and treated him as their equal, dividing the work of evangelisation with him. He then proceeds to develop the subject which drew this letter from him—justification by faith, apart from the works of the law, *i.e.* by the grace of Christ and not by any human effort, however successful. That this justification is not a mere imputation is certain from his insistence in ver. 20 on the fact that it is a *life*, lived in faith; a life lived unto God; a life, not his own, but of Christ living in him. And it is through faith that we receive the gift of the Spirit (iii. 14).

In ver. 18 we come across a use of χαρίζεσθαι which forms an exception to its accustomed usage in the New Testament; as a rule it seems to have lost altogether the primary sense of χάρις as "beauty" or "pleasure," and to have become

equivalent to merely "giving"; but here it seems to imply (as Grimm points out in his Lexicon) that God had a favourable regard towards Abraham, and made him to be morally worthy and acceptable in some sense to Himself. But yet the inheritance was not due to him as a right, but freely, the promise of God. The law was a temporary measure, intended to show the need of help and prepare the way for it. If the law could have given life, then righteousness might have been attained through it, but the law was deficient in this, for it could not give union with God; that could only be obtained through Christ, Who became Incarnate for that purpose (iv. 4), and by His Holy Spirit, Who is sent into our hearts, making us sons and heirs of God and maintaining (by prayer) the life of grace. And this life consists in "knowing God, or rather being known of God" (iv. 9), for the first move comes from God, Who has effectually known and called them, whereas their knowing Him is imperfect and must grow more perfect as they live the spiritual life. This life is a "forming of Christ in them" (ver. 19), which is a gradual process, not completed at once; beginning, it is true, with their "putting on Christ" in baptism (iii. 27), but to be continued by "faith working through love" (v. 6). And so the Church is the faithful remnant which inherits the promises made to Abraham and fulfilled in Christ.

In v. 4 we are again reminded of the dread possibility of "falling from grace," which has been accomplished in some of the Galatians by their return to Jewish legal righteousness. In contrast with this is the Christian righteousness which is accomplished by "faith working through love." Although the participle is here really middle and not passive, as Tertullian supposed,[1] yet the expression "fides formata per caritatem" is the expression of a certain truth, as we shall see in a later chapter.

This justification by faith, however, is not to be a cloke for Antinomianism; the Christian is freed from the yoke of the law, but his liberty is not to degenerate into license; he is to fulfil the law none the less surely, by the grace given to him, as his Master "came not to destroy the law, but to fulfil it." The readers are therefore to "walk by the Spirit," be "led by the Spirit," "live by the Spirit," bring

[1] Lightfoot, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, *in loc.*

forth "the fruit of the Spirit," and all will be secured (v. 16, 18, 22, 25). In vi. 15 the truth laid down in 1 Cor. vii. 19 is reiterated and the magnitude of the change from law to grace is revealed as being nothing less than an entire and radical alteration of the whole hierarchy of man's being, of his spiritual "economy."

The antinomy in this Epistle is between grace (faith) and the works of the Jewish law, *Christian* works being regarded as the necessary concomitants of grace, the fruits of faith.

(iv) *Romans.*—In this Epistle we have the deliberate working-out of the arguments which, in the Epistle to the Galatians, had come forth red-hot under the stress of controversy. This is, therefore, the Epistle *par excellence* for our purpose. In the very forefront St. Paul attributes all grace to God *through* the Lord Jesus Christ (i. 5, 7), both the grace common to all Christians and which makes them to be Christians ("*gratia gratum faciens*"), and also the grace of Apostleship, not given to every Christian, and not given to any man for his own advantage, but for that of others ("*gratia gratis data*").[1] The First Cause of Grace, as of all else, is God the Father, for it has its source, its "moving cause" in His Mercy; but the Meritorious Cause is our Lord Jesus Christ, and in particular His Incarnation and Atonement. But, as we see from other passages in St. Paul,[2] He works always through His Spirit Who is the Efficient Cause.

In i. 18–32 we have St. Paul's ideas as to the fact of what we may call "præter-Christian" grace, by which we mean, not grace given apart from Christ, which were inconceivable, but grace given apart from the Christian religion or its divinely revealed ancestor, the Jewish religion. He distinctly states that a sufficient revelation *had* been granted to the heathen (vers. 19–21), but though they knew God (and this must have been by His grace, unless we practically concede the whole Pelagian position!) they would not use their knowledge to His glory, but "refused to retain God in further knowledge" (ver. 28), and so God "gave them up," *i.e.* by a judicial surrender He withdrew or suspended this supernatural influence of grace.[3]

[1] For the distinction see Pohle-Preuss, *op. cit.* pp. 12–14.
[2] *E.g.* 1 Cor. xii. 3–13.
[3] *Vide* Sanday and Headlam, *loc. cit.* p. 50.

But although the general condition of the heathen world was so, there were some Gentiles who did "by nature the things of the law" (ii. 14), who thereby "shew the work of the law written in their hearts," and so give evidence that they have received and used in some measure that preventing grace of God which is usually referred to as "præter-natural" (as distinguished from "supernatural") or "medicinal" grace.[1]

St. Paul further proceeds to say that the "natural" uncircumcision may show evidence of grace, while the natural circumcision may have rejected it, not being a circumcision of the heart (vers. 26–29); the sphere of the workings of grace is within, though its influence will radiate outwards; but the outward may not spread inwards, and the exterior only profits, so far as it is a true index of the interior. Even Bishop Harold Browne [2] allows that "here the Apostle seems to speak as if the heathen, who had not the revealed knowledge of God's will, yet might so do His will as to be acceptable with Him. . . . It is possible that there may have been an imperfect faith, even 'in times of ignorance which God winked at.' We know not, but that they, who touched but the hem of Christ's garment, may have found virtue go out of it."

In the next chapter (iii.) the Apostle announces the doctrine that justification is "freely by His grace" (ver. 24), it is the free, spontaneous outflowing of divine compassion; nay, further, it is the divine help granted to sinful man, so that he may, at the end of the process,

[1] *Vide* Carr, *A Lamp of the Word*, xli. note, and Forbes, *Art. XIII.*, who points out that the acts of unjustified man may be divided into four classes: (1) Those done neither by the "grace of Christ" nor "the inspiration of His Spirit," such as good works of the heathen, done merely from custom or public opinion: of these the words of the Article are literally true. (2) The *splendida vitia* of the heathen done from simple self-respect or pride: these, though valueless to God, were nevertheless rewarded with temporal blessings (see St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, v. 15). (3) Acts performed by the grace of Christ "Who lighteth every man, coming into the world," acts done from a sense of duty or conscience: upon these we cannot pass any judgment; and (4) acts such as those of Cornelius, living up to his light and drawing down blessings from God: these cannot be said to be "of the nature of sin" and are therefore in some way acceptable to God, as done by His grace, though "before Justification." Cf. also Hastings' *Bible Dictionary*, s.v. "Justification."

[2] *The Thirty-nine Articles*, p. 328.

become just, and not only be declared just *in potentia* at the beginning. For the truth seems to be that justification is both *imputed* and *imparted* (or infused), *i.e.* that it springs from God's graciousness towards us, and is also a conveyance of His Grace to us, so that He is verily at the same time "Himself just and the justifier of him that hath faith in Jesus" (iii. 26). But on both counts glorying "is excluded," for it is "apart from the works of the law" that a man is justified, though not apart from works proceeding from faith and love.

In chapter iv. the case of Abraham is adduced in proof of this doctrine; he was justified because he believed God; his faith was put down to his account instead of actual righteousness performed; one quality was reckoned for another; but this very fact proves that he was not a workman receiving wages, but a suppliant receiving a gift; it was of grace or free favour, and not merited by him (vers. 3–5). And this faith on his part implies a free favour on God's, for the one is the complement of the other [1] (ver. 16). But this beginning of grace only ushers us into a "state of grace" wherein we are to stand (v. 2); it is, in the words quoted above, "grace constituting a state of grace"; the perfect righteousness of Christ at first imputed to us, is gradually *imparted* to us and appropriated by us, so that it becomes our own; imperfect, it is true, yet nevertheless real and *our own;* and daily increasing as "the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts through the Holy Ghost which is given unto us" (ver. 5).

We next come to the critical passage on Original Sin in this Epistle, viz. v. 12–21. The Apostle lays it down that the sin of Adam has affected his descendants, and that, not only by setting a bad example, but also by the transmission of a sinful nature. Adam was the head of the race; he sinned and thereby brought death into the world, which evil results "made their way to each individual member of the race" (διῆλθεν).[2] And, indeed, even when there was

[1] *Vide* Sanday and Headlam, *Romans*, p. 110; also Newman, *Lectures on Justification*, p. 150. "Why is faith more acceptable than unbelief? . . . faith is acceptable as having a something in it, which unbelief has not; that something, what is it? It must be God's grace, if God's grace act *in* the soul, and not merely externally as in the way of providence."

[2] καθάπερ τις κλῆρος πατρὸς διαβὰς ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐγγόνους (Euthymius-Zigabenus; see Sanday and Headlam, *in loc.*).

no law yet given, apart from the primitive revelation, yet sin was present, though not imputed, owing to the absence of a definite law. Nevertheless they sinned and they died; and this proves that there must be "something deeper at work;" this could only be the effect of Adam's sin transmitted or imparted to his descendants. The Apostle effectually excludes the possibility of a Pelagian sense being given to this passage by the argument in ver. 14, for he says that infants, idiots, and others who "had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression" yet had in some sense come under the dominion of sin and death, because they inherited his nature. And as the taint spread from the one to all his descendants by nature, so also the free favour of God, and the actual definite gift (δωρεά) given by the loving-kindness of Jesus Christ spreads to all His spiritual descendants, who are, as the Apostle explains (vi. 3, 4), all who have been "baptised into Christ Jesus." "The abundance of grace and of the gift of righteousness" (ver. 17) is greater and more powerful than the original taint of nature, even with the added defilement of actual sins, for "where sin abounded, grace did abound more exceedingly" (ver. 20), so that in the heart and will in which formerly sin was the master, grace might now be lord through the gift of an inherent righteousness which fits its possessor for the life of glory through Jesus Christ (ver. 21). Inherent righteousness, we say, the habit of righteousness infused into the soul, for only thus can grace be said to "reign" in the soul. So although we freely admit, with Newman [1] and many others, that δικαιόω generally (not quite always) in Scripture is to be interpreted as "declaring just" and not as "making just," yet we also demand that no man put asunder what God hath join together, but confess that if justification be argued with Bellarmine [2] to be *infused* because Adam's sin was infused into his posterity, yet, with Barrow [3] and many others, it is shown in Rom. v. 18 that God does not by His condemnation infuse any inherent unrighteousness into man, nor does He, by His Justification, infuse into him an inherent righteousness; both, we say, may be true, and that righteousness which at first was *imputed*, in the process of

[1] *Lectures on Justification.*
[2] *De Justificatione*, lib. ii. c. 3.
[3] *Works*, vol. ii. Sermon v.

salvation, becomes afterwards inherent in the soul. For the initial reception of grace, morally binds (and enables) the recipient to avoid sin (vi. 1, 2). and "grow in grace," in charity and all good works and thus "perfect holiness." [1]

Thus we advance to the consideration of the gradual subjection of all the members (of soul as well as of body) to God for the working of righteousness, and that by a more effective principle than the strict law, namely, the liberty of grace which is the bond-service of righteousness, though freedom from the bonds of sin (ver. 18). And the fruit of this is sanctification, by a willing service of God, and the ultimate result eternal life (ver. 22). But yet (and here we may see the comprehensiveness of St. Paul's theology) in spite of (or shall we say, "because of"?) man's share in it, this eternal life is described in the very next verse as "the free gift" (χάρισμα) of God, as contrasted with "the wages of sin" earned by the sinner!

In the next chapter (vii.) we find a passage which St. Augustine and other great writers on Grace were continually quoting, either whole or in part, viz. vers. 14–25, a wonderful psychological study. Man is a battleground of opposing armies; on the one hand the forces of sin ("the sinful passions," ver. 5), on the other the Spirit of God. And yet he is not entirely passive, but has to take part in the conflict, on one side or the other, or at one period on both! He forms a good desire (θέλω), but does not carry it into effect; again, he hates a certain course, but yet does it; nevertheless he cannot say "*I* did it," for *I* did not really consent to it; it was "the indwelling Sin" which took possession of my lower self and caused that to be done by that "flesh" which I did not really desire to do. In other words, I am "a kingdom divided against itself." My higher self approves of and even delights in what is right, but my lower nature is in rebellion and leagued with the powers of evil, and to such an extent that my better self cannot overcome it, but is in practical subjection to it. But God has delivered me from this servitude and restored my higher self to its rightful position of freedom and dominion, through His Grace in Jesus Christ; I am now made "free from the law of sin and death" (viii. 2) by the Spirit of life. Having been made free "by the Son," we

[1] See further, on this subject, Appendix A, p. 287.

are "free indeed,"[1] we are even now enjoying a foretaste of "the liberty of the glory of the children of God" (viii. 21); this is, again, through the habit of virtue which is being formed *in* us.

And so St. Paul draws a hard-and-fast line between the two classes of people, "they that are after the flesh"—those ruled by sin, and "they that are after the spirit"—those ruled by grace; they are distinguished by the general bent of their whole φρήν, *i.e.* the affections, the reason and the will, all considered together,[2] which complex action is entitled the φρόνημα and is therefore either the φρόνημα τῆς σαρκός or the φρόνημα τοῦ πνεύματος, according as it is dominated by "the flesh" or "the spirit."[3] "The mind of the flesh" is entirely hostile to God and cannot be anything else, since it sets up its own lusts and desires as "another god beside" the true God. And on this account, they who are "after the spirit" have continually to "mortify the deeds of the body" (ver. 13) for, even in those whose φρήν is on the side of "the spirit," "the flesh" is still present with its lusts, which though "crucified" (Gal. v. 24) are not yet dead, "even in them that are regenerate" (Art. IX.). We are still weak, though free, so there is need now of "co-operating grace" to assist us, to work in us, "the Spirit helping our infirmity" (viii. 26), while we "groan, waiting for our adoption, to wit, the redemption of our body" (ver. 23), when the body, as well as the soul, shall be wholly free from sin's domination and wholly subject to grace, which will then receive its natural fruition—glory; a blessed consummation in which the whole of creation shall share, as now in some mysterious manner it seems to share in the results of man's sin (vers. 19–23).

Then the point of view changes, and in vers. 28–30 we look at the process of the salvation of the individual from God's standpoint. The first link in the chain is God's eternal purpose, which governs all and works, as ix. 11 informs us, "on the principle of selection."[4] The next

[1] St. John viii. 36.

[2] Cf. St. Matt. xvi. 23; Rom. xii. 16.

[3] The human spirit originally, though the idea passes almost imperceptibly into the sense of the Divine Spirit.

[4] *Vide* note in Sanday and Headlam on ix. 11. That the πρόθεσις in viii. 28 is the purpose of God and not of men, see Sanday and Headlam, *in loc.*

step is His foreknowledge of them, which seems to be, not a knowledge of foreseen merit, but what is known as "nuda præscientia," the "fixing of regard upon" an object previous to selection for some special purpose; these He "fore-ordained to be conformed to the image of His Son," this is the definite fixing of the "calling" which is the next step, but still not irrevocable (see xi. 20, 21); those responding to the call (the κλητοί) He justifies (which here certainly includes sanctification, or the process of grace) and finally glorifies. These are all pictured as a series of steps following upon one another in time as well as in order of thought; but we must remember that to God they are all part of the eternal "now," and reckoned as complete and finished in the counsels of God, and that the works of His grace are known as surely as those of nature.

In the next pair of chapters (ix., x.), we have the antinomy stated in its baldest form. Chapter ix. seems to ignore human free-will, and regard all men as formed for either destruction or glory, though we may note, in passing, that while the one class is described as "those whom He afore prepared unto glory," the other is said to be "fitted unto destruction," not "whom He prepared unto destruction," nor, on the other hand, "who fitted themselves unto destruction." [1] Chapter x., nevertheless, seems to regard the choice as resting in man's own power of will, and the Jews who have rejected the Gospel are themselves to blame for it, for they were quite free to have done otherwise. How does St. Paul reconcile the two statements? As we pointed out above,[2] he does not do so; he asserts both the goodness and severity of God (xi. 22), and leaves it there. He says that the criterion of judgment will eventually be a man's whole life and career (ii. 5–9), and also that all "stand by faith" (xi. 20), being cut off by unbelief. But God's ways are past tracing out and His judgments unsearchable, in the last resort, and finite man cannot comprehend the Infinity of God; and, in any case, God is the First Giver, not man.

In the next chapter, he again lays down the need of a transformation, a radical change of the mind, not a mere outward conformation to a fashion; the mind must be

[1] In vers. 15, 16, he declares that all good resolves come from above.

[2] *Vide* p. 46.

renewed, and thus the intellect as well as the will shall be altered, so that it shall be true and exact in judging on spiritual and moral questions, and in all things follow the right.

He next proceeds to contrast the universality of grace and the disparity of graces. These graces (χαρίσματα) differ, yet each member of the Body has his own particular function, and grace given to him to carry it out (cf. xv. 15). Some gifts may be more brilliant, more showy, or more popular than others, but no man on that account is to think highly of himself, but to think soberly, because it is all according to God's good pleasure.

The passage xiv. 23 has often been adduced as bearing on this matter, even by St. Augustine,[1] but wrongly so; for St. Chrysostom and others point out that it refers only to the subject he then had under consideration, and not to works done before justification, the works of the heathen, etc. "Faith" is here practically equivalent to "a good conscience."

Before leaving this group, we may remind ourselves of one or two important points, relevant to our subject, but to which we have not given their due consideration. First, we remark that St. Paul transfers the privileges of "the Remnant of Jacob" to the Christian Church, mainly Gentile though it be [2]; and maintains, moreover, that this was the original meaning of the promise. And so the stock of the olive, into which the Gentiles were grafted, but from which the unbelieving Jews were cut off, seems to be sometimes the Faithful Remnant, though sometimes also the Person of Christ, Who was the true "seed of Abraham." All therefore who are His true members, are *ipso facto* engrafted into the stock of Abraham, into the Remnant to whom the promises were made.[3] For Christ is the Second Adam (and here we pass to another outstanding feature of Pauline thought), the new beginning of a new race, though from another point of view a true continuation of the old. Through our descent from the First Adam we received at our birth the heritage of sin and death; to remedy this we must receive grace and life from the Second Adam at our re-birth in Baptism, when we were made members of

[1] In *Contra Julianum*, iv. 32.
[2] *Vide* particularly Gal. iii.; Rom. xi.
[3] See Sanday and Headlam, p. 316 ff.; Oehler, *op. cit.* ii. p. 381.

Christ, offspring of the Second Adam, and branches of the good olive, and received the beginnings of grace. And so the Apostle assumes that all who had been baptised had received grace, and are in a state of grace, from which, however, it is possible for them to fall, even into gross sins, and thus may be cast off for ever. When this is the case, it is because they have sinned *against* grace, not because grace has been withheld from them; in the words of Archbishop Sumner,[1] "These corruptions (*i.e.* in the Corinthian Church) are nowhere attributed to the denial of grace, but always to the abuse or neglect of it." We must now pass on to the third group of the Pauline Epistles—the Epistles of the Captivity.

(*c*) *Ephesians, Colossians, Philemon, Philippians.*—The subject of grace is not so prominent in this group as in the previous one —the controversy is past, the din of battle has ceased for a time. Where it does appear, it is in a different form, chiefly under the simile of the Body, the germ of which has, however, come before us already, though not so exactly worked out into detail.

(i) *Ephesians.*—In i. 4 we find that Christians are chosen for grace and holiness "before the foundation of the world" and "fore-ordained unto adoption" according to the good pleasure of God's will, not because of any foreseen merit but quite freely by His free favour, though this favour is not merely "goodwill" but some active endowment, for the Apostle proceeds, "wherewith He endued us (ἐχαρίτωσεν) in the Beloved" (ver. 6). The Authorised Version translates "made us accepted," and the Revised Version "freely bestowed," but the latter certainly cannot be right, and the former only with a reservation, for, as we showed above,[2] χαριτοῦν is a factitive verb, and must signify "endowing with spiritual beauty or acceptableness"; we have then a paronomasia on the preceding χάριτος. The meritorious cause is then set forth—the Atonement of Christ and the Redemption worked out thereby, which consists of the forgiveness of our trespasses (ver. 7), and the "obtaining of an inheritance" by us (ver. 11), and the final result, viz. "the praise of His glory" (ver. 12); all of which proceeds from His grace. But all is fore-ordained and He works all "after the counsel of His will" (ver. 11).

[1] *Apostolical Preaching*, p. 152.

[2] See p. 36.

In ii. 3 it is stated, quite absolutely, that Christians were previously "children of wrath," *i.e.* deserving punishment, "even as the rest" who still are so, only God in His love and mercy saved us by His undeserved favour, by giving us, without any previous effort or deserving on our part, faith (ver. 8) and life (ver. 5), as well as potential glory (ver. 7). But if we are saved without previous effort, there must be succeeding effort, for we are "created in Christ Jesus for good works" (ver. 10), and this is the very purpose of our predestination, viz. "that we should walk in them," and if we do them not, we frustrate His purpose quite as much as if we failed to respond to His original free calling. If we are "a new creation," it is in order that we may fulfil the purpose of our existence.

Those who were separate from Christ, and "alienated from" the true Israel, *i.e.* from the Faithful Remnant, and estranged from the promise contained in the covenants, were without hope of salvation and had no knowledge of God; but God in His Grace has "made them nigh in the blood of Christ" (vers. 12, 13), and given them peace, by the new creation (vers. 15, 17), and communion with God through grace (ver. 18).

In iii. 2, 7, 8, he speaks of "the grace given to him" in one place calling it a gift (δωρεά), in another a stewardship (οἰκονομία), both alike speaking of a source external to himself, the former emphasising the ability wherewith he himself is endued for this work, the latter showing the ultimate purpose of the grace to be the good of others, its transmission to the flock committed to him.

In iv. 1–3 he reminds them that their calling is not irrevocable, but needs diligence to "walk worthy of" it. They are one body, but have differing graces according to the measure of the gift (δωρεά) of Christ, Who on His exaltation received and gave (cf. Ps. lxviii. 18, and ver. 8 here) gifts for and to men. And these are distributed according to the will of the Spirit (cf. 1 Cor. xii. 11), to perfect the saints, and build up the body of Christ, by the harmonious working of every part, according as that joint has received its supply (ver. 16).

Therefore Christians must not live as do those who are still on the natural plane—the Gentiles, whose understanding is darkened, their heart hardened, and their feelings blunted—but on the supernatural plane, being "renewed"

in the highest principle of the life (τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ νοός) and continually putting on ("being endued with") the new man, which has been created after the pattern (κατά) of God Himself in "righteousness and holiness of truth" (ver. 24). What further need to prove the objectivity and definiteness of grace, after this? We could not express it more strongly, did we so desire.

The use of χάρις in ver. 29 is probably only to express the general idea of "benefit," though it may be primarily "spiritual benefit," and, of course, includes the benefit of assistance in spiritual growth, which may be conveyed through the medium of speech.

The life of grace is described in vi. 8 as "light" and that of sin as "darkness," which the Christians once were, but are no longer; hence they must be careful to walk as those who are worthy of light (Hebrew idiom="children of light," cf. ii. 3), and to bring forth the fruit thereof, viz. goodness, righteousness, and truth, *active* virtues, not merely passive. The ultimate perfection of the Church is set forth in ver. 27 as absolute immaculacy, and nothing less than this is the goal of grace None may have yet attained it, to the best of our knowledge, but all are bidden to attempt it, and are given grace sufficient to reach it, if they will.

(ii) *Colossians.*—The members of the Church at Colossæ are addressed as those who have known "the grace of God in truth," and in whom this grace has borne fruit, as it had also in all the world (i. 6), clearly referring to a definite gift which has been used and well used; part of that fruit being defined as "your love, in the Spirit" (ver. 8). The Apostle prays for an increase of grace in them, for "power," for "wisdom and understanding," for "patience and long-suffering," for "joy," all of which go to make up the content of that word "grace," of which the fruit is "every good work" (vers. 9–11). He then glances at the past work of grace in them, the totality summed up in the phrase "made us meet to be partakers of the inheritance of the saints in light" (ver. 12), *i.e. gratia gratum faciens.* And he next enumerates the items, viz. "deliverance," "translation into" Christ's "kingdom," "the forgiveness of sins," all through Christ, the image of God and the medium and end of all creation. And the purpose of all is that they may be "holy, without blemish and unreprovable" (ver.

22), which will undoubtedly come to pass if they do their part, *i.e.* continue stedfast.

In ii. 9 he assures them that Christ has the whole *pleroma* of Godhead dwelling in Him, by the Incarnation, and they are "made full" in Him, the treasures of grace are all at their disposal, being derived from Him to them, as living members of Him (vers. 12, 19), by their baptism, "quickened together with Him," from the death of sin. So they are bidden to seek τὰ ἄνω, to live on the supernatural plane "where Christ is," and to mind (φρονεῖν, see p 61 above) τὰ ἄνω as the only things worthy of the Christian's consideration.

Chapter ii. 13 gives us an example of the usual meaning of χαρίζεσθαι as "forgiving" (cf. p. 54 above), having here become little more than a synonym of ἀφείς.

The use of χάρις in iv. 6 is to express moral beauty, "the winsomeness of language," the result of a work worked within by the Holy Spirit.

(iii) *Philemon.*—There is but one point upon which we need remark in this short Epistle, but it is an important one, though one not noticed by the casual reader. In ver. 13 St. Paul remarks that he "could have wished (ἐβουλόμην) to keep him with me," but "I wished (ἠθέλησα) to do nothing without thy mind." Leaving out of sight the difference of tense and treating only of the distinction of the verbs, we may lay it down that while θέλω usually denotes a mere act of "desire" or "wishing," and is equivalent to 'voluntas,' βούλομαι includes also the idea of intellectual choice, of will backed by the recommendations of reason, and is equivalent to "liberum arbitrium." In this instance, St. Paul at first had the desire to keep Onesimus, but his reasoned will in the end was to send him to his master with the letter. We must bear this distinction in mind when we come to consider the discussions on the point, raised in the Pelagian controversy.

(iv) *Philippians.*—In expressing his thanks to God for the faith and virtue of the Philippian Church, the Apostle expresses his confidence that God Who began the good work of their salvation will perfect it, thus confessing both 'preventing grace" and "assisting grace," as they are theologically termed, and his confidence is rooted in the fact that they, like him, are partakers of grace (vers. 6–8). And so he prays that their love may be more and more joined

with knowledge and "discrimination," so as to bring forth "the fruits of righteousness," which is the same as saying that they are to have a righteousness which is their own, and has become so by some exercise on their part of their spiritual faculties, yet "through Jesus Christ," and "unto the glory and praise of God," and so not by their own powers, but by the power of God given to them. But they must see to it that their "manner of life" (ver. 27) is such as is becoming to their calling, for that calling does not bring it about without their concurrence; they are to "stand fast" and not be afraid of any adversaries, which very fact of assurance is a token of their state of grace and shows it to be from God and not from themselves.

The next passage worthy of note in this matter is also a synthesis of both sides of the apparent antinomy—ii. 12, 13. Here St. Paul exhorts his converts to "work out" (κατεργάζεσθε) their own salvation; they are to carry out to completion, for that is the significance of the compound verb, that which is already begun. He recognises that God begins the work, and also goes on to perfect it, but man has a part somewhere, and his part is to "work out." And so he continues: "for it is God which worketh in (ὁ ἐνεργῶν) you both to will and to work (ἐνεργεῖν), for His good pleasure." God is "The Energiser," Whose very nature is to energise (for this is surely the meaning of the participle) and enables man both to wish (θέλειν) and to energise, but all, in the last resort, according to God's good pleasure. Thus, again, we find both truths asserted together—the origination of all in God, and the free action of man (which is in some sense origination by him)—but the problem of their logical reconciliation left untouched. And is this not the position of us all? In our consciousness we realise the necessity and reality of both truths, but are unable to make them agree by any human logic.[1]

We now proceed to iii. 6, 9, where we find the contrast drawn out between the "righteousness which is of the law," and "the righteousness which is of God." We observe that the former is termed also "mine own" (ἐμήν), not as implying that the latter does not become in any sense his own (or the exhortation in ver. 17 loses its point, as also does the statement of ver. 12 and the hope expressed

[1] Cf. also St. Mark xvi. 20, τοῦ Κυρίου συνεργοῦντος. *Domino co-operante.*

in ver. 21), but as marking the difference of its origin, the former arising out of his own efforts to keep the commands of the law, while the latter is "of God" (ἐκ θεοῦ), and granted "on condition of faith" (ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει),[1] and also "through faith of Christ" (διὰ πίστεως χριστοῦ), as the internal means of its appropriation. Yet he is far from denying the reality of the righteousness which is of the law, since he treats it as a real entity and acknowledges that, judged by that standard, he was, before his conversion, blameless. If that, then, were a real righteousness, shall we allow the grace of the Gospel to be treated as a mere fiction, as something external and not internal? Nay, it is most certainly a gradual inward process of "conformation" (συμμορφιζόμενος), a pressing on (διώκω) in order to apprehend (καταλάβω), for he has not already attained, nor is he already perfect, but has need of continual effort, as if, forsooth, all depended upon his own striving. Once more, in iv. 13, the Apostle sets forth both sides of the matter, when he claims that he has strength for all things, and yet it is not his own, but through Christ putting strength (ἐνδυναμοῦντι) into him. Thus closes the teaching of the Epistles of the Captivity on the grace of God and the freedom of man.

(*d*) *The Pastoral Epistles.*—We now proceed to examine the teaching of this, the last group of St. Paul's Epistles.[2] The prominence given to the subject in the second group receded in the third, and in this group becomes still less marked, and, indeed, requires rather close investigation to discover its existence at all. In the first place we perceive from 1 Tim. i. 5, that the aim of the life of grace is love, and that it comes from a pure heart, a good conscience, and unfeigned faith ("a faith which makes no reserves"), as contrasted with the over-emphasis laid by the false teachers whom he condemns, upon knowledge, and their continual employment in curious questions and vain speculations. In i. 14 the writer dwells upon the greatness of God's

[1] Cf. Acts iii. 16.

[2] The author takes for granted the authenticity of the Pastoral Epistles for, though he is aware of the fierce controversies that have raged on this subject, he is convinced that the traditional view is the correct one; and, indeed, criticism as in regard to other New Testament books, so here also, has slowly retraced its footsteps nearer to the previously accepted—the conservative—position. It may suffice to refer to the recent works by Mr. E. F. Brown, Dr. Hillard, Dr. St. John Parry and Dr. Lock.

favour and mercy towards him when he was a misguided, though conscientious, persecutor, and lays down faith and love as the results of that grace given to him, and states its purpose as being that he should be a pattern to all future believers. In ver. 19, as in ver. 5, he joins faith and "a good conscience,"[1] as if to condemn entirely the Antinomian tenet that faith saves of itself, whatever the life may be Nothing could be farther from St. Paul's thoughts; a faith without its fruits (*fides informis*) is entirely inconceivable to him.

In ii. 4 we have a passage very important in controversies on grace, where the Apostle says that God "will have all men to be saved and to come unto the knowledge of the truth." He does not state that God's will is to save all men, or else most certainly all *would* be saved; but, that "through the sacrifice and the death of Christ, *all* are rendered capable of salvation (*salvabiles*); that some are indisputably not saved, is not due to any outward circumscription or inefficacy of the Divine will, but to man's rejection of the special means of salvation which God has been pleased to appoint, and to which it is His Divine Will that man's salvation should be limited."[2] The statement here is really only written by St. Paul as the ground of the argument that prayer should be offered for all men, and not as a definite dogmatic statement, though doubtless it is perfectly true, but only if its exact phraseology be observed and duly weighed. In like manner, the death of the Saviour is said to be a ransom for all, though it is an obvious fact that all do not take advantage of it. In iv. 1 we are again reminded by express revelation of the Holy Spirit of the possibility of a fall from grace, and in v. 12, 15, we have the realisation of this fact recorded, though no doubt is thrown on the reality of the grace given or of the reception of it. In iv. 14 we come across χάρισμα again, and this time it is used of the gift of grace given in ordination to perform the duties of his office; the faithful use of it will work out both his own salvation and that of others also. But it must be "kindled up," "fanned into flame" (2 Tim. i. 6) by further supplies of grace and correspondences thereto. And so St. Paul reminds him that our salvation is not according to any foreseen works or merits of ours, but according to the grace of God (i. 9), which was *given* to us (not only destined

[1] Cf. also iii. 9.

[2] Bp. Ellicott, *in loc.*

for us) before all eternity in Christ Jesus, but "hidden" until "the fulness of time." And so he has confidence in God's power to keep his soul which he has entrusted to God as if a "deposit" (ver. 12). But yet this does not excuse him from his part, for he must "hold fast" the creed (ver. 13), "keep" the deposit (ver. 14), "purge himself" (ii. 21), "flee youthful lusts" (ii. 22), and "continue in these things" (iii. 14), though not trusting to them, but to the sure foundation in God's unchangeableness and that "The Lord knoweth them that are His" (ii. 19).

In ii. 1 we have χάρις used with the imperative ἐνδυναμοῦ[1] to express the strengthening power of grace, in the power of that inward sanctification which enables a man to will and to do according to the commands of God; grace here must be a power imparted to the soul, infused into its very being, which strengthens the will and makes it stedfast in virtue (for this must be the force of the οὖν, pointing out the contrast with those who had fallen away, in i. 15).

Chapter ii. 25, 26, shows us that the grace of God given unto men may sometimes lie dormant, as it were, under the overbearing supremacy of the evil passions of men, but at God's *fiat* and in response to the prayers and efforts of His Church, may revive and bring "repentance to the acknowledging of the truth," so that the possibilities of the Grace of God appear boundless and almost unlimited, and even those who have formerly been held captive by the devil may "recover themselves" and "do his (God's) will" (ver. 26, ἐκείνου).

The passage iv. 18 has often been alleged in favour of the doctrine of the final perseverance of every one who has once received grace, but it does not of necessity imply this, for St. Paul, when he wrote this, was on the very eve of martyrdom (vers. 6, 7), and might well have had an assurance which it is not ordinarily given to men to experience; this text would therefore ill suit the purpose for which it is usually adduced.

When we go on to the Epistle to Titus we are met by a statement in the midst of the opening salutation, that the purpose of St. Paul's apostleship was that "the elect of God" should come to faith and to the full knowledge of that truth which leads to a godly life, and "the basis on

[1] Cf. Clement Rom. 1 *Cor.* 55; Ignatius, *Ad Smyr.* 13.

which all this rested was the hope of eternal life" [1] promised by God from all eternity (i. 1, 2). Thus the eternal purpose of God does not at all affect our position as free agents, or what were the avail of preaching? or of prayer? or exhortation?

The worthlessness of a profession of faith without works is tersely put in i. 16; those whose mind (νοῦς) and conscience (συνείδησις) is defiled, may confess a true faith, but by their works they are known and shall be judged.

The grace of God is said in ii. 11 to have been made manifest (ἐπεφάνη), and to bring with it "salvation for all men." This manifestation is certainly in the first place the Incarnation, but also includes the whole Incarnate Life and the Atoning Death of our Lord. And it was to bring a salvation for all, though all did not "receive Him," and so forfeited that which He brought for them. But the clause is connected with the preceding one by γάρ! For Titus is to exhort all Christians that they must, *on account of this saving grace*, live good and righteous lives, "soberly, righteously, and godly," and live in hope of glory. The possession of grace is clearly no argument for the transgression of the law, but rather for its perfect fulfilment.

In the next passage which calls for any comment—iii. 4–8—we have a balanced statement of the whole matter: (1) God's general attitude was one of kindness, all-comprehending love (χρηστότης); (2) He also was moved by a special "love towards man" (φιλανθρωπία); (3) this was manifested in Christ; (4) it was perfectly gratuitous, not based on "works of righteousness which we had done," (5) conveyed in baptism, by the power of the Holy Ghost; (6) the result is justification and sonship; (7) the ultimate aim is eternal life; and (8) the means are faith and the practice of good works. This is practically the most complete summary of the matter in such short compass, in the whole of the New Testament. Before closing the letter, he regards it as necessary to reiterate the last point (ver. 14) and press again the practical importance of good works as the fruitful product of a real faith.

(*e*) We add here, as an *appendix* to the Pauline Epistles (not as one of them) the anonymous *Epistle to the Hebrews*. In this doctrine, as in so much of its teaching, it shows

[1] Dean Spence (in Ellicott's *Commentary*), *in loc.*

much kinship with that of St. Paul, almost to the point of identity.

If χάριτι θεοῦ be the true reading in ii. 9, we here have the death of Christ announced as the crowning instance of grace, and the anarthrous θεοῦ implies that the very Nature of God Himself is surety for its saving efficacy.[1]

In iii. 1 the writer denotes their calling a heavenly one, not only with regard to its source (cf. xii. 25), but also as to its purpose, viz. a life whose centre and goal is above. Nevertheless he thinks it possible (in ver. 12) that there may yet be in them "an evil heart of unbelief, in falling away from Him," so that those who have been called with so high a calling, may yet lose its privileges; and on this account it is necessary for them to "exhort one another daily," and "to hold the beginning of their confidence firm unto the end" (ver. 14; this is also, according to one reading, the text of ver. 6), only *if* they thus endure (ἐάνπερ, ver. 14) unto the end, shall they be partakers of Christ.

In iv. 11 the author bids them "give diligence" lest they fall, for effort is necessary if they are to attain the heavenly rest [2] and "festinemus," says Herveius Burgidoensis on this passage, "fide et bonis operibus."

In the next verse (ver. 12) we must notice the ideas of the writer as to man's constitution, for this will intimately concern us later on. There has been much division of opinion as to the grouping of the four constituents of man's nature here mentioned, but the prevailing opinion, of which Westcott is the protagonist, is that there are two pairs, the former standing for the immaterial part and the latter for the material, and the "division" is not of the various constituents from one another, but of each in itself, a dissection, as it were, of each several part to its very ground and basis. The πνεῦμα is certainly that part of his complex nature which holds converse with God, "the Father of spirits" (xii. 9). The ψυχή is a term which is used very ambiguously, ranging from its lowest application to that vital principle which man shares with the beast, to a use almost synonymous with "eternal life" (x. 39).[3] But the expression of moral character is reserved for the καρδία, where unbelief has its seat (iii. 12), or grace (xiii. 9); and

[1] *Vide* Westcott, *in loc.*

[2] Primasius says: "quoniam non sufficit sola fides sed debet addi et vita fidei condigna": *Comm. in loc.*

[3] Cf. also St. Matt. x. 39; xvi. 25, 26, etc., etc.

more inward still is that power which is the very voice of God, the συνείδησις, the final authority for right or wrong. The "word of God" pierces even to the most inward parts and lays them bare in their true being.

In iv. 16 we have the exhortation to "come boldly to the throne of grace," *i.e.* to God revealed as the Giver of grace and also seated in royal majesty; the purpose of our thus coming is "that we may receive mercy and find grace." The distinction drawn between ἔλεος and χάρις in the New Testament is nowhere more clearly pointed than here; "mercy" is for the past and is to be "received" by man in his weakness as given by God in His Infinite Pity, "grace" is for present and future use, and man is to "find" it by seeking for it.

In vi. 4–8 we have a passage which is very much to the point with regard to this doctrine. The writer puts forward (most probably only as hypothetical) the case of one who has been illuminated by grace and become a participator of the Spirit and a sharer of the moral beauty produced by the action of God in man, even that righteousness which is the potentiality of future glory, but yet has fallen away from grace received, and that not only by a decisive act in the past (παραπεσόντας), but by a continuous hostile attitude in the present (ἀνασταυροῦντας, παραδειγματίζοντας). And he declares it to be impossible (ἀδύνατον) to renew these to repentance, *i.e.* there cannot be a second re-birth, in the very nature of things. As the natural birth can only occur once, so also the spiritual new birth. The grace of God *may* be able even to raise the spiritually dead to life again, but this has not been revealed and may not be relied upon. This passage remains an awful warning against apostacy, and represents such a case as practically hopeless and all but certainly final! Grace may not be trifled with, but is given to be used; a definite gift which is given and must be retained by a process of assimilation, if the receiver is to have any profit therefrom.

God's promise is described as "immutable" (ἀμετάθετον, vi. 17), and doubly so, because "confirmed by an oath," so that we may have "strong encouragement"; yet this must of necessity have certain limitations. St. Augustine, for example,[1] shows that, though God is omnipotent,

[1] *De Civ. Dei*, v. 10. "Unde propterea quædam non potest quia omnipotens est."

there are certain things which He cannot do, or else He would contradict Himself; so also, we may remark, that having voluntarily limited Himself in the creation of finite, yet real, wills, He does not, and we may reverently say, *cannot*, coerce them into final salvation. This passage is, on that account, no support to the tenet of the necessary final perseverance of all the elect. The hope, the anchor of the soul, is sure and stedfast, and is well fastened, yet, however firm the anchor and cable may be, if the anchor be cast off from the ship, it will be of no avail, in spiritual just as in temporal affairs.

We are brought up against the great controversy regarding man's origin, when we come to vii. 5, 10. Man is here distinctly regarded as a mere layer (*tradux*) of a parent stock, and owes his entire vital force to it. He is *born*, he is a member in a body, an individual of a race, not a complete self-centred being; he is dependent upon the past, a link in the succession of the development of the germs, and consequently the descendants are included in the ancestor. This is the theory of Traducianism, held unfalteringly by Tertullian, and very much favoured by most of the great Western teachers. St. Augustine, however, hesitates very greatly concerning it, even though it would have served his anti-Pelagian polemic well, and provided a sufficient answer to his adversaries.[1]

The use of the phrase "dead works" in vi. 1 and ix. 14 cannot be passed by without some notice. In the former passage it is contrasted with "faith," in the latter with "serving the living God," *i.e.* with "live" works. Dead works are "works devoid of that element which makes them truly works. They have the form but not the vital power of works. There is but one spring of life, and all which does not flow from it is dead."[2] That element is, considered from the Divine point of view, grace; from the human side, faith in Christ, Who is "the life." And the defiling power affects the conscience, which therefore needs to be cleansed by the "blood of Christ, which cleanseth from all sin," and that, not by working any external change, but by communicating a vital force.

[1] On this subject see Liddon, *Some Elements of Religion*, pp. 98–100 (small ed.); Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, § 74; Westcott, *op. cit.* p. 116.

[2] Westcott, on vi. 1.

In x. 10 we find that our sanctification is not only *through* God's will, and *according to* it, but *in* it, *included* in it as part of His eternal purpose in Christ. But that which *in potentia* has been obtained for them, needs to be progressively realised by them *de facto* (τοὺς ἁγιαζομένους, ver. 14, note the tense), by an inward growth in righteousness, real and inherent, a writing of God's laws in the mind and heart (ver. 16, quoting Jer. xxxi. 31 ff.). Ver. 29 brings us again to the case of the apostate who has tasted all the blessings of the Christian religion, and yet has turned away, in act (καταπατήσας), in opinion (ἡγησάμενος), and in continued wilful assault (ἐνυβρίσας). The last is the worst count of the indictment; he has offered insult and outrage to "the Spirit of grace," through Whom the grace of God was manifested and conveyed to him and Whose benign influence he has felt. This dreadful act of blasphemy against the Holy Ghost shall receive a punishment befitting the nature of the offence (vers. 31, 32), and apostates shall be visited with the displeasure of God (ver. 38).

On the other hand, the condition of pleasing God is "faith" (xi. 6), such as made Enoch "well-pleasing to God" (Heb. = "walked with God"), because it surely betrays the presence of grace in the soul, which makes it thus acceptable.

Chapter xii. 9 shows us the other side of the controversy regarding the origin of the soul, to that which we found in vii. 10, viz. the Creationist[1] view. According to this theory, each soul is *created*, not merely born; it is an immediate work of the Creator, Who is continually creating souls out of nothing, and infusing them into bodies, each soul being created when the body for which it is destined really begins to live. The passage under consideration draws a distinction between the "fathers of our flesh" and the "Father of spirits," and is said to imply this hypothesis. This view was held by St. Jerome, and generally in the East, also by the heretic Pelagius, who thereby argued against Adam's sin affecting any of his descendants. The truth of this theory is that there is in man an element which he does not derive directly from his ancestors, though it probably follows immediately upon birth; there is, in

[1] See Liddon, *op. cit.* pp. 101–3; Martensen, p. 141 ff.; Westcott, p. 116; Delitzsch, *in loc.*

other words, in every man, some real individuality, as well as a large element of hereditary characteristics. Each single human being is in some real sense a new manifestation of the Divine will, as well as being the product of the preceding species.

The advice of the writer in xii. 14 to "pursue sanctification" points again to the need of effort to attain holiness of life and not only to an inactive passivity in the hand of God. And especially is this seen to be so when we consider the succeeding clause, that this holiness is absolutely necessary in order to enjoy the *visio Dei*, so that no one can attain to that bliss without having in some way, however imperfectly, made attempts to work out a righteousness of his own, though worked in him by God. And then he proceeds to exhort his readers to "look carefully" lest any of them should be in a continual state (note *present* participle) of falling behind the grace of God. Divine grace meets and stirs the progress of the Christian, but he must keep pace with it.

Although ἔχωμεν χάριν in xii. 28 might quite well be "let us be thankful," yet the consensus of opinion is in favour of the rendering "let us have grace" in the sense of realising it. Grace, which Primasius in this passage says means "fidem rectam, spem certam, caritatem perfectam, cum operatione sancta," is given to us, but we must make it our own. The contrast is drawn between "grace" and "meats" as means of strengthening the heart, in xiii. 9. It seems certain that the point here is that the true progress is to be made, not by outward observances and Jewish teachings, but by a strength supplied by a spiritual divine influence from without, from the free outflow of divine love for the quickening and support of man. Finally, in ver. 21, the writer prays God to make his readers perfect in every good thing, "to the end that they do" His will, *i.e.* the purpose of grace is human action; and yet from another point of view it is God Who does each deed. It is by the work of God alone that the work of man is possible at all, and the work is to be, when accomplished, "that which is well-pleasing in His sight."

Thus, in conclusion, we find the teaching of this Epistle on grace to be the same as that of St. Paul, although in many respects differently expressed. Both writers insist upon the fact that all ability to work comes from God, but that

human free-will and human effort must be enlisted in His service, and God will crown His own work in man with the reward of eternal glory, if he perseveres to the end.

(4) *The Catholic Epistles*

(*a*) *St. James.*—As we remarked before, we now pass to an entirely different type of doctrine, the Jacobo-Petrine, distinguished by its simplicity and objectivity. Although, in many respects, it has a somewhat Judaistic stamp upon it, yet, with regard to this particular dogma, it is in substantial agreement with the Pauline type, though not so developed. In i. 4 the end is represented as perfection and entirety, which is to be striven after by all, and the means thereto is "wisdom," which here signifies the sum of moral excellence and is further defined in iii. 17, 18. If that be lacking, it is to be obtained from God, the great Giver of all, Who gives liberally to all, but only if the prayer be the prayer of faith. Grace, then (for it seems to be synonymous with "wisdom" here) is given when "called for by diligent prayer." [1] In vers. 13–15 we have a study in the psychology of temptation. The source of temptation is not God, for He tempteth no man (not with the temptation of seduction to evil, though He does tempt with the tempting of probation [2]), but from within, from a man's own lust. From this unlawful desire comes sin, and when the sin is full grown, its natural result—death. It is quite true that there is an external tempter, but the temptation would have no power over man unless there were an ally within, a traitor in the camp as well as an enemy without; this ally is to be found in the *φρόνημα σαρκός*, *concupiscentia*, "the evil propensity."

But God is the giver of "every good gift and every perfect boon," (ver. 17), from Him come every good "act of giving" (*δόσις*), and every perfect thing thus given (*δώρημα*; cf. with formation of *χάρισμα*), whether physical or spiritual, temporal or eternal, and only thus can man perform anything that is good, for it was of "His own will" that we were brought into the state of salvation by

[1] *Church Catechism*, Intro. to Lord's Prayer.

[2] St. Augustine says: "St. James is speaking of temptations arising from evil motives, with a view to an evil end. No such temptations are from God."

His grace. In ver. 25 mention is made of "the perfect law of liberty"; the liberty "wherewith Christ set us free"[1] is not a state of "un-law," of lawlessness, but is "a law." Why, then, is the state of "grace" opposed to that of "law"? Because, surely, to the unrenewed man the commandments of God are a bondage, being imposed from without, but to the man renewed by grace and living in a state of grace, the law is imposed by himself and is in accordance with his high aims and principles, and so the will of God is to him the perfection of liberty, and sin now is a bondage, a burden from which "he groans to be delivered."[2] The "law of liberty" is, that is to say, an inward principle, not an external restraint; it is a principle of righteousness, gradually realising itself with the help of God and forming such a character as finds its best description in the Sermon on the Mount.

To proceed; we have in ii. 14–26 St. James' account of justification, "by works and not only by faith" (ver. 24). This appears to be in most flagrant contradiction to St. Paul's teaching, but is not really so. St. James' polemic is directed against a "barren faith" (ver. 20), that which a man has who "says he hath faith, but has not works" (ver. 14), *i.e.* produces no evidence of his faith; the Apostle reasonably asks, "Can such a faith save him?" (ἡ πίστις, note the force of the article); a mere "fides informis" cannot save, but requires to work by love and to be formed by love, or it is but on a level with the faith of devils. So again, the works he insists upon are the fruits of faith, and not "works of the Law," "dead works," as St. Paul terms them; dead faith and dead works are equally useless, and the life of either is evidenced by the co-existence with it of the other.

The next passage demanding notice is iv. 6, where we discover that the state of grace is to be a state of *increasing* grace; God is continually showering grace down upon His children, but they must be humble, not proud and envious, for humility is a fruit of grace. So man must not be merely passive, but to "draw nigh to God" and "resist the devil," to "cleanse his hands" and "purify his heart" (vers. 7, 8), and thus will he receive further grace, for grace used is grace gained.

[1] Gal. v. 1.
[2] Rom. viii. 18–23; 2 Cor. v. 2–4.

(*b*) 1 *Peter*.—In the very first words of this Epistle, the author addresses his readers as "elect," *i.e.* they have received the first beginnings of grace, as is evident by their having believed and been baptised. And their election was the result of God's "foreknowledge" of them, not by haphazard. And this is realised by the work of the Holy Ghost in their gradual sanctification, while they on their part live in continual obedience, and are daily cleansed from small defilements by the blood of Christ.

In i. 3–5 the work of salvation is attributed to the "mercy" (pity) of God, rather than to His "grace" (favour); but a very little reflection will show us that this is due partly to the Hebraic cast of the author's thought and partly to the fact that no attribute of God can be severed by a hard and fast rule from the rest, and therefore the work of man's salvation may be said to arise, now from God's mercy, now from His grace, or again from His loving-kindness or His compassion, etc.; all human words being inadequate to express the divine realities. We are "begotten again" to an amaranthine inheritance reserved for us in heaven, and we by the power of God (*i.e.* by His grace) are kept for it, for final salvation. And it is "through faith" as a means, that this is done; the office of grace is to maintain and preserve this attitude of believing, of trust in God, and staying upon Him, which goes to make up the state of faith—"thou standest by faith" (Rom. x. 20).

The use of χάρις in ver. 10 seems to be merely equivalent to "favour"; the prophets foretold the favour God was purposing to show to mankind; but in ver. 13 we shall be right in interpreting it in a more objective sense as the gift which is to be finally made over to us at the Second Coming of Christ in glory, and because of this we are bidden to be alert and watchful, and make our preparation for it, by actual holiness of life, a holiness as real and true as that of God Himself (ver. 16).

The phrase in ii. 3, though rendered "gracious" in both English versions, has really nothing to do with the root in the original, the word being χρηστός, "mild, gentle." Ver. 8 may seem at first sight to declare that those who stumble and are disobedient, do so because they have no other course open to them, because they are thereunto appointed. But comparing Scripture with Scripture we must come to the conclusion that they were "appointed"

to their punishment upon the contingency of disobedience, pride and unbelief arising, but that they had in the first instance the freedom to believe and obey. But when they had gone certain lengths of disobedience, then God "shut them up to unbelief," but was in no wise the original Author of their sin.

The Christian Church is shown in ii. 9, 10, to be the inheritor of the promises made and privileges granted to Israel of old; they had been "not a people" and "not pitied," but are now "the people of God" and are "pitied," and so they must be, in a sense in which the Jews never were so, a holy people, a people made-His-own, for He has chosen and called them by His grace, which they must use to work good works (ver. 12), to show forth His virtues (vers. 9, 12). The use of χάρις in iii. 7 is peculiar; it is often explained as meaning that husband and wife are alike sharers in "the gracious gift of eternal life"; but this seems rather a strained meaning. The more natural is that which represents husband and wife as conjointly possessors of a great gift, which has been granted to no angelic being, however highly placed, viz. the power of bringing into existence new members of their species, or causing, in some mysterious way, the existence of a new soul! "Grace" here will mean a definite gift of power, an endowment, a faculty granted to man by God; and χάρις here is really equivalent to χάρισμα.

We must now note the statement in iv. 8 that "charity covereth the multitude of sins" in view of the theological *dictum* that a living faith is *formata per caritatem*. The loose quotation from Prov. x. 12 has already been used by St. James in v. 20 in the same form as here. In the original it certainly implies that the *other* man's sins are hidden from sight, by the charity of the one who loves, and the truly loving man will continue to love, even when the object of his affection is undeserving. But in St. James the word used is αὐτοῦ not ἐκείνου, "his own" soul, not the other's, and so implies that charity covers his sins, and not only hides the other man's. In like manner, St. Peter seems to have in mind a virtue which shall be of avail when "the end of all things" comes, and so seems to mean that the presence of charity in the soul will hide a multitude of "venial" sins, and count for much in the day of Judgment. This passage, therefore, gives great support to the theological

tenet referred to above. Ver. 10 gives us an example of the use of χάρισπα and χάρις within the compass of one sentence. Χάρισμα is the definite gift, received by every member of the Church for the good of others, and the sum total of the various χαρίσματα is the ποικίλη χάρις Θεοῦ. Grace here cannot be a mere favourable inclination, but is the gift which is the sum and the root of all graces, it is *gratia gratis data*. Some of these graces, though not all, are then enumerated, so we are under no misapprehension as to the writer's meaning. The expression in vers. 5, 6, is an echo of St. James iv. 6, and calls for no further treatment here. Χάρις in ver. 10 is "all power of good living," *i.e.* it is the objective sense of help or assistance which is to be understood. Finally, the writer concludes by testifying that this is "a true grace of God" wherein they stand; their state is without any doubt, at present, one of grace; they have been received into God's favour, and have been put in the way of obtaining His continual help, but must take care to "stand" therein, to continue in it.

(*c*) 2 *Peter*.—In this Epistle the writer (whether the Apostle Peter, or not) passes almost imperceptibly from the opening salutation to the exhortation to his readers to progress in spiritual graces. And he bases his advice upon the facts mentioned in the greeting; reminding them and us that God has in Jesus Christ given to us by His Divine power all things that are necessary for the attainment of life and godliness, viz. His Grace, which is capable of supplying *all* our need, and all comes from Him, not from ourselves. And the ultimate result of grace is to make us "partakers of the Divine Nature," which is the state of true liberty, of "escape" (ver. 4), from the "bondage of corruption."[1] And "for this very reason" (ver. 5) they are to progress in all the virtues, "in their faith to supply"[2] virtue, etc., etc., which graces "inhering *in them*" (ὑπάρχοντα) and abounding, they will be neither barren nor unfruitful, and on the contrary, he who is absolutely without them, is blind and short-sighted, and has well-nigh forfeited the grace he once had. And the conclusion is that they must spare no effort to "make their calling and election sure."[3] While they go on doing these things (present participle)

[1] Cf. Rom. viii. 21.
[2] See Plummer's admirable note in Ellicott's *Commentary, in loc.*
[3] i. 10.

they shall never fall, for such grace *must* sustain him who willingly and of such set purpose co-operates with it.

The expression "denying even the Master that bought them" (ii. 1) is also much to our point, for it entirely contradicts the Calvinistic tenet of partial redemption; the false teachers themselves who denied Him, were nevertheless redeemed by Him, though it turns only to their "destruction," because they did not carry out the purpose of their redemption. "God spared not the" apostate "angels," and so (it implies, though the sentence is never finished, as regards the construction) He will not spare apostate men, who "have forsaken the right way," ver. 15 (though once in it!), and "though they had once escaped the pollutions of the world" (no doubt is thrown on the fact) and were possessed of "the full knowledge of the Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ," "are again entangled and overcome thereby," like "a washed sow wallowing in the mire" (vers. 20–22). Their state is worse by far than that of the heathen who have never "known the way of righteousness." Christians must beware lest they fall (as is certainly possible) "from their own stedfastness" (iii. 17), but are to "grow in the grace and the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ," that is, in the grace of which He is the giver and the knowledge of which He is the object. Grace here is the condition of being in grace, of continually and habitually responding to and using the help given by Christ. We now pass on to:

(*d*) 1 *John*.—We will consider first the passage i. 6–10. The Apostle is speaking to Christians, not to heathen, and reminds them that they walk in light, not in darkness, but yet they are not to say they have no sin, for all have it, and still need the cleansing of the Precious Blood; they "delight in the law of God after the inward man," it is true, but yet "see another law in their members," [1] and so need continual grace, not only to avoid sin, but also to cleanse from sin committed.

In ii. 2 we have the unqualified statement that the Death of Christ is of universal efficacy and application, and was not for the few only who shall actually be saved finally. It was for "the whole world," and it is possible that its effects may in some way reach to many who have never even heard of Him; but this we must leave in the hands

[1] Rom. vii. 22.

of God. And then we have a test of our state, whether it be one of grace or no; we can perceive that we know Him, by the touchstone of obedience; grace results in obedience to His commands (ii. 3). And so again, "doing righteousness" (ver. 29, note *present* participle) is the one sign of grace, of the permanency of the new nature received when we were "born of Him."

Chapter iii. 6, 9, has been a great difficulty to many; let us now examine it. It says that the one who abides in Christ does not sin, and so he who commits some deadly sin, is by that very act cast out of Him, until by some means he is restored; but it states next that "whosoever sinneth hath not seen Him (ἑώρακεν) neither known Him" (ἔγνωκεν). Does this mean that one single act of sin proves that the sinner never received grace? The Calvinist says so, but the Catholic says that it proves that he has fallen from grace. But the verbs are in the *perfect* tense, not the aorist, and the Greek perfect is not quite identical with our English perfect; it denotes a present state as produced by a past act continued into the present. So the meaning is that "Whosoever is born of God and continues in that state (*i.e.* "abides in Christ," St. John xv. 4, 5, 7), does not commit sin," does not live in sin, is not an habitual sinner. St. Augustine [1] explains it by the dual state in which the renewed man lives; "we are not yet freed from Adam's infirmity," on the one hand, and so we *do* sin; but, on the other hand, we are born of God and abide in Him, and the holy seed remains in us, so we sin not, and "the remains of this, though abiding in the inner man, day by day decreases in the advancing believer." This is the only satisfactory explanation of this verse, which also explains such passages as i. 6–10.

The only real test of grace is its fruit, says the Beloved Disciple in iii. 7, for "the righteous is he that doeth righteousness," not he that believes only, or thinks himself justified, or merely talks about righteousness and grace, or accounts Christ's righteousness as imputed to him while making no effort himself to do good works; he must, by the grace of God, of course, strive to "do righteousness," be "zealous to maintain good works," to bring forth a real and personal, though necessarily imperfect, righteousness of his own.

[1] *De Perfectione Justitiæ Hominis*, c. xviii. § 39. Cf. also St. Jerome, *Adversus Jov.* lib. ii. *init.*

And so he re-echoes it in ver. 24, in different words, "he that keepeth His commandments dwelleth in Him, and He in him. And hereby we know that He abideth in us, by the Spirit which He hath given us." The outward evidence is absolutely necessary, and is supported by the inward witness of the Holy Spirit's indwelling (vers. 19–21), which indwelling is itself manifested by its fruits, as St. Augustine says: "Is it not manifest that this is what the Holy Ghost works in man, that there should be in him love and charity?"

But there is yet one more test necessary; the Apostle warns us that there may be a kind of spurious imitation of grace; there is a spirit of Antichrist as well as a Spirit of God. And the great final test is the confession of the Incarnation; this confession can only be made by the help of grace,[1] and conversely, only by the Incarnation can grace be given to man.[2] So, in history, the confession or denial of the Incarnation has proved the real test of the possession or non-possession of real grace. Not that we are always in a position to decide in every individual instance, or that there may not be isolated exceptions, but the rule holds good in general, as we shall see further when we consider the connection between the Nestorian and Pelagian errors.

The intimate connection of grace with love, is further demonstrated in iv. 16, where we read that every one who dwells in love, dwells in God, and God in him. The indwelling of God, of course, implies grace in the soul, and the "dwelling in God" *must* connote the inflow of grace into the man,[3] for "He that hath the Son hath life," (v. 12), and hence love and grace are inseparably united in some way.

The difference between sins is given in v. 16, 17, where some sins are distinctly said to be "unto death," and some "not unto death"; the distinction of mortal (or deadly) sins and venial sins, is therefore a true one, in principle, if not altogether in detail. Many have denied the distinction in their zeal against the abuses to which it has been subject, but it is, nevertheless, both Scriptural and grounded on common-sense. "Death" must mean spiritual, not physical death; some sin or sins incur the death of the soul, with the loss of grace, and some do not; the classification

[1] Cf. 1 Cor. xii. 3. [2] St. John i. 12, 14, 16, 17.
[3] Cf. St. John xv. 4, 5.

of sins in detail is, however, a much more difficult, if not almost impossible, matter.

(*e*) 2 *and* 3 *John*.—In these short letters, there is little indeed to our purpose, but we must just notice 2 John 9 and 3 John 11, where we have the reiteration of the statement that grace and the being "of God," "seeing God" and "having God," are the necessary corollary of "doing good," of "transgressing not" and "abiding in the doctrine of Christ"; this is a constantly repeated Johannine idea, but agrees with the doctrine of all New Testament writers, and must be, on that account, the "mind of the Spirit."

(*f*) *Jude*.—We note that this Epistle is addressed to those who are "kept in Jesus Christ and called"; they are all assumed to have been "in Him," in grace, and to have been called to a knowledge of the Gospel; there is no doubt that they have experienced the movements of grace. "Grace" is, however, omitted from the salutation, and "love" inserted in its place as the highest fruit of grace. In ver. 4 certain men are stated "to be of old ordained to this condemnation," which has been said to be an absolute proof that God has created some men for eternal damnation, and so has withheld grace from them. But it is distinctly stated that these had received grace, but misused it, "turning it into lasciviousness." God must have given them the opportunity of salvation, and so the sentence referred to must have been consequent upon their wickedness, foreseen indeed, but not on that account of necessity or done under compulsion. And the writer further proves this by citing the case of the Israelites in the wilderness saved out of the land of Egypt, and put in the way of attaining the promised land, but afterwards destroyed on account of their unbelief; also the case of "the angels which kept not their first estate," proving that their dignity was not irrevocable. And so he goes on to exhort Christians to renewed effort, to "build themselves up on their most holy faith" (ver. 20), to pray and keep themselves in God's love, and "try to save" others (ver. 23, *present* imperative); of what use are these earnest exhortations if men have nothing to do but passively bask in the sunshine of God's favour, inactive and without effort or pains of any description? Throughout Scripture men are urged to work as well as to allow God to work, and one side is incomplete without the other;

God operates, man co-operates, and yet not at all by his own power, but by God's, given to him.

We have now only one book left to examine, viz. :

(*g*) *The Apocalypse.*—In ii. 4 we see that the sufferings, patience, labours, and even the perseverance of the Ephesian Church is entirely counteracted by the fact that their love has grown cold, so that unless they "repent and do the first works" their light shall be removed. But to "him that conquereth" is promised the eating of the tree of life, the participation in all that was lost by Adam's fall, but which Christ has won by His obedience, and having won will give to all who are united to Him. All supernatural gifts of grace, the right of entry to paradise, all shall be to those who conquer and endure. From the letter to Sardis we learn that it is possible for a Church to have a reputation for spirituality, to be alive in appearance, but to be dead in reality, or very nearly so, for some few things "remain" (iii. 2). But he who overcomes shall not have his name blotted out of the book of life! So such a thing is possible, and will actually occur in some cases; those who have once had their names entered there as partakers of grace and heirs of heaven, may forfeit the grace and lose their inheritance. The expression "written in the book of life" occurs also in xiii. 8, xvii. 8, xx. 15, and xxi. 27, as well as in Phil. iv. 3, where it is stated as being a fact with regard to certain individuals; it is derived from an Old Testament idea;[1] God is supposed to keep a register of His people, (1) of all true Israelites, (2) of those who shall enter into life. But the writing is by no means ineffaceable, as is assumed in Moses' prayer and in the passage we are considering, but final salvation depends on an individual's name continuing "on the books," for the final sentence at the Judgment shall be pronounced therefrom (xx. 12), and the knowledge that one's name is there is the greatest cause for the Christian's rejoicing (St. Luke x. 20).

In xiv. 12 we discover that "the patience of the saints" has two elements, keeping the commandments of God and keeping the faith of Jesus; grace does, and always *must*, produce both faith and good works; he who is to obtain glory must both "watch" and "keep his garments" (xvi. 15).

[1] Ex. xxxii. 32; Ps. lvi. 8; lxix. 28; lxxxvii. 6; Ezek. xiii. 9; Dan. xii. 1.

The characteristics of "those who are with the Lamb" in xvii. 14 are that they are both called and chosen and have continued faithful by "giving diligence to make their calling and election sure." God's call *must* elicit man's continual response. In xvii. 17 we have to face the stupendous fact that "God alone can order the unruly wills of sinful men."[1] When the ten kings "make war upon the Lamb" and "give their power and strength unto the beast" to fight, as they think, against God, yet they are only in actual fact fulfilling the will of God, Who, in some inscrutable manner, has worked His way through their free wills!

The vision of the Lamb's wife (xix. 1–9) teaches us again the duality of sanctification. The Church, the Lamb's wife, is "to array herself (περιβάληται, middle voice) in fine linen, clean and white," and this "fine linen is the righteousnesses of the saints" (ver. 8). Those who are "saints" have "righteous acts" of their own, clean and white, they are not merely sinful souls with an external garment thrown over them, as it were, but they are in some sense "righteous"; yet, on the other hand, this is "given to them," it has its source externally, though in the end internal; "the robes are washed and made white in the blood of the Lamb" (vii. 14). So all is Christ's, and yet something is their own!

The principle of judgment is affirmed in xx. 12, 13 and xxii. 12 to be "according to their works." If it be objected that this is contrary to the Pauline doctrine of "justification by faith," it is replied that it cannot be so, for St. Paul himself affirms the same,[2] and in doing so he is but echoing the teaching of our Lord,[3] Who tells us that words (as acts of speech)[4] and even thoughts (as embryo acts),[5] will have due weight in the final balance. So the ultimate account will not be according to faith itself, apart from works, but according to the fruits of faith, even as a "tree is known by its fruits." A bare faith (*nuda fides, fides informis*) is thus entirely excluded, while the really good works of the heathen, done from sincere high motives seem from St. Matt. xxv. 32 ("*all* the nations," cf. ver. 40) to

[1] Prayer-book Collect, *Fourth Sunday after Easter.*
[2] Rom. ii. 6, 7; 1 Cor. iii. 8; 2 Cor. v. 10.
[3] St. Matt. x. 41, 42; xxv. 31–46.
[4] St. Matt. xii. 36, 37.
[5] St. Matt. v. 22, 28.

be of more avail than faith without works. And once more, before the book closes—and with it the Sacred Canon—men are warned (xxii. 19) that even yet their names, having been recorded in the book of life, may be effaced and their inheritance forfeited! But the blessed, who do His commandments and have "washed their robes" (*v.l.* xxii. 14, ℵ, A, etc.) have the "right to the tree of life" which Adam lost, and the freedom of the New Jerusalem, likewise forfeited by sin, a freedom henceforth unhindered by any necessity, but consisting in the blessed freedom to do always the will of God, with the thorough co-operation of the human will and all the powers and faculties of the renewed man.

CHAPTER IV

THE EARLY CHURCH

WHEN we pass from the time of the Apostles to the period of the Apostolic Fathers, we find ourselves, on the whole, in an entirely different atmosphere, though it is remarkable that there is no change of attitude with regard to the subject we have in hand. After St. Paul's famous controversy, the Church seems "to have had peace" with regard to this matter until the rise of the Pelagian heresy. Yet we must not be understood to imply that it altogether escaped notice, for this was certainly not the case. But as it was not yet the subject of controversy, the references are rather incidental than formal, and form side-issues rather than set subjects for debate. This fact is consistent with the view which regards the writings of the first period of the Church as expansions and developments of the Jacobo-Petrine type of theology.[1]

The Apostolic Fathers are generally enumerated as six in number, viz. Clement of Rome, Barnabas, Hermas, Ignatius, Polycarp, and Papias. The anonymous writings such as the Didachè, and the Epistle to Diognetus, as well as the Epistle of the Church of Smyrna, and the spurious Second Epistle of Clement, are usually classed with them, as falling within the same period. To their testimony we must now address ourselves.

1. *St. Clement*, Bishop of Rome, and according to early tradition a member of the Flavian *patria*, and therefore related to the Imperial family, wrote (*c.* A.D. 95) an Epistle on behalf of the Church of Rome, to the Church of Corinth, on account of the internal dissensions in that church. As these disputes were not on the ground of doctrine, but rather of Church discipline, we do not, *a priori*, expect to find much allusion to such a subject as we are considering.

[1] See p. 47, *supra*.

On reading the work we are, however, astonished at the multitude of slight allusions, the more valuable indeed, on that very account, for our purpose. In the first chapter the writer commends "the complete adornment and stedfastness of their faith" (τὴν πανάρετον καὶ βεβαίαν ὑμῶν πίστιν). Newman[1] translates πανάρετον by "formata," and rightly so, for its meaning is that their faith is not barren, but brings forth its full complement of Christian virtues, it is fruitful in all good works. But this very fact has proved to be their undoing, for envy has entered in and spoilt the tender fruits, so that some of them are grown blind in their faith and rejected the leadings of grace given to them.[2] To pass on, faith and righteousness are twice treated by him as synonymous, in one instance referring to the teaching of St. Paul.[3] The source of grace, and that for the whole world, is the shedding of the Blood of Christ,[4] and this grace is committed to the presbyters of the Church as God's ministers, the whole process being "established by His almighty will, desiring that all His beloved should come to repentance."[5] He then exhorts them to obedience, adducing the Old Testament worthies as examples: Enoch "righteous in obedience"; Noah "proved to be faithful," who "preached regeneration to the world"; Abraham "found faithful, inasmuch as he obeyed the commands of God," "through faith and hospitality," "through obedience"; Lot "saved out of Sodom" "by hospitality and godliness"; and lastly, Rahab the harlot "by faith and hospitality."[6] Those who have become Christians are described as being "brought by Him under the yoke of His grace"[7] and "to whom grace is given from God."[8]

Of Job, Clement records that he was "just and without blame, true, one that served God and abstained from all evil" (Job i. 1), yet that he said, "No man is free from pollution, no not though he should live but one day" (Job xiv. 4).[9] The piety of these holy men of old is described by Clement as due to their "receiving His holy oracles with fear and truth," and they are termed "His glorious and exceeding gifts and benefits,"[10] for He "kindly and lovingly

[1] *Lectures on Justification*, p. 437.
[2] *St. Clement*, c. iii.
[3] C. v.
[4] C. vii.
[5] C. viii.
[6] Cc. ix.–xii.
[7] C. xvi.
[8] C. xxx.
[9] C. xvii.
[10] Cc. xix., xxiii.

bestows His graces upon all such as come to Him with a simple mind." [1] The words of Ps. xxxiv. 11–22 are quoted by him as "the faith which is in Christ," being spoken by "He Himself through the Holy Ghost"; and in that passage the righteous man is the one who not only "trusts in the Lord" but also departs from evil and does good, guarding his tongue and walking in the fear of the Lord.[2] Indeed, says Clement, we are "justified by our actions, and not our words," [3] even as Abraham "through faith, wrought righteousness and truth." [4]

Nevertheless it is not of ourselves, but of the gift of God,[5] for we are "the portion of the Holy One," "those to whom God has given His grace." [6] He is "our gracious and merciful Father, who has made us to partake of His election," [7] "that through His mercy we may be delivered from the condemnation to come," [8] and "when and as He pleases He will do all things; and nothing shall pass away of all that has been determined by Him; all things are open before Him, nor can anything be hid from His counsel." [9] We next come to what is certainly the most important passage on this subject, in the works of Clement: "They were all (*i.e.* the holy men of old) therefore greatly glorified, not for their own sake, or for their own works, or for the righteousness that they themselves wrought, but through His will. And we also, being called by the same will in Christ Jesus, are not justified by ourselves, neither by our own wisdom or knowledge or piety or the works which we did in holiness of heart; but by that faith by which God Almighty has justified all men from the beginning: to whom be glory for ever and ever. Amen." [10] The interpretation of this passage is very doubtful; are the works referred to "works done before the grace of Christ," or works done by grace, which are called evangelical works? Is the phrase "which we did in holiness of heart" expressive of a real case or only a hypothetical one? The most satisfactory solution seems to be Dr. Newman's,[11] that ἐν ὁσιότητι καρδίας means simply "piously," and the whole expression signifies

[1] *St. Clement*, c. xxiii.
[2] C. xxii.
[3] C. xxx.
[4] C. xxxi.
[5] "The greatness of this gift," *ibid.* c. xxxii.
[6] C. xxx.
[7] C. xxix.
[8] C. xxviii.
[9] C. xxvii.
[10] C. xxxii.
[11] *Op. cit.* p. 436.

a supposed case, and not a real one, that "even *if* we did any good works before we were justified, *which we did not*, yet our justification would not be by them, but by the will of God, through faith." The point of the whole passage is that the source of grace is God, not ourselves; it is "His gift." [1] But this is no reason for relaxation of our efforts, but rather for increasing them. He therefore bids us "do all those things that pertain unto holiness," [2] to "strive with all earnestness, that we may be found in the number of those that wait for Him; that so we may receive the reward which He has promised"; we are to "fix our minds by faith towards God, and seek those things that are pleasing and acceptable unto Him," to "act conformably to His holy will, and follow the way of truth, casting off from us all unrighteousness and iniquity." [3] This, he says, is the way in which we may find "our Saviour, the defender and helper of our weakness," and have "our eyes opened by Him and our foolish and darkened understanding rejoice to behold His wonderful light." [4] So let us remain "in the order in which we are placed by the gift of God," [5] "joining ourselves to the innocent and righteous, for such are the elect of God," for "one Spirit of grace is poured out among us all," [6] and this "holiness and righteousness" is "the gate of righteousness, opening unto life," "at which blessed are all they that enter in." [7] All who shall finally "obtain a place among the righteous" shall do so "by the grace of God," "having been made perfect in love." [8] In the same chapter, he says, paraphrasing the words of our Lord (St. Luke vii. 47), that "through love our sins will be forgiven us." St. Paul says it is "through faith," but his "fellow-labourer" here says "through love," *i.e.* as Newman points out "fides formata per charitatem." [9]

2. *II. Clement* (*so-called*).—For convenience' sake we will consider this writing here, although it is certainly not by St. Clement at all, neither is it an Epistle, but a homily

[1] On the passage in question see Harold Browne on *The Thirty-nine Articles*, p. 276.

[2] *St. Clement*, c. xxx.

[3] C. xxxv. We note how far he is, in this passage, from holding the Calvinist doctrine of "assurance" and of the indefectibility of grace!

[4] C. xxxvi.

[5] C. xxxviii.

[6] C. xlvi.

[7] C. xlviii.

[8] C. l.

[9] *Op. cit.* p. 437.

addressed to a congregation in church by a Gentile Christian of the early part of the second century. In the opening chapter he heaps up expressions to emphasise the grace of God; "He has illuminated us," "called us His children," "has saved us who were lost and undone"; "we were defective in our understaindings," "encompassed with darkness and having a mist before our eyes," but "He had compassion upon us," and "saved us, who had no hope of salvation but only through Him. For He called us who were not and was pleased from nothing to give us a being."[1] He "called us who were already lost" and "showed so great mercy towards us" that "we have been brought to the knowledge of the Father of truth" and therefore we "must do those things which He saith."[2] We must put forth great effort to do good works, for "if such righteous men (*i.e.* Noah, Job and Daniel, see Ezek. xiv. 14, 20) are not able by their righteousness to deliver their children, how can we hope to enter into the kingdom of God, except we keep our baptism holy and undefiled? Or who shall be our advocate, unless we shall be found to have done what is holy and just?"[3] The writer's view is, plainly, that it is works that matter, and throughout the homily he is continually inciting his hearers to fresh exertions and greater pains to do what is good and holy. Yet, once at least, we have another view glanced at timidly for a moment, though not worked out to its conclusion. He makes use of St. Paul's[4] (or rather Isaiah's) figure of the potter and the clay,[5] but in a somewhat different sense. The potter, before the clay is baked, can alter it as he will, so, while we are yet in this life, God can alter us by repentance, that we may be saved by Him, but as the clay is no longer plastic after passing through the furnace, so neither are we after passing out of this world. Therefore, the conclusion is (apparently almost a *non sequitur!*): because we are as clay in the hands of the potter, let us do the will of the Father, keep our flesh pure and observe His commandments!

The writer betrays no suspicion whatever of a righteousness which is merely imputed, a cloak thrown over the sinful heart which still remains sinful *per se!* He says, "Let us serve God with a pure heart, and we shall *be* righteous."[6]

[1] *II. Clement*, c. i. [2] Cc. ii., iii. [3] C. vi.
[4] Rom. ix. 20–24; Isa. xxix. 16; xlv. 8–10.
[5] *II. Clement*, c. viii. [6] C. xi.

Neither does he know anything of an assurance so certain that it can never be repealed, but urges the shamefulness of a "soul which knows God" being lost.[1] A sentence which needs remark is found in c. xv. where he speaks of "the reward that we are able to pay back unto God"; he does not seem to have in mind the idea of merit and reward, which was developed later by Tertullian and Cyprian; the reward is "faith and love," virtues which, above all others, preclude the legal ideas formulated later, and all systems of bargaining with God. His meaning is simply that in return for God's grace and loving-kindness to us, we should render Him a loving trust.

3. *Barnabas.*—The Epistle which goes under this name is, it is now generally allowed, not to be referred to "the Son of Consolation," the fellow-apostle of St. Paul, but is rather a work of the early part of the second century, somewhere between the years A.D. 95 and 120, and addressed, it is almost certain, to the Church of Alexandria. Its standpoint is rather like that of the heretic Marcion, though somewhat before his time. We shall find, however, very little in it to detain us. The subject is just touched upon, but that is all. In the first chapter there is a clear testimony as to the objectivity of grace, which is first called "the grace which was grafted in you," and then explained as "a spirit infused into you." We could not expect anything clearer than this; grace is something real and definite, it is a gift of God, not merely an attribute, it is infused into man, and not only looking towards him. He then exhorts them to "give diligence to inquire into the righteous judgments of the Lord," having "fear and patience as the assistants of our faith." And this diligent inquiry is "in order that the adversary may not have any extrance into us and deprive us of our spiritual life."[2] By the Christian revelation "God has manifested His foreknowledge and mercy to us; because the people which He has purchased to His beloved Son were to believe in sincerity."[3]

Our sanctification is "through the forgiveness of our sins," "by the sprinkling of the blood" of Christ, "Who gave up His body to destruction,"[4] and by this "remission of our sins we are renewed, and He has put us into another frame, that we should have souls like those of children,

[1] *II. Clement*, c. xvii.
[2] *Barnabas*, c. ii.
[3] C. iii.
[4] C. v.

forming us again Himself by the Spirit," [1] or again, "Having received remission of our sins, and trusting in the name of the Lord, we are become renewed, being again created, as it were from the beginning; wherefore God truly dwells in our house, that is, in us." [2] The writer is somewhat tinged with the Gnostic idea that salvation consists in "knowledge," though, as we have shown, he also holds that it consists in the renewal of the whole being and in obedience to God's commands through His assistance.[3] The grace of repentance is a gift of God,[4] as also wisdom and understanding.[5]

4. *The Didachè.*—This treatise might almost be passed by without comment, so few are the references it contains, were it not that it contains one which presents a different view of the subject from any we have hitherto found. The document is usually dated about A.D. 100 in its present form, though it is allowed that much in it is earlier, and the groundwork may even be pre-Christian. We must note the idea expressed in c. iv. that God only comes to call "those whom the Spirit hath made ready." There is plainly recognised here the duality of working of God's grace, the outward calling, and the inward preparation of the heart. In the Eucharistic thanksgiving in c. x. there is contained a petition, "Let grace come and let this world pass away." From the context of this (following clauses of the Lord's Prayer, expanded and applied) it seems to be equivalent to "Thy Kingdom come." Finally, in c. xvi. it is enunciated that "the whole time of your faith will not profit you, if ye do not become perfect in the last time," but "they that endure in their faith shall be saved from this curse" (*i.e.* from perishing). The treatise is full of practical exhortation, and is therefore another witness against Solifidianism.

5. *Hermas* wrote a peculiar work which he entitled "the Shepherd," a book of "visions, commands and similitudes" which he claims were divinely revealed to him. The book must be dated quite early in the second century, and the writer seems to have been a Christian prophet at Rome, and probably brother of Pope Pius I. God's foreknowledge is alluded to when Hermas is reproved for not ruling well his sons, whom he is to continue "to admonish

[1] *Barnabas*, c. vi. [2] C. xvi. [3] C. xv.
[4] C. xvi. [5] Cc. vi., xxi.

for the Lord knows that they will repent with all their heart, and they shall be written in the book of life." There is here represented, then, a simple knowledge of future events by God.[1] He teaches also a limit to the time of repentance allowed to "the elect," though the heathen are given a *locus penitentiæ* even to the last day.[2] Hermas is assured of his present state of salvation and of the future if he shall "continue in simplicity and singular continency";[3] the visions, however, are not given to him for his goodness and holiness, but "that the name of God may be glorified."[4] In the third vision, of the building of the Church, a large variety of destinies is declared to be in store for various classes of men. "Those who believed only in hypocrisy, but departed not from their evil ways" shall not be saved at all, but are cast away. Others, however, "may repent, but will not come into the tower," *i.e.* will not have the full Vision of God.[5] In the fourth vision the righteous man escapes great trials "by the power of God and through His singular mercy" because of his faith and his casting of his care upon God, whereupon God sends His special grace to assist his servant.

Hermas teaches that the presence of grace at one time does not guarantee its continuance, for "the Spirit, being tender, cannot tarry with the evil one, but departs and dwells with him that is meek. When, therefore, it is departed from the man in whom it dwelt, that man becomes destitute of the Holy Spirit, and is afterwards filled with wicked spirits, and is blinded with evil thoughts."[6]

He plainly shows his belief, also, in "guardian angels" by assigning[7] two angels to every man, "one of righteousness, the other of iniquity." He seems to attribute equal powers over man's thoughts and deeds to both of these, so that the destiny of man depends upon the final balance between the activities of these two within him. He seems, however, in some way, to leave the decision to follow or refuse to follow their promptings with the man himself.[8] Cheerfulness is said to be a mark of grace, and sadness "to

[1] *Hermas*, Bk. I. vis. i. c. 3.
[2] Vis. ii. c. 2.
[3] *Ibid.* c. 3.
[4] Vis. iii. c. 4.
[5] *Ibid.* c. 7.
[6] Bk. II. comm. v. c. 2.
[7] *Ibid.* vi. 2.
[8] "Seeing, therefore, thou knowest his works, depart from them all. . . . thou seest, therefore, how it is good to follow the angel of righteousness. If therefore thou shalt follow him and submit to his works, thou shalt live unto God."

grieve the Holy Spirit." [1] The operations of God's spirit are not "when a man will, but when God pleases," [2] so that grace is uncertain in its workings. The presence of grace is "the Lord God in the heart," and to those who have God thus within them, His commands are easy, pleasant, gentle and holy.[3] This is real freedom, and not that state of heart (if it could be imagined) in which dwells neither God nor the devil. "The devil may strive" against the servants of God, "but he cannot overcome them, who trust in God with all their hearts . . . but if he finds them empty (of faith) he destroys them." [4]

The awfulness of sin against grace is taught in the words "if thou shalt defile thy body, thou shalt also at the same time defile the Holy Spirit; and if thou shalt defile the Holy Spirit, thou shalt not live." The body which was the possession of the Son of God was perfect and served His Spirit perfectly, nor ever defiled It, and therefore was rewarded as "every pure body shall receive its reward." [5]

Hermas distinctly holds the doctrine of predestination "according to foreseen merit," as is evident from the statement that God "gave His spirit to them that were found worthy of repentance, . . . whose minds the Lord foresaw would be pure, and that they would serve Him with all their hearts; to them He gave repentance." But he does not shut up all the rest unto condemnation for he says "to these also repentance is offered, for thou seest that some of these have repented." [6] The need of works as well as faith is emphasised, as also that all who repent and amend their ways shall be saved if they believe and do good works. But he seems to say that we can do *more* works than God requires, and thus to *deserve* more glory.[7] But it is laid down that "by reason of their evil-doings, they deserve not to attain unto salvation" [8] so that their salvation is not of themselves, but of God's grace, Who sent His angel of repentance and "refreshed our spirits, which were almost gone, and who had no hope of salvation, but are now refreshed to the renewal of life." [9]

Again, "before a man receives the name of the Son of God, he is ordained unto death; but when he receives that

[1] *Hermas*, Bk. II. x. 3.
[2] II. xi. 2.
[3] II. xii. 4.
[4] *Ibid.* c. 5.
[5] Bk. III. sim. v., cc. 6, 7.
[6] III. viii. 6, 7.
[7] III. v. 3.
[8] *Ibid.* cc. 9, 11.
[9] III. ix. 14.

seal, he is freed from death and assigned unto life," *i.e.* the reception of grace brings with it the potentiality of life.[1] The offer of grace is made to all the world, and indeed, "all the nations which are under heaven have heard and believed in the same one name of the Son of God, by whom they are called. Wherefore, having received His seal, they have all been made partakers of the same understanding and knowledge; and their faith and charity have been the same." [2] So there is hope of salvation for every one, if they will but hear the messengers sent to them. The righteous find blessing in everything, for "the Lord, seeing their simplicity and innocence, has increased them in the works of their hands, and given them grace in all their works," [3] so that every deed of theirs is in some way a means of grace to them. The differing Christian virtues are represented as virgins who are sent to dwell with the righteous man and "all of them have grace with the Lord," *i.e.* acceptance, but it also includes the more active sense, for it says also that "these commands (which He has given thee) cannot be kept without these virgins." [4] The office of the ministry is also a means of grace, for: "declare to all men the great things of God, and thou shalt find grace in this ministry." [5] Thus we come to the close of the writing of Hermas.

6. *St. Ignatius*, Bishop of Antioch, wrote seven epistles, viz. to the Churches of the Ephesians, Magnesians, Trallians, Romans, Philadelphians, and Smyrnæans, and to St. Polycarp, Bishop of Smyrna, on his way from Antioch to his martyrdom at Rome in A.D. 115. The other five epistles once attributed to him have been proved spurious, while, although four of those enumerated above have been doubted, nevertheless their genuinenesss may be considered to be thoroughly proved.[6]

(*a*) *To the Ephesians.*—In the salutation he addresses the Ephesian Church as "predestinated before the world began" unto glory; he does not refer to individual predestination, but to corporate. He says he has heard of their name which they "have very justly attained by a habit of righteousness, according to the faith and love

[1] *Hermas*, Bk. III. ix, c. 16. [2] *Ibid.* c. 17.
[3] *Ibid.* c. 24. [4] III. x. 3. [5] *Ibid.* c. 4.
[6] See Pearson, *Vindiciæ Epistolarum Sancti Ignatii*, and especially Lightfoot, *Apostolic Fathers*, Part II.

which is in Christ Jesus our Saviour."[1] We have here the first presentation of righteousness as a *habit, i.e.* not "a garment," which is the primal sense of the Latin *habitus*, but "a custom, a method of conduct," as we now understand our English word "habit," the fixed result of constant effort, the beginnings of a formed character, the product in this instance of many acts of faith and love. He likens the Holy Spirit to a rope, and "he would say that the grace of the Spirit brings the machinery of Redemption into vital connection with the individual soul."[2] He bids them "love the grace that we at present enjoy."[3] grace here meaning God's loving-kindness towards us, for it is contrasted with "the wrath that is to come." He postulates faith as the beginning of spiritual life, and charity as its end, which two are "joined together of God"[4] and "all other things which concern a holy life are the consequences of these. No man professing a true faith sinneth; neither does he who has charity hate any. The tree is made manifest by its fruit; so they who profess themselves to be Christians are known by what they do; for Christianity is not the work of an outward profession; but shows itself in the power of faith if a man be found faithful unto the end."[5] Once again we see the stress laid upon the impossibility of any divorce between faith and conduct, a true belief and a holy life; and also that faith and love are inseparably joined together and bring all other virtues in their train. Grace is to be obtained through prayers and even through the prayers of others, he firmly believes.[6]

(*b*) *To the Magnesians.*—In this letter he contrasts the observance of the Jewish law and the possession of grace, stating that if any still live according to the Jewish law, they confess themselves not to have received grace,[7] the two being incompatible according to his mind, as also to St. Paul's. But he considers the holy prophets (*i.e.* of the Old Testament) to have lived acccording to Christ Jesus, and to have been inspired by His grace, thus confessing that grace was given (though sporadically) before the Incarna-

[1] C. i.

[2] C. ix.; quotation is from Swete, *The Holy Spirit in the Ancient Church*, p. 15.

[3] C. xi.

[4] Cf. *Ad Magn.* cc. vi., xiii.

[5] C. xiv.

[6] C. xx.

[7] C. viii.

tion, yet, nevertheless, flowing from it, for it was "His grace"![1]

(*c*) *To the Trallians.*—In this letter we find nothing to our purpose except the statement that "the Blood of Christ cleanses us from the Old Transgression,"[2] by which expression he evidently means to trace the origin of sin to Adam; so we pass on to:

(*d*) *To the Romans,* where we must note but one matter, viz. the uncertainty of grace, even unto the end. He, on the very eve of his martyrdom, when he might be thought to have been able to be assured, if any one might ever be so, yet speaks conditionally: "the beginning is well-disposed, if I shall but have grace, without hindrance, to receive what is appointed for me;"[3] there is still the possibility of his falling away and forfeiting "what is appointed for" him.

(*e*) *To the Philadelphians.*—In this there are but two references to grace which, it is quite obvious, here means "forgiveness."[4]

(*f*) *To the Smyrnæans.*—He has a firm belief in the power of grace over even the hardest hearts; they are to pray for confirmed heretics, "that if it be the will of God, they may repent; which will yet be very hard. But of this our Lord Jesus Christ has the power,"[5] so there is hope for all. He is certain that his beliefs about grace are quite true, "those who are of a different opinion from us as to what concerns the grace of Jesus Christ which is come unto us, how contrary they are to the design of God!"[6] His reward is due to grace, being entirely undeserved;[7] and he prays that grace to reward the deacon Burrhus also.[8]

(*g*) *To St. Polycarp.*—Though he likens grace to a garment here, yet he does not regard it as clothing a man who still lives a sinful life, but one whose "mind is fixed toward God," who "supports all in love" and "whose spirit is always awake."[9] The grace of God in men is to make them "ready to every good work"[10] and so be fruitful.

This concludes the teaching of Ignatius, and we next pass to:

7. *St. Polycarp,* the aged Bishop of Smyrna, to whom St. Ignatius wrote the letter we have just considered, who

[1] C. viii. [2] *Ad Trall.* c. viii. [3] C. i.
[4] Cc. viii., xi. [5] C. iv. [6] C. vi.
[7] C. xi. [8] C. xii. [9] C. i. [10] C. vii.

had been the personal disciple of St. John the Apostle and Evangelist, and who suffered martyrdom in A.D. 155. It is practically certain, however, that his epistle to the Philippians, the only one now extant (though he probably wrote others), was written in A.D. 116 or 117. He impresses on them that "by grace they are saved not by works, but by the will of God through Jesus Christ." [1] If a man has "the faith" and is "followed with hope and led on by a general love, both towards God, and towards Christ, and towards our neighbour . . . he has fulfilled the law of righteousness; for he that has charity is far from all sin." [2] He likewise, we observe, holds the intimate conjunction of faith and love, adding also hope as a third necessary virtue for salvation, though he omits it in chapter x. He has a trust in the Justice of God, and is confident that those who have "run in faith and righteousness, are gone to the place that was due to them from the Lord"; we have here the beginning of the teaching of the doctrine of the "merits of the saints" which was so disastrously developed in later times.[3]

8. *The Epistle of the Church of Smyrna* concerning the Martyrdom of St. Polycarp seems to have been written soon after the event, *i.e.* in A.D. 155. It declares the tragedy to have been God's will, and "ascribes the power and ordering of all things unto Him," [4] and declares the martyr to have been "supported by the grace of Christ," and "full of grace" [5] of God, Who had "made choice of" him and "is able to bring us all by His grace and help to His eternal kingdom." [6] Grace here must, obviously, mean active help and assistance, or the passages become meaningless.

9. *The Epistle to Diognetus.*—This anonymous epistle used formerly to be ascribed to Justin Martyr, but it is almost certainly not his, though probably contemporary with or, rather, slightly earlier than his writings, being usually dated about A.D. 150. The author says he was a disciple of the Apostles and appears to have been born before the destruction of Jerusalem. The description of God's method of dealing with mankind, contained in chapters ix. and x. of this beautiful little treatise, is very useful for our inquiry. Most eloquently he shows how God's purpose was eternal,

[1] C. i. [2] C. iii. [3] C. ix.
[4] C. ii. [5] Cc. ii., vi., xii. [6] C. xx.

but not made manifest until the fulness of time, though "He in Himself, together with His Son, knew all things in His dispensation."[1] His reason for this was "in order that we being convinced of our unworthiness to attain life through our own works in that time, might now be made worthy through the kindness of God; and having made it manifest that by our own strength it was impossible to enter the kingdom of God, we might be enabled to enter by the power of God. . . . In the foregoing time, then, He convinced us that our nature could not attain life, but now He revealed the Saviour, able to save even the helpless."[2] He goes on to say that through Christ "grace abounding is plenteous among the saints, . . . vouchsafed as a gift to those that seek," and further proceeds to call it "the grace of the Church" as contrasted with "the grace of the prophets" under the law; but this grace must not "be grieved," which plainly shows that by "grace" he understands the gift of the Holy Spirit, Who is given to them that ask for Him.[3] He then draws a lesson from the trees of Paradise, the two trees, of knowledge and of life, being planted contiguous to one another to teach us that "neither is there life without knowledge, nor is knowledge secure without true life."[4] Grace is, then, both life and knowledge, not as said the Gnostics, and Pelagius after them, merely teaching and illumination.

We have now drawn out the teaching of all the Apostolic Fathers and other writings grouped therewith, with the sole exception of *Papias*, Bishop of Hierapolis, in the early part of the second century. Of his writings we only know one by name, the "Exposition of the Oracles of the Lord," and of this we only know about half a dozen sentences which are quoted by Eusebius in his "Ecclesiastical History." In these, there is nothing whatever bearing on this subject, even remotely.

We have examined these writings somewhat minutely in order to establish two things: (1) that though the writers are far from treating formally of this doctrine (or indeed of *any* particular doctrine!) yet there is an abundance of slight references to it; and (2) that these Fathers did not hold, as is popularly supposed, a rather Pelagian view of grace, nor did they hold a modern Calvinistic view, or, again,

[1] C. ix. [2] C. x.
[3] C. xi. [4] C. xii.

a strict Augustinian doctrine, but seem to combine various features, so far as can be ascertained, of the first and last of these, leaning rather, however, towards the latter. The difficulties of expressing their views by any definite name are due chiefly to the fact that the subject had not yet become a matter of controversy, and so it had not been found necessary to define it with any exactness. We may, however, sum their teaching up briefly as follows:

(1) "Grace," though retaining many of its old meanings, usually signifies an active and objective gift of God to man.
(2) It is gratuitous, *i.e.* not merited; and bestowed by Christ.
(3) It is bestowed in consequence of God's eternal purpose to save mankind.
(4) It, in some sense, repairs the ravages of sin. (This damage is not, however, greatly dwelt upon, or minutely defined.)
(5) It begins with faith, though it cannot end there, but must bear the fruit of good works, and of all the virtues; and has charity for its end.

The next group with which we have to deal is that of the *Apologists*, so called because they wrote ἀπολογίαι, or "defences" of the Christian religion, addressed as a rule to Emperors or Imperial officers. The most notable are Justin Martyr, Tatian, Athenagoras, Theophilus and Minucius Felix. We will begin with—

1. *Justin Martyr* (born *c.* 89, died 161–168), a native of Flavia Neapolis (Sychem) in Samaria, became a philosopher, first a Platonist and then a Stoic, and even after his conversion to Christianity remained such, and still wore the threadbare garb of the philosopher. He wrote two "Apologies," one to the Emperor Antoninus Pius, the other to the Roman Senate, also a "Cohortatio ad Græcos" and a "Dialogus cum Tryphone Judæo." His second Apology proved the cause of his death, to which he was hounded by the Cynic philosopher Crescens, whose enmity it aroused. His Apologies are variously dated from 138 to 155, but the most probable date is that given by Volkmar, *i.e.* both in 150. His teaching is that man is the creature of God, both body and soul, and is the end of all creation.[1] The

[1] Καὶ πάντα τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα δημιουργῆσαι αὐτὸν ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης δι' ἀνθρώπους δεδιδάγμεθα (*Apol.* i. 10).

soul of man is immortal [1]; and he has been supposed to teach that it is an emanation from the Deity,[2] but the phrase is probably not an expression of his own opinion, but of that of the Gnostics which he wishes to refute. He holds that Gentile teaching on immortality has been borrowed from the Jewish scriptures,[3] though he also allows that Christ was "the Logos in which all the race of men partook. And those who lived with the Word are Christians even if they were accounted atheists," [4] owing to the "seed of the Word inborn in every race of men," so that "they nobly uttered what they saw akin to the part of the divine seminal Word which they had received." [5] It is only by God's self-revelation that men could know the things of religion, *i.e.* by the grace of God.[6] He emphasises the *αὐτεξούσιον*, the self-determination of the human soul, as do the other Apologists, and the Greek and Alexandrian Fathers, and boldly combats determinism. "For this we term 'fated,' that is, unavoidable, that deserved rewards are given to those who choose the good, and likewise due recompense to those who choose the opposite. For God did not create man like the rest, for example, trees and four-footed beasts, unable to do anything by free choice; for neither would he have been worthy of requital or of praise if he did not derive the good from himself but was made so, nor if he were evil would he be justly punished, not being so by his own doing, but being unable to be anything different from what he was made.[7] Man must therefore be a moral being and have freedom to do good or evil, as he feels inclined. Yet he complains of the universality of sin, and confesses that the whole human race is under the curse, for cursed is every one who keeps not the law.[8] The Fall was due chiefly to the cunning and malice of the devil, the beast who seduced man, though on man's part there was disobedience and unbelief,[9] yet elsewhere he seems to

[1] Ἡ μὲν ψυχή ἐστιν ἄφθαρτος (*Fragm. de Resurrectione*, 11).

[2] Μέρος οὖσα τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ ἐμφύσημα (*ibid.*).

[3] *Apol.* i. 44.

[4] *Ibid.* i. 46.

[5] *Ibid.* ii. 8, 13.

[6] Οἴεσθε ἂν, ἡμᾶς ποτε, ὦ ἄνδρες, νενοηκέναι δυνηθῆναι ἐν ταῖς γραφαῖς ταῦτα, εἰ μὴ θελήματι τοῦ θελησάντος αὐτὰ ἐλαθόμεθα χάριν τοῦ νοῆσαι (*Dial. c. Tryph.* c. 92; cf. cc. 32, 100, 119, 121).

[7] *Apol.* i. 43.

[8] *Dial. c. Tryph.* c. 95.

[9] *Ibid.* cc. 79, 119.

ascribe the origin of evil to the sensuous nature.[1] Man is not so fallen as to have lost his right moral feelings,[2] though every man deserves death because he resembles Adam in his transgression.[3] He seems to teach the doctrine of original sin in the passage, *Παρθένος οὖσα Εὔα καὶ ἄφθορος τὸν λόγον τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄφεως συλλαβοῦσα, παρακοὴν καὶ θάνατον ἔτεκε*,[4] but when we consider the amount of evidence there is for the prevalence of what is called "the Clementine theory,"[5] we are inclined to doubt whether this interpretation is as obvious as it looks. Yet he plainly calls unregenerate men "children of necessity and of ignorance," who by baptism become "children of free choice and of the knowledge of the remission of sins."[6] Men must therefore repent, believe that Jesus is the Christ, and keep His commands, and they shall receive remission of their sins.[7] True repentance is known by its external signs, such as tears, etc.[8] Yet divine grace is necessary for salvation,[9] although he only seems to attribute to it a power to work *with* the human will, which can actively set itself in the right direction by its own efforts.[10] God's predestination of men is dependent upon His foreknowledge of their future merits, but this does not make God the author of those wicked actions which He has foreseen, *e.g.* the crucifixion of our Lord by the Jews. He foretells certain evil actions, not because He causes, but simply because He foresees them;[11] "not because we say that they should so happen by fatal necessity, but because God foreknew the future actions of all men."[12] So God postpones the punishment of evil men until "the foreknown number of the good and

[1] *Apol.* i. 10; *De Res.* c. 3.

[2] *Τὰ γὰρ ἀεὶ καὶ δι' ὅλου δίκαια καὶ πᾶσαν δικαιοσύνην παρέχει ἐν παντὶ γένει ἀνθρώπων· καὶ ἔστι πᾶν γένος γνώριζον ὅτι μοιχεία κακόν, καὶ πορνεία, καὶ ἀνδροφονία, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα* (*Dial. c. Tryph.* c. 93).

[3] *Ibid.* c. 124. Cf. also *Dial. c. Tryph.* c. 79, "Mankind, who through Adam had fallen under death by the deception of the serpent."

[4] *Dial. c. Tryph.* c. 100.

[5] See below, p. 172.

[6] *Apol.* i. 61.

[7] *Dial. c. Tryph.* c. 95.

[8] *Ibid.* c. 141.

[9] *Ἐπὶ Θεὸν τὸν πάντα ποιήσαντα ἐλπίζειν δεῖ πάντας, καὶ παρ' ἐκείνου μόνου σωτηρίαν καὶ βοηθείαν ζητεῖν* (*ibid.*).

[10] *Apol.* i. 10; *Dial. c. Tryph.* c. 32.

[11] *Dial.* c. 141.

[12] *Apol.* i. 44.

virtuous should be fulfilled.[1] We will now leave Justin, and pass on to the next writer.

2. *Tatian*, the Syrian, called by Dorner "the Assyrian Tertullian," was a disciple and convert of Justin Martyr's, and is chiefly known on account of his great harmony of the Four Gospels, the *Diatessaron*, which he compiled somewhere about A.D. 160–170. He also wrote a work, the λόγος πρὸς Ἕλληνας (*Oratio contra Græcos*), which furnishes some material for our purpose. He, like his master, lays great stress upon the self-determination of the will, basing upon it the justice of punishment and reward.[2] He holds that the soul was created mortal, but by the knowledge of God becomes immortal.[3] Tatian explains the propensity of man to evil by the sovereignty of demons. Their influence, however, though very strong indeed, did not amount to absolute compulsion, and so man still has the αὐτεξούσιον.[4] The demoniac influence excites within man sinful desires which, if gratified, with the assent of the will, produce actual sin. In this he differs somewhat from Justin, for, as Harnack remarks, "the idea that the demon sovereignty has led to some change in the psychological condition and capacities of man is absolutely unknown to Justin."[5] Nevertheless, in the passage quoted above (*Dialogus cum Tryphone, c.* 100), Justin allows some kind of demoniac influence upon Eve.

3. *Athenagoras* was born at Athens in the latter part of the second century, but beyond this, hardly anything is known of his life though he is said to have been the teacher of Clement of Alexandria. Two of his works are in existence, but we do not know whether he wrote any others; the two are, *De resurrectione mortuorum* and *Legatio pro Christianis* (πρεσβεία περὶ χριστιανῶν), the former being the dogmatic,

[1] *Apol.* i. 44.

[2] Τὸ δὲ ἑκάτερον τῆς ποιήσεως εἶδος αὐτεξούσιον γέγονε, τἀγαθοῦ φύσιν μὴ ἔχον, ὃ πλὴν μόνον παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, τῇ δὲ ἐλευθερίᾳ τῆς προαιρέσεως ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐκτελειούμενον· ὅπως ὁ μὲν φαῦλος δικαίως κολάζηται, δι' αὐτὸν, γεγονὼς μοχθηρός· ὁ δὲ δίκαιος χάριν τῶν ἀνδραγαθημάτων ἀξίως ἐπαινῆται κατὰ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον τοῦ θεοῦ μὴ παραβὰς τὸ βούλημα (*Oratio*, c. 7).

[3] Οὔκ ἐστιν ἀθάνατος ἡ ψυχὴ καθ' ἑαυτήν, θνητὴ δέ· Ἀλλά δύναται ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ μὴ ἀποθνήσκειν· Θνήσκει μὲν γὰρ καὶ λύεται μετὰ τοῦ σώματος μὴ γινώσκουσα τήν ἀλήθειαν· Ἀνίσταται δὲ εἰς ὕστερον ἐπὶ συντελείᾳ τοῦ κόσμου σὺν τῷ σώματι, θάνατον διὰ τιμωρίας ἐν ἀθανασίᾳ λαμβάνουσα· Πάλιν δὲ οὐ θνήσκει, κἂν πρὸς καιρὸν λυθῇ, τὴν ἐπίγνωσιν τοῦ θεοῦ πεποιημένη (*Oratio*, c. 13).

[4] *Ibid.* c. 7.

[5] *History of Dogma*, vol. i. p. 216, n. 2.

the latter an apologetic work. God, he says, created the world Himself, directly, and made man as its summit and end.[1] He made man, not because He stood in any need of him for His own glory (διὰ χρείαν ἰδίαν) nor yet without a purpose (μάτην), but for man's sake (δι' ἑαυτόν), that man may ultimately be a sharer in His own wisdom and goodness.[2] All the disorders of the world, physical as well as moral, are the work of the devil and his demons. The devil (ἀντίθεον) is not a being co-existent with God from the beginning, but a creature (γενόμενον μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ). God made man to do good and not evil, but gave him a will to decide either way, "God did not create us as sheep or brute beasts, so it is not natural that we should will to do evil."[3] Like Tatian, he attributes evil to the sovereignty of the demons over man, rather than to a bondage of the will as the result of original sin.[4]

4. *Theophilus*, who was sixth bishop of Antioch, according to Eusebius, wrote his Apology, addressed to his friend Antolycus, about A.D. 170 or shortly after; it is entitled περὶ τῆς τῶν χριστιανῶν πίστεως. Man, he says, is free.[5] Adam was a νήπιος, and had to be treated as a child.[6] He was created neither mortal nor immortal, but capable of both.[7] He disputes the idea that the physical death of our first parents, caused by the poisonous fruit of the tree, exhausts the meaning of the sentence on their disobedience.[8] Salvation is by faith, which he seems to understand as a historic faith only,[9] receiving and holding as proved, the things which are alleged by the Christian tradition.

[1] *Legatio*, 16.
[2] *De Resur.*, c. 12.
[3] *Legat.*, 31; cf. also *De Res.*, 12, 13, 15, 18.
[4] *Legat.*, 25.
[5] Ἐλεύθερον γὰρ καὶ αὐτεξούσιον ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς ἄνθρωπον (*Ad. Autol.*, ii. 27).
[6] *Ad. Autol.*, ii. 24.
[7] Εἰ γάρ ὁ θεὸς ἀθάνατον τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀπ' ἀρχῆς πεποιήκει, θεὸν αὐτὸν πεποιήκει· πάλιν εἰ θνητὸν αὐτὸν πεποιήκει ἐδόκει ἄν ὁ θεὸς αἴτιος εἶναι τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ· Οὔτε οὖν ἀθάνατον αὐτὸν ἐποίησεν οὔτε μὴν θνητόν, ἀλλὰ δεκτικὸν ἀμφοτέρων· ἵνα, εἰ ῥέψῃ ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς ἀθανασίας τηρήσας τὴν ἐντολὴν τοῦ θεοῦ, μισθὸν κομίσηται παρ' αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀθανασίαν καὶ γένηται θεός, εἰ δ' αὖ τραπῇ ἐπὶ τὰ τοῦ θανάτου πράγματα παρακούσας τοῦ θεοῦ, αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ αἴτιος ᾖ τοῦ θανάτου (*Ad. Autol.*, ii. 27).
[8] Οὐ γὰρ ὡς οἴονταί τινες, θάνατον εἶχε τὸ ξύλον ἀλλ' ἡ παρακοή (*ibid.* ii. 25).
[9] *Ibid.* i. 14.

5. *Minucius Felix.*—This is the only notable *Latin* Apologist; he was a distinguished Roman lawyer and flourished about A.D. 230, but although thus late in date, his work (the *Octavius*) is generally classed with the earlier Apologies. With them, he upholds the power of the will in man and his responsibility.[1] When Cæcilius, the Pagan, objects that the Christians believed that God judges man according to predestination and not according to his actual conduct, *Octavius* indignantly denies it, as a false idea.[2] Minucius bases the predestination of God upon His foreknowledge of human conduct.[3] He seems to have the idea that salvation is by *knowledge*, or at any rate, that it contributed largely towards it.[4] The orthodoxy of this depends, of course, upon his interpretation of "notitia," by which, however, he seems to mean "an instructed faith."

We have now treated of the Apologists in detail, and in conclusion will sum up their teaching on the subject of freedom and grace. As Harnack remarks, "The Apologetic theology necessarily adhered to the two following propositions:

(1) The freedom to do what is good is not lost and cannot be. This doctrine was opposed to philosophic determinism and popular fatalism.

(2) The desires of the flesh resulting from the constitution of man only become evil when they destroy or endanger the sovereignty of reason. The formal *liberum arbitrium* explains the possibility of sin, whilst its actual existence is accounted for by the desire that is excited by the demons."[5]

He also points out that in their teaching, "men are beings possessed of soul and body, endowed with reason and freedom, and therefore made in the image of God; beings who are to partake of the blessedness and perfection of God. As beings possessed of soul and body, men are neither mortal nor immortal, but capable either of death or immor-

[1] "Nec de fato quisquam aut solatium captet aut excuset eventum. Sit sortis fortuna, mens tamen libera est, et ideo actus hominis, non dignitas judicatur": *Octav.* c. 36.

[2] *Ibid.* xi. 6.

[3] *Ibid.* c. 36.

[4] "Imperitia Dei sufficit ad pænam, notitia prodest ad veniam": *Ibid.* c. 35.

[5] *History of Dogma*, p. 216, n. 2.

tality. . . . In giving man reason and freedom as an inalienable possession God destined him for incorruptibility, by the attainment of which he was to become a being similar to God. To the gift of imperishability God, however, attached the condition of man's preserving τὰ τῆς ἀθανασίας, *i.e.* preserving the knowledge of God and maintaining a holy walk in imitation of the divine perfection. This demand is as natural as it is just; moreover, nobody can fulfil it in man's stead, for an essential feature of virtue is its being free, independent action. Man must therefore determine himself to virtue by the knowledge that he is only in this way obedient to the Father of the world and is able to reckon on the gift of immortality." [1]

At the same time while they are sure that virtue is a matter of freedom, they are equally sure that no soul is virtuous unless it obeys God's will. We note also, in their teaching, the absence of any idea of the depravity of human nature; all evil seems to them to be due to some external influence, not to have its roots within the man.

We must now turn aside from the teaching of the Catholic Church and note that of heretics, viz. that of the differing sects of *Gnostics*. This broad title includes all those widely divergent sects which arose outside the Church in the second century of our era. Their main error is their conception of Christianity as a new philosophy of the universe or of history. They form, in the main, a pagan reaction from the Christian religion, and can really only be termed Christian at all on account of their blending with many Jewish and heathen speculations, the doctrine of redemption through Christ; their principal feature is the exaltation of knowledge at the expense of faith, and the making of an aristocratic distinction between those who know and those who only believe. There are usually said to be three schools of Gnostic thought, (1) the *Syrian*, represented by Saturninus and Bardesanes, the characteristics of which were its dualism and its asceticism; (2) the *Egyptian* or *Alexandrian*, the most numerous, represented by Basilides, Carpocrates, Valentinus, Epiphanes, the Ophites, etc. Its distinguishing characteristics were a Platonic pantheism, antinomianism, and immorality; (3) the *Asiatic*, consisting of Marcion and his followers, whose principles were an exaggerated Paulinism, a strict asceti-

[1] *History of Dogma*, pp. 213–214.

cism and an entire rejection of the Old Testament. The problems which they endeavoured to solve were two in number, viz. that of creation, how God, the Infinite, could by any possibility come into contact with matter, the finite; and, of evil, its existence and the deliverance from it. And they approached the inquiry with a prejudice, namely, that matter is inherently evil.

But, undoubtedly, the chief interest which Gnosticism has for us in this inquiry is that "the Gnostics were the first to frame the dilemma, 'If the first man was created perfect, how could he sin? If he was created imperfect, God is Himself the author of sin.' It cannot be said that any sufficient answer was given on the side of the Church. Clement, indeed, denied that man was created perfect, declaring that he was made with the capacity for virtue, but that its cultivation depended on himself (*Strom.* vi. 12). And others drew a distinction between the εἰκών (the image, the original capacities which were indestructible) and the ὁμοίωσις τοῦ θεοῦ (the likeness of God, which was to be realised by the right use of these capacities in due development). The perfection was 'ideal,' and there was also freedom of the will; and it was in the will that the source of sin was found, the actual development of the innate capacity falling short of the ideal. Most of the Fathers also held that for the realisation of the ideal there was needed a third principle, which was supernatural in character, namely, fellowship with God, so that without this co-operation man could not attain to his destiny." [1] Thus, for example, we find Apelles, a disciple of Marcion, in his "Syllogisms," writing thus: "Si hominem non perfectum fecit Deus, unusquisque autem per industriam propriam perfectionem sibi virtutis adsciscit: nonne videtur plus sibi homo adquirere, quam ei Deus contulit?" [2] So we find the Gnostics pointing out the antithesis of free-will and grace, of human liberty and divine election, and finally taking their stand on the latter ground to the exclusion of the former. Indeed, to such an extent do they shadow beforehand the outlines of the Augustinianism of two centuries later that Harnack remarks, "It is interesting to note that Basilides portrayed the sin inherent in the child

[1] Bethune-Baker, *An Introduction to the Early History of Christian Doctrine*, p. 306, n. 4.

[2] Quoted in St. Ambrose, *De Parad.*, v. 28.

from birth, in a way that makes one feel as though he were listening to Augustine," and in proof of it he refers the reader to a fragment of the twenty-third book of the Ἐξηγητικά, preserved by Clement in *Strom.* vi. 12, 83.[1] But in one respect Gnosticism differs vastly from St. Augustine's doctrine of predestination; the Gnostics entirely denied freedom of will, and allowed no share whatever in the work of salvation to man himself. Men were made by God as they are finally, and their actions are the result of εἱμαρμένη *i.e.* fate, "which stands in intimate connection with the stars and is brought about by their instrumentality"[2] and was supposed to settle the life and affairs of man by *necessity*. So they held a peculiar doctrine of election. The principal Gnostic teachers "maintained that there was a radical difference amongst men; some, created evil, were incapable of salvation; and others, who were of celestial or divine origin, would finally be saved, however licentious their lives."[3] They divided men into "pneumatic" and "hylic" (from ὕλη, "matter"); indeed, the Valentinians, and probably many other Gnostic sects also, distinguished between "pneumatic," "psychic" and "hylic." Only the pneumatic were capable of γνῶσις and the divine life, which in its fulness is freedom from the law; these are saved without good works. The hylic (*i.e.* material) perish altogether, but the psychic (*i.e. ordinary* Christians) are capable of a certain blessedness and of a corresponding certain knowledge of the supersensible, obtained through Pistis, *i.e.* Christian faith; these "soulish" men are bound to the performance of good works, but their ultimate destiny remained uncertain, depending on their greater inclination on the one hand to the spiritual, on the other to the carnal.[4] The Valentinian, Ptolemy, ascribes free-will to this class, but not to the higher "spiritual" or the lower "material"; but Gnosticism as a whole denied free-will and all moral responsibility: those who were to be saved, would be, whatever they did; and those who were not to be saved, could not be, whatever they did. It is easy to understand, therefore, how "they found the Epistle

[1] Harnack, *op. cit.* i. p. 257, n. 2.

[2] F. Ch. Baur, *Lehrbuch der christliche Dogmengeschichte*, s. 232.

[3] J. H. Blunt, *Dictionary of Doctrinal and Historical Theology*, s.v. "Antinomianism."

[4] The teaching of Valentinus, in Tertullian *De Anima*, cc. 21–30.

to the Romans, or to speak more correctly, certain texts and ideas selected from the Epistle (such as Rom. v. 14 and viii. 19) and generally misinterpreted, very congenial. And, as might naturally be expected, the doctrine of election, rigidly interpreted, harmonised with their own exclusive religious pretensions, and with the keyword of their system, φύσις. We are not surprised therefore to learn that Rom. ix., especially ver. 14 *sq.*, was one of their strongholds, nor do we require to be told how they interpreted it." [1] Similarly we find *Marcion*, who was a Gnostic, though a bigoted Paulinist, omitting Rom. x. 5 to xi. 32, on account of its insistence of man's freedom, which would not accord with his system, though we may well imagine his chagrin at being compelled to omit ix. 1–33 (which from one point of view would have been such a bolster for his theory) on account of its dealing with the Old Testament! But Marcion, though having much in common with other Gnostics, yet betrays many differences also. He held that "to yield to the promptings of Divine grace is the only decisive distinction" between good and evil men, and he was "completely carried away with the novelty, uniqueness and grandeur of the Pauline Gospel of the grace of God in Christ," yet "faith is, to him, reliance on the unmerited grace of God which is revealed in Christ" and not, as with the other Gnostics, a mere second-rate substitute for the vastly superior faculty of knowledge! [2] They ascribed the origin of evil either to the Demiurge, the inferior God who created the universe, or, like the Manichæans, held it to be inherent in matter as such. Sin is brought into the world through the disorder consequent upon the domination of the feminine principle.[3] On the other hand, many of them looked upon the Fall as "a fall upwards," *i.e.* an elevation. They therefore divided into two groups on the subject of sin, one looking upon sin as a perfectly indifferent matter, which could not affect the spirit, and consequently giving themselves over to licentiousness; the other thinking it ought to be stamped out at any cost, and so they practised the most extreme asceticism.

While we are dealing with the heretical sects, we must note in passing those writings, much-lauded in their day,

[1] Sanday and Headlam, *op. cit.*, p. 269.
[2] Harnack's summary of Marcion's views, p. 268.
[3] See Hagenbach, *A History of Christian Doctrines*, i. § 61 (5).

the *Pseudo-Clementine* literature, the Clementine Homilies and Recognitions. These are generally attributed to the latter part of the second century, and betray a marked Jewish or Ebionite bias, which is most evident in the Homilies, but somewhat toned down in the Recognitions. Hence we find a directly opposite tendency to that of the Gnostics; they denied human freedom, but these emphasise it.[1] In one respect, however, these extremes meet, viz. their glorification of Adam. The author of the Homilies so idealises him as to convert him into a purely mythical being, and to endow him with all perfections. He could not sin, they said, for it were blasphemous to assert that the *θεῖον πνεῦμα* which was manifested in him, could sin; which must have been the case, had he sinned.[2] Yet he supposes that the image of God was defaced in his descendants, and that the evil propensity has increased since then by accumulation.[3]

Although somewhat of an anachronism, it is nevertheless most convenient for us to consider *Manichæism* at this juncture. Our excuse for doing so shall be its great similarity to the Gnostic heresies; in fact, we may regard it as to some extent a development of Gnosticism. It does not appear until about A.D. 250, and its origin seems to have been in Persia. Manes, or Mani, was a Magian who attempted to reconcile Christianity and Zoroastrianism. But there is very little of the Christian Religion in it at all, it being a thoroughly dualistic system, and is really to be regarded rather as a separate religion than as an heretical offshoot of Christianity. It was more uncompromising in its dualism than Gnosticism. The earlier system had made evil a power derived ultimately from "the Unknown Father," but Manes taught that evil was coeval with and antagonistic to good from the beginning, and the history of the world, as well as of each individual, was the history of the struggle between these two powers. Matter was inevitably evil, and was not created by the Deity, but by the co-equal Evil One. Our great interest in this system arises from

[1] *E.g.* Ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐλεύθερον ἐποίησεν ἔχειν τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἑαυτὸν ἀπονέμειν ᾧ βούλεται, ἢ τῷ παρόντι κακῷ, ἢ τῷ μέλλοντι ἀγαθῷ (*Hom.* xv. 7.

[2] *Hom.* iii. 21; viii. 10; see also Hagenbach, *History of Doctrines*, § 61 (5); 62 (1), (4).

[3] *Hom.* iv. 23, x. 4; cf. Hagenbach, 62 (4); 59.

the fact that Augustine of Thagaste, afterwards the great Catholic Doctor St. Augustine, was for nine years (A.D. 374–383) a catechumen of theirs, and so learnt their tenets at first-hand. More important still is the fact that the Pelagians dubbed the Catholic Christians "Manichæans."[1] From St. Augustine's refutation of this calumny, we learn that they held that (*a*) God was not the Creator of every nature, (*b*) that the concupiscence of the flesh was not an accident of human nature, but human nature itself, (*c*) that the beginnings of evil in "the elect" come from an evil nature, not from a free will, (*d*) that the soul is a "particle of God," but sins from its union with an evil nature, *i.e.* matter, (*e*) that the gifts of God are given in response to the merits of a good nature, in reward for the works of his members, (*f*) that the water in baptism is unnecessary, as being of no advantage to a profane heart, (*g*) that Christ was not born of a virgin, or, indeed, of any human mother at all, as dishonouring to the Divinity. The Pelagians anathematised these opinions, and, says St. Augustine, "they do well," but they fall into the opposite extreme, while the Catholics refute both, holding the "via media."[2] The system, though once very popular, seems to have died a natural death, for, after St. Augustine's time, it is very little heard of.

We next turn to consider the early *Western theology*, and find ourselves in an entirely different atmosphere, practical rather than speculative. We have come face to face with the beginnings of controversy on grace and sin. But before proceeding to the mention of individual writers, we are bound to address ourselves to the settlement of the question, "Why did the Pelagian controversy arise in the West, and rend in twain the Western Empire, while the East was practically undisturbed by it?" As an illustration of the fact, before we approach the question, we may adduce the result of the Synod of Diospolis (Lydda) in 415, when Pelagius was acquitted and recognised as "within Catholic communion" by fourteen bishops of Palestine, under the presidency of Eulogius, metropolitan of Cæsarea. It is quite true that it was owing to Pelagius' "hedging," but it serves to show the profound indifference, or rather lack of understanding, in the East, of the whole issue at stake in the West. And to this day, although the subject

[1] St. Augustine, *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum*, lib. II. c. 1.
[2] *Ibid.* III. c. ix. § 25.

is one we "always have with us," the Eastern Church is almost unmoved by it. Why is this so? It must be that the subject is one that has offered no attractions to the Oriental mind. The problems that troubled the East, because congenial to its general trend of thought, were metaphysical, such as those which concerned the being of God, rather than the nature and capacities of man. "In general, Latin theology distinguishes itself from Greek, by its less subtle and speculative character—though in Augustine the speculative faculty is combined with the practical in a remarkable degree—by its stronger adherence to tradition and by its preference for the treatment of the class of doctrines I have called anthropological—the doctrines of human nature and of sin and grace; instead of, as in the Greek Church, those of the Trinity and of the Person of Christ." [1] The reasons of this distinction are, at root, three, which are very well put by Mr. Pullan as follows:

"(*a*) In the East, doctrine was regarded as part of a Christian philosophic view of the universe; in the West it was understood rather as the expression of a Divine command.

"(*b*) In the East, Christian piety had been mainly concerned with the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity; in the West, sin and amendment, punishment and expiation, had been the burning problems.

"(*c*) In the East, with regard to the doctrine of Christ's Person, argument was sometimes in advance of conviction, as was shown by the relapse of many Bishops who had been present at the Council of Nicæa; in the West, conviction was in advance of argument. The moral earnestness of the West had led men on to apprehend by intuition the truth which many in the East were laboriously approaching by an intellectual effort." [2]

But yet it was inevitable that Eastern theologians should be bound to give some slight attention to the constitution and condition of human nature. When they did so, their view

[1] J. Orr, *The Progress of Dogma*, p. 137.
[2] Pullan, *The Church of the Fathers*, p. 344.

was an optimistic one, such as we have seen to be generally prevalent heretofore. Indeed, these pre-Augustinian writers and the *Eastern* post-Augustinian theologians have often been accused of heterodoxy on these subjects, even when esteemed orthodox on all other matters. Or, conversely, St. Augustine's views were considered heretical (as Julian attempted to show during his lifetime) by being compared with the loosely formulated language of his admittedly orthodox predecessors. And here we must remark that some of the more extreme Augustinian views have never received the approval of the whole Catholic Church; but of this, more anon. Here, we must emphasise the fact that the Eastern doctors, as the earlier Western teachers also, did not write formal theological treatises on these matters, nor were they careful to guard their language on the subject. Their tenets appear unsound very often, *because the subject had not been controversially raised*, and the need of exact language was not realised as yet. But, as has been so often remarked, they made no formal departure from the apostolic *regula fidei*. "The Eastern branch of the Church, in particular, had never gone deeply into this class of questions. It laid hold, by preference, of the element of *freedom* in human nature, and gave prominence to that in opposition to pagan ideas of fate and destiny." [1] They connected the capacity for good which they attributed to human nature, with the hidden workings of the λόγος σπερματικός who "enlighteneth every man," even the heathen. When they spoke of our heritage from Adam they dwelt rather on the loss of grace than on its effect on human nature, and generally avoided imputing to his posterity any share in Adam's guilt, though they allow the inheritance of the *physical* effects thereof, such as corrupti-

[1] Orr, *op. cit.* pp. 153–154. "The problem was then and there (*i.e.* in the Eastern Church at the beginning of the third century and onwards) to burst the bounds of Pagan naturalism, and rise to the higher level of spiritual morality. Both in the contest between the Greek philosophy and the old mythological spirit, and in the contest between Christianity and Gnosticism, the issue at stake was to make a definite distinction between nature and morality, to disentangle man from all his improper complications with nature, to make him feel himself an independent moral centre, to place him as a free responsible personality in his relation to God. Hence the constant and strong emphasis which all the Greek Fathers, from Origen to Chrysostom, lay on human freedom; hence the shyness they evince towards anything which might make sin appear as a

bility, suffering, disease and death.[1] But they stopped short of the position subsequently called Pelagian, so that Vincent of Lérins, who was, to say the least, suspected of Semi-Pelagianism, could testify that the Pelagian exaltation of free-will and denial of transmission of original sin, was an innovation.[2]

We now come to the consideration of the views of Western theologians, of whom the most notable are Irenæus, Tertullian, his disciple Cyprian, and the great teachers of the Alexandrian school. We begin with—

1. *Irenæus.*—He was a disciple of Polycarp, and so we may conclude that his early life was spent near Smyrna, somewhere about the beginning of the second century. He became a presbyter in the Church of Lyons, and succeeded Pothinus the martyr as its bishop about A.D. 177. The Church seems to have enjoyed rest during his time, though one rather doubtful tradition attributes his end to martyrdom. He was "a clear-headed, thoughtful, philosophical theologian," but with the exception of the *Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching*,[3] we have only one work of his now in existence, viz. his principal one, *Adversus Hæreseos*, or Ἔλεγχος καὶ ἀνατροπὴ τῆς ψευδωνύμου γνώσεως; it was written in Greek, but we have only the first book in the original, the other four being in a rather poor Latin translation, with the exception of a few quotations contained in the works of later writers. The first two contain a statement and refutation of the Gnostic heresy, the remaining three being devoted to a positive statement of the faith and practice of the Church. The date of the work is usually put at A.D. 180. We find much of interest in it for

natural power. However grave the consequences of the fall may be . . . nevertheless, actual sin is always man's own deed, issuing from that point in him which cannot be obliterated without destroying him as a moral being—the freedom of his will": W. Möller in Schaff-Herzog, *A Religious Encyclopædia*, s.v. "Pelagius."

[1] *Vide e.g.* Irenæus, *Adversus Hæreseos*, iii. 23; v. 15; Athanasius, *De Incarnatione*, 4–5.

[2] "Neminem, ante prodigiosum Pelagii discipulum Cœlestium, reatu prævaricationis Adæ omne genus humanum negasse adstrictum."

"Neminem ante profanum illum Pelagium tantam virtutem liberi præsumisse arbitrii, ut ad hoc in bonis rebus per actus singulos adjuvandum necessariam Dei gratiam non putaret": *Commonitorium adv. Hær.*

[3] Extant in Armenian. English edition by J. A. Robinson, 1920.

our purpose and must proceed to examine the most salient features of it. He agrees with the Apostolic Fathers in representing the devil as created good, but falling by the misuse of freedom, and becoming the source of the temptation of others,[1] the cause being envy [2]; but like them also, he maintained that the devil can never compel any man to sin apart from the man's own consent.[3] Man is pre-eminent in body and soul among God's works [4]; this pre-eminence is the bearing of the image of God. Irenæus is the first to distinguish between "the image" and "the likeness" of God; the latter being obtained by a moral conflict,[5] the former being referred to the body chiefly but also to the spiritual endowments of man. Harnack gives the substance of his teaching under this head as: "The Deity is indeed capable of bestowing perfection on man from the beginning, but the latter was incapable of grasping or retaining it from the first. Hence perfection, *i.e.* incorruptibility, which consists in the contemplation of God and is conditional on voluntary obedience, could only be the *destination* of man, and he must accordingly have been made *capable* of it (iv. c. 38). That destination is realised through the guidance of God and the free decision of man, for goodness not arising from free choice has no value. The capacity in question is on the one hand involved in man's possession of the divine image, which, however, is only realised in the body, and is therefore, at bottom, a matter of indifference; and on the other, in his likeness to God, which consists in the union of the soul with God's Spirit,[6] but only comes about when man is obedient to Him. Along with this, Irenæus, has also the idea that man's likeness consists in freedom. Now, as man became disobedient immediately after the creation, this likeness to God did not become perfect. Through the fall he lost the fellowship with God to which he was destined, *i.e.* he is forfeit to death.

[1] "Quum igitur a Deo omnia facta sunt, et diabolus sibimet ipsi et reliquis factus est abscessionis causa, juste scriptura eos, qui in abscessione perseverant, semper filios diaboli et angelos dixit maligni": iv. 41.

[2] Ἐζήλωσε τὸ πλάσμα τοῦ θεοῦ (iv. 40. 3).

[3] II. 32, 4. [4] IV. 29.

[5] Τὴν ὁμοίωσιν βεβαίως κατέστησε συνεξομοίωσας τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῷ ὁρατῷ πατρί (v. 16. Cf. also v. 6).

[6] "Qui nos aptaret Deo": *Hær.* iii. 17, 2. "In adunitionem et communionem Dei et hominis": *Ibid.* v. 1, 2.

This death was transmitted to Adam's whole posterity." [1] He therefore, like the Greek writers, insists strongly upon man's freedom and self-determination.[2] Man was not endowed with immortality at his creation, as part of his nature, but it was added to him immediately after as a *donum superadditum*,[3] given by the grace of God. He regards the Fall as a historical fact,[4] though, on the evidence of a passage of doubtful genuineness, contained in Anastasius Sinaïta he is said to have explained it "spiritually, not historically." By the fall Adam lost "the image and likeness of God" [5] and became liable to physical ills, and above all to death. All these evils were a testimony that man had lost the *donum supernaturale* and had become mortal; these effects are allowed to be inherited by the descendants of Adam.[6] But Irenæus seems to go further

[1] Harnack, *op. cit.* pp. 269–70.

[2] "Sed frumentum quidem et paleæ, inanimalia et irrationabilia existentia, naturaliter talia facta sunt: homo vero, rationabilis et secundum hoc similis Deo, liber in arbitrio factus et suæ potestatis ipse sibi causa est, ut aliquando quidem frumentum, aliquando autem palea fiat": iv. 4.

Εἰ φύσει οἱ μὲν φαῦλοι, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν, οὔθ' οὗτοι ἐπαινετοὶ, ὄντες ἀγαθοὶ, τοιοῦτοι γὰρ κατεσκευάσθησαν· οὔτ' ἐκεῖνοι μεμπτοὶ, οὕτως γεγονότες. Αλλ' ἐπειδὴ οἱ πάντες τῆς αὐτῆς εἰσι φύσεως, δυνάμενοί τε κατασχεῖν καὶ πρᾶξαι τὸ ἀγαθὸν, καὶ δυνάμενοι πάλιν ἀποβαλεῖν αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ ποιῆσαι· δικαίως καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώποις τοῖς εὐνομουμένοις, καὶ πολὺ πρότερον παρὰ θεῷ οἱ μὲν ἐπαινοῦνται καὶ ἀξίας τυγχάνουσι μαρτυρίας τῆς τοῦ καλοῦ καθόλου ἐκλογῆς καὶ ἐπιμονῆς· οἱ δὲ καταιτιῶνται καὶ ἀξίας τυγχάνουσι ζημίας τῆς τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ 'γαθοῦ ἀποβολῆς (iv. 15, 37. Cf. also iv. 39; v. 27. This freedom is seen in his faith as well as in his works, iv. 37, and cf. fragment of sermon *De fide*).

[3] "Sine initio et sine fine, vere et semper idem et eodem modo se habens solus est Deus. . . . Et de animalibus, de animabus, et de spiritibus et omnino de omnibus his quæ facta sunt, cogitans quis minime peccabit, quando omnia, quæ facta sunt, initium quidem facturæ suæ habeant, perseverant autem, quoadusque ea Deus et esse et perseverare voluerit. Non enim ex nobis, neque ex nostra natura vita est, sed secundum gratiam Dei datur. Sicut autem corpus animale ipsum quidem non est anima, participatur autem animam, quoadusque Deus vult, sic et anima ipsa quidem non est vita, participatur autem a Deo sibi præstitam vitam": ii. 64.

[4] III. 18, 21.

[5] "Perdideramus in Adam—secundum imaginem et similitudinem Dei esse": iii. 18.

[6] "Condemnationem autem transgressionis accepit homo tædia et terrenum laborem et manducare panem in sudore vultus sui et converti in terram, ex qua assumtus est; similiter autem mulier tædia et labores et gemitus et tristitias partus et servitium, hoc est ut serviret viro suo; ut neque maledicti a Deo in totum perirent,

and hold that men are in a state of guilt in consequence of Adam's transgression, and so we find in him an approximation to Augustinianism.[1] Indeed, a German writer, Duncker, says that the doctrine of original sin and hereditary evil is so fully developed in the writings of Irenæus "that the characteristic features of the western type of doctrine may be distinctly recognised."[2]

Irenæus dwells largely on the manifestation of Christ as the Second Adam and "recapitulating" human nature. The doctrine of *ἀνακεφαλαίωσις* (cf. Hippolytus, *Against Beron*, II) is a favourite one with him. It is founded on Eph. i. 10 (cf. passive in Rom. xiii. 9), but is apparently suggested to Irenæus by Justin Martyr. The Incarnation is the consummation of the ideal human destiny, and the reversal of the Fall by taking up anew and winning the conflict in which man was worsted. The Incarnation was the consummation both of all that had gone before and of the original idea of God for man.[3] Jesus Christ joined

neque sine increpatione perseverantes Deum contemnerent": iii. 23. "Propter inobedientiæ peccatum subsecuti sunt languores hominibus": v. 15. "Sed quoniam Deus verax est, mendax autem serpens, de effectu ostensum est morte subsecuta eos, qui manducaverunt. Simul enim cum esca et mortem adsciverunt, quoniam inobedientes manducabant: inobedientia autem Dei mortem infert": v. 23. He speaks also of "the ancient wound of the Serpent": iv. 5.

[1] III. 18 (quoted above, note 2), also: "Quemadmodum illa (Eva) inobediens facta et sibi et universo generi humano causa est facta mortis," iii. 22; *ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Ἀδὰμ προσεκόψαμεν, μὴ ποιήσαντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐντολὴν, ἐν δὲ τῷ δευτέρῳ Ἀδὰμ ἀποκατηλλάγημεν ὑπήκοοι μέχρι θανάτου γενόμενοι. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλῳ τινὶ ἤμεν ὀφειλέται ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκείνῳ οὗ καὶ τὴν ἐντολὴν παρέβημεν*, v. 16; "et quemadmodum adstrictum est morti genus humanum per virginem, salvatur per virginem," v. 19.

[2] *Apologetarum secundi Sæculi de Essentialibus Naturæ humanæ Partibus Placita*, s. 132.

[3] "Quando filius Dei incarnatus est et homo factus, longam hominum expositionem in semetipso recapitulavit," iii. 18; "Filius hominis factus est, ut assuesceret hominem percipere Deum et assuesceret Deum habitare in homine secundum placitum Patris," iii. 20; "Recapitulans autem universum hominem in se ab initio usque ad finem, recapitulavit et mortem ejus," v. 23, 2; "Omnes enim venit per semetipsum salvare: omnes, inquam, qui per eum renascuntur in Deum, infantes et parvulos et pueros et juvenes et seniores. Ideo per omnem venit ætatem, et infantibus infans factus, sanctificans infantes; in parvulis parvulus, sanctificans hanc ipsam habentes ætatem, simul et exemplum illis pietatis effectus et justitiæ et subjectionis; in juvenibus juvenis, exemplum juvenibus fiens, eosque sanctificans Domino; sic et senior in senioribus,

man and God [1] and recovers for us what we had lost in Adam.[2] This work is worked for all, not only for a certain inner circle; "he is distinguished from (the Gnostics) by the fact that . . . he applies the benefits of Christ's work not to the 'pneumatic,' but in principle to all men, though practically only to those who listen to the Saviour's words and adorn themselves with works of righteousness." [3] We must therefore by the power of a free choice [4] make this work our own, by faith [5] and penitence.[6] Nevertheless, we are unable to do this of ourselves, but need the grace of God,[7] for "no man who does not partake of the blessing and assistance of the Lord, can procure for himself the means of salvation." [8] But we must be careful to maintain good works,[9] for "Christ, as the teacher, imparts to men, who are free and naturally constituted for fellowship with God, the knowledge which enables them to imitate God, and thus by their own act to attain communion with Him. . . . To Irenæus the highest blessing bestowed in Christianity is the deification of human nature through the gift of immortality, and this deification includes the full knowledge and enjoying

ut sit perfectus magister in omnibus, non solum secundum expositionem veritatis sed et secundum ætatem, sanctificans simul et seniores, exemplum ipsis quoque fiens; deinde et usque ad mortem pervenit, ut sit primogenitus ex mortuis ipse primatum tenens in omnibus, princeps vitæ, prior omnium et præcedens omnes," ii. 22, 4.

[1] Ἥνωσεν τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῷ θεῷ, iii. 18, 7.

[2] III. 18, 1.

[3] Harnack, *op. cit.* p. 288.

[4] "Posuit in homine potestatem electionis quemadmodum in angelis (et enim angeli rationabiles) ut hi quidem qui obedissent juste bonum suit possidentes, datum quidem a Deo, servatum vero ab ipsis": *In Matt.* xxiii. 37.

[5] IV. 13, 2.

[6] III. 23,3.

[7] "Non enim ex nobis neque ex nostra natura vita est, sed secundum gratiam Dei datur," ii. 34, 3; "sicut arida terra, si non percipiat humorem, non fructificat; sic et nos, lignum aridum existentes, nunquam fructificaremus vitam sine superna voluntaria pluvia," iii. 19; "in Rom. vii. 18 significans, quoniam non a nobis, sed a Deo est bonum salutis nostræ," iii. 20, 2.

[8] IV. 27.

[9] "Adhuc manifestavit oportere nos cum vocatione, et justitiæ operibus adornari, uti requiescat super nos spiritus Dei," iv. 36, 6. "Commendante Domino Spiritui Sancto sua hominem. . . . dans duo denaria regalia ut per Spiritum imaginem et inscriptionem Patris et Filii accipientes, fructificemus creditum nobis denarium, multiplicatum domino annumerantes," iii. 17, 3.

of God (*visio Dei*)." [1] To this, Christians are predestined, but it is on account of God's foreknowledge of their future actions,[2] that they are made the recipients of His Grace. Of the reality and objectivity of his interpretation of "grace" we can have no doubt, for he constantly "employed the following categories: restoring the likeness of God in humanity; abolition of death; connection and union of man with God; adoption of men as sons of God and as gods; imparting of the Spirit Who now becomes accustomed to abide with men; imparting of a knowledge of God culminating in beholding Him; bestowal of everlasting life." [3] All these go to prove that he, like his predecessors, believed grace to be not merely the subjective attitude of God towards mankind, but also a positive gift given by Him, and that gift full of life, working actively and producing its effects within the soul of man; to sum up, it is an imparted, inherent righteousness, and not only an imputed, external covering of sin.

2. *Tertullian.*—When we pass from Gaul to Africa, the first great outstanding personality is Quintus Septimius Florens Tertullianus, called "The Father of Latin Theology." He was born in Carthage about A.D. 160; his father was commander of a Roman legion, and young Tertullian therefore received a liberal Græco-Roman secular education in history, philosophy, law and rhetoric, and subsequently became a lawyer and rhetorician. At the age of thirty-five years, he was converted to Christianity and was ordained a presbyter at Carthage. Owing to the laxity of the African Church and the insults he received from his fellow-clergy, he became an adherent of the Montanist heresy in 202, and thus remained until his death in 220. On all points except those necessarily involved in the heresy he had embraced, he continued to be a zealous advocate of the Catholic Faith, and his chief leaning towards Montanism was due to his gloomy and ascetic temperament. We have over thirty works of his still remaining, many of them written, however, after he had become a Montanist. In his theology, his legal training is very evident, and he is the originator of many words which afterwards became technical terms of Catholic theology, such as "trias," "satisfactio,"

[1] Harnack, *op. cit.* pp. 239–40.
[2] IV. 29, 2.
[3] Harnack, *op. cit.* p. 292.

"vitium originis," "indulgentia," "permissio," etc. Like Irenæus and the Apologists, he held the devil to have been created good, and to have fallen by free-will [1]; physical ills were the work of him and his demons,[2] and so, Tertullian holds, were the heathen religions, even the germs of truth contained therein.[3] But they cannot seriously injure any soul, without its own concurrence,[4] for the name of Christ can overcome them. Man's creation "in the image of God" is interpreted of his *body* [5] which was formed by God's hand; [6] but he attains to the "likeness" of God by baptism.[7] In opposition to earlier Fathers, but in agreement with Origen, though for a different reason, Tertullian held that the soul was created immortal and not merely capable of immortality. He held to a dichotomistic division of man, and therefore that the soul was immortal. He ascribes sin to "impatience," *i.e.* inconstancy.[8] He insists upon the exact literal interpretation of the narrative of the Fall.[9] He went farther than his predecessors and contemporaries in the direction of the doctrine of original sin. He first made use of the expression *vitium originis;* [10] he held that theory of the origin of the soul which was subsequently

[1] "Sed quomodo de angelis quibusdam sua sponte corruptis corruptior gens dæmonum evaserit damnata a Deo cum generis auctoribus et cum eo quem diximus principe, apud litteras sanctas ordine cognoscitur": *Apol.* c. 22.

[2] "Operatio eorum est hominis eversio," *ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.* and also *De præscrip. hær.* 40.

[4] "Omnis hæc nostra in illos dominatio et potestas de nominatione Christi valet, et de commemoratione eorum quæ sibi a Deo per arbitrium Christum imminentia exspectant. Christum timentes in Deo, et Deum in Christo, subjiciuntur servis Dei et Christi": *ibid.* c. 23.

[5] *De Carne Christi*, 6: *adv. Marc*, v. 8; *adv. Prax.* 12.

[6] "Homo est a Deo conditus, non imperiali verbo, ut cætera animalia, sed familiari manu, etiam præmissio blandiente illo verbo: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram": *Adv. Marc.* ii.

[7] *De Bapt.* c. 5.

[8] "Nam ut compendio dictum sit, omne peccatum impatientiæ adscribendum": *De Pat.* 5.

[9] *De Resurr. Carnis* 61; *Adv. Judæos* II.; *De virg. vel.* 11; *Adv. Marc*, ii. 2, etc.

[10] In *De Anima*, c. 41: "Malum igitur animæ, præter quod ex obventu spiritus nequam superstruitur, ex originis vitio antecedit, naturale quodammodo. Nam, ut diximus naturæ corruptio alia natura est, habens suum Deum et patrem, ipsum scilicet corruptionis auctorem."

termed "Traducianism," and which maintained that the soul of a child was the product of its parents' souls, just as its body was the product of theirs. So, he said, the soul itself is propagated with all its defects just as matter is propagated.[1] He held, however, that man's *true* nature is good, but that evil has become a kind of *second nature* to him; the former is *proprie naturale*, the latter *naturale quodammodo*; and adds: "Quod enim a Deo est, non tam extinguitur, quam obumbratur. Potest enim obumbrari, quia non est Deus, extingui non potest, quia a Deo est."[2] Tertullian is, on this account, often regarded as the originator of Augustinianism; and reasonably so, for he seems to be the first to take such a serious view of the havoc made with human nature by the Fall. And so this vitiated nature is inherited by all children born to Adam.[3] Yet he seems to have been unwilling to impute original sin to children as real sin, as witness his question, in reference to baptism, "Quid festinat innocens ætas ad remissionem peccatorum?"[4] Nevertheless, he does not suppose that the vitiated origin destroys altogether the power of free-will, though he certainly holds that it has so weakened it that it has need of assistance from without. He strives vigorously on behalf of the freedom of Adam's will,[5] and also of that of his descendants.[6]

Yet he acknowledges the need of divine grace if we are

[1] "Ita omnis anima eo usque in Adam censetur, donec in Christo, recenseatur; tamdiu immunda, quamdiu recenseatur. Peccatrix autem, quia immunda, recipiens ignominiam ex carnis societate": *ibid.* c. 40; cf. also cc. 3, 19, 36.

[2] *De Anima*, c. 41.

[3] See *infra*, p. 164. "Per diabolum homo a primordio circumventus, ut præceptum Dei excederet, et propterea in mortem datus exinde totum genus de suo semine infectum suæ etiam damnationis traducem fecit": *De Test.* 3.

[4] *De Bapt.* 18.

[5] "How could man, who was destined to rule over the whole creation, be a slave in respect to himself, and not have the faculty of reigning over himself?": *Adv. Marc.* ii. 8. 9.

[6] "Non dabit enim arbor mala bonos fructus, si non inseratur: et bona malos dabit, si non colatur. Et lapides filii Abrahæ fient, si in fidem Abrahæ formentur. Et genimina viperarum fructum pœnitentiæ facient, si venena malignitatis expuerint. Hæc erit vis divinæ gratiæ, potentior utique natura, habens in nobis subjacentem sibi liberam arbitrii potestatem, quod αὐτεξούσιον dicitur": *De anima*, i.

to do God's will,[1] so that the holy life is the result of the working together of divine grace and human endeavour [2]; consequently he held that grace was given to those who were foreseen to be such as would use it well.[3] He seems to have thought that a kind of grace was given to the better heathen philosophers, such as Socrates, etc.,[4] by which they opposed the prevalent polytheism, but from his strong views on the absolute necessity of baptism, it is practically certain that he would have denied the possibility of the salvation of any heathen.[5]

But no review of the teaching of Tertullian would be complete without at least a slight investigation into his theory of "satisfaction" and "merit," which is given very fully in his work *De Pœnitentia*, and more incidentally in *De Patientia* 13 and *De Pudicitia* 9. He starts from the distinction between God's positive will (*voluntas Dei*) and His permission (*permissio, licentia*, or *indulgentia Dei*). The man who foregoes God's *permissio* (though it is in no way sin to make use of it) and does God's *voluntas, i.e.* renounces "the good" for "the better," earns merit and has some sort of a claim on God for a reward. This is his theory of *passive* merit. More important is his formulation of the doctrine of *active* merit, which depends on the value of "satisfaction." Man has, from different sources, learnt God's will, *i.e.* what is necessary to "satisfy" or content God. But men are always sinning and incurring God's vengeance, which *must* fall. But man may take the punishment on himself voluntarily, making amends for his own sins by confession and amendment, which shows itself in

[1] "We ask Him therefore to supply us with the substance and power of His will that we may be saved both in heaven and in earth, seeing that the sum of His will is the salvation of those whom He has adopted": *De Oratore*, 4. "Cum sine gratia Dei salutem non possit custodire natura humana quam accepit, quomodo sine gratia Dei poterit reparare quod perdidit": *De Anima*.

[2] "Quædam sunt divinæ liberalitatis, quædam nostræ operationis. Quæ a Domino indulgentur, sua gratia gubernantur; quæ ab homine captantur, studio perpetrantur": *Ad. Uxor.* i. 8; cf. also *De Virg. Vel.* 10; *De Patient.* 1; *Adv. Hermog.* 5.

[3] *Adv. Marc.* ii. 23.

[4] "Idem (Socrates) et quum aliquid de veritate sapiebat, deos negans," *Apol.* c. 46; "Taceo de philosophis, quos superbia severitatis et duritia disciplinæ ab omni timore securas, nonnullus etiam afflatus Veritatis adversus deos erigit": *Ad nationes*, i. 10.

[5] See Bishop Kaye, *Tertullian*, p. 345.

works, *e.g.* by physical chastisements, fasting, endurance of poverty and discomfort or by martyrdom. By not sparing himself, man will be spared by God.[1] These things are a debt due to God, an expiatory sacrifice of which a certain amount is due for every possible offence. If more than necessary is done, the balance forms a "bonum opus" and "habent Deum debitorem," *i.e.* stands to our credit with God. According to the final state of our "Dr. and Cr." account with God, will be our eternal reward or punishment. It must be noted that Tertullian does not apply this to any but baptised Christians.[2] Cyprian takes up and develops this teaching, as we shall see when dealing with his theology, but we already have, in germ, the mediæval theory of merit and of salvation by works, though it is only just to add that Tertullian holds that "ex fidei libertate justificatur homo, non ex legis servitute, quia justus ex fide vivit."[3]

3. We will now pass on to the next great name of the African Church, *Thascius Cæcilius Cyprianus*. He was born of noble heathen parentage about A.D. 200, though not at Carthage, it seems; but we know nothing whatever of his early life, except that after a good education, he became the foremost professor of rhetoric in Carthage, and a great student of law and literature; he was very wealthy but spent his wealth freely in a life of license, free from all restraint. Nevertheless he felt, withal, the lack of satisfaction with the things of the world and eventually became a catechumen, and was prepared for baptism, which he received on Easter Eve, A.D. 246. He gave away the proceeds of the sale of his large estates to the poor. He was ordained priest in 247, and consecrated Bishop of Carthage in 248, his appointment having been demanded by the people, although he was, according to ecclesiastical rules, still a novice. He suffered martyrdom under Valerian in 258. He was not so much a scholar as a "man of affairs," his *forte* being in organisation. Hence, even in his moral treatises we find the stress on practical matters rather than on dogma. His greatest contribution was made to the

[1] "In quantum non peperceris tibi, in tantum tibi Deus, crede, parcet": *De Pœnitentia*, c. 10. Cf. also *ibid.* c. 9.

[2] Fuller expositions of this position may be found in: Bethune-Baker, *op. cit.* pp. 353–55; Wirth, *Der Verdienst-Begriff;* and *Church Quarterly Review*, Oct. 1902, p. 207.

[3] *Adv. Marc.* v. 3.

development of the doctrines of the Church and Sacraments; the "sphere of Grace" and the "means of Grace." But of the actual relations between grace and the free-will of man, as also of its connection with its Giver, he has very little to say, though what he has said came to have an almost undue importance attached to it by the exigencies of controversy. In his theology he follows and develops the thought of his predecessor Tertullian, whose writings he diligently studied and whom he was accustomed to call "The Master."

He maintains that at the Fall, beside the gift of immortality, man lost also the higher physical strength which he had [1]; he was tainted with a fatal depravity of nature ("contagium mortis antiquæ") which he nevertheless hesitates to call "sin." [2] And although he says "Neminem sine sorde et sine peccato esse," [3] and firmly defends infant baptism on this ground, yet he does not reckon that the guilt there washed away was properly their own.[4] The attacks of sin are manifold, and it is a hard struggle for man's will to resist them,[5] yet it does not annul man's freedom.[6] But that freedom is so far weakened that divine grace is necessary to the accomplishment of good actions, and they cannot be performed without it.[7] This

[1] *De Bono Patientiæ*, s. 9.

[2] "Recens natus nihil peccavit, nisi quod secundum Adam carnaliter natus contagium mortis antiquæ prima nativitate contraxit": *Ep.* 64 *ad Fidum*, c. 5, cf. *Ep.* 59.

[3] *Libri III. Testimoniorum*, bk. iii. c. 54. "Si autem nemo esse sine peccato potest, et quisquis se inculpatum dixerit, aut superbus aut stultus est." *De Op. et Eleemosynis*, s. 2; "et quoniam quotidie deese non potest quod peccetur in conspectu Dei," *ibid.* s. 17; "qui sine aliquo conscientiæ vulnere esse non possumus," *ibid.* s. 2.

[4] "Infanti remittuntur non propria sed aliena peccata," *Ep.* 64, c. 5.

[5] "Cum avaritia nobis, cum impudicitia, cum ira, cum ambitione congressio est; cum carnalibus vitiis, cum illecebris sæcularibus assidua et molesta luctatio est; obsessa mens hominis, et undique diaboli infestatione vallata, vix occurit singulis, vix resistit. Si avaritia prostrata est exsurgit libido, etc. . . . cogeris maledicere, quod divina lex prohibet; compelleris jurare, quod non licet": *De Mortal.* s. 3, 4.

[6] *De Gratia Dei*, c. 2.

[7] "Non jactatum, sed gratum quicquid non virtuti hominis adscribitur, sed de Dei munere prædicatur; . . . Dei est omne quod possumus: inde vivimus, inde pollemus": *Ep. II. ad Donatum.*

grace we need to pray for daily,[1] and, having received grace and used it well, we are yet to refer all to God.[2] All may receive grace, he holds,[3] and more grace is granted according to the capacity for it, and the use made of previously-granted grace,[4] by the performance of good works, especially alms-giving.[5] He naturalises the doctrine of merit formulated by his master and gives it its place in the system of Catholic doctrine. But at the same time, he holds that all can sincerely pray "Forgive us our trespasses" for all are sinners and are compelled to pray for pardon.[6]

4. The next writer demanding consideration is the Roman presbyter *Novatian*, who either was, or was supposed to be the founder of the sect bearing his name; he is also said to be the first "false-Pope." St. Cyprian says he was a Stoic before his conversion. His ordination by Fabian, Bishop of Rome, was objected to by the clergy, on the ground that he had received clinic baptism. His great work is the *De Trinitate*, which is perfectly orthodox. He

[1] "Opus est enim nobis quotidiana sanctificatione, ut qui quotidie delinquimus, delicta nostra sanctificatione assidua repurgemus," *De Orat. Dom.* c. xii. s. 9; "Quæ ut fiat in nobis, opus est Dei voluntate, id est, ope ejus et protectione: quia nemo suis viribus fortis est, sed Dei indulgentia et misericordia tutus est," *ibid.* c. xiv. s. 11; "et ideo petimus inter duo ista (*i.e.* flesh and spirit) ope et auxilio Dei concordiam fieri," *ibid.* c. xvi. s. 13; "hoc diebus ac noctibus postulamus, ut sanctificatio et vivificatio, quæ de Dei gratia sumitur, ipsius protectione servatur," *ibid.* c. xii. s. 9.

[2] "Ut dum præcedit humilis ac submissa confessio et datur totum Deo, quicquid suppliciter cum timore et honore Dei petitur, ipsius pietate præstatur," *ibid.* c. xxvi. s. 19; "in nullo gloriandum, quando nostrum nihil sit," *Testim.* iii. 4.

[3] "Universi judicamus nulli hominum nato misericordis Dei gratiam denegandum. Nam cum Dominus in Evangelio suo dicat, 'Filius hominis non venit animas perdere, sed salvare'": *Ep.* lxiv. s. 2, cf. also ss. 4, 5.

[4] "Nostrum tantum sitiat pectus et pateat; quantum illuc fidei capacis afferimus, tantum gratiæ inundantis haurimus": *De Gratia Dei*, p. 3. "Plane eadem gratia spiritalis, quæ æqualiter in baptismo a credentibus sumitur, in conversatione atque actu nostro postmodun vel minuitur vel augetur": *Ep.* 69, s. 14.

[5] See treatise *De Operibus et Eleemosynis*.

[6] "Quam necessarie autem, quam providenter et salubriter admonemur, quod peccatores sumus, qui pro peccatis rogare compellimur; ut dum indulgentia de Deo petitur, conscientiæ suæ animus recordetur. Ne quis sibi quasi innocens placeat, et se extollendo plus pereat, instruitur et docetur peccare se quotidie dum quotidie pro peccatis jubetur orare. Sic denique et Joannes (1 *Ep.* i. 8, 9)": *De Or. Dom.* c. xxii. s. 16.

states that God willed man to be free, but at the same time limited his freedom and places the origin of evil in a possible exercise of free-will in contempt of the law.[1] He holds a real power of strengthening grace: "For gradually and by progression human frailty was to be strengthened by the image to that glory of being able one day to see God the Father."[2] The Holy Spirit "dwells in Christ full and entire, but with His whole overflow copiously distributed and sent forth, so that from Him others might receive some enjoyment of His graces; the source of the entire Holy Spirit remaining in Christ, so that from Him might be drawn streams of gifts and works."[3] The Holy Spirit makes us God's temple, solicits the divine hearing for us, is "an inhabitant given for our bodies and an effector of their holiness," raises them at the resurrection, trains them to advance to inmortality, restrains, controls, conquers them, and, in short, works all the works of grace in us.[4]

5. Next comes *Hippolytus*, who was (it is generally held) Bishop of Portus, a harbour of Rome at the mouth of the Tiber, born about A.D. 150, and martyred somewhere about A.D. 235–39. His *magnum opus*, the *Philosophumena*, or *Refutation of all the Heresies*, had long been known by repute, but no copy was extant until one was discovered by M. Minos, a Greek, at the Monastery of Mount Athos, in 1842. In his final enunciation of the true doctrine, he says man was a "creature endued with a capacity of self-determination (αὐτεξούσιος) but not possessing a sovereign intellect"; he "brings forth what is evil, that is, accidentally." "The Word promulgated the divine commandments, thereby turning man from disobedience . . . by a choice involving spontaneity." He is our example, above all; but the author goes on to say that "He has arranged to wash away sin from human beings, rendering regenerate the old man."[5] "The grace of Christ" is to "go forth to the whole earth and sea."[6] "The grace of Christ" seems to mean His loving condescension but no more.[7] He "saves perishing man" by "uniting His own power with our mortal body,"[8] by taking flesh from the holy Virgin Mary and assuming also a human (*i.e.* a rational)

[1] C. i.
[2] C. xviii.
[3] C. xxix.
[4] *Ibid.*
[5] X. 29, 30.
[6] *Fragment* on Gen. xlix. 12–15.
[7] On Gen. xlix. 21–26, 27.
[8] *On Christ and Antichrist*, § 4.

soul.[1] He thus "confers immortality on men."[2] Man is "made God by water and the Holy Spirit after the regeneration of the laver."[3] Christ is "the helper of vanquished man."[4]

We now journey once again, and come to Egypt, and outline the evidence from the writings of the teachers of the great *Catechetical School at Alexandria*, Clement and Origen.

6. *Titus Flavius Clemens* was born at Athens somewhere about the middle of the second century, and became well versed in the Greek philosophy, but failed to find satisfaction therein. Accordingly he travelled about seeking purer truth, and in his wanderings came to Alexandria and was fascinated by the teaching of Pantænus, the ex-Stoic, who was at that time head of the Catechetical School. He became a priest of the Church and eventually succeeded Pantænus as head of the School. He died between A.D. 212 and 220. His three chief works form a connected series: (1) The *Λόγος προτρεπτικός*, or "Cohortatio." (2) The *Παιδαγωγός*. (3) *Στρώματεις*, or "Miscellanies"; the homily "Quis dives salvetur" forms the eighth and last book of the "Stromateis." His *ὑποτυπώσεις*, a commentary on the Old and New Testaments, in eight books, is lost.

He endeavoured, as did his teacher Pantænus, his disciple Origen and, in general, the whole Alexandrian School, to formulate the true Christian *γνῶσις*, as contrasted with the heathen speculations of the Gnostic sects. But their speculative tendency, especially in the case of Origen, led them into many strange ideas, and their theology presents a strange contrast with that of the Latin writers, and in particular with the legal exactness and literalism of Tertullian. And thus we are quite prepared to find in the Alexandrian theologians a great affinity with the opinions of Pelagius, as we found in Tertullian the germ of those of St. Augustine.[5] Creation was the voluntary act of God, not because he had any need of His creatures;[6] yet God exercises His providence towards men, working it out through

[1] *Against Noetus*, § 17.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] *On the Holy Theophany*, § 8.
[4] *A discourse on "the Great Song."*
[5] See further, *infra*, pp. 140, 177, *et supra*, p. 125.
[6] *Ἀνενδεὴς δὲ μόνος ὁ θεὸς καὶ χαίρει μάλιστα μὲν καθαρεύοντας ἡμᾶς ὁρῶν τῷ τῆς διανοίας κοσμῷ* (*Pæd.* iii. 1).

natural means, calling also upon human *συνέργεια* to work together with His divine *πρόνοια*. This doctrine was afterwards termed the "doctrine of the *concursus*." [1] The great object of the Christian religion is to teach man to know himself and thus will he come to know God.[2] The soul is created directly by God, not generated by the parent souls.[3] Man is a heavenly plant,[4] a most beautiful hymn of praise to the Deity,[5] and the principal object of God's love.[6] He was created in the image of God; not however of God Himself, but of the Logos, *i.e.* an image after an image.[7] This image resides in the soul, but shines through the physical organism and is reflected in his countenance [8]; yet he also, in one place, strangely connects the "image of God" with the procreative power of man.[9] The image of God is communicated to man *εὐθέως κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν*, but he obtains the likeness *ὕστερον κατὰ τὴν τελείωσιν*.[10] Like the Apologists, and the Greek Fathers, he insists on the freedom of man; [11] man must therefore co-operate with God, for "as the physician offers health to those that work with him with a view to health, so too, God offers eternal salvation to those that work with Him with a view to knowledge and right conduct [12]; he therefore does not hold that the grace of God is irresistible. As none is expected to do more than he is by nature fitted to do, so man can only be required to strive after righteousness, because he has been given the power to do so.[13] It is often in his power to obtain both

[1] *Strom.* vi. 17.

[2] *Pæd.* iii. 1.

[3] *Cohort.* x.; *Strom.* vi. c. 16.

[4] *Cohort.* v.

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] *Pæd.* i. 3.

[7] Ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θεοῦ εἰκών ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ, καὶ υἱὸς τοῦ νοῦ γνήσιος ὁ θεῖος λόγος, φωτὸς ἀρχέτυπον φῶς· εἰκὼν δὲ τοῦ λόγου ὁ ἄνθρωπος (*Cohort.* x.; cf. *Strom.* v. 14).

[8] *Coh.* vi.; *Strom.* v. 14; ii. 19.

[9] *Pæd.* ii. 10.

[10] *Strom.* ii. 22.

[11] Ὑμῶν ἐστιν (*i.e.* the kingdom of heaven) ἐὰν θελήσητε, τῶν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν τὴν προαίρεσιν ἐσχηκότων (*Coh.* x.); Οὔτε μὴν ἄκων σωθήσεται ὁ σωζόμενος, οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν ἄψυχος· ἀλλὰ παντὸς μᾶλλον ἑκουσίως καὶ προαιρετικῶς σπεύσει πρὸς σωτηρίαν· διὸ καὶ τὰς ἐντολὰς ἔλαβεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὡς ἂν ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὁρμητικὸς πρὸς ὁ πότερον ἂν καὶ βούλοιτο τῶν τε αἱρετῶν καὶ τῶν φευκτῶν (*Strom.* vii.).

[12] *Strom.* vii. 7.

[13] *Coh.* x.

enlightenment and strength, but he will have to account only for that sin which proceeds from free choice.[1]

But Clement is far from neglecting the fact of sin; he points out how it has introduced an internal conflict into the nature of man; it does not belong to his nature, though infecting all mankind; we sin without knowing how we do it.[2] Sin is everything contrary to right reason,[3] disobedience to God,[4] and a wrong reckoning, an error[5]; he holds that it comes from lack of knowledge, not from lack of will-power[6]; the corruption resided in the body and the lower (animal) soul, but the higher (reasonable) soul, in which he included reason, conscience and will, was not at all affected.[7] Yet in some way evil has its source in man, for God is not its cause[8]; it is nevertheless not inherent in matter, viz. the body, though neither body nor soul is exempt.[9] Adam was created capable of immortality, but not with full possession of it; "they (the Gnostics) may learn from us (he says) that Adam was created perfect, not in relation to his moral excellencies, but in respect to his capacity of receiving virtue; for there is certainly a difference between a capacity for virtue and the real possession of it. God will have us attain to salvation by our own exertion (*ὁ θεὸς ἡμᾶς ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν βούλεται σώζεσθαι*), hence it belongs to the nature of the soul to determine itself." [10] So he holds that the original state of man consisted only of what is purely human;[11] the Fall was due to sensuality, which is represented by a serpent.[12] Sin

[1] *Strom.* ii. 14.

[2] *Strom.* ii. 15.

[3] Πᾶν τὸ παρὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν ὀρθὸν, τοῦτο ἁμάρτημά ἐστι (*Pæd.* i. 13).

[4] Ἀυτίκα γοῦν ὅτε ἥμαρτεν ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος, καὶ παρήκουσε τοῦ θεοῦ (*Ibid.*).

[5] Ὡς ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι τὸ πλημμελούμενον πᾶν διὰ τὴν τοῦ λόγου δι' ἁμαρτίαν γινόμενον καὶ εἰκότως καλεῖσθαι ἁμάρτημα (*Ibid.*).

[6] Τὸ δὲ ἁμαρτάνειν ἐκ τοῦ ἀγνοεῖν κρίνειν ὅ τι χρὴ ποιεῖν συνίσταται ἢ τοῦ ἀδυνατεῖν ποιεῖν (*Strom.* ii. 15).

[7] See Candlish, *Biblical Doctrine of Sin*, for a brief, though very good, statement of this, p. 99.

[8] Κακίας δ' αὖ πάντως ἀναίτιος (ὁ θεός) (*Strom.* vii. 2).

[9] Ἀλλ' οὔτε ἀγαθὸν ἡ ψυχὴ φύσει, οὐδὲ αὖ κακὸν φύσει τὸ σῶμα, οὐδὲ μὴν, ὅ μή ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν, τοῦτο εὐθέως κακόν· Εἰσι γὰρ οὖν καὶ μεσότητές τινες (*Strom.* iv. 36).

[10] *Strom.* vi. 12.

[11] *Strom.* iv. 23.

[12] *Coh.* xi.

is now, therefore, universal,[1] but all are not absolutely depraved,[2] for some seem by nature much better than others, and no one sins for its own sake.[3] He repudiates the imputation of original sin to children.[4] To obtain salvation, men must repent and believe. Repentance is of two kinds, known afterwards as "contritio" and "attritio."[5] Faith is the key of knowledge and by it we are made the children of God.[6] So God gives His grace to those who show an earnest desire for it, so that "whilst a man strives and labours by himself to subdue his vicious affections, he can do nothing; but if he manifests an earnest and vehement desire to do so, he is enabled by the divine power to accomplish his purpose; for God favours and co-operates with willing minds."[7] Here he approaches very nearly to what was subsequently the Semi-Pelagian heresy; but, as we have before remarked, it is due to the efforts to find a satisfactory solution of the antithesis between divine grace and human freedom, while as yet no authoritative definition had been made upon the subject. He does not hesitate to ascribe our salvation to divine grace, to "the drawing of the Father unto Himself."[8] Those who are saved are they whom God foreknew,[9] and upon His Divine *præscientia* that they would be righteous depends His *prædestinatio*.[10] So he speaks of men's own choice constituting the difference of the election,[11] and says distinctly that it is their own fault if they are not elected, for they are like those who choose to

[1] Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐξαμαρτάνειν πᾶσιν ἔμφυτον καὶ κοινόν (*Pæd.* iii. 12).

[2] *Strom.* i. 6.

[3] *Strom.* iii. 16.

[4] Λεγέτωσαν ἡμῖν· Ποῦ ἐπόρνευσεν τὸ γεννηθὲν παιδίον ἢ τῶς ὑπὸ τὴν τοῦ Ἀδάμ ὑποπέπτωκεν ἀρὰν τὸ μηδὲν ἐνεργῆσαν (*Strom.* iii. 1).

[5] *Strom.* iv. 6. Cf. *Pæd.* i. 9; *Quis Div. Salv.* 40.

[6] *Coh.* cc. i., ii., xii.

[7] *Quis div. salv.* c. 21. Cf. τοῖς εὖ βιοῦν ἐπανηρημένοις ἰσχὺν πρὸς τὴν λοιπὴν σωτηρίαν ἐμπνεῖ (*Strom.* vii. 7).

[8] Δεῖ γὲ καὶ τὴν γνώμην ὑγιῆ κεκτῆσθαι, τὴν ἀμετανόητον πρὸς τὴν θήραν τοῦ καλοῦ· πρὸς ὅπερ μάλιστα τῆς θείας χρῃσόμεθα χάριτος, διδασκαλίας τε ὀρθῆς καὶ εὐπαθείας ἀγνῆς, καὶ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁλκῆς (*Strom.* v. 1); πάμπολυ τὴν σωτηρίαν ἁπάσῃ τῇ ἀνθρωπότητι (*Pæd.* i. 6).

[9] Οὓς προώρισεν ὁ θεὸς, δικαίους ἐσομένους πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου ἐγνωκώς (*Strom.* vii. 17). Οἶδεν οὖν (ὁ θεὸς) οὸς κέκληκεν, οὸς σέσωκεν (*Pæd.* i. 6).

[10] Μόνην εἶναι φάμεν τὴν ἀρχαίαν καὶ καθολικὴν ἐκκλησίαν . . . δι' ἑνὸς τοῦ Κυρίου συνάγουσαν τοὺς ἤδη κατατεταγμένους, οὓς προώρισεν ὁ θεὸς (*Strom.* vii. 17).

[11] Μεταλαμβάνει δὲ τῆς εὐποιΐας ἕκαστος ἡμῶν πρὸς ὃ βούλεται· ἐπεὶ τὴν διαφορὰν τῆς ἐκλογῆς ἀξία γενομένη ψυχῆς αἵρεσις τε καὶ συνάσκησις πεποίηκεν (*Strom.* v. *sub fine*).

leap out of the ship into the sea.[1] He firmly believed, then, in the necessity of grace for man's salvation, and was, in consequence led to speculate much as to the way in which the grace of God influenced men before the coming of Christ. He held that the Law was given to the Jews and philosophy to the Greeks, to prepare for the coming of Jesus Christ.[2] He holds that heathen philosophy had partly borrowed its truths from Jewish revelation and partly derived them from reason, illuminated, however, by the pre-existent Logos. They did not possess the deeper knowledge of its meaning (οὐ κάτ' ἐπίγνωσιν), but he thinks it was capable by God's appointment, of justifying those who had no opportunity of knowing better; "he considered that God mysteriously worked in the Gentiles by His grace, using, as an external means, the imperfect instrument of their own philosophy. So that whatever good, he thought, might have existed in heathens, he still ascribed to God's grace, and therefore did not consider their goodness as 'works done before the grace of Christ.'"[3]

7. We now leave Clement and examine the works of his greater pupil *Origen*, who was called also ἀδαμάντινος and χαλκέντερος. He was born in A.D. 185 at Alexandria, of Christian parents, and was baptised in childhood and educated by his father Leonidas, also by Pantænus and Clement. His father suffered martyrdom in 202, and the boy Origen and his mother bravely encouraged him; Origen supported his widowed mother and his six sisters by giving private instruction and by copying manuscripts. In the following year Demetrius, Bishop of Alexandria, appointed him to succeed Clement as head of the Catechetical School, although he was still a layman, and but eighteen years of age; he held this office for nearly thirty years. He visited Rome, Arabia (where he worked as a missionary), Antioch, and Palestine. While there, he was ordained presbyter by the Bishops of Jerusalem and Cæsarea, to the great indignation of Bishop Demetrius, who called two Councils at Alexandria and excommunicated him, depriving him of

[1] *Strom.* vi. 6.

[2] Εἰκότως οὖν Ἰουδαίοις μὲν νόμος, Ἕλλησι δὲ φιλοσοφία μέχρι τῆς παρουσίας, ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἡ κλῆσις ἡ καθολικὴ εἰς περιούσιον δικαιοσύνης λαόν (*Strom.* vi. 17; cf. also *ibid.* i. 5; vii. 2). See also Westcott, *The Gospel of Life*, c. iv. *sub fine*.

[3] Kaye, *Clement of Alexandria*, p. 122.

his office. He went to Cæsarea and opened a theological school there; in 244 he was at Bostra in Arabia at a Synod, where he succeeded in converting its Bishop, Beryllus, from his Sabellian error. He died at Tyre in 254, and was buried in the Cathedral there. He was undoubtedly the greatest name in the Eastern Church of that, or any other, age, and was acknowledged by Pagan and Christian alike as a miracle of scholarship and erudition. He was famous alike as a philosopher, exegete, linguist, critic, dogmatist, and apologist, his works being said by Epiphanius to number 6,000, though Jerome gives the more moderate estimate of 2,000. His greatest works were the *Hexapla*, a critical text of Scripture, and the περί ἀρχῶν or *De Principiis*, a dogmatic work. This latter work we only possess in the very inaccurate Latin translation of Rufinus. It is in four books, and is full of Platonising and Gnostic errors, many of which he afterwards retracted. He was the first Christian "school-man," *i.e.* the first to undertake a systematic statement of Christian doctrine. But he was much given to speculation, and though "his reason frequently overcomes his imagination, yet his imagination obtains more victories over his reason." [1] So he was led by his allegorising tendencies into many philosophical and dogmatic errors, the chief of which were condemned at a local synod in Constantinople in A.D. 543. In spite of his heretical teachings, however, he exerted the greatest influence in developing Catholic theology, and the great Nicene Fathers found his works a veritable mine of information for their purpose, and nearly all the greatest teachers of the Eastern Church owed much, either directly or indirectly, to his teachings, though they learnt to reject his peculiar views and to adhere to that only which was truly Catholic.

But Origen has been called "the Father of Pelagianism," [2] and it must be conceded that, even more than his teacher, Clement, he leans towards it in his strenuous defence of human free-will, which he expressly states to have been part of the *prædicatio ecclesiastica*. This notoriety has been

[1] Mosheim, *Origines contra Celsum*, p. 60.

[2] In like manner he was also called "the Father of Arianism" because he taught an inequality between the Persons of the Blessed Trinity; but the charge seems to be false, or at the least, exaggerated, for he was the first to teach clearly the Eternal Generation of the Son of God, as distinct from His human birth. On the other hand, he clearly asserts the Son's equality to the Father.

due to the influence of St. Jerome, who calls Pelagianism "Origenis ramusculus." [1] But Origen uses language which might well have been put into the mouth of St. Augustine, though he emphatically teaches man's possession of freedom and his ability to do right if he so will.[2] Of course, the truth is that he was a pioneer in the work of reducing Christian doctrine to a definite system, and it was inevitable that he should make mistakes, and put forth many unguarded statements, which his followers greatly exaggerated. But we shall see, when we come to consider his doctrine in detail, that he held and stated *both* sides of the Catholic truth, even if he unduly pressed the one, as St. Augustine unduly pressed the other.

He taught that matter was not eternal, but had been created by God, though he held that it was the root of evil. The devil and the demons are creatures of God, though created as righteous spiritual beings.[3] Men are induced to sin by them, though not compelled unwillingly [4]; yet he disagrees with those who think that if there were no devil, there would be no sin.[5] He believed even the devil might repent and be saved.[6] Man was "a soul making use of a body," [7] and so he often calls the soul "homo." He held that the soul had existed previous to the formation of the body [8] and maintained that it came into the body as a

[1] *Ep.* cxxxiii. 3.

[2] "Origen in opposing the Diarchic principle of Valentinus and Marcion, and the old Gnostic notion that evil is inherent in matter, maintained the existence of one Eternal good principle and affirmed that evil was the result of man's imperfect moral nature, acting under an uncontrolled freedom of will. He denied that the souls of men were naturally divided into a good and a bad seed, but declared that all might be good it they would, by free-will acting in a right direction. The Manichæans having succeeded to many of the Gnostic notions, Pelagius also followed in the steps of Origen and declared that man by his own innate power might be virtuous without the grace of God, that there was no original sin, neither was death brought in by Adam's fall": Blunt, *op. cit.* s.v. "Heresy."

[3] *Contr. Cels.* iv. 65.

[4] *Ἀλλ' οὐ χριστιανὸς, ὁ ἀληθῶς χριστιανὸς καὶ ὑποτάξας ἑαυτὸν μόνῳ τῷ θεῷ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ πάθοι τι ἂν ὑπὸ τῶν δαιμονίων, ἅτε κρείττων δαιμόνων τυγχάνων* (*Contr. Cels.* viii. 36; cf. also *ibid.* i. 6; *De Princ.* iii. 2, 4; *in lib. Ies. Nave*, xv. 6.

[5] *De Princ.* iii. 2, 4.

[6] *De Princ.* iii. 6, 5.

[7] *Contr. Cels.* vii. 38.

[8] *Τὴν ψυχὴν γάρ τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν λέγει προϋπάρχειν*, says Epiphanius (*Hær.* 64, 4).

punishment for its former sins.[1] There were, then, three theories of the origin of the soul held by early Christian writers :—

(1) *Pre-existence*, held by Origen, who believed, in consequence, that the soul sinned in the former state of existence by misuse of freedom, but could recover its bliss, by a right use of that power in this world. The atonement was spiritual only, though applied to every individual.

(2) *Creationism*, held generally in the East, also by Jerome and Hilary in early times and by Roman theologians generally (with a few exceptions), as well as by Calvin and the majority of Calvinistic and Reformed Church divines, in modern ages. This hypothesis is that the body only is generated by the parents, but each individual soul is a fresh creation by God. On this theory, which is favourable to Pelagianism and was made great use of by Pelagius against St. Augustine, it was very difficult to explain the fact of original sin, except on the assumption that it comes from the effect of sinful flesh upon the soul, or that of the federal or covenant oneness of the race, Adam being constituted by God the representative of the race. The atonement in this case is physical only, the soul being in itself, as God's fresh creation, " very good."

(3) *Traducianism*, held generally in the West, according to St. Jerome,[2] Tertullian being its chief exponent, also by Apollinaris and St. Gregory of Nyssa in the East, as by Klee and a few others in the Roman Church, and by Luther and Lutheran theologians generally. It is noteworthy that although St. Augustine had such great inducements to hold this view, he hesitated very much as to adopting it. The very fact that Pelagius so stoutly held Creationism, while the Traducian hypothesis would have given St. Augustine a powerful weapon to wield in return, might almost have induced him to favour it, but he resisted the temptation, and generally his language is studiously undecided,[3] because he felt its great tendency towards Materialism.[4] The problem of original sin is ridiculously easy of

[1] *De Princ.* i. 7, 4 ; *in Matt.* xv. 34, 35 ; xx. 6, 7.
[2] *Ep.* lxxviii.
[3] *E.g. De Anima*, i. 2 ; iv. 2 ; *De Lib. Arb.* iii. 21, 59.
[4] *De Genesi ad Litteram*, x. c. 1 ; *Ep.* cxc. c. 4 ; but see also : " As soul and flesh are alike punished, unless what is born is purified by regeneration, certainly either both are derived in their corrupt

settlement, upon this theory, for if souls are transmitted from parents to children, as it maintains (the soul being a *tradux*, i.e. a layer from the parent stock), then sin is transmitted along with other elements of the soul, and original sin is a necessary inference. But St. Augustine voluntarily put aside this argument as "playing with an edged tool." The atonement is, on this view, both physical and spiritual, and the Christian is a "new creation" in both body and soul.[1]

We must now return, after this digression, to the opinions

state from man (Traducianism), or the one is corrupted in the other, as if in a corrupt vessel, where it is placed by the secret justice of the Divine law (Creationism). But which of these is true, I would rather learn than teach, lest I should presume to teach what I do not know": *Opus impf. c. Julian*, v. 4. "Whether the doctrine that souls are created (Creationism) or are propagated (Traducianism) is to be believed, he did not venture to speak so decidedly; although he well knew what advantages the latter theory offered his system, and although it had been connected with the doctrine respecting the propagation of depravity, by many of the Western Church, ever after the time of Tertullian. He was probably hindered, however, by the fear of falling, with Tertullian, into material conceptions respecting the nature of the soul, from declaring himself in favour of a theory which otherwise was so much to his purpose. On the other hand, he saw clearly the difficulties in which the theory that souls are created involved his theological system": Neander, *Comparative View of Augustine and Pelagius*, Eng. trans. Woods, pp. 107–8.

[1] For further discussion of this subject, see Liddon, *Some Elements of Religion, Lect. III.* § 2; Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, § 74; Delitzsch, *A System of Biblical Psychology*, c. i, § 7. The following passage is also worthy of note: "Plerique veterum ita loquuntur, quasi peccatum originis censeant esse aliquid positivum, sive habitum, sive aliam qualitatem. Quæ sententia non videtur aliter defendi posse, quam si horum alterum statuamus, vel animas traduci et in earum generatione simul ingenerari peccatum: vel creari quidem illas a Deo, sed infici a semine vel carne. Quorum utrumque a nonnullis veterum conditum fuit. Sed plurimis, et hoc et illud ratione rectæ videtur repugnare: qui iccirco dicere malunt peccatum hoc esse privationem meram, nempe justitiæ originalis carentiam, sive potius habitualem a Deo aversionem ex defectu originalis justitiæ promanantem. Et pro hac sententia est, tum quod Patres sæpe peccatum hoc constituant in amissione gratuitorum donorum, et favoris divini; tum quod alioqui consequi videtur, vel propagari animas, vel spirituale a corporeo infici posse, tum denique quod credendo, formaliter esse privationem meram, non minus commode omnium hujus peccati effectuum caussas reddire possumus, quam si illud aliquid esse positivum dicamus": Vossius, *Historiæ Pelagianæ*, bk. vii. pp. 217–18.

of Origen. He refers the "image of God" exclusively to man's spirit, and explains it as the possibility of perfection implanted in him at the beginning, while "the likeness" is the perfect fulfilment of his destiny.[1] He upholds most strongly the power of the human will, and is its strongest pre-Pelagian defender; "his assertion of the freedom of the will is in strong contrast with Augustine's teaching, and he maintained that guilt arises only when men yield to sinful inclinations."[2] He maintains that "freedom precedes and supporting grace follows. As in Christ's case His human soul gradually united itself with the Logos in proportion as it voluntarily subjected its will to God, so also every man receives grace according to his progress. . . . Faith is the first step and is our own work. . . . But when left to her own resources, the soul herself is everywhere weak and powerless; she requires at every stage the divine grace, that is, enlightenment. Thus a union of grace and freedom takes place within the sphere of the latter, till the 'contemplative life' is reached."[3] Origen does not doubt that God gives man help in the struggle, for nothing good is without God, but God gives this assistance, he holds, in such a way as not to interfere with human liberty. There is no accountability without liberty; "if man were corrupt *by nature*, and could not possibly do good, God would appear

[1] "Ut ipse (homo) sibi eam propriæ industriæ studiis ex Dei imitatione consciseeret, cum possibilitate sibi perfectionis in initiis data per imaginis dignitatem in fine demum per operum expletionem perfectum sibi ipse similitudinem consummaret": *De Princ.* iii. 6, 1. Cf. *Contr. Cels.* iv. 20.

[2] Bethune-Baker, *op. cit.* p. 307, and cf. *De Princ.* iii. 2, 2, 4; Basil, *Hexæm*, ii. 5; vi. 7.

[3] Harnack, *op. cit.* p. 375. "'Fides in nobis; mensura fidei causa accipiendarum gratiarum' is the fundamental idea of Clement and Origen, as of Justin Martyr; 'voluntas humana præcedit'" (*In Ezech. hom. I.* c. 11). "In tua potestate positum est, ut sis palea vel frumentum.' But all growth in faith must depend on Divine help (*In Matt.* series 69, Lomm. iv. p. 372). 'Fidem habenti, quæ est ex nobis, dabitur gratia fidei quæ est per spiritum fidei, et abundabit; et quidquid habuerit quis ex naturali creatione, cum exercuerit illud, accepit id ipsum et ex gratia Dei, ut abundet et firmior sit in eo ipso quod habet'": Harnack, p. 375, n. 2. See also Clem. *Strom.* v. 1, 7. Χάριτι σωζόμεθα, οὐκ ἄνευ μέντοι τῶν καλῶν ἔργων, and Orig. περὶ ἀρχῶν, iii. 2, 2. "In bonis rebus humanum propositum solum per se ipsum imperfectum est ad consummationem boni, adjutorio namque divino ad perfecta quæque perducitur": Harnack, p. 375, n. 4.

as a judge, not of *actions*, but of *natural capacities*." [1] And so, in the end, it is in us and in our wills that the decision remains, so that we may be good or evil, according as we, in our freedom, choose to be so.[2] And thus man is responsible and will receive praise or blame accordingly, for otherwise he would not be a reasonable creature.[3]

Origen held the soul of man to be immortal and not only capable of it, and in this he agrees with Tertullian, though on very different grounds, it being connected with his views on pre-existence. The reason of the soul's immortality is its inherent principle of life, and its natural relation to God.[4]

But, he says, sin is universal and is become a bad custom and a "second nature." [5] But evil was not created by God, though under His providence.[6] All moral evil is ἀνυπόστατον or even οὐδέν,[7] and the Fall therefore is a μείωσις, a *diminutio*. He regarded the account of the Fall, however, as purely allegorical, as a type of what happens in free moral agents always and everywhere, but clothed in the garb of history.[8] Hence the effects of the Fall are moral and spiritual ones, the death referred to being the separation of the soul from God.[9] But Origen strongly holds the doctrine of original sin, for he says that human souls come

[1] *De Princ.* ii. 5; cf. i. 5, 3; also Ἀρετῆς μὲν ἐὰν ἀνέλῃς τὸ ἑκούσιον, ἀνεῖλες αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν (*Contr. Cels.* iv. 3).

[2] "Et per hoc consequens est in nobis esse, atque in nostris motibus, ut vel beati vel sancti simus, vel per desidiam et negligentiam a beatitudine in malitiam et perditionem vergamus, in tantum ut nimius profectus (ut ita dixerim) malitiæ, si quis in tantum sui neglexerit, usque ad eum statum deveniat, ut ea quæ dicitur contraria virtus efficiatur": *De Princ.* i. 5, 5.

[3] "Omnis creatura rationabilis laudis et culpæ capax, laudis si secundum rationem, quam in se habet, ad maliora proficiat, culpæ si rationem recti declinet": *De Princ.* i. 5, 2.

[4] *De Princ.* ii. 11; iii. 1, 13; *Exhort. ad Mart.* 47.

[5] Σαφῶς γὰρ φαίνεται, ὅτι πάντες μὲν ἄνθρωποι πρὸς τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν πεφύκαμεν, ἔνιοι δὲ οὐ μόνον πεφύκασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰθισμένοι εἰσὶν ἁμαρτάνειν (*Contr. Cels.* iii. 66); Ἀδύνατον γὰρ φάμεν εἶναι ἄνθρωπον μετ' ἀρετῆς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἄνω βλέπειν· Κακίαν γὰρ ὑφιστάσθαι ἀναγκαῖον πρῶτον ἐν ἀνθρώποις (*ibid.* iii. 62).

[6] Ἡμεῖς δέ φαμεν, ὅτι κακὰ μὲν ἢ τὴν κακίαν καὶ τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῆς πράξεις ὁ θεὸς οὐκ ἐποιήσε (*Contr. Cels.* vi. 55; cf. iii. 69; *De Princ.* iii. 2, 7).

[7] Πᾶσα ἡ κακία οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ οὐκ ὂν τυγχάνει (*in Joh.* t. ii. c. 7; cf. *De Princ.* ii. 9, 2).

[8] *De Princ.* iv. 16; *Contr. Cels.* iv. 40.

[9] *De Princ.* ii. 9; *Contr. Cels.* iv. 62; *Comm. in Mt.* xiii. 7; *in Joh.* xvii. 37; *in Ep. ad Rom.* vi. 6.

into the world stained and corrupted with the sins of a former existence,[1] and so "the curse of Adam is common to all men,"[2] and all, even new-born children are polluted and need the grace of Baptism.[3] For obtaining forgiveness of sins both faith and repentance are necessary.[4] Good works are also necessary, and, indeed, meritorious;[5] every one who lives after Christ's commands has communion with God.[6] They who thus are partakers of Christ are enabled in some degree to partake of His sinlessness, according as they "abide in Him and He in them."[7] Grace, then, is not merely enlightenment, though it is that, but it is also a real participation of the fulness of Christ, a most real union (*συμπνεούσης*) of the divine power, with human choice.[8] "As divine teacher and hierophant He (Christ)

[1] "Omnis qui ingreditur hunc mundum in quadam contaminatione effici divitur (Job xiv. 4, 5) . . . Omnis ergo homo in patre et in matre pollutus est, solus vero Jesus Dominus meus in hanc generationem mundus imgressus est, et in matre non est pollutus. Ingressus est enim corpus incontaminatum": *Hom. viii. in Lev.*; cf. *De Princ.* iii. 5.

[2] *Contr. Cels.* iv.

[3] "Quod si placet audire quid etiam alii sancti de ista nativitate senserint, audi David dicentem; *In iniquitatibus*, inquit, *conceptus sum et in peccatis peperit me mater mea;* ostendens quod quæcumque anima in carne nascitur, iniquitatis et peccati sorde polluitur: et propterea dictum esse illud quod jam superius memoravimus, quia *nemo mundus a sorde, nec si unius diei sit vita ejus.* Addi his etiam potest, ut requiratur quid causæ sit, cum baptisma Ecclesiæ pro remissione peccatorum detur, secundum Ecclesiæ observantiam etiam parvulis baptismum dari; cum utique si nihil esset in parvulis quod ad remissionem deberet et indulgentiam pertinere, gratia baptismi superflua videretur": *In Lev.* viii. 3.

[4] "Impossibile est salvari sine fide": *In Num. Hom.* xxvi. "Etiamsi opera quis habeat ex lege, tamen, quia non sunt ædificata supra fundamentum fidei, quamvis videantur esse bona, tamen operatorem suum justificare non possunt, quod eis deest fides, quæ est signaculum eorum, qui justificantur a Deo": *Comm. in Ep. ad Rom.* p. 517. "Est adhuc et septima, licet dura et laboriosa, per pænitentiam remissio peccatorum, etc.": *Hom. in Lev.* ii. 4.

[5] *Ep. Ad. Rom.* iii, p. 507.

[6] *Ὅτι ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἤρξατο θεία καὶ ἀνθρωπίνη, συνυφαίνεσθαι φύσις· ἵν' ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη τῇ πρὸς τὸ θειότερον κοινωνίᾳ γένηται θεία οὐκ ἐν μόνῳ τῷ Ἰησοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς μετὰ τοῦ πιστεύειν ἀναλαμβάνουσι βίον, ὃν Ἰησοῦς ἐδίδαξεν* (*Contr. Cels.* iii. 28).

[7] "Participes vero ejus quam proximi fuerint vasculo, tam odoris erunt participes et capaces": *De Princ.* ii. 6, 6.

[8] *Τὸ τοῦ λογικοῦ ἀγαθὸν μικτόν ἐστιν ἔκ τε τῆς προαιρέσεως αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς συμπνεούσης θείας δυνάμεως τῷ τὰ κάλλιστα* (*Hom. in Ps. ii.* p. 571). "It is thus that by the unceasing work towards us of Father, Son, and

had to reveal the depths of knowledge and to impart in this very process a new principle of life, so that they might now partake of His life, and themselves become divine, through being interwoven with the Divine Essence." [1]

To whom, then, does God give His Grace? whom does He call? Origen says, agreeing on this point with the rest of the pre-Augustinian Fathers, those whom He foresaw would be worthy of His Grace.[2] But Origen goes farther back than did the other patristic writers and asks when they made themselves worthy, and answers that it was in their previous existence.[3] So if Pharaoh's heart is said to be hardened, it is because he refused to yield to divine grace; the rain has different effects, according to the ground it falls upon; the sun melts wax, but hardens clay; and so grace softens some hearts but hardens others.[4] Yet Origen does not hold the doctrine of reprobation, for those who are not chosen, he thinks, are merely left for a later grace of God; grace is delayed to them, not refused. Souls are prepared by God, not for this life only, but

Holy Spirit, carried through successive stages of progress, we are able (if it may be so) to behold the holy and blessed life of the saints" (*De Princ.* i. 3, 8).

[1] Harnack, *op. cit.* pp. 367–68.

[2] *Philocalia*, c. 25; cf. "Ut enim Jacob esset vas ad honorem sanctificatum, et utile Domino, ad omne opus bonum paratum, anima ejus emundaverat semetipsam; et videns Deus puritatem ejus, et potestatem habens ex eadem massa facere aliud vas ad honorem, aliud ad contumeliam, Jacob quidem, qui ut diximus emundaverat semetipsum, fecit vas ad honorem, Esau vero, cujus animam non ita puram nec ita simplicem vidit, ex eadem massa fecit vas ad contumeliam": *Comm. ad Rom.* vii. 17. "God is ever distributing to those who are able to partake of Him His own Spirit, who dwells in those that are *worthy of His presence*": *C. Celsum*, vi. 70. Also: "All the Fathers of this period agree that God so far predestines men to blessedness or condemnation as He foresees their free acts, by which they are made worthy of reward or punishment; but the foreseeing of these acts is not the cause of them, but the acts are the cause of the foreknowledge": J. C. L. Gieseler, *Dogmengeschichte*, s. 212; in other words, that God calls men because they are worthy, not that they are worthy because they are called; and that they are worthy, because they have made themselves so.

[3] "Igitur sicut de Esau et Jacob diligentius perscrutatis scripturis invenitur, quia non est injustitia apud Deum . . . si ex præcedentis videlicet vitæ meritis digne eum electum esse sentiamus a Deo, ita ut fratri præponi mereretur": *De Princ.* ii. ix. 7.

[4] *De Princ.* iii. 1.

for eternity. So, on this subject as on so many others, we find in the many writings of this master-mind, the germs of all later orthodox teaching as well as the seeds of many heresies, so that those who attribute Pelagianism to him, really see but half the truth, and it would be quite possible for another, with nearly equal truth, to give him credit for the greater part of the opposite theory, which we find fully-fledged in the works of St. Augustine.

8. The professed followers of the great Alexandrian furnish us with little material to our purpose, so that we shall spend no time upon consideration of them.[1] But one of his opponents claims at least a passing notice, *Methodius*, if only on account of the fact that, although a staunch adversary of Origen, he adopted in his Συμπόσιον, or *Convivium* ("Banquet of the Ten Virgins"), many of Origen's views on free-will. This man became Bishop of Olympus in Lycia about A.D. 290, but was subsequently translated to Tyre. He suffered martyrdom in the persecution of Diocletian and Maximin in 311.[2] Besides the work mentioned above, he wrote works περὶ γενητῶν and περὶ ἀναστασεως λόγος and "de libero arbitrio," which we do not possess in the original, except a part of the second-named, but only as preserved for us by Photius. There was also in existence an apologetic work of his, against Porphyry, but it is now entirely lost. "Against the Gnostics he maintained the freedom of the human will. Like St. Augustine and St. Bernard in later times, he taught the blessing of a mystical union between the human soul and Christ, a hidden life in which Christ Himself is born and suffers and rises again. This union comes through baptism and the teaching of the Church, which is the bride of Christ ('His Eve') and the mother of souls, and it is made effectual by faith and works."[3] Man, he says, does not possess the power either of having desires or of not having them (ἐνθυμεῖσθαι ἢ μὴ ἐνθυμεῖσθαι), but he has the choice either to gratify (χρῆσθαι) them or not, as he pleases.[4] He sets a very great value

[1] Blind Didymus, however, attributes "the restoration of our nature, the spiritual life, the adoption of sons, the title of joint-heirs with Christ" to the work of the Holy Spirit: Swete, *The Holy Spirit in the Ancient Church*, p. 223. See Didymus, *De Spiritu Sancto*, i, fol. 176, B.C. M.; 177, D.E.

[2] Hier. *de vir. illus.* 83; Socrates, *Hist. Eccl.* vi. 13.

[3] Pullan, *The Church of the Fathers*, p. 154.

[4] In Photius, *Bibl. Cod.* 234.

upon the human will, but he also, on the other hand, emphasises the reality of grace, as forming and preserving the mystical union with Christ. He lays great stress on the fact that everything God has created, and *as* He has created it, is capable of permanence and transfiguration.[1] The imperfection of Adam, then, is natural, but the Incarnation is the completion of creation. Adam, *i.e.* mankind, was plastic, capable of receiving any impression, good or evil; but this imperfection was removed in Christ. All who are incorporated in Christ by baptism through grace attain growth, *i.e.* His holiness and glory; they participate in Christ and are "born as a Christ."[2]

9. The next writer we must deal with is *Arnobius* "Senior," sometimes called "Afer," to distinguish him from Arnobius "Junior," or "Gallus," who lived a century and a half later. *Arnobius Senior* was born at Sicca Veneria in Numidia towards the close of the third century. He became a teacher of rhetoric, and wrote his treatise, "Adversus Gentes, libri vii," to attest his sincerity, while still a catechumen, about A.D. 303. This work was of an apologetic nature, and so far as it treated dogma, it dealt only with the being of God, and to some extent with Christology; but on soteriological and anthropological subjects he only just touches. He speaks of a connatural infirmity which makes man weak to resist sin,[3] and so implies that there is need of some higher power not his own, in order to seek the things that are above. But this is practically the extent of his teaching on this subject, so we pass on to his disciple, Lactantius.

10. *Lucius Cælius Firmianus Lactantius*, to give him his full name, was called "the Christian Cicero" on account of his rhetorical skill and literary excellence. He was an Italian by birth, and became a teacher of rhetoric and Latin at Nicomedia, and was afterwards appointed, in his old age, tutor to Crispus, the eldest son of Constantine the Great. He died about A.D. 330. His teachings are very unorthodox

[1] *De resur.* 28.

[2] *Conviv.* viii. 8.

[3] "Proni ad culpas et ad libidinis varios appetitus, vitis sumus infirmitatis ingenitæ": *Adv. Gentes.* i. 27. "At vero nos nobis nihil de nostra infirmitate promittimus, naturam intuentes nostram virium esse nullarum et ab suis affectibus in omni rerum contentione superari. . . . nos tantam reformidamus audaciam nec in nostra ducimus esse positum potestate, res superas petere": *ibid.* ii. 33.

on many points; in theology proper he seems to be at once an Arian and a Sabellian, while in anthropology he shows markedly Manichæan leanings. His chief works were seven books of "Divinarum Institutiones," the "De Ira Dei," and "De Opificio Dei vel formatione hominis." He is a strenuous adherent of Creationism, appealing to the fact that clever parents sometimes have stupid children, and *vice versa*. The soul, he says, is born with the body, having been created directly by God and at a certain moment united with the body while yet developing itself in the womb.[1] The soul is not essentially immortal, but by the practice of virtue attains to immortality as its reward.[2] He held that the body was the seat as well as the organ of sin, and so any perfection was an impossibility in this life.[3] He thinks that evil is necessary as a contrast to good, which would cease to be, were there no contrast.[4] Yet no man sins of necessity, but of purpose and free-will; a statement of his which the

[1] *Inst.* iii. 18; cf. also "Illud quoque venire in quæstionem potest, utrum anima ex patre, an potius ex matre, an vero ex utroque generetur. Nihil ex his tribus verum est, quia neque ex utroque, neque ex alterutro seruntur animæ. Corpus enim ex corporibus nasci potest, quoniam confertur aliquid ex utroque; de animis anima non potest, quia ex re tenui et incomprehensibili nihil potest decedere. Itaque serendarum animarum ratio uni ac soli Deo subjacet:

> 'Denique cœlesti sumus omnes semine oriundi,
> Omnibus ille idem pater est,'

ut ait Lucretius; nam de mortalibus non potest quidquam nisi mortale generari. Nec putari pater debet, qui transfudisse aut inspirasse animam de suo nullo modo sentit; nec, si sentiat, quando tamen et quomodo id fiat, habet animo comprehensum. Ex quo apparet, non a parentibus dari animas, sed ab uno eodemque omnium Deo patre, qui legem rationemque nascendi tenet solus, siquidem solus efficit; nam terreni parentis nihil est, nisi ut humorem corporis, in quo est materia nascendi, cum sensu voluptatis emittat vel recipiat, et citra hoc opus homo resistit, nec quidquam amplius potest; ideo nasci sibi filios optant, quia non ipsi faciunt. Cetera jam Dei sunt omnia: scilicet conceptus ipse et corporis informatio et inspiratio animæ et partus incolumis et quæcunque deinceps ad hominem conservandum valent; illius munus est, quod spiramus, quod vivimus, quod vigemus": *De Opif. Dei*, 19.

[2] *Instit.* vii. 5.

[3] "Nemo esse sine delicto potest, quamdiu indumento carnis oneratus est. Cujus infirmitas triplici modo subjacet dominio peccati; factis, dictis, cogitationibus": *De Ira Dei.* 15; cf. *Inst.* ii. 12; vi. 13.

[4] *Inst.* ii. 8.

Pelagians brought forward in defence of their doctrine.[1] But man was weak and needed help, which Christ afforded by His example,[2] but more by a "continual giving,"[3] by which sin should be entirely done away with.

11. We next go on to the teaching on grace of the great protagonist of the Nicene faith against the Arian heresy—*St. Athanasius*. We must remember that his great anti-Arian polemic taxed all his energies, gigantic though they were, and so we must expect to find but little on our particular dogma that we have under consideration; yet we may find many slight hints which will be very valuable as showing the anthropological ideas latent in his mind. He was born at Alexandria about A.D. 297, became Bishop of his native city in 326, and died in 373, after a life of great exertions and many exiles. His works are too numerous to mention (so says St. Jerome),[4] but many of them are now lost.

Sin, he says, is not a necessary attribute of human nature, though connected with the development of man. Man was originally free from sin, and Christ came to prove the sinless life possible.[5] He favoured Creationism[6] and the bipartite division of human nature. Sin is something negative,[7] and consists in the indolence of man and in sensuality which is a kind of indolence.[8] Man has, he holds, the power of choosing good as well as evil,[9] and he says that,

[1] "Et iterum, ut desideriis carnis edomitis, doceret non necessitatis esse peccare, sed propositi ac voluntatis": *Inst.* iv. 25, quoted by St. Augustine, *De Natura et Gratia*, lxi. § 71.

[2] "Oportuit magistrum doctoremque virtutis homini simillimum fieri, ut vincendo peccatum doceat hominem vincere posse peccatum": *Inst.* iv. 24.

[3] "Quodsi mortalis conditio non patitur, esse hominem ab omni macula purum; debent ergo largitione perpetua peccata carnis aboleri": *ibid.* vi. 13. Conveniently omitting to notice this passage, the Pelagians adduced the one previously quoted as a proof that man was able to overcome sin by his own strength of will, without any external assistance beyond mere example.

[4] *De Vir. Illus.* 87.

[5] *Contra Apoll.* lib. ii.

[6] *C. Arian.* ii. 48.

[7] Ὄντα δὲ ἐστι τὰ καλά, οὐκ ὄντα δὲ τὰ φαῦλα· ὄντα δὲ φημὶ τὰ καλά, καθότι ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος θεοῦ τὰ παραδείγματα ἔχει· οὐκ ὄντα δὲ τὰ κακὰ λέγω, καθότι ἐπινοίαις ἀνθρώπων οὐκ ὄντα ἀναπέπλασται (*C. Gent.* 4); Ὅτι τὸ κακὸν οὐ παρὰ θεοῦ, οὐδὲ ἐν θεῷ, οὔτε ἐξ ἀρχῆς γέγονεν, οὔτε οὐσία τίς ἐστιν αὐτοῦ (*ibid.* 7).

[8] *Ibid.* 3.

[9] Ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν οὐκ ἦν κακία, οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ νῦν ἐν τοῖς ἁγίοις ἐστὶν, οὐδ' ὅλως κατ' αὐτοὺς ὑπάρχει αὐτή (*C. Gent.* 2).

even before Christ there were many who were free from original sin.[1] This power of choice, as also the endowment of reason itself, was not part of human nature as such, but a *donum superadditum*, given potentially, not absolutely; a gift of grace which was, by continual use and exercise in man's free moral development, to attain to the perfect knowledge and perception of God.[2] The Fall caused a loss of the divine, but God was still anxious to prevent man, who had been destined to such a goal, from being lost through becoming the prey of his lower nature. Man's present state is, therefore, a merely natural one.[3] Yet elsewhere he thinks that the ψυχὴ λογική is an essential part of man's nature, and is both immortal and inalienable. It is only λογική (rational) because it partakes of the Logos (ἐκ πηγῆς ἀγαθῆς ἀγαθὸς προελθών), who came down to His creatures and made them after His image. It possesses a shadow of Him, and is only powerful so long as it is connected with Him and guided by His direction and His power (νεύματι καὶ δυνάμεσι).[4] Hence this is called an "external" endowment, though in a certain sense, a "natural" one.[5] But he seems to prefer the view that man did not suffer a great loss once for all, but rather that he has lost more and more, as age succeeds to age, the consciousness of God, through the darkening of his mind. He still has, it is true, the faculties; but the power of attainment is lacking. "Sinful man gradually lost, according to Athanasius, what was supernatural in his prerogatives, and retained only what was natural. Supernatural, on the one hand, were moral goodness, on the other the correct consciousness and due use of rationality and immortality; while rationality and immortality generally were natural. . . . He teaches, indeed, that the spiritual gifts of man were lost through sin, but he conceives this ruin as gradual in time and degree, depending on the extent to which men had

[1] Πολλοὶ γὰρ οὖν ἅγιοι γεγόνασι καθαροὶ πάσης ἁμαρτίας (*C. Arian*, iii. 33). He cites especially Jeremiah and John the Baptist.

[2] Note the terms he uses for this: φαντασία περὶ θεοῦ, γνῶσις, κατανόησις, κατάληψις, θεωρία τῶν θείων, θεωρία τῶν νοητῶν, θεωρία περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἔννοια τῆς εἰς πατέρα γνώσεως.

[3] Ἡ παράβασις τῆς ἐντολῆς εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν αὐτοὺς ἐπέστρεφεν (*De Inc.* iv.).

[4] *De Incarn.* iii.; cf. *Contra. Gent.* 41–44.

[5] Ὁ Ἀδὰμ πρὸ τῆς παραβάσεως ἔξωθεν ἦν, λαβὼν τὴν χάριν καὶ μὴ συνηρμοσμένην ἔχων αὐτὴν τῷ σώματι (*C. Ar.* ii. 68).

turned from the contemplation of the spiritual and to the sensuous." [1]

God, then, threatened to punish transgressors with death, and would not have been true had He failed to do so; but on the contrary, it would be just as much opposed to His goodness if He had allowed rational beings, partakers of His Spirit to be finally lost [2]; and so the Logos assumed a mortal body to fulfil the law for us, to offer the sacrifice of Himself, to give immortality and thus to restore the divine image in man. This, then, is the true and full meaning of "grace." He distinguishes between grace in creation and grace in redemption, and points out that we have received by grace what the Son has by nature, *i.e.* sonship.[3] And this sonship depends on the dwelling of the Logos in us,[4] which is "grace." But if he emphasises grace, he does not forget the power of the human will, but exhorts to "correspondence between the will and God's grace, lest, if the will remains idle, the grace given us should depart." [5] Yet all should be attributed to God, Who gives us the power to do whatever we do well.[6]

The Arian *Eunomius* did not hold the universality of sin, but said it did not follow that because the minds of some were impaired by sin, therefore all were! [7] Grace is knowledge (*ἀκρίβεια τῶν δογμάτων*), though only obtainable perfectly through Christ.

12. We will next glance at the teaching of *Cyril*, the great Bishop of Jerusalem. He was born about 315 A.D., and was made deacon in 335, and bishop in 350. The chief

[1] Atzberger, *Die Logoslehre des h. Athanasius*, p. 156.

[2] *Πάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπολλυμένων κατὰ τὴν παράβασιν τοῦ Ἀδὰμ* (*C. Ar.* ii. 61).

[3] *Cont. Ar.* ii. 58, 59, especially *Αὕτη δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ φιλανθρωπία ἐστίν, ὅτι ὢν ἐστι ποιητὴς, τούτων καὶ πατὴρ κατὰ χάριν ὕστερον γίνεται.*

[4] *Εἰ γὰρ καὶ 'κατ' εἰκόνα' γεγόναμεν, και 'εἰκὼν καὶ δόξα θεοῦ' ἐχρηματίσαμεν, ἀλλ' οὐ δι' ἑαυτοὺς πάλιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἐνοικήσασαν ἐν ἡμῖν εἰκόνα καὶ ἀληθῆ δόξαν τοῦ θεοῦ, ἥτις ἐστὶν ὁ Λόγος αὐτοῦ, ὁ δι' ἡμᾶς ὕστερον γενόμενος σὰρξ, ταύτην τῆς κλήσεως ἔχομεν τὴν χάριν* (*C. Ar.* iii. 10). Cf. *C. Ar.* iii. 25. We are sons and "gods" through the Logos in us. Through wickedness we "fall from the Spirit," though grace still remains in us so long as our will is set towards right, and there is any chance of repentance.

[5] From the *Festal Letters*.

[6] *Κἂν μεγάλα καὶ θαυμαστὰ ποιῇ, ἀλλ' ἡ τοῦ χριστοῦ χάρις ἐστιν ἡ ταῦτα ἐνεργοῦσα* (*Hom. in Pass. et Crucem Domini*).

[7] Socrates, *Eccl. Hist.*, iv. 7.

event of his life was a prolonged dispute with the ultra-Arian Acacius, which eventually brought Cyril over from the Eusebian to the Nicene position. He was deposed three times, but restored to his see, and held a place of honour at the Second General Council in Constantinople in 381. He died about 386. His chief work is the "Catechetical Lectures," of which twenty-three are extant. He also wrote five "Mystagogical Discourses." He holds that all come into this world sinless, and sin enters only with the use of free-will.[1] The devil has no power over man except with the consent of his free-will, for the soul is *αὐτεξούσιος*.[2] He even seems to say that grace is given to those who are worthy, approaching dangerously near to the Semi-Pelagian position.[3] Christ has redeemed us on the Cross, and has purchased for us far more than we had lost by sin.[4] Christians are "disciples of the New Covenant, and partakers of the mysteries of Christ," first by their calling, and later on by the reception of divine assistance which enables them to ratify their calling.[5] Right faith requires the complement of good works,[6] though he says that the greatest acquisition is the learning of the doctrines.[7] "All gifts of grace," says he, "are given by the Father, through the Son, in conjunction with the Holy Spirit," and "no creature can dispense with the teaching and sanctifying power of the Spirit,"[8] who "comes to us gently and gradually, heralded by the dawning of a new day within the soul. He comes to save and to heal, to teach and to admonish, to give strength and comfort and light. He

[1] *Ἐλθόντες εἰς τόνδε τὸν κόσμον ἀναμάρτητοι, νῦν ἐκ προαιρέσεως ἁμαρτάνομεν* (*Cat.* iv. 19).

[2] *Αὐτεξούσιος ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή, καὶ ὁ διάβολος τὸ μὲν ὑποβάλλειν δύναται· τὸ δὲ καὶ ἀναγκάσαι παρὰ προαίρεσιν οὐκ ἔχει τὴν ἐξουσίαν* (*ibid.* iv. 21).

[3] *Εἰ γὰρ τις ἀβλεπτῶν μὴ καταξιοῦται τῆς χάριτος, μὴ μεμφέσθω τῷ πνεύματι, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἀπιστίᾳ* (*ibid.* xvi. 23).

[4] *Οὐ τοσοῦτον ἡμάρτομεν, ὅσον ἐδικαιοπράγησεν ὁ τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τεθεικώς* (*De Recta Fide*).

[5] *Καινῆς διαθήκης μαθηταὶ καὶ χριστοῦ μυστηρίων κοινωνοί, νῦν μὲν τῇ κλήσει, μετ' ὀλίγον δὲ καὶ τῇ χάριτι, καρδίαν ἑαυτοῖς ποιήσατε καινὴν καὶ πνεῦμα καινόν, ἵνα εὐφροσύνης ὑπόθεσις γένησθε τοῖς οὐρανοῖς* (*Cat.* i. 1).

[6] He says that as the rain causes the growth of flowers of different colours "so the Holy Spirit, though Himself one and indivisible, distributes His grace as He wills. The soul that receives it bears in all cases the fruits of righteousness, yet not the same fruits": *Cat.* xvi. 11, 12.

[7] *Cat.* iv. 2.

[8] *Ibid.* xvi. 23.

enlightens the soul and makes it see what is beyond human sight." [1]

13. The next writer with whom we have to deal is a less-known, but from our point of view, more important one—*Caius Marius Victorinus*. This able, though somewhat obscure, writer was a layman, an African by birth, who spent a long life in Rome, as a teacher of rhetoric and the Neoplatonic philosophy, about the middle of the fourth century. He accepted the Christian faith late in life, for St. Augustine tells us that while yet a pagan he was an "aged man, most learned and skilled in the liberal sciences, who had read and weighed so many works of the philosophers; the instructor of so many noble Senators, who also both deserved and obtained a statue in the Roman Forum. . . was not ashamed to become the child of Thy Christ." [2] The account of his conversion is given us by St. Augustine in this passage, very fully. After his conversion he continued the exercise of his profession for a time, until the Edict of the Emperor Julian in A.D. 362 forbade Christians to hold office as teachers. "Had his conversion occurred while he was in the prime of life, it is possible that his name might have been only less prominent than that of the Bishop of Hippo." [3] He it was who popularised the Neoplatonic philosophy at Rome by his original writings, and by his translations of the works of Neoplatonic authors. He also continued to write prolifically after his conversion, his chief works being four books against Arius, a tract on the Homoousion, some hymns on the Holy Trinity, and commentaries apparently on all St. Paul's Epistles,[4] but we only have extant those on Galatians, Ephesians, and Philippians. He "combined an ardent admiration for St. Paul's teaching about faith and grace, with a conception of God which was enriched by all that was best in Neoplatonism." [5] The reason why such of his works as remain have not been more read is the obscurity of his language, and, indeed, it is hard for us to understand how he obtained, as he undoubtedly did, his great reputation for

[1] *Cat.* xvi. 16.

[2] St. Aug. *Conf.* viii. 2. The statue was erected in A.D. 353. His conversion occurred some time just before A.D 361.

[3] Swete, *The Holy Spirit in the Ancient Church*, p. 308.

[4] St. Jerome, *De Vir. Illust.* 101, and *Præf. ad Gal.*

[5] Pullan, *The Church of the Fathers*, p. 345.

eloquence. His great importance to us is that he was the first of Western theologians to unite Neoplatonic speculation with highly orthodox Christianity, and from this standpoint to oppose Manichæism; in this he was the precursor of St. Augustine. When, therefore, he minutely studied St. Paul's Epistles, he became an "Augustinian before Augustine." He seems to have made much of the fact that, of all the ancient systems of philosophy, Platonism was that which apparently did most to "lead to the belief in God and His Word."[1] Most important of all is the almost certain fact that, as Harnack states, "unless all signs deceive, Augustine received from Victorinus the impulse which led him to assimilate Paul's type of religious thought; for it appears from the works of the aged rhetorician that he had appropriated Paul's characteristic ideas, and Augustine demonstrably devoted a patient study to the Pauline Epistles from the moment when he became more thoroughly acquainted with Neoplatonism."[2] St. Augustine never met Victorinus, but learnt of him from his writings, and from his history told to St. Augustine by the presbyter Simplicianus, the instructor and director of both SS. Ambrose and Augustine. Yet his influence upon St. Augustine's thought was immense, though we have failed to appreciate it on account of the greatness of St. Augustine, and the wide circulation of his writings. Victorinus is not strictly orthodox on all points, as, for example, in his doctrine of the pre-existence of souls and their pre-temporal fall, and in the emanationist theory of creation. He strongly insists on the universality of Christ's redemption,[3] but pushes it almost to the point of explaining away the reality of the Incarnation by a process of hyper-spiritualisation! Yet he seems elsewhere to restrict its scope to those who are members of the Body of Christ.[4] But in no case is it by chance that any are saved, for everything without exception, undergoes a strictly necessary development; so he strongly emphasises the doctrine of

[1] St. Augustine, *ut supra.*

[2] Harnack, *op. cit.* v. p. 34.

[3] "Quia corpus ille catholicum ad omnem hominem habuit, omne quod passus est catholicum fecit; id est ut omnis caro in ipso crucifixa sit": *Ad. Phil.* (Ed. Migne, t. viii. p. 1221).

[4] "Non omnia restaurantur sed quæ in Christo sunt": *ibid.* p. 1245. "Universos sed qui sequerentur": *ibid.* p. 1221. "Quæ salvari possent": *ibid.* p. 1274.

predestination, though he is also compelled by his anti-Manichæan polemics to lay stress on the freedom of the human will. Yet he does not doubt that both the "willing" and the "doing" are the work of God.[1] Salvation, then, is by faith, by grace, not by human works or merit.[2] He held the Neoplatonic view of sin as "not being," as merely the privation of good, following in this respect the doctrines of Origen and Athanasius, and being himself followed by Ambrose, Augustine, Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, Pseud Dionysius, and many others.

14. From Victorinus we pass to *Hilary*, Bishop of Poitiers (Pictavium) in Gaul. He was born about A.D. 300 in Poitiers, and of heathen parentage, it is believed, and passed through Neoplatonism to Christianity; he became Bishop in 350, and died in 368. His chief fame lies in his championship of the Catholic faith against the Arians, but also in the use made of his writings by the Pelagians. The most important work of his is the *De Trinitate* (sometimes called *De Fide* or *Contra Arianos*), in twelve books, but he also wrote Commentaries on the Psalms and on St. Matthew's Gospel, as well as several smaller works. He was a determined upholder of Creationism.[3] Yet he expressly taught that all men are concerned in some way in the sin of Adam.[4] Nevertheless he does not exclude man's liberty from the work of righteousness;[5] indeed, he states

[1] "Quia ipsum velle a deo nobis operatur, fit ut ex deo et operationem et voluntatem habeamus": *Ad. Eph.* i. 14; iii. 7; *Ad. Phil.* ii. 13.

[2] "'Non meam justitiam' tunc enim mea est vel nostra, cum moribus nostris justitiam Dei mereri nos putamus perfectam per mores. At non inquit, hæc habens justitiam, sed quam? Illam ex fide. Non illam ex lege; væ in operibus est et carnali disciplina, sed hanc quæ ex Deo procedit 'justitia ex fide'": *Ad. Phil.* iii. 9; *Ad. Gal.* iii. 22. "Non nostri laboris est, quod sæpe moneo, ut nos salvemus; sed sola fides in Christum nobis salus est . . . nostrum pene jam nihil est nisi solum credere qui superavit omnia. Hoc est enim plena salvatio, Christum hæc vicisse. Fidem in Christo habere, plenam fidem, nullus labor est, nulla difficultas, animi tantum voluntas est": *Ad. Phil.* iv. 9; *Ad. Eph.* ii. 5.

[3] *In Ps.* xci. 3; cxviii. 1.

[4] "Ovis una, homo intelligendus est, et sub homine uno, universitas sentienda est; sed in unius Adæ errore omne hominum genus aberravit": *In Matt.* xviii. 6. Cf. *In Ps.* lviii.; cxviii. *litt.* 22, v. 6. "Si enim Deus peccatores sperneret, omnes utique sperneret; quia sine peccato nemo est": *In Ps.* cxviii. 15, 6.

[5] "Est quidem in fide manendi a Deo munus, sed incipiendi a

the opinion known subsequently as Semi-Pelagian.[1] He emphasises the need of the assistance of God's grace to keep His commands, as well as to know the verity of the faith.[2] And this grace does actually work a real righteousness in us, so that we attain a pure mind.[3] Only those who have attained to this righteousness, and with it to some degree of immortality, can perceive that which is immortal in God.[4] These last three passages were eagerly laid hold of by Pelagius in his *De Natura*, as proof of his doctrine of human sufficiency for obtaining perfection. St. Augustine has no difficulty in showing that Hilary used these phrases with the understanding that it was to be attained *with the help of divine grace;* so that St. Hilary gives no sanction whatever to Pelagian opinions, if he does to those of the Semi-Pelagian party. But, on the other hand, he seems in some places to contradict even these opinions, speaking of faith as "God's gift to the faithful"[5] or again, "Let us therefore make use of this great benefit and seek for personal experience of this most needful gift. . . . The soul of man, unless through faith it have appropriated the gift of the Spirit, will have the innate faculty of apprehending God, but be destitute of the light of knowledge. That gift which is in Christ, is one yet offered, and offered

nobis origo est. Et voluntas nostra hoc proprium ex se habere debet, ut velit. Deus incipienti incrementum dabit, quia consummationem per se infirmitas nostra non obtinet; meritum tamen adipiscendæ consummationis est ex initio voluntatis": *In Ps.* cxviii. 15. "Dives by the exercise of his own free-will might have been in Abraham's bosom": *In Ps.* li.

[1] "The Holy Spirit we must seek and must earn, and then hold fast by faith and obedience to the commands of God": *De Trinitate*, ii. c. 35.

[2] "Ad quorum custodiam nisi a Deo dirigamur, infirmi per naturam nostram erimus. Adjuvandi igitur per gratiam ejus dirigendique sumus ut præceptarum ordinem justificationum consequamur . . . Iam vero in ipsam fidei veritatem, hoc est, Dei patris et Domini intelligentiam, per quam maxime justificatio nobis erit probata; quanta opus est nobis Dei gratia, ut recte sapiamus": *In Ps.* cxviii. 1, 5.

[3] "Quas Job litteras legeret, ut abstineret se ab omni re maligna? quia Deum sola mente vitiis non admixta venerabatur, Deum autem colere justitiæ proprium officium est": *Fragmenta.*

[4] "Non enim nisi spiritu perfecti et immortalitate mutati, quod solis mundis corde dispositum est, hoc quod in Deo est immortale cernemus": *In Matt.* v. 8.

[5] *De Trin.* ii. 29.

freely, to all; it is denied to none, and given to each according to the measure of his willingness to receive; its stores the richer, the more earnest the desire to earn them." [1]

15. A glance must be cast at that most voluminous writer, *St. Ephrem*, generally surnamed "Syrus." He was a native of Nisibis in Mesopotamia, born about A.D. 308, and for many years a deacon of the Church in Edessa; he was also abbot of the monastery there, dying in A.D. 378. His many works were written in Syriac, into which tongue he introduced Greek science, and much dogmatic terminology. Many of his works are extant in the original, and others in Greek and Arabic translations. The chief are a *Commentary on the New Testament*, a tract *Against False Doctrines* (chiefly against Manichæanism), and one *De Divina Gratia*. He published innumerable homilies and sermons, and many hymns (12,000, it is said). He held that man is born innocent, and sin only comes from the use of free-will. Evil is not a real existence, but both good and evil are conditions resulting from the right or wrong use of free-will.[2] At the same time he allows the need of assistance, on account of the weakness of the will; grace is a "guard," a "master," a "companion," a "counsellor." [3]

16. Now let us turn to *Macarius* (*c.* A.D. 370). This writer, though unquestionably an Oriental, an Egyptian, approaches most nearly of any of the Eastern writers to Western thought. In his homilies he draws a sharp contrast between the spheres of nature and of grace,[4] and emphasises the impossibility of doing anything at all that is of real worth, apart from the grace and power of God.[5] Yet he

[1] *De Trin.* ii. 35.

[2] See Overbeck, *St. Ephræmi Syri aliorumque Opera Selecta*, pp. 63 f.

[3] "Enitere ut divinam gratiam jugiter in mente tua habeas, ne illudaris. Cole illam ut custodem tuam, ne injuria affecta relinquat te. Venerare illam, ut magistram tuam invisibilem, ut ne illa absente verseris in tenebris. Sine illa noli certamen inire, ne turpiter intereas. Sine comitatu illius, virtutis semitam ne ingrediaris, nam draco rugiens insidias tibi struet. Absque consilio ipsius non tractes, quæ ad animam pertinent, multi enim sunt, qui specie recti mentem depravant, etc.": *De Divina Gratia.*

[4] *Hom.* i. 10; iv. 7–9 (recently published by S.P.C.K., edited with an introduction by Dr. Mason).

[5] Χριστιανῶν γὲ ἡ δόξα, καὶ τὸ κάλλος, καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος ὁ οὐράνιος ἀλάλητος ἐστι, καὶ μετά πόνου καὶ ἱδρώτων, καὶ δοκιμασιῶν, καὶ ἀγώνων πολλῶν ποριζόμενος (? for *acquisitæ*). Τό γε ὅλον χάριτι θεοῦ (*Homil.* v.). Ἄνευ τοῦ

does not altogether exclude the power of the will to make a right determination, for he quotes the text, "Mihi adhærere deo bonum est," as the sum of all knowledge, interpreting the "cleaving to God" as a free independent decision for God.[1] Again, he seems to imply that a movement must be made by man, before God will give His grace, and that this grace is given in response to human self-denial.[2] He is, then, on the whole characteristically Eastern, which is almost equivalent to saying that he is rather inclined towards the Semi-Pelagian type of doctrine.

17. We next come to the group of the great Cappadocian Fathers, *Basil* and the two *Gregorys*. These three were friends and contemporaries, there not being more than two years difference in age between the three of them. Basil and Gregory of Nyssa, his younger brother, were sons of Christian parents, Basil and Emmelia, born at Cæsarea in Cappadocia in 329 and 331 respectively; the other Gregory, born in 329, was the son of Gregory, Bishop of Nazianzus in Cappadocia. The three young men studied at Antioch and Athens, where a fellow-student was Julian, afterwards Emperor. *Basil* renounced his profession as advocate, for the religious life, persuaded by his sister Macrina, and founded a monastery near to Neocæsarea. His great importance arises from the part he took in the Arian and Macedonian controversies, and his writings therefore deal chiefly with Trinitarian subjects; he touches anthropology, on this account, only incidentally. He regards sin as something negative, as merely the opposite of good, a deflection from virtue which *is*, to that which *is not*.[3] Like other Easterns, he held that men began life in a state of innocence, but sin comes in with free-will. All, however, he says in his λόγος περὶ τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου are depraved, as a matter of fact, and therefore there is need of

Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ, καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς θείας δυνάμεως, οὐκ ἔστι γινώσκειν μυστήρια καὶ σοφίαν θεοῦ ἢ εἶναί τινα πλούσιον καὶ χριστιανόν (*Homil.* xvii.).

[1] *Ep.* i. *in fin.*

[2] "How should God treat a man who, in the exercise of free-will, devotes himself to the world, lets himself be seduced by its pleasures, or revels in dissipations? God only sends His help to him who renounces worldly pleasures, and preserves himself completely from the snares and traps of the sensuous world": *Hom.* iv. 5.

[3] Ὅτι κακόν ἐστιν οὐχὶ οὐσία ζῶσα καὶ ἔμψυχος, ἀλλὰ διάθεσις ἐν ψυχῇ ἐναντίως ἔχουσα πρὸς ἀρετὴν διὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ ἀπόπτωσιν τοῖς ῥαθύμοις ἐγγινομένη (*Hexæmeron*, ii. 19).

divine grace to co-operate with human liberty.[1] Grace is not only a divine illumination of the mind,[2] but an energy of the Spirit, which is to inhere in the soul,[3] which is not able to attain salvation by its own powers or wisdom as self-sufficient,[4] but requires the power of God.[5] Thus his line of thought seems to waver, and sometimes inclines towards an Augustinian sense and sometimes towards its opposite, as does that of Hilary.

18. His brother, *Gregory of Nyssa*, is much more consistent, but in a Pelagian direction. He is one of the few Eastern theologians who held the Traducian hypothesis regarding the origin of the soul.[6] He regards the image of God in man as the faculty of reason and the dominion over the irrational creation;[7] the likeness is the possibility of becoming a Christian.[8] Man was created imperfect, but capable of perfection, and also mortal, but capable of immortality.[9] Sin, he says, is the absence of virtue.[10] He takes for granted a universal bias to sin.[11] Yet in spite of this, and in spite also of his Traducianist theories, he held that no transmission of sin took place,[12] and so he finds no sin in infants.[13] Every man sinned because he had freedom

[1] Οὐκ ἐκ τῆς οἰκειάς αὐτῶν ἰσχύος περιγενέσθαι τῶν τοῦ πονηροῦ σκανδάλων δυνάτον· ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς ἀηττήτου δυνάμεως τοῦ θεοῦ (cf. also *Hom. de Sp. S.*).

[2] Ἑλλαμφθέντες τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, χάριτι τὸν φωτισμὸν αὐτοῦ εἰς ἑαυτοὺς χωρήσωσιν (*Hom. in Ps.* xxxiii.).

[3] Πίστις οὐχ ἡ γεωμετρικαῖς ἀνάγκαις, ἀλλ' ἡ ταῖς τοῦ πνεύματος ἐνεργείαις ἐγγινομένη (*In Ps.* cxv.).

[4] Οὐ ἐν δυνάμει ἀνθρώπου, ἢ ἐν σοφίᾳ, ἀλλ' ἐν χάριτι τοῦ θεοῦ ἐστιν ἡ σωτηρία (*Hom. in Ps.* xxxiii.). Νοῆσαι ἐπὶ τῶν δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς ὡς οὐκ αὐτοτελοῦς οὔσης οὐδ' αὐτῆς πρὸς σωτηρίαν (*In Ps.* xlviii.).

[5] See extract from λόγος περὶ τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου, *supra*.([1])

[6] Ἀλλ' ἑνὸς ὄντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τοῦ διὰ ψυχῆς τε καὶ σώματος συνστηκότος, μίαν αὐτοῦ καὶ κοινὴν τῆς συστάσεως τὴν ἀρχὴν ὑποτίθεσθαι, ὡς ἂν μὴ αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ προγενέστερος τε καὶ νεώτερος γένοιτο, τοῦ μὲν σωματικοῦ προτερεύοντος ἐν αὐτῷ, τοῦ δὲ ἑτέρου ἐφυστερίζοντος· κ.τ.λ. (*De Hom. Opif.* c. 29).

[7] Ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν· τουτέστι· δώσομεν αὐτῷ λόγου περιουσίαν. . . . Οὐ γὰρ τὰ πάθη εἰς τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ εἰκόνα παρελήφθη, ἀλλ' ὁ λογισμὸς τῶν παθῶν δεσπότης (*In verba, Faciamus hominem, Orat.* I); ὅπον ἡ τοῦ ἄρχειν δύναμις, ἐκεῖ ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ εἰκών (*ibid.*).

[8] Κατ' εἰκόνα ἔχω τὸ λογικὸς εἶναι καθ' ὁμοίωσιν δὲ γίνομαι ἐν τῷ χριστιανὸς γενέσθαι (*Orat.* i.).

[9] "Thou dost transform into imperishableness and beauty that which was mortal and unseemly" (*Life of Macrina*).

[10] Οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλην κακίας γένεσιν ἐννοῆσαι, ἢ ἀρετῆς ἀπουσίαν (*Orat. Catech.* c. 5).

[11] *De Orat. Dom., Or.* v.

[12] Περὶ κατασκευῆς ἀνθρώπων, 29.

[13] *Orat. de infantibus qui præmature abripiuntur.*

to sin, and his passions (πάθη) induced him to sin, and by this a state of depravity was introduced from which man was unable to free himself. The Incarnation procured this redemption, however, but it was applied only to those who abstained entirely from sin, *i.e.* who exerted their wills aright. "Gregory of Nyssa definitely finds in the freedom of the will the explanation of the fact that the grace of faith does not come upon all men alike. The call, he declares (*Or. Cat.* xxx., xxxi., cf. *Antirrhet*, xxix.) comes with equal meaning to all, and makes no distinction, but He who exercises control over the universe, because of His exceeding regard for man, permitted something to be under our own control, of which each of us alone is master. This is the will (προαίρεσις), a thing which cannot be enslaved, but is of self-determining power, since it is sealed in the liberty of thought and mind (διάνοια)." [1] The final result of man's right choice, his use of the grace afforded to him, is that he becomes like God, is deified.[2]

19. Basil's great friend, *Gregory of Nazianzus*, next demands our attention. He was bishop successively of Sasima, Nazianzus and Constantinople, and was surnamed θεολόγος, on account of his great services towards the settlement of the Arian controversy. He died in A.D. 390. It is remarkable that St. Gregory Nazianzen seems to be the one to whose authority St. Augustine appeals in preference to all the other Eastern theologians. He maintains that both the νοῦς and the ψυχή have been depraved by sin, and says that idolatry is the effect of the primal sin. But yet he holds fast to the freedom of the will, which though impaired is not totally lost.[3] As regards the state of new-born children, before baptism, he holds that if they die they will go to some intermediate state of neither glory nor punishment.[4] This opinion formed one of the *capitula* of Pelagius, which were so energetically opposed by St. Augustine, and on this point at least Gregory seems to have

[1] Bethune-Baker, *op. cit.* p. 307.

[2] Τῶν οὖν τοιούτων ταῖς διὰ τοῦ πυρὸς ἰατρείας ἐκκαθαρθέντων τε καὶ ἀφαγνισθέντων, ἕκαστον τῶν πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον νοουμένων ἀντεισελεύσεται, ἡ ἀφθαρσία, ἡ ζωή, ἡ τιμή, ἡ χάρις, ἡ δόξα, ἡ δύναμις, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον αὐτῷ τε τῷ θεῷ ἐπιθεωρεῖσθαι εἰκάζομεν (*Colloq. cum Macrina*, p. 170).

[3] *Orat.* xxxviii. 12; xliv. 4; xiv. 25; xix. 13; *Carmen*, iv. 98.

[4] Τοὺς δὲ μήτε δοξασθήσεσθαι, μήτε κολασθήσεσθαι περὶ τοῦ δικαίου Κριτοῦ, ὡς ἀσφραγίστους μὲν, ἀπονήρους δὲ, ἀλλὰ παθόντας μᾶλλον τὴν ζημίαν ἢ δρασάντας (*Orat.* xl.).

taught the Pelagian doctrine. Ullman[1] says of him, "Gregory by no means taught the doctrines afterwards propounded by Pelagius and his followers; but if all his sentiments be duly considered, it will be found that he is far more of a Pelagian than of an Augustinian." He seems, however, in one of his songs to hold that infants are, nevertheless, affected with Adam's guilt:

> "For I was but a captive at my birth,
> Sin my first life, till its base discipline
> Revolted me towards a nobler path."[2]

Elsewhere he compares sin to the robbery by the evil one of the flame of heaven, while man lies prostrate:

> "But my foot slipped, and, as I lay, he came,
> My gloomy foe, and robbed me of heaven's flame.
> Help thou my darkness, Lord, till I am light."[3]

He acknowledges, then, man's need of real assistance. This help is necessary not only for the act, but previously for the volition itself. This is evident from his comment on Rom. ix. 16.[4] And he is quite certain also that God, Who gave the first grace, will not fail to give the second also.[5] He is not really a Pelagian, then, since he teaches the necessity of both "preventing" and "assisting" grace. However, he emphasises at the same time the need of man's action—"Keep the commandments of God, and walk according to His precepts, for the act is the first step to knowledge."[6] And the purpose of grace is that it may so change man that he may "become God." "We become like Christ, since Christ also became like us; we become gods on His account, since He also became man for our sake."[7]

20. *Optatus* was Bishop of Mileve in Numidia, and wrote a work *De schismate Donatistarum* as a kind of eirenicon, in reply to a work by the Donatist bishop Parmenian, about

[1] In *Gregor von Nazianzus der Theologe*, s. 439, f.

[2] At the moment I cannot verify this extract, which is quoted by Newman in his *Historical Sketches*.

[3] εὐχή ἑωθινή. Tr. Chatfield, p. 121.

[4] Διδάσκει τούτους ὁ λόγος, ὅτι καὶ τὸ βούλεσθαι, δεῖται τῆς παρὰ θεοῦ βοηθείας (*Orat.* xxxi. *on Matt.* xix.).

[5] Δώσει γὰρ εὖ οἶδα ὁ τὸ πρῶτον δοὺς, καὶ τὸ δεύτερον, καὶ μάλιστα (*Orat.* xliv. *in Pentecosten*).

[6] *Orat.* xiv. 33; xxviii. 16; cf. xxviii. 6.

[7] *Orat.* i. 5; cf. also πίστευε τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ. . . . Τοσοῦτον ἄνθρωπον διὰ σε, ὅσον σὺ γίνῃ δι' ἐκεῖνον θεός (*Orat.* xl. 45).

A.D. 380. To this writer, St. Augustine is also greatly indebted, chiefly for his views on the Church and the Sacraments. He is also important on account of his laudation of faith above even the other virtues and above good works. In this, too, he is the master of Augustine. He ascribes faith to the action of the grace of God;[1] and sanctification is the work of God, not of the one who wills to be sanctified.[2] Faith seems, moreover, to be regarded as a merit, for he speaks of "meritum fidei" and of "credentis meritum."[3] He also marks the distinction between "præcepta" and "consilia" in his exegesis of the Parable of the Good Samaritan, the beginning of the idea of "works of supererogation."[4] He regards grace as the help which God gives as a last resort to those who have done what they could without Him, but are unable with all their striving to attain to perfection. He seems to place man's goodwill and efforts first, however.[5]

21. Our excuse for turning aside for a moment to a little-known writer like *Pacian* (*c.* A.D. 380) shall be that he puts boldly the deficient idea of grace that was in the minds of the Western authors before St. Augustine;[6] it was, to them, practically no more than the forgiveness of sins (a real objective gift, though, even then), but, as we have seen, they sometimes regard it as an illumination of the intellect and sometimes, but only rarely, as an active power of God, given us for our assistance.

22. We next proceed to the investigation of the teaching of him who was *par excellence*, St. Augustine's spiritual father, *St. Ambrose*, Bishop of Milan. This illustrious man was born in A.D. 340, probably at Trèves (Augusta Trevirorum) in Gaul, of which province his father was prefect. His father died while Ambrose was still a child, and his mother took him to Rome to be educated. He

[1] "Ad gratiam dei pertinet qui credit": *De schis. Don.* v. 7.

[2] "Nomen trinitatis est, quod sanctificat, non opus": *ibid.*

[3] "Restat jam de credentis merito aliquid dicere," v. 8.

[4] VI. 4.

[5] "Est Christiani hominis, quod bonum est velle et in eo quod bene voluerit, currere; sed homini non est datum perficere, ut post spatia, quæ debet homo implere, restet aliquid Deo, ubi deficienti succurrat, quia ipse solus est perfectio et perfectus solus Dei filius Christus, cæteri omnes semi-perfecti sumus": ii. 20.

[6] "Quid est gratia? peccati remissio, *i.e.* donum; gratia enim donum est": *Sermo de bapt.* 3.

became an advocate in the prætorian court, and was made, while yet young, governor of Milan. He became a catechumen in 373, but before his baptism he was, on the suggestion of a child and endorsed by public opinion, chosen as Bishop, being consecrated in 374. Though his theological education only now began, he made great progress and became the chief orthodox theologian of the West. His most important works were an account of the creation, called *Hexaëmeron* in six books; *De Officiis*, three books; *De Incarnationis dominicæ Sacramento*, *De Fide*, five books; *De Spiritu*, three books. Many other works, chiefly exegetical, were once ascribed to him, but it is now definitely established that they are not his, though who their real author was, is not known, and they are usually cited under the title of *Ambrosiaster*.

But it is as the spiritual father of St. Augustine, that we excuse our lengthy treatment of him here. There is no doubt whatever that St. Augustine derived much of his theology from him. His great reverence for him may be seen from the following extract: "Audi excellentem dei dispensatorem, quem veneror ut patrem; in Christo Jesu enim per evangelium me genuit et eo Christi ministro lavacrum regenerationis accepi. Beatum loquor Ambrosium cujus pro Catholica fide gratiam, constantiam, labores, pericula sive operibus sive sermonibus et ipse sum expertus et mecum non dubitat orbis prædicare Romanus."[1] Ambrose had studied Philo, Hippolytus, Origen and Basil, and from the latter he learnt much which he in turn communicated to his great disciple. From Basil he learnt, like the Easterns, to regard sin as negative, but yet as necessary for a foil and contrast to good. He said, in Harnack's words, that "evil was radical, and yet its root was not found in the sensuous, but in pride of mind (*superbia animi*); it sprang from freedom, and was yet a power propagating itself in mankind."[2]

[1] *Contra Jul.* i. 4, 10. Cf. also "Quem vero judicem poteris Ambrosio reperire meliorem? De quo magister tuus Pelagius ait, quod ejus fidem et purissimum in scripturis sensum ne inimicus quidem ausus est reprehendere": *Opus imperf.* i. 2. The words of Pelagius are as follows: "Beatus Ambrosius episcopus, in cujus præcipue libris Romana elucet fides, qui scriptorum inter Latinos flos quidam speciosus enituit, cujus fidem et purissimum in scripturis sensum ne inimicus quidem ausus est reprehendere": *De Gratia Christi et Libero Arbitrio*, 43.

[2] *Op. cit.* v. 49.

He teaches, in no measured terms, the universality of sin.[1] It began with the temptation of our first parents by the evil one,[2] and from them we have inherited a defiled nature, an "injury," a "contagion."[3] Concupiscence is, he says, an evil horse which needs to be restrained and pulled up.[4] Therefore the help of grace is necessary, for human effort is helpless without it.[5] And as human nature is powerless, so also is the law.[6] Justification, then, is by faith, by

[1] "Quod lapsum fateris, in eo tibi cum omnibus commune consortium; quia nemo sine peccato. Negare hoc sacrilegium": *In Ps.* cxviii. "Fuit Adam, et in illo fuimus omnes; periit Adam, et in illo omnes perierunt": *ibid.* "Quicunque natus est sub peccato, quem ipsa nostræ conditionis hæreditas adstrinxit ad culpam": *ibid.* "Perfectos secum multos ait Apostolus in hoc adhuc mundo sitos, qui si ad perfectionem veram respicias, perfecti esse non poterant. Quia ipse dixit, *Videmus nunc per speculum*, etc. Ita et immaculati sunt in hoc mundo, et immaculati erunt in regno Dei; cum utique, si minutius excutias, immaculatus esse nemo possit, quia nemo sine peccato": *A lost work* (quoted by St. Augustine, *De Gratia Christi*, c. xlix. § 54).

[2] "Quis iste peccati est fœnerator nisi diabolus? A quo Eva mutuata peccatum obnoxiæ successionis usuris defœneravit omne genus humanum": *In Tob.* c. 9.

[3] "Idcirco Christus immaculatus, quia nec ipsa quidem nascendi solita conditione maculatus est": *Lost work* (quoted in St. Aug. *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum*, iv. xi. 29). "Quod illico intellexisset, lavacro pedum, qui in primo lapsi sunt homine, sordem obnoxiæ successionis aboleri": *ibid.* "Omnes homines sub peccato nascimur. Quorum ipse ortus in vitio est, sicut habes lectum, dicente David," etc. (Ps. l. 7): *De Poen.* i. 13. "Antequam nascamur, maculamur contagio, et ante usuram lucis originis ipsius accipimus injuriam, in iniquitate concipimur": *Apol. David*, i. 56. "In delictis generat unumquemque mater sua . . . et nec unius diei infans sine peccato est. . . . Concipimur ergo in peccato parentum et in delictis eorum nascimur": *ibid.* "Omnes in primo homine peccavimus et per naturæ successionem culpæ quoque ab uno in omnes transfusa est successio": *ibid.* 71, and many other passages.

[4] In Aug. *Contra Julian*, i. 11.

[5] "Quia humana cura sine divina ope imbecilla est ad medendum, Deum auxiliatorem requirit": *In Is. proph.* "Quis nostrum sine divina potest subsistere miseratione? quid possumus dignum præmiis facere cælestibus? Quis nostrum ita assurgit in hoc corpore ut animum suum elevet quo jugiter adhæreat Christo Quo tandem hominum merito defertur ut hæc corruptibilis caro induat incorruptionem? Et mortale hoc induat immortalitatem? Quibus laboribus, quibus injuriis possumus nostra levare peccato? Indignæ sunt passiones hujus temporis ad superventuram gloriam. Non ergo secundum merita nostra sed secundum misericordiam Dei cælestium decretorum in homines forma procedit": *In Ps.* cxviii. 20.

[6] "Lex os omnium potuit obstruere, non potuit mentem con-

grace, not by the works of the law.[1] And even before faith is evoked, the grace of God prepares the heart, so that he teaches the full Augustinian doctrine of "prævenient" grace.[2] Even prayer is the result of previous grace.[3] From divine grace comes man's repentance,[4] his love towards God,[5] and indeed his whole sanctification whereby from being at first impure he becomes pure.[6] But we must make efforts to co-operate with the grace of God, we must strive to attain the victory, must pray, must cleave to God.[7] But though all this is incumbent upon us as a duty, yet it is

vertere": *De Fuga Sæculi*, 15. "Lex factum damnat, non aufert malitiam": *ibid.* 39.

[1] "Hoc dicit quia sine operibus legis credenti impio, id est gentili, in Christum, reputatur fides ejus ad justitiam, sicut et Abrahæ. . . . Non ergo opus est lege, quando impius per solam fidem justificatur apud Deum": *In Rom.* iv. 5.

[2] "Quod cum dicit, non negat Deo visum: a Deo enim præparatur voluntas hominum. Ut enim Deus honorificetur a sancto, Dei gratia est": *In Luc.* i. 3. "Simul disce, quid recipi noluit a non simplici mente conversis. Nam si voluisset, ex indevotis devotos fecisset. Cur autem non receperint eum, evangelista ipse commemoravit, dicens, Quia facies ejus erat euntis in Jerusalem. Discipuli autem recipi intra Samariam gestiebant. Sed Deus quos dignatur vocat, et quem vult religiosum facit": *In Luc.* vii. 27. "Vides utique, quia ubique Domini virtus studiis coöperatur humanis, ut nemo possit ædificare sine Domino, nemo custodire sine Domino, nemo quidquam incipere sine Domino": *In Luc.* ii. 84.

[3] "Et orare Deum gratia spiritualis est. Nemo enim dicit Dominum Jesum, nisi in Spiritu sancto": *In Is. proph.*

[4] "Negavit primo Petrus, et non flevit, quia non respexerat Dominus: negavit secundo, non flevit, quia adhuc non respexerat Dominus: negavit et tertio, respexit Jesus, et ille amarissime flevit": *In Luc.* x. 89.

[5] "Secundum homines plus fortasse offendit, qui plus debuerat: sed per misericordiam Domini causa mutatur, ut amplius diligat qui amplius debuit, si tamen gratiam consequatur": *In Luc.* vi. 25.

[6] "Nam cum Ecclesia ex gentibus, hoc est, ex peccatoribus congregata sit, quomodo ex maculatis immaculata potest esse, nisi primo per Christi gratiam, quod abluta delicto sit; deinde, quod per qualitatem non peccandi abstineat a delictis? . . . Nec ab initio immaculata; humanæ enim hoc impossible naturæ: sed per Dei gratiam et qualitatem sit, quia jam non peccat, fit ut immaculata videatur": *In Luc.* i. 6.

[7] "Operetur igitur mors in nobis, ut operetur et vita, bona vita post mortem, hoc est, bona vita post victoriam, bona vita absoluto certamine": *De Bon. Mort.* 9. "Abhinc induamus hujusmodi studium, ut appropinquet anima nostra Deo, appropinquet oratio, adhæreat illi nostrum desiderium, non separamur ab eo": *ibid.* 49.

no ground for boasting, for in the last resort, all our hopes of salvation are in the Lord Jesus.[1] In the teaching of St. Ambrose we may find the germ of St. Augustine's whole theory of sin and of grace, as we found in Victorinus his theory of predestination and of justification by faith, and in Optatus that of the Church and Sacraments and of the sovereignty of faith. The doctrine of St. Ambrose on original sin has, however, its roots in the works of Tertullian, the real father of Augustinianism.

23 Allusion was made just now to an anonymous writer, now passing under the pseudonym of "Ambrosiaster," whose works are found with those of St. Ambrose, to whom they were for a long time popularly attributed. Many suggestions (some of them very ingenious) have been made as to the authorship, but no real certainty has been attained as to the person of the writer. It seems to be assured that they were the works of a contemporary, probably a slightly *earlier* contemporary, of St. Ambrose. Owing to the fact that a quotation from this writer's commentary on the Epistle to the Romans is attributed by St. Augustine [2] to "sanctus Hilarius" and the great St. Hilary of Poitiers cannot possibly be its author, a fictitious "Hilary the Deacon" has had its authorship assigned to him. But this theory has little support, and the works are still unclaimed and likely to remain so. He is a true Western in thought, and abreast of the current of thought in his time. His chief works are expositions of St. Paul's Epistles and a book *Quæstiones ex vetere et novo Testamentis*,[3] which has inserted in it a tractate against Novatian. St. Augustine seems to have known his works and made use of them in his anti-Pelagian warfare, but on the whole there is a very great similarity between the thought of St. Ambrose and his unknown confrère. In the passage quoted by St. Augustine he holds strongly the doctrine of the transmission of original sin, and also gives us the then current interpretation of the phrase

[1] "Nemo sibi arroget, nemo de meritis, nemo de potestate se jactet, sed omnes speremus per dominum Jesum misericordiam invenire—quæ enim spes alia peccatoribus": *In Ps.* cxviii. 20.

[2] *Contra d. Epp. Pel.* iv. 7.

[3] Of this work, Oudinus says: "Author istarum quæstionum non sibi ipse constat in suis sententiis: unde nunc cum Pelagianis sentit, nunc contra Pelagianos; juxta authores diversos, ex quibus suam rapsodiam contexuit": *De Script. Eccl.* i. 488.

ἐφ' ᾧ in Rom. v. 12 as equivalent to "in quo," *i.e.* Adam.[1] He attributes all to God and not to man.[2]

24. Next in order to be noticed is the heretic *Jovinian* (*c.* 388), an Italian monk who taught a system which was a strange medley of what would be now called "sacramental" with "evangelical" views. He taught that the natural man is in a state of sin, and that even the slightest sin separates from God and exposes to damnation. The state of the Christian rests on regeneration, that is, baptism coupled with faith. This is a state with no degrees, it either is or is not; where it exists it is necessarily joined with righteousness which is its proof. Those who have truly received this gift lack nothing, and nothing can be added to them. There are, then, no special meritorious works, for all Christians possess the one and only possible good. The truly regenerate cannot therefore sin. Grace is, on this account, the gift given in baptism and cannot be increased or diminished, but may be lost, and so earnest effort is continually necessary. It seems to have been to him very little more than the forgiveness of sins and an incorporation into the Church, but *not* on any account, a continual help given in time of need, or any advancement of the process of sanctification.[3] In this "magical" conception of grace he had a forerunner in *Heraclius* (A.D. 307), who wrote "semel baptizatus non recipit peccatorum reatum, etiam quantavis fuerint operibus ejus peccata permixta."[4] How like is this to much modern Antinomianism, except that in the later variety "a feeling of faith" takes the place of the sacrament of Baptism!

[1] "'In quo,' id est, in Adam, 'omnes peccaverunt.' Manifestum in Adam omnes peccasse quasi in massa; ipse enim per peccatum corruptus, omnes quos genuit, nati sunt sub peccato. Ex eo igitur cuncti peccatores, quia ex eo ipso sumus omnes": *In Rom.* v. 12.

[2] "Ego . . . te (Deum) quæsivi, te desideravi, tibi credidi; de homine nihil speravi": *C. Novat.* in *Quæstiones.* It is significant of the many-sidedness of the authors who wrote before the rise of the Pelagian controversy, that Oudin, in discussing whether these works are to be attributed to "Hilary the Deacon," decides against it, *because they show an unmistakable Pelagian bias!* and so must be dated after the time of Pelagius! And he accuses Natalis Alexander of "whitening the Ethiopian," for attempting to defend the treatises against that imputation! Oudin, *op. cit.* i. 483–4.

[3] See St. Augustine, *De fide and operibus;* St. Jerome, *Contra Jovinian.*, also works of St. Ambrose and Siricius.

[4] *Liber prædestinationis*, c. 16.

25. Only one more name now remains before we close this chapter, and with it the list of the great men who taught in the Church before the outbreak of the great battle of grace and free-will; this one is the great *St. John Chrysostom*, who was, in this matter, "taken away from the wrath to come," for in the year 405, when Pelagius first promulgated his views, St. Chrysostom was in exile, that last exile from which he never returned alive. He was born at Antioch in Syria (A.D. 345–7). He lived an ascetic life at home, refraining from entering a monastery because of his mother's tears and pleadings, although nearly persuaded by his friend Basil the Great. He was ordained deacon in 381, and priest in 386. In 398 he was taken by force and consecrated Archbishop of Constantinople, which dignity he held until his death in A.D. 407. He was a great preacher (whence his name of Chrysostom, "golden mouth"), but also wrote voluminous works; most of these are exegetical and homiletical, though he also composed some dogmatic works. In these last, he shows a very strong contrast with his great contemporary, St. Augustine, by his almost Pelagian views on the power of the human will. It must be remembered that, so far as he, and the Greek Fathers generally, were called upon to touch these problems, they were defending not only grace but free-will, against the fatalist tendencies of Gnosticism, Manichæism and Neoplatonism; "he had not had to contend with the Pelagian enemies of grace, but with Manichæan and other heretics who were enemies of nature and of free-will." [1] His whole tendency was of a practical and moral kind; he "was so zealous for morality, that he must have considered it a point of special importance to deprive men of every ground of excuse for the neglect of moral effort. His practical sphere of labour in the cities of Antioch and Constantinople gave a still greater impulse to this tendency. For in these great capitals he met with many who sought to attribute their want of Christian activity to the defects of human nature and the power of Satan or of fate." [2]

He says that man's being made in "the image of God" consists in the dominion over creation, in reason and in his

[1] Tillemont, xi. 357. Yet Petavius thinks that he knew Pelagius, and referred to him in his *Epistle* 4 "ad Olympiades," mourning his defection: *De Pel. et Semipel. Hær.* c. i. § 3.

[2] Neander, *Church History*, iii. 2, § 1639.

endowment with immortality [1]; he was destined to attain some nobler dignity had he not fallen.[2] But our first parents fell through moral negligence (ῥᾳθυμία), and thus became deprived of immortality and divine wisdom, their nature being weakened, though not changed.[3] Evil, then, is no part of man's nature, it is not a δύναμις ἐνυπόστατος,[4] but his προαίρεσις (power of choice) is perverted. There is, then, no constraint either to holiness or to sin,[5] but man is free to do either. Sin is not by nature, or it were useless to attempt to alter it, but it is from choice.[6] Infants therefore are free from sin.[7] Since the Fall, however, the force of the will has been weakened, so that his nature is inclined towards evil (ὀξυῤῥέπης πρὸς κακίαν), but this tendency will be controlled by the προαίρεσις if that is in a healthy condition.[8] Man, at his creation, was given this power of free-will, and only thus could he be held responsible.[9] Since the Fall, then, all men are tainted with an hereditary tendency to sin, but "Chrysostom shrinks from the expression 'hereditary sin.'" [10] He acknowledges the doctrine of the Two Adams, and so does not hold that man's sin is merely an "imitation" of Adam's. He says that Adam "by that grievous sin condemned the whole human race," [11] and "It was not the sin which consisted in transgression of the law, but that of Adam's transgression, which contaminated everything," [12] or again, "It was Adam who brought in the beginning of the debt." [13] On the other hand, he maintains the ability of the will, even in man's fallen state, to choose what is good, as when preaching upon "Domine, non est in homine" (Jer.

[1] *In Gen. Hom.* xxi. 2.
[2] *Hom. de Stat.* xi. 2.
[3] *In Gen.* xvi., xvii.
[4] *In Rom.* xii. 6.
[5] *In Gen.* xx. 3; *In Matt.* lix. 1, 2; *In* 1 *Cor.* ii. 2.
[6] "Et quia non est naturale ideo contra illud legem datam, et quod de arbitrii libertate descendit": *In Eph.* ii. 3.
[7] *In Matt.* xxviii. 3; lviii. 3.
[8] *In Heb.* xii. 2, 3.
[9] Καὶ ὅτι αὐτεξουσίους ἡμᾶς εἰργάσατο ὁ τῶν ἁπάντων δημιουργὸς, καὶ πανταχοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς γνώμης τῆς ἡμετέρας ἢ κατακρίνει ἢ στεφανοῖ (*In Gen.* xx.). Διά τοι τοῦτο καὶ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον ἡμῖν δεδώρηται καὶ ἐν τῇ φύσει καὶ ἐν τῷ συνειδότι ἡμῶν ἐναπέθετο τὴν γνῶσιν τῆς κακίας καὶ τῆς ἀρετής (*ibid.* xxiii.).
[10] Stephen's *St. John Chrysostom*, p. 394.
[11] *Ep.* iii. 3.
[12] *In Rom.* x. 1.
[13] *Serm. ad neoph.*

x. 23) he says that men make this text and "It is not of him that willeth, etc.," an excuse for their own negligence. "If," he continues, "such passages prove that nothing is in our own power, it is all over with the promise of a kingdom and with the menace of hell." But the prophet's meaning is, he says, that "it is of our own resolution to choose what is best, to will it, to be earnest about it, to labour hard for it; but to bring our endeavours to good effect. . . . is the work of the grace from above." If, then, it is of free-will to choose what is good, yet it is not within the power of *unassisted* free-will; there is need of divine aid, as he shows in the last extract, and also in many others.[1] "Therefore," he says, "we baptise infants to impart holiness and goodness, as well as to establish a relationship with God."[2] How does grace work, then? His doctrine on this matter seems to be very inconsistent, for in *In Rom. Hom.* viii. 4 he says that "faith comes when attracted by grace," but in other places his language is "Semi-Pelagian," *e.g.* he speaks of Christians "attracting grace to co-operate with them,"[3] or "to believe at the beginning, to obey when we are called, is of our own right-mindedness; but after the foundations of faith have been laid, then we need the aid of the Spirit, that our faith may remain perpetually unshaken. For neither God nor the grace of the Spirit anticipates (*προφθάνει*=*prævenit*) our choice; He calls us, indeed, but He waits for us to come to Him voluntarily, and then, when we have come to Him, He affords us all the support that is

[1] *Οὐ γὰρ σὰ κατορθώματα ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ χάριτος* (*Hom.* xii. *in* 1 *Cor.* iv.); *εἰ γάρ τις ἔρχεται πρὸς αὐτὸν, φησὶ τί δεῖ τῆς ἕλξεως; τοῦτο δὲ οὐ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἀναιρεῖ, ἀλλὰ δείκνυσιν ἡμᾶς βοηθείας δεομένους· καὶ αἰνίττεται ἐνταῦθα οὐ τὸν ἄκοντα ἐρχόμενον ἀλλὰ τὸν πολλῆς ἀπολαύοντα συμμαχίας* (*In Joh. hom.* xlvi.). *Πάντα τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἀπό τε τοῦ ἡμέτερου (βουλήματος) καὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ ῥοπῆς* (*Hom.* viii. *in* 2 *Tim.* iii.). "If the law of nature availed not, and the written Law was of no advantage, but both weighed down those that used them not aright, and made it plain that they were worthy of greater punishment, then the salvation which is by grace was henceforth necessary" (*Hom.* vii. *in Rom.* v.). *Τοῦτο μόνον ἴσθι, πάντα ὁ θεὸς οἰκονομεῖ, ὅ τι πάντων προνοεῖ, ὅ τι αὐτεξούσιοί ἐσμεν, ὅ τι τὰ μὲν ἐνεργεῖ, τὰ γὲ συγχωρεῖ, ὅ τι οὐδὲν πονηρὸν γινὲσθαι βούλεται, ὅ τι οὐκ ἀπὸ βουλήματος αὐτοῦ πάντα γίνεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡμετέρου, πάντα τὰ κακὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡμετέρου μόνον, πάντα τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἀπὸ τε τοῦ ἡμετέρου καί τῆς αὐτοῦ ῥοπῆς* (*Hom.* viii. *in* 2 *Tim.* iii.).

[2] Quoted by St. Augustine, *Contra Jul.* i. p. 630, but not yet verified in St. Chrysostom's works.

[3] *In Phil. Hom.* i. 3.

His to give,"[1] or again, "God does not anticipate our volitions by His gifts; but when we have begun, then He Himself gives us, in abundance, the means of salvation,"[2] or, still again, "He waits for us to make the start, that He may display His liberality in full measure; let us not, then, through indolence deprive ourselves of His gifts, but hasten to make a good beginning, in order that we may enjoy the assistance that comes from above, and may be able to attain the end,"[3] or, once more, "Although Jacob enjoyed the heavenly assistance, yet still he first exhibited what he could do on his own part. So let us be assured, that although we may make a thousand efforts, we shall never be able to achieve anything unless we receive the impulse from above. As we are unable to achieve what is right unless we receive that assistance, so, unless we contribute our own efforts, we shall never be able to receive the impulse from above,"[4] and, "When He, who knows the secrets of our hearts, sees us eagerly prepare for the contest of virtue, He instantly supplies us with His assistance, lightening our labours, and strengthening the weakness of our nature. In the Olympian contests the trainer stands by as a spectator merely, awaiting the issue, and unable to contribute anything to the efforts of the contender; whereas our Master accompanies us, extends His hand to us, all but subdues our antagonist, arranges everything to enable us to prevail, that He may place the amaranthine wreath upon our brows."[5] On this language of his, Stephens well remarks: "It must not be imagined, however, that Chrysostom regarded Divine grace as merely accessory or subsidiary to man's own will and purpose. He fails not to represent it as indispensable to every human soul, however powerfully inclined of itself to good. The human will, weakened and depraved by evil, is not for a moment to rank as co-ordinate in its action with the work of the Holy Spirit: the real efficient force in the work of sanctification is the Holy Spirit. The beginnings, indeed (ἀρχαί), are our own, and we must contribute what we can, small and cheap though it be, because, unless we do our part, we shall not obtain the Divine assistance; but though the initiatory step is ours, the accomplishment of the work is altogether God's, and, since the major part is His,

[1] *In Verb. ap. habentes eundem Spiritum*, i.
[2] *In Joh. Hom.* xviii.
[3] *In. Gen. Hom.* xxv.
[4] *Ibid.* lviii.
[5] *In Gen. Hom.* xlii. 1.

we commonly say that the whole is His." [1] The first step, then, is faith, which is not so much regarded merely as an instrument or as a hand held out to take God's offered gift, but as the first in a row of good works, a fruitful source of all good actions. "Abraham believed God, and it was counted to him for righteousness. Why? To prove that belief itself, in the first instance, and obedience to the call of God, come from our own good judgment (εὐγνωμοσύνη); but as soon as the foundation of faith is laid, we require the alliance of the Holy Spirit, that it may remain constantly unshakable and inflexible." [2] The power of faith is great, for it is that which justifies.[3] Justification is to him usually "making righteous," the beginning of the work of sanctification, of the process of the infusion of a real holiness. "The declaring of His righteousness is not only that He is Himself righteous, but that He doth also make them that are filled with putrefying scars of sin suddenly righteous." [4] But yet he seems in one instance at least to conceive of it as a "declaring just" only: "For when the Judge's sentence declares us just (δικαίους ἀποφαίνει), and such a judge too, what signifieth the accuser?" [5] Faith must come first, for there is no worth in anything without it,[6] but good works are the necessary fruit of faith,[7] and form as it were a store laid up for our journey to our native land, part of it having been sent on in advance.[8] But he constantly asserts that it is by God's mercy and favour that we are saved, not by faith or good works as efficient causes,[9] though our punish-

[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 400–1.

[2] *De Verb. Apost.* iii. 276.

[3] Τί γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ἐβλάβη μὴ γενόμενος ὑπὸ νόμον; οὐδὲν, ἀλλ' ἤρκεσεν ἡ πίστις εἰς δικαιοσύνην αὐτῷ (*In Gal.* iii.). Τὸ δὲ κομῶντα ἐν κατορθώμασι μὴ ἐντεῦθεν ἀλλ' ἀπὸ πίστεως γενέσθαι δίκαιον, τοῦτο ἦν θαυμαστὸν, καὶ μάλιστα τῆς πίστεως τὴν ἰσχὺν ἐμφαίνον (*In Rom.* viii.).

[4] *Hom.* vii. *in Rom.* iii. 24, 25. Cf. δύναται ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἐν ἀσεβεία βεβιωκότα τοῦτον ἐξαίφνης οὐχὶ κολάσεως ἐλευθερῶσαι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ δίκαιον ποιῆσαι . . . εἰ γὰρ μακάριος οὕτως ὁ λαβὼν ἄφεσιν ἀπὸ χάριτος πολλῷ μᾶλλον ὁ δικαιωθεὶς (*Hom.* viii. *in Rom.* iv. 5). Ἐπὶ τούτῳ γὰρ καὶ ἀπέθανε καὶ ἀνέστη ἵνα δικαίους ἐργάσηται (*Hom.* ix. *in Rom.* iv. 25).

[5] *Hom. in Rom.* viii. 33.

[6] Οὐδέν ἐστιν ἔξω πίστεως ἀγαθόν (Περὶ πίστεως, vi. 838).

[7] Οὐκ οὖν ἅμα ἐπίστευσας ἅμα καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις ἐκόμησας· οὐχ ὅτι καὶ ἐλλείπῃ πρὸς τὰ ἔργα, ἀλλ' ὅτι καθ' ἑαυτὴν πίστις πλήρης ἐστὶν ἀγαθῶν ἔργων (*ibid.*).

[8] *In Gen.* v. 1.

[9] *In Eph.* iv. 2, τὸ κληθῆναι γὲ οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀξιάς γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ τῆς χάριτος (*Hom.* lxx. *in Matt.* xxii.).

ment and reward will depend on good works.[1] This purpose of grace which God purposed was known to Him from all eternity. He distinguishes between God's "antecedent" will (*θέλημα προηγούμενον, τὸ σφοδρὸν θέλημα* or *θέλημα εὐδοκίας*), by which He wishes all men to be saved, and His "subsequent" will (*θέλημα δεύτερον*) by which He limits His purpose by the free choice which He has given to men, and according to which those who accept His favour will be saved and those who refuse it will be punished.[2] God's election, then, of those who are called is not compulsory, but persuasive [3]; it is dependent upon His foreknowledge of what they will be,[4] but His knowledge does not constrain men to be either good or bad.[5] "Whence comes it then," he asks, "that some are vessels of wrath, and some of mercy? Of their own free choice. God, however, being very good shows the same kindness to both [6];" Pharaoh has been fitted to destruction by his own act, for God has left undone nothing which should save him, while he himself had left undone nothing which would lead to his own destruction. Yet God had borne with him, wishing to lead him to repentance. God's love and grace and man's faith must always work hand in hand, and man is under no necessity, either external or of his own nature, to accept or reject, but has the power of choosing as he will.[7] And so, he says, it is not impossible for "a vessel of wrath" to be converted into "a vessel of mercy," for a bad tree to become a good one.[8] But although men may be foreknown to be worthy, yet their worthiness is by no means a sufficient

[1] "It is upon works that punishment and reward depend, not upon circumcision or uncircumcision": *In Rom.* ii. 10.

[2] *Οὐ κατὰ τὰ ἔργα ἡμῶν, φησὶν, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἰδίαν πρόθεσιν· τουτέστιν οὐδενὸς ἀναγκάζοντος, οὐδενὸς συμβουλεύοντος, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἰδίας προθέσεως· οἴκοθεν ἐκ τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ, ὁρμώμενος ἔσωσε, τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστι τὸ κατ' ἰδίαν πρόθεσιν* (*Hom.* ii. *in 2 Tim.*).

[3] *Προτρεπτικὴ οὐ βιαστική* (*In Joh.* xlvii. 4. Cf. *In Matt.* lxxx. 3).

[4] *Ἡ ἐκλογὴ ἡ κατὰ πρόθεσιν καὶ πρόγνωσιν γενομένη* (*In Rom.* ix. 16). "What the blessed Paul aimed at was to show by all that he said that only God knoweth who are worthy": *ibid.* 20.

[5] *In Cor.* ii. 2; vii. 2; *In Eph.* i. 2.

[6] *In Rom. Hom.* xvi. 8, 9.

[7] *Ὁρᾷς ὅτι οὐ φύσεως οὐδὲ ὑλικῆς ἀνάγκης ἐστὶ τὸ εἶναι χρυσοῦν ἢ ὀστράκινον ἀλλὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας προαιρέσεως* (*Hom. in 2 Tim.* ii. 21).

[8] *Ὁ δὲ χριστὸς οὐ τοῦτο λέγει, ὅτι τὸν πονηρὸν ἀμήχανον μεταβάλλεσθαι, ἢ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀδύνατον μεταπεσεῖν, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἕως ἂν ᾖ πονηρίᾳ συζῶν, οὐ δυνήσεται καρπὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐνεγκεῖν· μεταβάλλειν μὲν γὰρ εἰς ἀρετὴν δύναται πονηρὸς ὤν, μένων δὲ ἐν πονηρίᾳ καρπὸν οὐκ οἴσει καλὸν* (*In Matt.* vii. 18).

exchange for the gifts and calling of God, which still remain of grace and not due to man's worth.[1] Christ's merits are superabundant and more than sufficient for all the sins of all men,[2] so that he thinks even the religious and virtuous Gentile may be saved.[3]

Before we leave the pre-Augustinian fathers, let us briefly sum up the general trend of their teaching. The prevailing view was the so-called "Clementine," which held that man at the Fall lost his endowment of supernatural grace and suffered a weakening of his will, but *no more!* His will, they maintained, was still free, irrespective of moral considerations, for only in proportion as he was free could he be responsible; he had, they said, full liberty of action for either good or evil. This view was universally held in the East and before Tertullian in the West. But subsequent Western teaching, beginning from Tertullian and Irenæus, differed in the opinion that the will was more seriously impaired and depraved by an hereditary bias towards evil, so that while finding evil easy, he found the good difficult. This teaching was developed by Cyprian, Victorinus, Ambrose, "Ambrosiaster," and in some respects by Origen, and Hilary, until it was made the centre of Augustine's system, to which we will in the next chapter turn our attention.

[1] Οὐδεὶς γὰρ τοιαύτην ἐπιδείκνυται πολιτείαν ὡς βασιλείας ἀξιωθῆναι ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτοῦ δωρεᾶς ἐστι τὸ πᾶν (*In Coloss.* ii.). Κἂν γὰρ μυρία κατορθώσωμεν ἀπὸ οἰκτιρμῶν ἀκουόμεθα καὶ φιλανθρωπίας· κἂν πρὸς αὐτὴν ἀνέλθωμεν τῆς ἀρετῆς τὴν κορυφὴν ἀπὸ ἐλέους σωζόμεθα (*In Ps.* iv.). God has graciously willed that they who have faith and good works shall be saved: we could not do good works without God's assisting grace, nor could they in the end and at the best save us if it were not His merciful and gracious will (see *Hom. in Eph.* iv. 2).

[2] Πολλῷ γὰρ πλείονα ὧν ὀφείλομεν κατέβαλεν ὁ χριστὸς, καὶ τοσούτῳ πλείονα, ὅσῳ πρὸς ῥανίδα, μικρὰν πέλαγος (*In Rom.* x. 17).

[3] *Hom.* vi. *in Rom.*

CHAPTER V

THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY

WE now open a momentous chapter in the history of this doctrine, the most momentous, indeed, in the whole survey on which we are now engaged. It was within the episcopate of St. Augustine that the great battle was fought, and he was the Catholic David who set out to fight the Pelagian Goliath. And so it is but right that we should devote more space to the details of the life and character of this great Doctor of the Church, and also of his great antagonists, than we have hitherto done; for their past life to a great extent determined and moulded the forms of their doctrine, and in either case they dwelt more emphatically (and, even in the Catholic Doctor as well as in the heretic, too much so) on that aspect of the paradox which had commended itself to them in their own experience.

Aurelius Augustinus, born in A.D. 354 at Thagaste, in Numidia, was the son of Patricius, a poor heathen freeman of that city, and Monica, his Christian wife. When he was yet a boy, he tells us, he learnt something of the Christian religion from his saintly mother, but the full extent of his prayer was for immunity from beatings at school, though he had been admitted a catechumen in infancy. He had a serious illness in his boyhood, and was near to death; preparations were made for his baptism, but, owing to his recovery, it was deferred, as was, indeed, very usual at that time. He hated lessons, but was compelled to learn against his will; he was a liar and a thief, he informs us, and also a glutton and a cheat, though he had made promise of better things on his sick-bed. He studied grammar and rhetoric at Madaura, a neighbouring city, and by means of his father's self-sacrifice he was sent when sixteeen years old, after a year's residence at home, to complete his

education at Carthage. But he had already fallen into fleshly sins, in spite of his mother's warnings. At Carthage he continued his dissolute course, but seems to have shared his sin with but one paramour,[1] and had one child by her, a child of whom he became very fond, and who continued by his side for the rest of his life, being baptised with him, and named by him "Adeodatus." At Carthage he studied the *Hortensius* of Cicero, which, he says, "changed my disposition and turned my prayers to Thyself, O Lord; and made me have other purposes and desires."[2] Soon after he went to Carthage his father had died, having become a Christian but a short time before; but this does not seem to have affected young Augustine. Cicero, however, led him to study Scripture, whose beauty he did not appreciate but rather conceived a dislike for. He next fell in with some Manichæans, and joined them, being now in his nineteenth year. He then began to teach rhetoric, apparently in his native place at first, and afterwards at Carthage, where be began his literary career with a treatise *De Pulchro et Apto*, being about twenty-six or twenty-seven years old. At this time also he mastered Aristotle's *Dialectics*, which had some influence upon his later thought. In A.D. 382 Faustus, a Manichæan bishop and a pillar of that sect, came to Carthage, to whom Augustine went for the satisfaction of his spiritual longings, but found him very ignorant of the things he professed to know, and this disgusted him with the Manichæans. He now decided to go to Rome, because the students there were more orderly and respectful than at Carthage. He went against his mother's wish, finally stealing away secretly in the night. On his arrival at Rome, he was stricken down with sickness, but recovered, and followed his profession for a time, but soon obtained a post of public reader in rhetoric at Milan. Here he began to frequent the preaching of St. Ambrose, then Bishop of Milan, became a Catechumen of the Catholic Church, together with his friend Alypius, whom he had met at Rome. His mother now joined him here. He became gradually weaned from his errors by the preaching of St. Ambrose, and the arguments of a friend—Nebridius—but more than all by the writings of certain Neoplatonic philosophers, translated by Victorinus. By these he was filled with a fresh desire to know more

[1] *Confessions*, iv. 2. [2] *Ibid.* iii. 4.

about God, and turned to the Epistles of St. Paul, which showed him what he needed. For counsel he turned to the presbyter Simplicianus, the adviser and spiritual father of St. Ambrose. This man told him the story of Victorinus, which greatly impressed him. A visitor, Pontitianus, told him next of the life of Antony. After this, he and Alypius went into the garden, where his meditations were interrupted by the heaven-sent voice, "Tolle, lege," and on his doing so, there occurred that sudden great revulsion of heart and will which formed his conversion from evil to good, followed by that of Alypius also.[1]

Is it to be wondered at, then, that he who, looking backward at his own wild career, and seeing himself checked here, urged on there, turned aside in one place, and straitened in another, and finally brought to a standstill suddenly, in a moment, and the whole course of his life turned in a new direction, should be led to emphasise the Divine rather than the human element, the grace of God rather than the freedom of man, predestination rather than human choice? The wonder would have been if he had been able to put any *other* construction on what seemed to him indisputable facts. He was firmly persuaded that all along, the grace of God had been leading him, and that though he seemed at the time to decide for himself upon his course of action, yet it was not really he but God that moved, and that even in his evil deeds he was working out, though possibly in a perverse manner—yet none the less surely, working out—the will and purpose of God to its predestined result. Thus he became, as time elapsed—and he meditated more and more upon these things—a more convinced upholder of the doctrines of original sin, and of divine predestination and grace.

After his baptism, which with that of his friend Alypius, and his son Adeodatus, took place on April 25, 387, in the Cathedral at Milan at the hands of St. Ambrose, St. Augustine retired from his Professorship, and departed with his mother for Carthage. But at Ostia, before embarking, she died. He then returned to Rome, but after a year, went to Thagaste, his old home, for quiet retirement, writing during this period most of his anti-Manichæan works. In A.D. 391 he was ordained priest and became a famous preacher. In 395 he was appointed Coadjutor to

[1] *Confessions*, viii. 12.

Valerius, Bishop of Hippo, but in the following year he succeeded him in the see.

At this point we will digress to consider the early history and character of his opponent, *Pelagius*. Pelagius is the Græcised form of "some Irish sea-name such as Muirchu, 'hound of the sea,'" [1] which has been modernised as "Morgan." He was called "Marigena" at Rome, so Oudin informs us.[2] All the ancients call him "Britonem," or "Britannum," except Lambert Danæus in his *Scholia ad librum Augustini de Hæresibus*." [3] Prosper calls him "coluber Britannus." Prof. Zimmer says he was born in Ireland, but Bury thinks he was of Scottish descent, though born in Britain,[4] probably in Somerset, Devonshire, Cornwall, or South-West Wales, where there were many Irish settlers. He became a monk, and, says Balæus, he was prior of the famous monastery of Bangor Iscoed, near Chester, "where there were 2100 Christian philosophers," but that he was expelled from Britain. He seems to have gone to Rome, and to have resided there for a long time,[5] and where he seems to have formed the opinions which pass under his name.

About the beginning of the fifth century there visited Rome a Syrian theologian named *Rufinus*, whom St. Jerome calls "Grunnius," but alludes to in respectful terms in writing to his more famous namesake of Aquileia [6]; he also says that he was "præcursorem Pelagii, quem stolidissimum et Scotorum pultibus prægravatum," [7] but there seems to be some doubt as to the meaning of the relative clause, *i.e.* whether it was Rufinus or Pelagius who "was overfed with Scotch porridge"; the grammar seems to favour the former, but the sense the latter. At any rate, we know that he was at Rome about that time, "with the holy Pammachius," [8] and that he conversed with Cœlestius, if not with Pelagius also, on the subject of original sin, and

[1] Prof. J. B. Bury, *The Life of St. Patrick*, p. 43.

[2] Casimirus Oudinus, *Commentarium de Script. Eccl.*, *sub voce*.

[3] Petavius, *De Pel. et Semipel. Hær.* in his *De Theologicis Dogmatibus*, vol. iii. p. 587.

[4] *Op. cit.*

[5] "Roma, ubi diutissime vixerat": Augustine, *De Pecc. Orig.* c. xxi. § 24.

[6] *Ep.* lxxxi. See also Marius Mercator, *Commonitorium*, ii. 2.

[7] Jerome, *In præfatio ad commentarios in Ieremiam.*

[8] Cœlestius, quoted in Augustine, *De Pecc. Orig.* c. iii. § 3.

its transmission. St. Augustine seems to be uncertain whether Pelagius "learned from others" or not,[1] but Marius Mercator certainly considers these opinions as due to the teaching of Rufinus, and Cœlestius' answer at Carthage seems to bear it out. The same historian also traces the ideas back to *Theodore of Mopsuestia* (b. 350, d. 429), while Jerome refers them to Origen. It is certain that Theodore (about A.D. 416) wrote a work in five books now lost, "Against those who say that man falls by nature, not by sentence," defending Pelagianism against "the Syrian," as he calls Jerome; some fragments are, however, preserved in Latin by Marius Mercator. He maintained that "Adam was created mortal whether he sinned or not. For God did not say 'Ye will be mortal' but 'Ye will die,'" and he proceeds to quote Ps. ciii. 15 and Rom. ii. 6. "Against original sin he appealed to the case of saints like Noah, Abraham, and Moses. If God had passed sentence of death on all as the punishment of sin, He would not have made Enoch immortal. Accordingly, Baptism did not, according to Theodore, remove inherited sin, but initiated the believer into sinless discipleship of Christ, and at the same time blotted out the sins he had himself committed. In the former sense it had its use even for children; for Baptism, like all grace emanating from the Incarnation, raised man to a new stage, elevated him above his present nature, and prepared him for the future state. This is most strongly emphasised by Theodore, and here his teaching is distinguished from the doctrines of Pelagius and Julian of Eclanum, who subordinated redemption through Christ completely to the rationalistic theory. That Theodore did not do. While he was thoroughly convinced, with Pelagius, that in the present state everything turned on men's own actions which rested on knowledge, freedom, effort, and heroic fighting, yet he was equally certain, on the other hand, that human nature did not attain immutability, immortality, and sinlessness through this conflict—it was merely a condition—but only through redemption. For this reason Christ came. He did not restore, but produced a new, a higher state. He did not heal, but transfigured."[2] To him, then, redemption is the *completion* of human nature, for that which is found in idea only in Adam, is found in

[1] *De Pecc. Orig.* c. xxii. § 25.
[2] Harnack, *op. cit.* iii. 282.

Christ in perfect reality. It is not so much the removal of sin and guilt, as a participation in that which Christ has become for us, in the possession of immortality (for man was necessarily created mortal, he said) and an absolutely unchangeable divine life, through union with Christ. He holds that in all good conduct, man's free-will takes the first step, and God then gives His power to carry on the work of sanctification and holiness.[1]

But St. Jerome traces the opinions of Pelagius farther back, as we have done also, and sees them in germ in the works of Origen.[2] Origen's theory of the pre-existence of souls, it has been said, "does not allow of the derivation of sinfulness from Adam," and "is very inconsistent with correct notions of the working of God's grace. It supposes the freedom of will unimpaired through every stage of declension from holiness. "Thus the operation of that which we call preventive grace is excluded, and he asserts that faith comes of ourselves and that the gifts of God's grace wait upon the proper exercise of the gifts of nature." [3]

Pelagius, as a monk, was of exemplary life, and, as St. Augustine bears witness, "a holy man, an advanced Christian." [4] He lived an ascetic life, and earned the respect, not only of Paulinus, Bishop of Nola, himself a good man and a saint, but even of St. Augustine himself.[5] But this very circumstance goes far to explain his tenets. The fact that he had never, like Augustine, run into any excess of riot, had never been enticed by lust, had never gone into the depths of sin, but had always led a life of self-

[1] Theodore, *In Rom.* v. 13; viii. 19; *In Eph.* ii. 10.

[2] *Vide supra*, p. 136. "Addit Hieronymus, haustum esse hoc dogma e fontibus Origenis: unde illud mundo propinarint triumviri isti, Grunnius sive Rufinus, Evagrius Ponticus et Iovinianis: quos etiam tanquam Pelagianæ hæresios patriarchas incessit præfatium in dialogos adversus Pelagium": Vossius, *Historiæ Pelagianæ*, lib. vii. p. 7.

St. Jerome says that Pelagius followed the ideas of (1) Jovinian. "Non erubescis explosam atque damnatam Ioviniani sententiam sequi?" (*Lib.* ii. *c. Pel.*). Jovinian was condemned at Rome by Pope Siricius. And (2) Evagrius, who wrote a book περὶ ἀπαθείας, "quam nos impassibilitatem vel imperturbationem possumus dicere, quando nunquam animus ullo perturbationis vitio commovetur" (*Ad Ctes.*). And (3) Rufinus, "qui ἀπαθείαν and impeccantiam prædicat" (*Lib.* iv. *in Hierem, cap.* xxii.).

[3] Evans, *Biography of the Early Church*, ii. 99.

[4] *De Peccati Meritis*, iii. § 1.

[5] *De Gestis Pelagii*, c. xxvi. § 51.

control, had never become "involved in the sad experience of human infirmity and of the strong tyranny of evil habit," but had always been able, as it seemed to him, by the strength of his own moral nature, to do what was right—this very fact, I say, led him so to exaggerate the good in human nature, and the strength and liberty of the will of man, that he practically explained away altogether the power of the grace of God. The system of Pelagius, therefore, had affinities in three directions, and its distinguishing characteristics are three in number. It had:

(1) *A naturalistic tendency*, in that it ascribed all moral actions, whether good or ill, to the unfettered, unrestricted, and unassisted powers and capacities of human nature. In this respect also, it is followed, though in a lesser degree, by Semi-Pelagianism and by Baianism.

(2) *A Judaistic tendency*, in the laudation of good works, in the exaggerated idea of the meritoriousness of works, and their efficacy in the work of salvation.

(3) *A Stoic tendency*, in the doctrine that the soul of man was proof against the assaults of the tempter, which was practically the ancient philosophic doctrine of ἀπάθεια, *i.e.* "nulo afflatu vitii, neque pravi affectus commotione tentata integritas animi; quam ex Origenis, ac Ruffini disciplina hauserant."[1] This is expressed in the Pelagian *dictum*, "Posse hominem sine peccato, si velit, esse."[2]

But Pelagius did not, we may be sure, mean to depart from the Catholic faith; on the contrary, he believed he was upholding it. He thought that Augustine and others had greatly erred, by holding a one-sided view of the faith, and by undue depreciation of human nature, which was the highest work of God's hand. He was, in the words of Professor Bury, "championing the man against the Christian," or rather, "humanity against the inhuman side of the Christian faith."[3] He "does not seem to have succeeded in really working his theory of human nature into the Christian system, *which he fully accepted*,[4] and this was the logical weakness of his position in the theological debate."[5]

[1] Petavius, *op. cit.* vi. s. 10.
[2] Augustine, *De Gestis Pelagii*, c. xi. § 23; *De Pecc. Orig.* c. xi. § 12.
[3] Bury, *op. cit.* pp. 45–6.
[4] He wrote a work, in three books, *De Fide Trinitatis.*
[5] *Ibid.* p. 45. (N.B.—The italics are mine, E.J.)

Holding this view of man, we can readily undertand his being so taken back on hearing St. Augustine's prayer, "Da quod jubes, et jube quod vis." [1] He believed that man was already able, but only required his will arousing to the task. Many Christians, he said, were lazy, and were glad to blame human nature for their faults, and by so doing, he maintains, to "accuse God." [2] Man, he held, had a part, and a large, a real part in "working out his own salvation," and it was a "blind madness" to disregard this fact.

According to Professor Bright [3] the faults of Pelagius were twofold:

1. *Intellectual.*

(*a*) A one-sided view of human nature, in the exaggeration of its capacity for right-doing

(*b*) A partial view of the Divine Justice, in its relation to individuals, overlooking its extension to the race, and its incomprehensibility by man's finitude.

(*c*) An imperfect view of Redemption, in his belittlement of the application of its effects to men.

2. *Moral.*

A defect of humility, which, as is so often the case, he almost boasts of possessing.[4]

Or, to put it more concisely, he suffered from a lack of (1) *Comprehensiveness* regarding (*a*) man, (*b*) God as Creator, (*c*) God as Redeemer, and (2) of *Humility.* A modern writer, again, sums it up as follows: "In others (heretics) it was to an excessive reliance on reason when dealing with the supra-rational, and a corresponding absence of trust in mystical intuition that heresy was due. Arius and Pelagius are heretics of this type." [5]

Here appears, then, the strength and the weakness of Pelagianism; its strength, in that it continues to lift up its head, even at the present time, although mortally wounded many times over; and its weakness, in that its adherents have never done or suffered great things, and have never even formed a sect or body for the propagation of their tenets. As regards the former, "Pelagianism is not

[1] *Confessions*, x. 40. Cf. also *De dono persev.* 53.

[2] "Dicimus . . . non possumus, homines sumus . . . Accusamus Deum": Pelagius, *Ad Demetriadem*, 16.

[3] *Select Anti-Pelagian Trealises of St. Augustine, Introd.* p. viii.

[4] *Ad. Dem.* 20.

[5] Evelyn Underhill, *Mysticism*, p. 126.

one of those dull, lifeless heresies which have no more interest than the fact that they once possessed for a short space the minds of men a long while dead," [1] but "the question was and is perennial. The harmony between Divine sovereignty and human freedom, the limits of man's ability and responsibility in religious matters, the hereditary nature of sinfulness, and the efficacy of Divine grace—these are topics on which the thoughts of men have been baffled through all the Christian ages, and of which the mystery is perhaps insoluble." [2] As regards the latter, "Pelagius instituted no schism, formed no churches; his doctrine remained a speculation of individual thinkers, or of groups within the Church, although at times the weapon of excommunication was freely employed against them." [3] Or again, "No Pelagian ever has, or ever will, work a religious revolution. He who is destined for such a work must have a full conviction that God is acting directly, immediately, consciously, and therefore with irresistible power, upon him and through him. It is because he believes himself, and others believe him to be, thus acted upon, that he has the burning courage to undertake, the indomitable perseverance to maintain, the inflexible resolution to die for his religion; so soon as that conviction is deadened, his power is gone. . . . He who is not predestined, who does not declare, who does not believe, himself predestined as the author of a great religious movement, he in whom God is not manifestly, sensibly, avowedly, working out His pre-established designs, will never be saint or reformer." [4]

We must now trace the course of this controversy. It first arises in a letter which Pelagius, then at Rome, wrote to Paulinus, Bishop of Nola in A.D. 405, and to which he refers as follows: "In about 300 lines nothing else than the grace and help of God is confessed, and that we are unable to do any good at all without God." [5] But St. Augustine remarks that, after reading this epistle, he finds that he does not hold the grace of God, which he mentions, to be anything more than the original natural endowments of man, but that he is altogether silent as regards anything

[1] Bury, *op. cit.* p. 43.
[2] Dr. S. G. Green, *A Handbook of Church History*, p. 308.
[3] *Ibid.*
[4] Dean Milman, *Latin Christianity*, i. p. 150.
[5] Augustine, *De Gratia Christi*, c. xxxv. § 38.

beyond that. He, indeed, *denied* that any supernatural grace was necessary, directly assisting man to the true service of God. He was willing to use the term, however, for the moral law and other instruction as to duty given by God to man, and even went so far as to allow the gift of remission of sins to be thus termed. But there he stopped. "By justification we are indeed cleansed of our personal sins through faith alone ("per solam fidem justificat Deus impium convertendum," *Patr. Lat.* xxx. 661), but this pardon (*gratia remissionis*) implies no interior renovation or sanctification of the soul."[1] But it is evident that he could not long rest content with this position. He shortly developed his theory of man's integrity, contending that there was no transmission of any "fault and corruption of nature" from the first man to his descendants, due to the first man's sin, nor was physical death due to that cause.

Some time between 405 and 410 he seems to have written his *Expositiones* (or *Commentarii*) *in Epistolas Sancti Pauli* in fourteen books, *i.e.* one on each Epistle. They are to be found in many collections of the works of St. Jerome, to whom they were frequently attributed, as also to Pope Gelasius, and to Primasius, Bishop of Hadrumetum in North Africa, though some anonymous copies are also in existence. In many Irish MSS. it is quoted under Pelagius' own name.[2] An orthodox redaction is in existence, due to the pen of Cassiodorus. His doctrine appears to be well developed in this work; *e.g.* he says, "Insaniunt, qui de Adam per traducem asserunt ad nos venire peccatum" (*Patr. Lat.* xxx. 678). St. Augustine refers to this work in *De Gestis Pelagii*, § 39; also at the close of *De Peccatorum Meritis*.

It is to be emphasised that we cannot say that either side of the dispute was caused by the other; on the contrary, they seem to have arisen, as Harnack contends,[3] independently of one another. They were due to the fact that the same problem, *i.e.* "whether virtue or grace, morality or religion, the original and inalienable constitution of man, or the power of Jesus Christ, was supreme," was studied simultaneously by diverse minds, coming to opposite

[1] Prof. Pohle in *The Catholic Encyclopædia*, s.v. "Pelagius."

[2] For a good account of its history, see Prof. Souter in *The Expositor*, 7th series, May 1907, p. 455.

[3] *Op. cit.* vol. v. p. 168 *sq.*

conclusions. Although extremely wonderful, yet there is nothing unusual in two minds being, in perfect independence, engaged on the same line of thought; the case of Darwin and Wallace being joint discoverers of the doctrine of "natural selection" is but one instance out of many that might have been adduced, though in their case they reached practically the same, not opposed, solutions. It is due to "the logic of history," a phenomenon hitherto not understood, but in regard to which possibly, ere long, the study of "mental suggestion" and "telepathy" and of "The New Psychology," will somewhat enlighten us. St. Augustine's theory appears in the *Confessions*, written A.D. 399, while he did not hear of the theory of Pelagius until about 404 or 405. And, on the other hand, Pelagius does not seem to have founded his system in opposition to Augustine's, but to have been shocked by the Augustinian prayer quoted above, *because of* his already preconceived theory. St. Augustine's view was formed by his consideration of his clerical office, his study of the Epistle to the Romans, and his Neoplatonic system of philosophy, reinforced by his introspection which produced the *Confessions*. He learnt from the Platonists to refer all good to God, and therefore faith which preceded knowledge and was the first motion of the soul, was the gift of God. Man, then, was only free and good in dependence on God, Whose plan is universal and His will completely carried out. Pelagius, on the contrary, embraced the popular philosophy, a blend of Stoicism and Aristotelianism which is best expressed in the words of Cicero quoted above.[1] Being also a monk, an enthusiast for, and a proficient in, virtue, and with no trace of such an inward struggle as was Augustine's, he naturally thought as he did, and proclaimed his ideas of human power.

But Pelagius was not alone; he had a friend, a disciple, an ally, in the person of *Cœlestius*, a man of high birth, a eunuch from birth, who had practised as a lawyer ("auditorialis scholasticus"), and having been persuaded by Pelagius at Rome, he gave up his calling and devoted himself, still a layman, to this controversy. If we may believe Gennadius (and we have no reason to do otherwise) Cœlestius was somewhat drawn towards the monastic ideal for some time before he met Pelagius, for the above-named writer

[1] *Supra*, p. 13.

attributes to him at that time three epistles, *De Monasterio.*

In Africa, Augustine heard much in praise of Pelagius, but disquieting rumours soon reached him to the effect that "adversus Dei gratiam disputaret." [1] But it is characteristic of the large-hearted charity of Augustine, as well as of the regard in which he held Pelagius (though he had neither made his acquaintance, nor even seen him), that he endeavoured to believe the best of him, and carefully examined his works to see if he could refute the rumour, but found, to his great regret, that he could not deny it.[2] When, however, he felt bound to enter the arena, he avoided mentioning Pelagius by name, so as to give no offence to him at all.

In A.D. 410 the Goths, under Alaric, captured Rome, and Pelagius and Cœlestius left the city and sailed to Carthage. St. Augustine, however, was absent at the time, and when he returned he found Pelagius gone, but, he was told, Pelagius had said nothing at all like what report had attributed to him, while he was at Carthage. Early in 411 Pelagius came back to Carthage, but Augustine was very busy with the Donatist dispute, and though he "saw the face of Pelagius once or twice," and heard some whispers that all was not well, yet he had no chance of an interview with him, before he sailed away for Palestine. What he had heard as to the teaching of Pelagius was that he denied the remission of the sins of infants in Baptism, but allowed their sanctification only, which was the particular watchword of Cœlestius. Though Pelagius departed, Cœlestius remained, being now a candidate for ordination, and managed to deceive many of the Church people in Carthage, disturbing also many more,[3] both by his personal influence and by his treatise which he wrote for the purpose.

There now arrived in Carthage a deacon of the Church of Milan named *Paulinus,* who was collecting materials for his proposed *Life of St. Ambrose,* and had come to see Augustine for this purpose. This work of his is extant and is addressed to his "venerable father Augustine." By A.D. 412 the tenets of Cœlestius had spread so much that in that year [4] a Synod was convened at Carthage, under the

[1] *De Gest. Pel.* c. xxii. § 46. [2] *Ibid.*
[3] *Ibid.* c. xxxv. § 62.
[4] This is the date usually given, on the authority of Quesnel,

presidency of Aurelius, archbishop of Carthage and metropolitan, to consider these doctrines. Paulinus appeared as the accuser of Cœlestius, and charged him with teaching and "employing others to teach throughout the provinces" heretical teaching which was summed up against him under seven *capitula*. We have five records of these charges, two in Marius Mercator: (1) in *Commonitorium super Nomine Cœlestii*, ii. 5, and (2) in *Subnotationes in verba Juliani*, p. 115, and three in St. Augustine; (3) in *De Peccato Originali*, §§ 2, 3; (4) in *De Peccato Originali*, § 12, and (5) in *De Gestis Pelagii*, § 23). (2) and (3) profess to be taken from the official record of the Council, but all the accounts differ, except (4) and (5), which agree with one another in omitting charge No. 4. The charges are:

1. "Adam mortalem factum, qui sive peccaret sive non peccaret moriturus fuisset."
2. "Peccatum Adæ ipsum solum læsit, non genus humanum."
3. "Parvuli qui nascuntur in eo statu sunt, in quo fuit Adam ante prævaricationem."
4. "Infantes, etsi non baptizentur, habere vitam æternam."
5. "Neque per mortem vel prævaricationem Adæ omne genus hominum moritur, nec per resurrectionem Christi omne genus hominum resurget."
6. "Lex sic mittit ad regnum cœlorum quomodo et evangelium."
7. "Et ante adventum Domini fuerunt homines impeccabiles (*i.e.* sine peccato)."

Augustine was not, for some reason unknown to us, present at this Synod, but he gives us an account of it which he obtained from the official records. The account is only fragmentary, and is contained in *De Peccato Originali*, §§ 2–6. The discussion seems to have been only on the second and third charges.

In reply to No. 2 Cœlestius said, "I stated that I was doubtful about the transmission of sin, yet nevertheless I will agree with one to whom God has granted the gift of knowledge, for I have heard varying opinions from those

Bright, and many others; but the Ballerini, in their edition of St. Leo, tom. iii. p. 846, n. 5, give it as 411, in which they are followed by Hefele.

who have been made priests of the Catholic Church." When pressed for his authorities he instanced "Rufinus, who was at Rome with the holy Pammachius." Asked for other names, he replied, "Is not *one* priest enough?" They then went on to the third head. After its being read, Cœlestius challenged Paulinus to explain what was meant by "ante transgresssionem." Paulinus demanded a denial of this charge, and said that Cœlestius must do one of two things, either state that he had not taught it, or else condemn it now. Aurelius, the president, then defined the issue, "*I* say, that Adam was so constituted in Paradise, as to be at first immortal, but afterwards on account of his transgression became corruptible." And then, Paulinus agreeing, he proceeded, "Paulinus wishes to ascertain, whether the condition of infants baptised nowadays is the same as that of Adam before he sinned or whether they inherit he guilt of transgression from the same sinful fount whence they are born?" Cœlestius' reply was, "I have already said that in the Catholic Church, I have heard many both defending and impugning the transmission of sin; it is therefore not heresy, but an open question. I have always allowed that infants need baptism and ought to be baptised: what more do you want?" And therefore he would not condemn those who maintained the opinions expressed in charges (2) and (3). The Synod could do nothing else but excommunicate him, which it accordingly did. Yet we must not overlook the fact that Cœlestius confessed that even infants needed "redemption" and called him "impius" who would forbid it to them, of whatever age they might be."[1] And, St. Augustine says, this is equivalent to saying that they have need of "remission of sins";[2] but, on the other hand, the real difficulty was that Cœlestius "noluit confiteri ex Adam in eos transisse peccatum." He was quite willing for them to be baptised, and to say that this "baptism" was "for the remission of sins," but with the reservation that the sins in question were actual sins committed by them, for he seems to have held that from their very first hour they were capable of personal sin. The result of the Synod was, in the words of *Orosius*, "Auditum, convictum, confessum, detestatumque ab Ecclesia, ex Africa profugisse."[3] He said he should appeal to Pope Innocent

[1] *De Pecc. Orig.* c. xix. § 21; *De Pecc. Mer.* i. § 63.
[2] *De Pecc. Mer.* ii. § 58. [3] *Apol. in Aug.* tom. x. 1698.

of Rome, but does not appear to have done so, on this occasion. He departed to Ephesus, where he was ordained priest, and then, it appears, went to Constantinople.

Now St. Augustine enters the arena, but at first confines himself to sermons on the subject in his own diocese of Hippo. He laid stress on the fact that mankind did not share in Adam's transgression by imitation only, as the Cœlestians said,[1] but by an inherited tendency, a transmitted taint, which is conveyed to the offspring, even when the parents had been baptised. For Pelagius argued that if Baptism effaced original sin, then the children of baptised parents could not be born in sin.[2] Infants, therefore, stood as much in need of a Saviour as did adults, and for this reason they were partakers of both Baptism and Holy Communion, and so, said Augustine, is upheld the absolute necessity for salvation of these Sacraments. The Pelagians, on the other hand, though they acknowledged the universal necessity of Baptism [3] for entrance into "the kingdom of heaven," yet shrinking from the Augustinian doctrine of the condemnation of unbaptised infants, made a distinction between "eternal life" which they allowed even to the unbaptised, and "the kingdom of heaven" (the highest blessedness), which was only to be given to those who had been baptised. St. Augustine also laid great emphasis in a sermon at this time [4] on the fact that grace must *precede* all good desires or acts in man; from the text "Deus meus misericordia ejus prævenient me" (Ps. lviii. 11 (E.V. lix. 10)) he coined the phrase "prævenient grace" which has since become part of our theological heritage.[5]

The tribune Marcellinus, who was secretary of state at the time, and a great friend of Augustine's, was greatly perturbed by the arguments of some Pelagians at Rome, and in his perplexity wrote to St. Augustine.[6] In reply he composed the three books of his first anti-Pelagian treatise, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione et de Baptismo Parvulorum.* As previously remarked, in both this

[1] *De Pecc. Mer.* i. § 9.
[2] *Ibid.* iii. 16.
[3] See Appendix B, p. 289, *infra.*
[4] *Sermon* clxxvi. 5.
[5] Vide *De Natura et Gratia,* § 35; *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum,* ii. 21; iv. 15.
[6] *De Gestis. Pel.* 25.

and the following work, Pelagius' name is not so much as mentioned. The plan of the work is as follows:

I.—1. Jesus Christ is the Second Adam, in whom we are incorporated by Baptism (i. § 19, *sq.*).

2. Infants are, according to the practice of the Catholic Church, brought to Baptism (i. § 22).

3. These facts prove that there must be some inherited sinfulness to demand such a remedy (i. § 23), which is really given and not only spoken of (i. § 62; c. ii. § 44).

II.—1. Perfect sinlessness is, in the abstract, possible even in this life.

2. Yet in actual fact, it never has existed in any one except in Jesus Christ, the "One Mediator."

3. Yet perfect forgiveness and a fresh innocence is given at Baptism to all (ii. §§ 43, 44), which is, however, but the beginning of a *process* of renewal.

III. As a supplement, he criticises Pelagius' Commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul, written by him about 408, and which is still extant, though very much amended in the orthodox direction, among the works of St. Jerome.[1] St. Augustine's notes are chiefly on the baptism of infants.

But Marcellinus was by no means satisfied with St. Augustine's remarks on sinlessness in book ii., and so he wrote asking for further enlightenment, and the answer was the work, *De Spiritu et Littera*, written in the same year, viz. A.D 412. Its outline is:

I. *Introductory.*

(*a*) Because a thing has not yet happened, it is not therefore impossible (§ 1).

(*b*) The chief error to be combated is the denial of the necessity of grace (2–4).

II.—1. Grace is the gift of the Holy Spirit, and produces love of God; but the Law is the letter that killeth (5–14).

2. Law manifests righteousness, but only, as it were, secretly (15–22) and therefore "kills" (23–35).

III.—1. Grace is "the Law written on the heart" and obtains an eternal reward (36–42).

[1] *Vide supra*, p. 182.

2. Rom. ii. 14, 15, refers to those who shall believe on Christ, and "nature" is "nature restored by grace"[1] (43–47).

3. The Image of God never wholly effaced (48–49).

4. Righteousness a gift (50, 51).

5. Free-will, Faith and Grace (52–60).

IV. *Conclusion.* Sinlessness possible, though unexampled, except in Christ (61–63).

IVA. *Appendix.* A certain righteousness is attained by Christians here, but perfect righteousness hereafter (64–66).

A few points in this work call for more detailed comment:

(1) The opinion that men can live in this life without sin, though an error, is not a serious one. But it is usually conjoined with the pernicious assertion that they can do so without the aid of grace, which must at all costs be resisted. But even on the former point, his opinions developed subsequently. When he wrote *De Gestis Pelagii* in 417 he still treated it as an allowable opinion, but by 419 he came to hold that it was positively erroneous, and abhorrent.[2]

(2) His interpretation of Rom. ii. 14, 15, may appear rather strained.[3] Rationalists in all ages have contended for the literal truth of the phrase "by nature," as did Pelagius, and the Church as consistently has since that time explained it as referring to those converted from heathendom to Christianity, or at the most to those few prominent heathen who had some præternatural divine assistance given them, some reflection of that "light which lighteneth every man." See *Essays and Reviews*, p. 273. It is noteworthy that in this connection, he quotes some words from the latter part of Plato's *Menon*, viz. "quæ secundum justitiæ regulam non solum vituperare non possumus, verum etiam merito recteque laudamus."[4]

[1] See Appendix A, p. 287, *infra.*

[2] "Illud jam tertium videamus, quod non minus in istis omne Christi membrum et totum ejus corpus exhorret, quia contendunt esse in hac vita, vel fuisse justos, nullum habentes omnino peccatum. Qua presumptione apertissime Orationi Dominicæ contradicunt," etc. *Cont. d. ep.* iv. 27.

[3] See Appendix A, p. 287, *infra.*

[4] *De Sp. et Litt.* 48.

(3) St. Augustine plainly holds that "free-will" is an "indifferent" power, *i.e.* a "midway power"; "quem statum *indifferentem*, hoc est, nulla re necessario definitum et obligatum, appellant Theologorum, ac Philosophorum Scholæ." [1] He definitely states that "consentire vel dissentire propriæ voluntatis est" or again, "consentire autem vocationi Dei, vel ab ea dissentire, sicut dixi, propriæ voluntatis est." [2] He is far, then, from doing what his opponents said he did, viz. destroying the freedom of the human will; he defends it. "Accipere quippe et habere anima non potest dona, de quibus hoc audit, nisi consentiendo: ac per hoc quid habeat, et quid accipiat, Dei est: accipere autem et habere utique accipientis et habentis est." [3]

Meanwhile Pelagius in Palestine was striving for peace. About this time he sent a letter to St. Augustine, in a very friendly and even flattering style. St. Augustine replied with one which was perfectly polite but rather reserved, rejecting his flatteries and asking rather for his prayers that by the help of God, he might become what Pelagius already supposes him to have become.[4] He seems to have been blamed afterwards for writing so charitably to Pelagius, and to have found it necessary to explain, in *De Gestis Pelagii*, §§ 51–53, his reasons for doing so, and what he meant by various phrases in the letter. Pelagius seems to have made friends quickly in Palestine, and especially with *John, Bishop of Jerusalem*, and with *St. Jerome*, the learned monk of Bethlehem. But somehow or other St. Jerome became aware of his unsound doctrines, and turned against him his bitter tongue. Ctesiphon consulted Jerome as to one of the questions raised by either Pelagius or Cœlestius, "Utrum peccatum radicem ita quisquam valeat evellere, ut reliquiæ ejus nullæ supersint?" [5] To this he replied in his *Epistola adversus Pelagium ad Ctesiphontem* (No. 133) in A.D. 411, in which he does his best to malign the character of Pelagius by connecting him with Origen and other heretics, and by heaping abuse and almost insult upon

[1] Dionysius Petavius, *De Opificio Sex Dierum*, lib. iv. c. i. s. 3.
[2] *De Sp. et Litt.* 60.
[3] *Ibid.*
[4] The text is preserved in *De Gestis Pelagii*, § 52.
[5] Vossius, *op. cit.* p. 53.

him. To this assault Pelagius apparently did not reply publicly.

He wrote, however, a treatise *De Natura* "in which he defended, with such arguments as he was able, human nature against that grace of God by which the ungodly is justified, and by which we become Christians."[1] St. Augustine is not blind to the merits of the work, however, for he allows that there was some need for it; "vidi hominem zelo ardentissimo accensum adversus eos, qui cum in suis peccatis humanam voluntatem debeant accusare, naturam potius accusantes hominum, per illam se excusare conantur."[2] This work is lost, and we have only such fragments as are preserved in St. Augustine's reply *De Natura et Gratia*. But there is another work of Pelagius, written in A.D. 414, which is still preserved, and which gives us a clear account of his doctrine; I refer to his *Epistola de Virginitate ad Demetriades*. This *Demetrias* was a high-born maiden, daughter of the consul Anicius Hermogenianus Olybrius, who died while she was but young, and she was left to the care of her grandmother Faltonia Proba and her mother Juliana, who were Christians and very rich. On the occasion of the sack of Rome in 410, after capture by the barbarians and subsequent release, they went to Carthage. They were received by St. Augustine, who addressed at least one letter to the grandmother.[3] In A.D. 413 Demetrias, now come of age, resolved to devote herself to the life of holy virginity, though destined by her guardians for the married vocation. Although it seems to have been her own doing, yet it was owing also to the unconscious influence of St. Augustine and his friend Alypius, Bishop of Thagaste.

When the news came to the ears of St. Jerome in his cell at Bethlehem, he wrote, in A.D. 414, apparently at the instance of Proba and Juliana, to encourage the young maiden in her purpose.[4] A remarkable passage in this lettter is: "'God resisteth the proud and giveth grace to the humble.' Now where grace is in question, there is no recompensing of works, but bounty of a giver, according to the Apostle's saying, 'Not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy.' And yet

[1] St. Augustine, *Retractationes*, i. 42.
[2] Ibid. *De Natura et Gratia*, i.
[3] *Ep.* 130. *To Proba.*
[4] *Ep.* 130.

to will and not to will is ours; yet not ours, what is even ours, without God's showing mercy." He might reasonably be supposed to be here combating the opinions of Pelagius, but it is usually held that Pelagius' Epistle was subsequent to that of St. Jerome, though within the compass of the same year, viz. 414. Pelagius professes to write to her at the suggestion of Juliana, and his letter has much excellent advice, but also much dangerous heresy. It is true that in many places in the letter he speaks of nature as "restored by the grace of Christ," or "through Christ," or "through penitence," but in all cases he seems to refer to doctrine or else to man's own works, and not to any real influx of divine assistance. St. Augustine wrote to Juliana an Epistle in A.D. 417 to warn her and her daughter against these doctrines, but either at this time did not know who was the actual writer of the letter, or else in his charity avoided anything in the nature of "personalities," [1] for he speaks of it as "a treatise which someone has written." He quotes some words from it as follows: "You are possessed of that for which you are deservedly preferred to others; nay, the more, in that your personal nobility and opulence belong to your friends, not to you; but spiritual riches none but yourself can provide for you. In that is your right praise, your deserved preference, which cannot be except of thee and in thee." But St. Augustine remarks: "Forbid it, that a virgin of Christ should take pleasure in such words, who has a religious understanding of the innate poverty of the human heart, and therefore wears no ornaments there but the gifts of her Bridegroom! Who was it that separated you from the mass of death and perdition which is in Adam? He surely, Who came to seek and to save that which was lost. When, then, a man hears the Apostle ask, 'Who made thee to differ?' shall he answer, 'My religious will, my faith, my justice,' and not rather go to hear what follows, 'What hast thou which thou hast not received?'" He also reminds her in another part of the same letter that it is from God that "she has all the goods which make her good and will have all which make her better, as far as in this life she can be better; and which will make her perfect, when she is perfected by divine grace, not by human praise." "The principal characteristic," says Dr. Sparrow Simpson,[2] "of the letter to Demetrias is its consistent and evidently

[1] *Ep.* 188.

[2] *Op. cit.* p. 129.

deliberate omission of the doctrine of supernatural and moral aid enabling man to do and become what otherwise he could not." [1] We do not know whether Demetrias was taken in by the wiles of Pelagius, but it is probable that tradition would have said so, were there the slightest excuse for the statement. Let us now return to Pelagius, however.

About this same period (*c.* 412–414) he wrote a letter of condolence to a widow named Livania, which was full of foolish extravagances, but which is lost, except for the framents which have been preserved in St. Augustine, St. Jerome, and Marius Mercator. Parts of it were brought up against him at the Synod of Diospolis in 415, and he there owned that his words had been foolish. The portions referred to were three in number:

> (1) "Inveniat apud te pietas, quæ nusquam invenit, locum: inveniat ubique peregrina in te sedem justitia; veritas quam jam nemo cognoscit, domestica tibi et amica fiat: et lex Dei, quæ ab ominbus prope hominibus contemnitur, a te sola honoretur."
>
> (2) "O te felicem et beatam, si justitia, quæ in cœlo tantum esse credenda est, apud te solam inveniatur in terris!"
>
> (3) "Ille ad Deum digne elevat manus, ille orationem bona conscientia effundit, qui potest dicere, Tu nosti, Domine, quam sanctæ et innocentes, et mundæ sunt ab omni molestia et iniquitate et rapina, quas ad te extendo manus; quemadmodum justa et munda labia et ab omni mendacio libera, quibus offero tibi deprecationem, ut mihi miserearis."

But Pelagius denied that he had ever said such things,

[1] There is also extant another treatise written to Demetrias which has been ascribed variously to Prosper and to Leo the Great, of about A.D. 430; part of it runs thus: "Enter into the chamber of thy mind and in the secret place of that thy most pure conscience look round on what ornaments are there stored up for thee; and, whatever splendid, whatever beautiful and costly, thou shalt there find, doubt not it is of divine workmanship and a gift, and so in all the goods of thy opulence acknowledge both the grace of the Giver, and His right of ownership. For thou hast received what thou hast; and whatever has accrued to thee by the diligence of thy efforts, through Him has it been increased by Whom it was begun. Therefore thou must use what God has bestowed; and must even beg of Him that thou mayest use His gifts faithfully and wisely": *De Humilitate ad Demetriadem*, c. 22.

and declared that the passages were not to be found in his books. This, of course, we cannot verify, but at any rate, "we must allow the possibility of Pelagius having so expressed himself in a flattering letter, not meant to be published, to a sanctimonious widow." [1] But if not his own actual words, they are the logical conclusion drawn by another from his premisses, in the nature, almost, of a *reductio ad absurdum.*

We will now return to St. Augustine. He was invited, or rather commanded, by his metropolitan, Aurelius of Carthage, to preach on the subject in the cathedral at Carthage ("In basilica Majorum"), which he did on June 27, 413. He refuted the charges now brought by the Cœlestian party against the Catholics of bringing in new and unheard-of doctrines; they adduced the line of thought common to the majority of Eastern theologians, viz. the stress laid by them on the αὐτεξούσιον of the human will, and he replied most dramatically by taking into his hands the *Epistola* of St. Cyprian, their great and much-revered martyr-Bishop, and reading therefrom his words: "Cæterum si homines impedire aliquid ad consecutionem gratiæ posset, magis adultos et provectos et majores natu possent impedire peccata graviora. Porro autem si etiam gravissimis delictoribus, et in Deum multo ante peccantibus, cum postea crediderint, remissa peccatorum datur, et a Baptismo atque gratia nemo prohibetur; quanto magis prohiberi non debet infans, qui recens natus nihil peccavit, nisi quod secundum Adam carnaliter natus, contagium mortis antiquæ prima nativitate contraxit; qui ad remissam peccatorum accipiendam, hoc ipso facilius accedit, quod illi remittuntur non propria, sed aliena peccata?" [2] He seems to have been able to convince some of the heretics, and to have brought them back to the Catholic Faith.

But in A.D. 414 he received a letter from a Sicilian named Hilary, a layman, that this opinion was gaining ground in Syracuse and the neighbourhood. This correspondent informed St. Augustine that the Cœlestians denied "original sin" and held that it was possible, in this world, to attain entire sinlessness; and they also said that "Divites baptisatos, nisi omnibus abrenuntient, si quid boni visi fuerint

[1] Harnack, *op. cit.* v. p. 177, n.
[2] *Ep.* 64 *ad Fidum*, s. 5.

facere, non reputari illis, neque regnum Dei posse eos habere."[1] St. Augustine wrote a letter to him in reply.[2]

He next found two young men of high birth and good education, *Timasius* and *James* by name, who had been perverted by the teaching of Pelagius, and had renounced the world on his advice. By some means or other they had come to hear St. Augustine's arguments on behalf of grace, and gave him a copy of Pelagius' work *De Natura*, asking him to reply to it. He immediately set to work to do so, and the result was the publication of *De Natura et Gratia*, at the beginning of the year 415. Here again he avoids mentioning Pelagius' name, and, indeed, goes out of his way to honour him.[3] We now append a short analysis of his thought in this work:

Introductory—
- (*a*) Definition of Divine Righteousness (1, 2).
- (*b*) Human Nature, created good, fell (3).
- (*c*) All condemned by justice, some saved by grace (4–5).

I. Pelagius' distinction between "posse" and "esse" (6–10).
II. Pelagius acknowledges a kind of grace (11–15).
III. ,, on James iii. 8 (16–19).
IV. ,, on prayer (20).
V. ,, denies corruption of human nature (21–46).
- (1) How human nature corrupt (21–24).
- (2) Our ability to sin, but not to return (25–28).
- (3) How God's grace is necessary (29–31).
- (4) Pride (32–36*a*).
- (5) Free-will not set aside (36*b*).
- (6) Sinlessness does not make men gods (37).
- (7) We are *not* sinless (38–44). (B.V. Mary a possible exception, s. 42).
- (8) The sins of the righteous (45–46).

VI.—1. How Pelagius thought the name of Christ necessary to us (47–50).
2. The worthies of old saved by faith in Christ (51–53).

[1] *Ep.* 156 (Hilary's letter); cf. also *De Gestis Pel.* 23, 57; *De Pecc. Orig.* 12.
[2] *Ep.* 157, §§ 23 *sqq.*
[3] §§ 1 and 71.

VII. Necessity is not opposed to free-will (54–58).
VIII. How Pelagius thinks of sinlessness (59–60).
IX. What the "gratia Dei" is (61–70).
X. Replies to Patristic quotations (71–81).
XI. Conclusion (82–84).

Before leaving this treatise, we will comment on certain points of importance raised by it:

(1) The foundation of all St. Augustine's arguments on the vindication of God's doings is the "massa perditionis," which appears in § 5. God may "do what He will with His own"; all without exception have deserved punishment, and if all were to receive it, there would be no injustice done. But God has, of pure mercy decided to select and save some of them and *still* there is no unfairness, for none have got *less* than they deserved, though some have got *more!*

(2) When condemning the statement of Pelagius that certain saints of old had lived justly and without sin, he expressly excepts the Blessed Virgin Mary, "de qua propter honorem Domini nullam prorsus, cum de peccatis agitur, haberi volo quæstionem" (§ 42), in which he follows in the train of his master, St. Ambrose, who wrote, "Virgo, per gratiam, ab omni integra labe peccati." [1]

(3) Man's original state was one of innocence; he was created "whole and blameless" (§ 50), "unblamable and without any fault" (§ 3); but contracted by the misuse of a free-will a "vitium" by which his "natural good" was "obscured and weakened so as to need illumination and healing"; this is the state of "original sin" in which all men are since born (§ 3).

(4) In § 74 he quotes one of the hymns of St. Ambrose which he would hear when he was a catechumen at Milan.

(5) In § 79 he allows that in the present state of the unregenerate man, there is a kind of necessity of sinning, not from human nature itself, but from human nature as weakened by original sin, but this can be overcome by the grace of God and a full liberty granted of doing right.

[1] *In Ps.* cxviii. *Hom.* xxii. 30.

In the early part of the same year (415), a young priest from Bracara (Braga) in Portugal, Paulus Orosius by name, came to Hippo to consult Augustine about the Priscillianist and Origenist heresies then so rife in his native land. He seems to have made his inquiries in a writing entitled *Commonitorium de errore Priscillianistarum et Origenistarum.*[1] St. Augustine answered him in a treatise *Ad Orosium contra Priscillianistas et Origenistas,* and seems also to have taken a fancy to the young cleric, whom he sent on to St. Jerome at Bethlehem with two letters on the subject.[2] The aged monk was busily engaged on his *Dialogi adversus Pelagianos,* libri iii. The work is cast into the form of an argument between "Critobulus" which is a synonym for Pelagius, and "Atticus," who represents Jerome himself. They discuss Pelagius' book of "Testimonies," and "Atticus" exposes Pelagius' unreal sense of "grace" as meaning the natural powers of the will.

Meanwhile Augustine had a communication from two Spanish bishops, who had a little while before presented to him a memorial against certain heresies [3]; their names were Eutropius and Paul. The paper was brought by some Christians from Sicily, and consisted of sixteen "Definitiones, ut dicitur, Cœlestii." They are sharply-cut dilemmas, fit offspring of a legal mind, and their object was to prove the Augustinian views of sin illogical and absurd. The point of the whole collection is that man can live entirely without sin, and that whosoever denies this must deny the reality of sin, because he really denies all man's responsibility for his actions! In an appendix the author also mentions nine texts quoted against his position, but without explaining them, goes on to quote others which he believes support him.

St. Augustine replied to these in *De Perfectione Justitiæ Hominis,* which he wrote in A.D. 415 or 416. The outline of the work is very simple:

Introduction. Circumstances under which written.

I. The Sixteen "Ratiocinations" or "Definitions" of Cœlestius, with replies (1–16).

II. Man commanded to be without sin, in Scripture (17–20).

[1] In Migne, *Patrologia Latina,* xxxi.
[2] *Epp.* 166, 167.
[3] Orosius, *Ad Aug.* 1.

III. Scripture testimonies that the Divine commands are not grievous (21–22).

IV. The nine texts quoted by Cœlestius as alleged against them, proved to be conclusive (23–43).

(1) Job xiv. 4 (23–28).
(2) Ps. cxv. 2 (29–30).
(3) Ps. xiii. 1, 3 (31).
(4) St. Mark x. 18; St. Luke xviii. 19 (32).
(5) Prov. xx. 9 (33–36).
(6) Eccles. vii. 21 (37).
(7) Ps. cxlii. 2 (38).
(8) 1 John i. 8 (39).
(9) Rom. ix. 16 (40–43).

Conclusion (44).

It is a point of importance that the final conclusion reached by Augustine is not that sinlessness is impossible in this life, but a merely "agnostic" one; "non audeo reprehendere, quanquam nec defendere valeam" (§ 44). The Council at Carthage in 418 went farther, and altogether condemned the opinion. But St. Augustine, although he at this time allowed the possibility, in the abstract, yet, he maintained, no one ever has realised it, with the one *certain* exception of our Lord, and the *possible* one of His Holy Mother. And in another place he gives his explanation of this fact, viz. that the fault is in the human will.[1]

We may also note in passing that in the same section he makes a distinction between being sinless, and having no sin imputed, referring to Ps. xxxi. 2. We cannot be perfectly certain, but it appears as if there were some who allowed that even the just and pious committed venial sins, but that these were not imputed to them by God.

We have now to go back a little in time as well as to take a journey from Africa to Palestine, and follow the priestly messenger of St. Augustine. Orosius arrived at Bethlehem about the middle of 415, and as an honoured guest was invited to attend the Diocesan Synod at Jerusalem on July 28; Pelagius does not seem to have been present, though we know that he had been in Jerusalem just shortly before, for Orosius had seen and spoken to

[1] "Cum voluntate humana, gratia adjuvante divina, sine peccato in hoc vita possit homo esse, cur non sit, possem facillime, ac veracissime respondere, quia homines nolunt": *De Pecc. Mer.* ii. 6.

him there, and he was shortly after sent for by the meeting. In some way or other the subject was brought up, and Orosius was requested to tell what he knew about the opinions in question. He therefore gave an account of the trial and condemnation of Cœlestius at Carthage, and showed a copy of St. Augustine's letter to Hilary referred to above, and said, moreover, that Augustine was writing a full refutation of Pelagius' tenets; it was St. Augustine's *De Natura et Gratia*, to which he referred, and on which St. Augustine had been engaged when he left.

Bishop John of Jerusalem, however, was rather disposed towards Pelagius' opinions, and sent for him, so as to hear his side of the matter also. On his arrival, the Synod asked him "whether he had taught that which Augustine had answered?" Pelagius' answer was, "And what is Augustine to me?" which set the feeling of the assembly against him, for they all respected Augustine on account of the success of his anti-Donatist campaign. Bishop John, however, answered, "It is I who am Augustine here," meaning, not that he fully concurred in Augustine's teachings (which he apparently did not, for he had been attacked about A.D. 400 by St. Jerome, for his Origenistic opinions), but because he was his fellow-bishop, and the only representative of the episcopate present. He bade Pelagius sit down, as if a full member of the Synod, though he was but a layman, and called on Orosius to make his accusation of Pelagius. He stated that Pelagius had said to him, "My teaching is that a man can, if he will, live without sin, and easily keep God's commandments"; in this he was supported by Posserius and Avitus, two priests of the diocese, and Pelagius himself owned to it. Orosius pointed out that that opinion had been condemned by the Council of Carthage, as well as by St. Augustine, and by St. Jerome in his Epistle to Ctesiphon, and also in his Dialogue against the Pelagians which he was then engaged on. Orosius and his supporters, however, refused to have the questions formally re-opened, as they regarded the Carthaginian sentence as final. Pelagius, nevertheless, withdrew part of his former statement, by saying, "Non dixi quoniam recepit natura hominis ut impeccabilis sit; sed dixi quoniam qui voluerit pro propria salute laborare et agonizare, ut non peccet et ambulet in præceptis Dei, habere eum hanc possibilitatem a Deo."

(I did not say that human nature was endowed with sinlessness, but that whoever was willing to work and struggle for his own salvation, so as not to sin and to walk in the commandments of God, he has this possibility from God.) The assembled presbyters, on hearing this, began to whisper to one another, and some even said aloud, "Pelagius dicit esse posse hominem sine peccato!" (Pelagius says man can be without sin!) The President then quoted some passages of Scripture wherein St. Paul and the Psalmist laid stress on the need of Divine assistance (1 Cor. xv. 10; Rom. ix. 16; Ps. cxxvi. 1). Pelagius then replied, "Et ego sic credo; anathema sit qui dicit absque adjutorio Dei posse hominem ad profectum omnium venire virtutum." (And so I believe; let him be anathema who says that man can attain to all virtue without the help of God.) The bishop then asked Orosius whether he denied the efficacy of the Divine help; Orosius replied, "Not I, certainly, but the matter is of Latin origin and is best understood by Latins; let it be referred to Pope Innocent of Rome, and both sides agree to accept his verdict." All were satisfied with this, and thus the appeal to Rome on this subject, meditated by Cœlestius, three years previously, at the Synod of Carthage, would now have become an actual fact, and that without any demur on either side, had it not been for another incident mentioned below, totally unexpected.

The Synod laboured under one great disadvantage; its members knew no Latin, but Orosius knew no Greek; the services of an interpreter were called in, therefore, and he seems to have acquitted himself but poorly; to the great disadvantage of the Catholic cause.

Orosius went, six weeks after the Synod, to make a call upon the bishop, but was accused by him as having said that a man could not live without sin, even with God's help. Orosius answered that he had never said so, and in order to prove it, wrote his *Apologia pro Libertate Arbitrii*. This work consists chiefly of an attack on Pelagius in which he descends even to sarcasm and to making fun of his personal appearance. He accuses Pelagius, but without any just ground, of having maintained *his own* immaculacy and sinlessness, and he makes great capital out of the Epistle referred to above, written by Pelagius to Demetrius.

The scene now changes to Cæsarea, where were two

Gallican refugees, *Heros*, Bishop of Arles, who had been a disciple of St. Martin, Bishop of Tours; and *Lazarus*, Bishop of Aix, who had been exiled from their sees for some unknown reason, and had come to live at Cæsarea. They there came across a book written by Pelagius on the model of the books of "Testimonies" so common in the Early Church.[1] Of these, the most famous was St. Cyprian's, in three books, and upon this Pelagius based his work. It was known under various designations: *Eclogæ ex divinis Scripturis, liber unus; Εὐλογιῶν; de vita actuali; Capitula; de vita clericorum; Testimonia.* It was a collection of short counsels, with Scripture texts, and its purpose was to prove that sinlessness was possible of attainment by man through the powers given to him at his creation. They were, says St. Augustine, "perversitate disputationum ejus offensis" (offended by the perversity of his arguments) [2] and perhaps also, as Bethune-Baker suggests, "put up" to it by St. Jerome, and so they composed an indictment, drawn from his works and from his book "non quidem habentis auctoris sui titulum, sed qui perhibetur esse Cœlestii" ("not having, indeed, its author's name, but attributed to Cœlestius").[3] They added also the charges already objected against his disciple Cœlestius at Carthage, and those tenets which were taught by the Pelagians of Sicily and reported to St. Augustine by his correspondent Hilary.[4] This charge they placed before *Eulogius*, metropolitan of Cæsarea and primate of Palestine, and called a council of the Bishops of Palestine, to meet at Diospolis (Lydda) on December 20, 415. Thirteen bishops attended, whose names are recorded in Augustine, *C. Julian*, i. 19, 32; Bishop John of Jerusalem is amongst the number, we remark. But the accusers were not present on the actual occasion, one of them being ill, and the other could not appear without him; Orosius had no right to be present, and so the Catholic cause had no bold advocate there. Pelagius, on the other hand, was present, and found a skilful advocate to assist him, so St. Jerome tells us,[5] in a deacon, *Anianus of Celeda.*

[1] On the subject of "Testimonia" see the illuminating article by Dr. Rendel Harris in *The Expositor* for November, 1906, Seventh Series, vol. ii. p. 385.

[2] *De Gest. Pel.* § 53.

[3] *Ibid.* § 65.

[4] *Ibid.* § 23.

[5] *Ep.* 143.

Probably at the beginning of the session, Pelagius read aloud some friendly letters he had received from various eminent bishops, including the one he had from St. Augustine, as described above.[1] The Council then commanded the charges to be read out in Greek, one by one, and Pelagius was bidden to reply to each, as read. These were twenty-eight in number, and fall into four divisions, and of these and their refutation, if such it can be called, we will now proceed to treat. Our chief source of information for the doings of this Council is the writing which Augustine called *De Gestis Palæstinis*, but which is now always cited, much less correctly, as *De Gestis Pelagii*. The accusations are as follows:

I. *From the writings of Pelagius himself.*

1. "Non posse esse sine peccato, nisi qui legis scientiam habuerit" (No man can be without sin, except he who possesses a knowledge of the law): *De Gestis Pelagii*, §§ 2–4.

Pelagius' answer to this was, "I indeed said so, but not in the way they understand it: I did not state that he who had a knowledge of the law could not sin, but that he was helped towards sinlessness by knowing the law, as it is written, 'He gave them the law for a help' (Isa. viii. 20, LXX.)." The Synod agreed that Pelagius' statement was quite orthodox on this point. Yes, says Augustine, so it is; but this is *not* what he said in his book. There is a great difference between a man being helped towards sinlessness by a knowledge of the law, and his not being able to attain to sinlessness, except by it! St. Augustine allows that Pelagius may mean the Christian law, *i.e.* the Baptismal Creed, but even then, he is still wrong. And he represents Pelagius besieged by a multitude of newly baptised infants who say to him, "Ecce nos grex magnus agnorum sine peccato sumus, et legis tamen scientiam non habemus!" (Lo, we are a large flock of sinless lambs, and *we* have no knowledge of the law!) His language, then, is hopelessly ambiguous on this head.

2. "Omnes voluntate propria regi" (Every man is ruled by his own will: *De Gestis Pel.* §§ 5–8.

Pelagius responded that he said this "on account of

[1] P. 190.

the freedom of the will, to which God gives help, in the man who chooses good; but in the case of the sinner, he himself is to blame, viz. his free-will." The Council agreed that this too was quite consonant with the Church's mind, as also St. Augustine allows. But, he says, in the place in his works from whence this phrase was taken, the rest of the sentence throws some light upon the sense in which the extract is to be understood. It, by itself, was patient of both an orthodox and a heretical interpretation, and the key is given by the context, which at the Council was orthodox, but in the book is heretical. For he continued the sentence thus: "et suo desiderio unumquemque dimitti" (and each man is left entirely to his own desire). And Pelagius went on to allege the support of Wisdom vii. 1–7, especially of the last verse of the passage. But, St. Augustine comments, though man may "hope" and man may "call," yet it is "hoc Spiritu, non viribus propriæ voluntatis, reguntur et aguntur qui filii sunt Dei" (They who are the sons of God are ruled and led by that spirit, not by the powers of their own will). So here again he imposes upon the Council by means of an ambiguous phrase, which being in Latin, and thus not understood by them in the original, they were unable to perceive the pitfalls in.

3. "In die judicii iniquis et peccatoribus non esse parcendum, sed æternis eos ignibus exurendos" (In the day of judgment there will be no mercy granted to the ungodly and to sinners, but they shall be burnt up with eternal fires: *De Gestis Pelagii*, §§ 9–11.

Pelagius seemed to his accusers to make no distinction whatever between "sinners who would be saved by fire, who had Christ for a foundation, but built thereupon wood, hay or stubble," and those who would certainly be punished with eternal punishment. Pelagius answered, "that he said this according to the Gospel, where it is said of sinners, 'They shall go into eternal punishment, but the just into life eternal'" (St. Matt. xxv. 46). He then added, "And if any one thinks otherwise, he is an Origenist!" Now if there was one name that was a veritable "bogey" to the Eastern Church at that time it was that of Origen, and Pelagius might well be excused for thinking that he had "a trump up his

sleeve" when he "trotted out this bogey." And it had the desired effect, for his judges were at once in agreement with him; they saw the point he meant them to see, and also failed to see that which he meant them to be blind to. They therefore said "this also was not alien from the mind of the Church," and passed on. And St. Augustine, who was sharp enough himself to see the danger, does not blame the Council, for he concludes: "vera quidem sententia episcopali est confirmata judicio: sed adhuc quid sentiat Pelagius non apparet, et post hoc etiam episcopale judicium non impudenter inquiritur." (And the true meaning, indeed, is confirmed by the episcopal judgment: but so far, it does not appear what Pelagius really meant, and after this episcopal pronouncement it need not be impudently inquired into.) But what was the point of this controversy? It lay in the fact that Origen taught a doctrine called "Universalism," viz. that even the devil and all his angels would finally be saved and admitted to the blessed company of the saints reigning with God. Pelagius' opinion was that all sinners without any exception would be eternally punished. From this, his inference was that all could not, therefore, be stained with original sin, but that there must be a considerable number of people, who, by the continual exercise of their will in the right direction, lived righteously and without sin in this world. Augustine replies that many who *have been* sinners will be saved, if they have turned from their sins and become incorporated into Christ, but that if Pelagius' statement be limited to those who at the day of judgment are still found to be obdurate and hardened sinners, he too can agree with it. The method of procedure at that Last Day is more than we can comprehend; "modis enim multis significatur, quod uno modo futurum est" (for that which shall be carried out by one rule, is [in Holy Scripture] signified under many). And so, as Pelagius has not said "all sinners" or even "some sinners," but has left it quite indefinite, and says that he speaks "according to the Gospel," therefore this may be allowed to pass.

4. "Malum nec in cogitationem venire": *De Gestis Pel.* § 12. The meaning of this, and its orthodoxy,

depend upon the translation of the Latin. According to the idiom of that langage it might be equal to:

either, "malum nec cogitandum quidem" (evil ought not even to be thought upon), in which case it is, of course, both obvious and orthodox.

or, "justis et sanctis in cogitationem (*i.e.* mentem) non venit quod malum est" (that which is evil does not enter the thoughts (that is, the mind) of the just and holy), in which case it is both absurd and heretical.

And Pelagius at the Council explained his meaning thus: "Hoc non ita posuimus; sed diximus, debere studere Christianum, ne male cogitet" (We did not put it in that way; but we said that a Christian ought to take care not to think evil things); in other words, he gave it the former of the two meanings above, which the judges accepted, and rightly so, in Augustine's judgment.

5. "Regnum cœlorum etiam in Veteri Testamento promissum" (The kingdom of heaven was promised, even in the Old Testament): *De Gestis Pelagii*, §§ 13–15.

To this Pelagius made answer, "Hoc et per Scripturas probari possibile est: hæretici autem in injuriam Veteris Testamenti hoc negant. Ego vero Scripturarum auctoritatem secutus dixi, quoniam in propheta Daniele scriptum est, 'Et accipient sancti regnum Altissimi.'"[1] (This also is possible to be proved by the Scriptures, but heretics deny it, to the disadvantage of the Old Testament. But I, holding to the authority of the Scriptures, said it because it is written in the prophet Daniel, 'And the saints shall receive the kingdom of the Most High.') His idea was to prove that, as his ally Cœlestius more boldly put it, the Law was as good as the Gospel, for sending men to heaven. But the word "promised" was very ambiguous, St. Augustine shows us, and by it the Council was deceived, and said that "neither is this alien from the Church's faith." It is quite true that "the kingdom of the Most High," which is the same as "the kingdom of God" and "the kingdom of Heaven," is "promised" in "the Scriptures of the Law and the prophets, which were administered before the Lord's Incarnation," but *they were promised as the peculiar distinction of the New Dispensation!* "His enim verbis (*i.e.* those from Daniel quoted

[1] Dan. vii. 27.

by Pelagius) præmium non Veteris sed Novi Testamenti prophetabat" (For in these words he foretold the reward, not of the Old Testament, but of the New).[1] So the Council was right in acquitting him according to *their* sense of the words, but not according to *his* construction of them.

6. "Posse hominem, si velit, esse sine peccato" (A man, if he wishes, can be without sin): *De Gestis Pelagii*, §§ 16, 23.

Pelagius went on to expand this by saying, "Posse quidem hominem sine peccato esse, et Dei mandata custodire, si velit, diximus; hanc enim possibilitatem Deus illi dedit. Non autem diximus quod inveniatur aliquis, ab infantia usque ad senectam, qui nunquam peccaverit; sed quoniam a peccatis conversus, proprio labore et Dei gratia possit esse sine peccato; nec per hoc tamen in posterum inconversibilis." (We said that a man can indeed be without sin and keep the commandments of God, if he will; for God gave him this possibility. But we did not state that there actually was any one who had never sinned, from infancy to old age; but that when one had been converted from sin, he could, by his own efforts and the grace of God, be sinless; nevertheless it would not be impossible for him to change subsequently.) St. Augustine points out that the ambiguity lies in the words "Dei gratiam." The judges accepted this phrase in the Catholic sense, not suspecting that Pelagius meant it in a different way. And so they acquitted him on this charge also, being deceived by him. This grace, says St. Augustine, is not nature (*De Gest. Pel.* § 20), nor is it the knowledge of the law (*ibid.*), nor, again, is it free-will (§ 21), but it is an active "auxilium" from God, "through Jesus Christ our Lord" (§ 21). What Pelagius really meant is to be seen in his book *De Natura*, given to St. Augustine for refutation by Timasius and James,[2] where he says "hanc se dicere Dei gratiam, quod possibilitatem non peccandi natura nostra, cum conderetur, accepit, quoniam condita est cum libero arbitrio" (that he meant by "the grace of God," that our nature received at creation, the possibility of not sinning, since it was

[1] *De Gestis Pel.* § 14.
[2] *Supra*, p. 195.

endowed with free-will).[1] He also explained subsequently to his own disciples, "Dixi quidem, proprio labore et Dei gratia posse hominem esse sine peccato; sed quam dicam gratiam optime nostis, et legendo recolere potestis, quod ea sit, in qua creati sumus a Deo cum libero arbitrio" (I did indeed say that man could by his own effort *and the grace of God*, be sinless; but what I mean by "the grace of God" you know very well and can recall by reading, that it consists in those endowments with which, together with freedom of will, we were created by God). But the judges supposed that by "grace" he meant not that with which *qua* man, we were endowed, but that by which we are made "a new creature, by adoption"; and so they in their ignorance acquitted a heretic as if he were a Catholic. What opened St. Augustine's eyes, he himself tells us, is that in his book, referred to above, Pelagius had said that "Abel justum nunquam omnino peccasse" (The righteous Abel never sinned at all), whereas now he says "Non autem diximus quod inveniatur aliquis, etc." Righteous Abel, however, he did *not* say had been converted from a sinful course and made sinless for the remainder of his life, but that "he never had done any sin." So Pelagius certainly deceived the Council, though Augustine hesitates to say that he lied.

7–9 are three passages quoted from Pelagius' flattering letter "to a widow," whose name is not given, but whom Harnack calls Livania, but Bright holds to be Juliana, the mother of Demetrias. They are: "Inveniat apud te pietas, quæ nusquam invenit, locum: inveniat ubique peregrina in te sedem justitia: veritas quam jam nemo cognoscit, domestica tibi et amica fiat: et lex Dei, quæ ab omnibus prope hominibus contemnitur, a te sola honoretur" (May Piety, which has never yet found a home, find one with thee: may Righteousness, which is everywhere a vagrant, find in thee a settled habitation; may Truth, which no one has hitherto known, be a member of thy household and a friend of thine, and may the Law of God, which is by almost all men despised, be honoured by thee alone). Or again: "O te felicem et beatam, si justitia, quæ in cælo tantum esse credenda est, apud te solam inveni-

[1] *De Gest. Pel.* § 22.

atur in terris" (O happy and blessed art thou, if righteousness which must be believed to exist only in heaven, is found in thee alone upon earth!). Or: "Ille ad Deum digne elevat manus, ille orationem bona conscientia effundit, qui potest dicere, 'Tu nosti, Domine, quam sanctæ et innocentes, et mundæ sunt ab omni molestia et iniquitate et rapina, quas ad te extendo manus; quemadmodum justa et munda labia et ab omni mendacio libera, quibus offero tibi deprecationem, ut mihi miserearis'" (He worthily lifts up his hands to God, he pours out his prayer with a good conscience, who can say, Thou, O Lord, knowest, how holy and innocent and pure from all burden, iniquity and robbery, are the hands which I stretch out to Thee; how righteous, clean and free from all guile are the lips with which I offer my petition to Thee for mercy!).

Pelagius on being interrogated with regard to these, made answer, "Neque in libris nostris sunt, neque talia unquam diximus" (These are not in our books, nor did we ever say any such thing). He was then asked, "Quoniam negas te talia scripsisse, anathematizas illos qui sic tenent?" (Since you deny that you wrote such things, will you anathematise those who hold them?) To which he replied, "Anathematizo quasi stultos, non quasi hæreticos; siquidem not est dogma" (I anathematise them as foolish, but not as heretical, since it is not a matter of doctrine), which was accepted by the Council. Augustine's remark is, that it was certainly very foolish, whether heterodox or no. Things may be foolish without being heretical, and the best people say many foolish things; but, on the other hand, all heresy is, *ipso facto*, foolish also. But under whichever category his statements come, they are under the general name of "faults."[1] As regards his authorship, says St. Augustine, the words certainly occur in the work in question, for we have read them there. And the brethren who sent me the book, said that nearly four years ago they began to hold it to be the work of Pelagius, nor did they ever hear any doubt expressed on the subject. So, as we are perfectly certain of the veracity of these brethren, there remains no conclusion but that Pelagius must have spoken a faleshood at the Council,

[1] *De Gestis Pel.* §§ 17, 18.

unless perhaps the work was written by another and falsely attributed to him. For St. Augustine had suffered in this way, certain works being circulated in Spain, which were not really his.[1]

10. "Ecclesiam hic esse sine macula et ruga" (That the Church here is without spot and wrinkle): *De Gestis Pelagii*, § 27.

Pelagius allowed that this was his statement, but proceeded to qualify it somewhat, and thus to evade the real question. "Dictum est a nobis," he said, "sed ita, quoniam lavacro ab omni macula et ruga purgatur Ecclesia, quam velit ita Dominus permanere" (We said it, but not thus; since the Church is cleansed from every spot and wrinkle at the font, and the Lord wishes it to remain so). When put in this way, it was accepted by the Synod. And it must be accepted also by all right-thinking men also, St. Augustine remarks, that all who are baptised, rise from the laver of regeneration "without spot or wrinkle." In like manner it is universally confessed, that the Church shall at the last abide for ever in that same blissful condition of perfect purity, as our Lord Himself informs us. But what of the time between? During this "time of pilgrimage" we have need to pray[2] the prayer "Forgive us our trespasses,"[3] and therefore the Church is not actually faultless here and now, though continually praying and striving to be so.

II. *From the writings of Cœlestius. De Gestis Pelagii*, § 23. In point of order, these seven objections were considered at the Synod before the one (No. 10) which we have just discussed, but we have put it in that position as being one culled, like the preceding nine, from Pelagius' own teaching. Chronologically they precede it, but by logical division they follow.

1. "Adam mortalem factum, qui sive peccaret, sive non peccaret, moriturus esset" (Adam was created mortal, and would have died, whether he sinned or not).

[1] *De Gestis Pel.* § 19.

[2] Cf. St. Jerome, "Quamdiu vivimus, in certamine sumus et quamdiu in certamine nulla certa est victoria": *Adv. Pelag.* ii. 2.

[3] St. Matt. vi. 12.

2. "Quoniam peccatum Adæ ipsum solum læserit, et non genus humanum" (The sin of Adam did not injure the whole human race but only himself).

3. "Quoniam infantes nuper nati in illo statu sunt in quo Adam fuit ante prævaricationem" (Newly-born infants were in the same state as Adam was before he sinned).

4. "Infantes, etsi non baptizentur, habere vitam æternam" (Infants, even if not baptised, would obtain eternal life). This head of the accusation is omitted by St. Augustine in the lists in *De Gestis Pelagii*, § 23, and in *De Peccato Originali*, § 12, but appears in both places in a short *appendix*, as attributed to the followers of Pelagius in Sicily, together with (I. 6) above and (III.) below.

5. "Quoniam neque per mortem vel prævaricationem Adæ omne genus hominum moriatur, neque per resurrectionem Christi omne genus hominum resurget" (That the whole human race did not die through the death or transgression of Adam, neither would they rise again through the resurrection of Christ).

6. "Quoniam Lex sic mittit ad regnum, quemadmodum Evangelium" (That the law is as good a means of salvation as the Gospel).

To these six, the response given by Pelagius was: secundum ipsorum testimonium a me dicta non sunt, pro quibus ego satisfacere non debeo: sed tamen ad satisfactionem sanctæ Synodi, anathematizo illos qui sic tenent, aut aliquando tenuerunt" (According to their own (*i.e.* his accusers') testimony, these things were not said by me, and consequently *I* am not the one to make satisfaction; yet, to please the holy Synod, I anathematise those who hold or have at any time held, these opinions): § 24.

7. "Quoniam ante adventum Christi fuerunt homines sine peccato" (That there were sinless men, even before the coming of Christ).

Pelagius explained his meaning as: "quoniam ante adventum Christi vixerunt quidam sancte et juste, secundum Scripturarum sanctarum traditionem" (That before the coming of Christ, certain men had lived holily and righteously, according to the account of the Holy Scriptures). This put, of course, an entirely different

complexion on the matter. "Who ever denied this latter?" said St. Augustine; "for this is one thing, but to have been without sin is quite a different matter: for indeed even those people lived holily and justly who nevertheless said quite sincerely, 'If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves and the truth is not in us.' And at this moment there are many living holily and justly, nor do they speak untruly, in prayer when they say, 'Forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors.'" [1, 2]

III. *The Opinions of some Sicilian Pelagians.*

In addition to (I. 10) and (II. 4) above, we are told that Hilary informed St. Augustine about some heretics at Syracuse who said "Divites baptizatos, nisi omnibus abrenuntient, si quid boni visi fuerint facere, non reputari illis, neque regnum Dei posse eos habere" (Rich men who have been baptised cannot inherit the kingdom of God, nor will any good that they seem to have done, be imputed to them, unless they renounce all): *De Gestis Pelagii*, §§ 23, 57, 65; *De Peccato Originali*, § 12.

The reply of Pelagius to this charge was the same as to (II. 1–6) above, viz. that his accusers allowed that the opinions were not his, and therefore he was not responsible for them. And indeed, so far as this doctrine of riches is concerned, we cannot tell whether or no he shared in his disciples' opinion. But we *do* know that the other opinions which he anathematised along with this, were undoubtedly held and taught by him, and it was only by a certain very questionable kind of mental reservation that he was able to disown them. He taught them no less plainly afterwards than before, and so must be held to justify very fully Augustine's attribution to him of more cunning and deceit than his pupil Cœlestius.

[1] A parallel to this may be found in the *Enchiridion ad Laurentium*, § 64. "For although every crime is a sin, every sin is not a crime. And so we say that the life of holy men, as long as they remain in this mortal body, may be found without crime; but, as the Apostle John says, 'If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us.'" (1 Jn. i. 8).

[2] St. Matt. vi. 12.

IV. *Drawn from the General Sense of the Works of Cœlestius.*

This last set of accusations was made up of ten propositions drawn from a nameless book of an anonymous author, but which was believed at the time to be the work of Cœlestius, and he does not deny it, while Pelagius evaded the question, and St. Augustine confesses it to be "dubium vel occultum" (doubtful or hidden): *De Gestis Pelagii*, § 30. They are:

1. "Quoniam plus facimus, quam in Lege et Evangelio jussum est" (That we do more than is commanded us in the Law and the Gospel): *De Gestis Pelagii*, § 29.

Pelagius answered, "Hoc quasi nostrum posuerunt: dictum est vero a nobis secundum Apostolum de virginitate, de qua Paulus dicit, 'Præceptum Domini non habeo'" (They quote this as if it were of *our* origination: but it was said by us in accordance with the Apostle's opinion about virginity, concerning which Paul says, "I have no commandment from the Lord").[1] Whereupon the Synod agreed and passed on to the next. St. Augustine observes, however, that the setting of the quotation in Cœlestius' book, and the inference drawn by him are very different from the argument of the Apostle. Cœlestius attempts to prove by an *a fortiori* argument that since some can maintain a perpetual virginity, which is not commanded (and therefore the lack of it is not sin) it is evident that we must be able to do the lesser, *i.e.* to fulfil the commandments, which alone is necessary in order to avoid sinning. This then, says he, we do by the strength of free-will which we possess by nature, *ergo* we can do, by our own nature, more than is commanded. St. Augustine remarks that this reasoning is incorrect, for though he acknowledges that perpetual virginity is not commanded, yet he says that neither the married nor the virginal state can be adequately lived without the grace of God, quoting St. Paul's words in 1 Cor. vii. 7.

The next three (*De Gestis Pelagii*, § 30) appeared of the greatest importance to St. Augustine—he calls them "capitula capitalia," and adds that they are "sine dubitatione damnanda, quæ nisi anathematizasset, cum his sine dubio damnaretur" (they are without

[1] 1 Cor. vii. 25.

any doubt to be condemned, and unless he (Pelagius) had anathematised them, he would doubtless have been condemned with them). These three "capital charges" were:

2. "Gratiam Dei et adjutorium non ad singulos actus dari, sed in libero arbitrio esse, vel in lege ac doctrina" (The grace and help of God are not given for particular actions, but inhere in free-will or in law and doctrine).

3. "Dei gratiam secundum merita nostra dari, quia si peccatoribus illam det, videtur esse iniquus" (God's grace is given according to our deserts, for if He gave it to sinners, He would seem to be unjust). And he drew the further inference, "Therefore also grace itself depends upon my will, whether I am worthy or unworthy. For if we do all things through grace, when we are overcome by sin, it is not we who are overcome, but the grace of God, which wished in every way to help us but was not able!"

4. "Si gratia Dei est, quando vincimus peccata; ergo ipse est in culpa, quando a peccato vincimur, quia omnino custodire nos aut non potuit, aut noluit" (If it is due to the grace of God, when we conquer sin; therefore He is at fault when we are overcome by sin, because either He is altogether unable or else unwilling to keep us therefrom).

To these three, Pelagius made reply, "Hæc utrum Cœlestii sint, ipsi viderint qui dicunt ea Cœlestii esse; ego vero nunquam sic tenui, sed anathematizo qui sic tenet" (Whether these are the opinions of Cœlestius, let those look to, who say they are his; *I* truly never held them, but anathematise him who does). And his anathema was accepted by the Council. And so from that moment we have to deal with a condemned heresy, says Augustine, condemned by a Catholic Synod, condemned also by Pelagius himself. But, he goes on, though the matter might seem to stop there, it does not really do so; it must be looked at more minutely. Pelagius was very subtle, and was always ready to take advantage of his opponents by a stratagem, or to ride off in triumph upon an ambiguity. St. Augustine's suspicions as to the meaning attached by Pelagius to the term "grace" had been aroused before,[1] when he

[1] *Vide supra*, p. 206.

said that by the help of grace man could be without sin, and then proceeded to explain that by grace he meant the "possibility" of nature endowed by God with free-will. But lo! says the Catholic Doctor, now he seems to fall in with the orthodox position, for he condemns those who deny that grace is given for particular actions. Again, he acknowledges that grace is more than a knowledge of the law, by his confession that it is given for single acts, as also he condemns those who explain "All men are ruled by their own will" by the original endowment of freedom given at creation. Now, St. Augustine thinks, we are getting to a clearer understanding of the matter; but no sooner has he said this than he remembers the next charge and is again troubled by misgivings as to Pelagius' meaning and, indeed, his honesty.

5. "Affirment unumquemque hominem omnes virtutes posse habere et gratias, et auferant diversitatem gratiarum, quam Apostolus docet" (They say that any one man may possess all virtues and graces, and thus they do away with that diversity of graces which the Apostle teaches): *De Gestis Pelagii*, § 32.

Pelagius responded, "Dictum est a nobis, sed maligne et imperite reprehenderunt. Non enim auferimus gratiarum diversitatem: sed dicimus donare Deum ei, qui fuerit dignus accipere, omnes gratias, sicut Paulo apostolo donavit" (It was said by us; but they condemn it in a malicious and ignorant way. For we do *not* do away with the diversity of graces; but we say that God gives all graces to him who is worthy to receive them, as he did to the Apostle Paul). A possible objector is represented by St. Augustine as saying, "Why then is he anxious? Do you deny that the Apostle had all graces and virtues?" Well, if they refer to those mentioned by St. Paul in 1 Cor. xii. 28, as the Bishops in the Synod seem to have understood, I allow that he possessed them all, but this does not exhaust the list of all possible graces and virtues, for there are many which are not mentioned there. Indeed, the Apostolic teaching in the same chapter, with regard to the Body of Christ and its many members effectively disposes of that idea, for the whole point is that though there are certain gifts common to all the members, such

as life and health, yet such functions as sight and hearing are proper to particular organs. But however satisfactory may have been the answer of Pelagius to that matter, the real objection is not to the attribution of a large number of graces and virtues to one man, whether that one be the Apostle St. Paul or any other, but it lies in the phrase "ei qui fuerit dignus accipere"; that is, in Pelagius' return to the position that "the grace of God is given according to our deserts." [1]

And here we may digress for a moment to note the cunning of Pelagius' tactics. His system is, at root, founded upon two main hypotheses, the denial of "original sin," and the denial of a supernatural, directly assisting grace. But the heresy was not thus baldly put forward; it was advanced in many writings, hidden under many diverse propositions, and thus became, in the language of fable, a "Hydra-headed monster," so that when one head was cut off, its place was taken by two. We have now a very clear example before us. The doctrine of grace "secundum merita" had been advanced; it was brought forward as one of the three "capital charges"; Pelagius professed a doubt as to whether it was really taught by his pupil, throwing the *onus* of proof upon his accusers, and then denied that he had ever held it and anathematised those who did. Yet here again, not many minutes after, it is brought up again under cover of a defence of St. Paul and of his panoply of graces! And similarly, throughout the controversy, we find Pelagius harping upon the same two strings really, but disguising it under a variety of treatment, such as is accorded to a fugal theme by a master of music. Hence, when he is opposed by a keen analytic mind of the calibre of St. Augustine's, we find we are brought back, again and again, to the root principles which, having been decisively disproved, the whole superstructure falls to the ground.

To return to this particular instance, St. Augustine asks how he could help being suspicious when he reads the phrase as to the worthiness of the recipient; for Pelagius said, not that "God gave to whom He wished," but "God gave to him who was worthy to receive"! [2] For the very name of grace and its meaning are totally

[1] *Vide supra*, p. 213.

[2] *De Gestis Pelagii*, § 33.

nullified if it be not given freely, but rather rendered as a reward to previous merits. The very essence of grace is that it is given to the *un*worthy. But the supposed objector argues, "I do not mean the 'deserts' of good works, but of faith." Of course faith produces works, St. Augustine allows, for it is the beginning of them, but we must go further back and ask how we obtain faith. And the answer is "ipsam certe fidem ut haberemus, nulla fide meruimus sed . . . misericordia ejus prævenit nos" (Assuredly we do not obtain faith, because we have deserved it by previous faith, but . . . His mercy prevents us). The objector continues, How do you get over 2 Tim. iv. 7, 8? Easily, replies the Catholic writer, for "the crown could not be given to the worthy, unless grace had been given to the unworthy"; and, rising to the heights of eloquence, he continues, "Wherefore, O blessed Paul, great preacher of grace, I say and fear not (for who would be less inclined to be angry with me for saying such things, than thou who didst say what ought to be said and teach what ought to be taught?), I say and fear not, I repeat; that the crown is the reward indeed of thy merits, but *thy merits are the gifts of God!*" But, after all, Augustine owns that he is at a loss to understand how the judges allowed the matter to rest where they did, how they permitted the phrase in question to pass. He merely throws out a suggestion which has occurred to him, and which might have been his position had he been one of the number of the judges, viz. that "dignus" should be interpreted in the sense of "prædestinatus" or "electus"; in this case, he says, it might pass, though he still seems to think that the word was not due to any "carelessness of speech" on the part of Pelagius, but rather to "carefulness of doctrine"!

In regard to the remaining propositions (*De Gestis Pelagii*, § 42) the Synod adopted a different method, in condemning them *before* asking Pelagius his opinion upon them:

6. "Filios Dei non posse vocari, nisi omni modo absque peccato fuerint effecti" (None can be called the sons of God, unless they have become in every way free from sin).

7. "Oblivionem et ignorantiam non subjacere peccato, quoniam non secundum voluntatem eveniunt, sed secundum necessitatem" (Forgetfulness and ignorance are not of the nature of sin, since they happen from necessity and not from choice).

8. "Non esse liberum arbitrium, si Dei indigeat auxilio, quoniam in propria voluntate habet unusquisque aut facere aliquid, aut non facere" (The will is not free if it needs the help of God, since it is in the power of the will of any man to do a thing or not).

9. "Victoriam nostram non ex Dei esse adjutorio, sed ex libero arbitrio" (Our victory over sin is not due to the assistance of God, but to our free-will), and from this the inference was drawn, "Nostra est victoria, quoniam propria voluntate arma suscepimus; sicut e contrario nostrum est quando vincimur, quoniam armari propria voluntate contempsimus" (The victory is ours, since by our own will we take up arms; and on the other hand it is our fault when we are conquered, because by our own will we neglected to be armed).

10. "Quoniam si anima non potest esse sine peccato, ergo et Deus subjacet peccato, cujus pars, hoc est anima, peccato obnoxia est" (If the soul cannot be sinless, therefore also God is subject to sin, since part of Him, *i.e.* the soul, is liable to it). But another version of this charge appears in § 65, where we read, "That the logical consequence of what St. Peter says, 'we are partakers of the divine nature,'[1] is that the soul can be without sin, like God." Dr. Bright regards the latter version as the more accurate, but the more probable theory seems to the present author to be that both alike are the expression of the teaching of Cœlestius, for in both places they form part of a collection of purported quotations of Cœlestian heresies, and the former is the extension of the latter; in both cases, the phrases quoted seem to be indicated by the context to be portions of longer and more thorough discussions of the subject.

11. "Quoniam pœnitentibus venia non datur secundum gratiam et misericordiam Dei, sed secundum merita et laborem eorum, qui per pœnitentiam digni fuerint misericordia" (That forgiveness is not granted

[1] 2 Pet. i. 4.

to penitents according to the grace and mercy of God, but according to their merits and exertion, since through repentance they become worthy of mercy).

In response to all these Pelagius said: "Iterum dico quia hæc et secundum ipsorum testimonium non sunt mea; pro quibus, ut dixi, satisfactionem non debeo: quæ vero mea esse confessus sum, hæc recta esse affirmo: quæ autem dixi non esse mea, secundum judicium sanctæ Ecclesiæ reprobo, anathema dicens omni contravenienti et contradicenti sanctæ Catholicæ Ecclesiæ doctrinis. Ego enim in unius substantiæ Trinitatem credo, et omnia secundum doctrinam sanctæ Catholicæ Ecclesiæ: si quis vero aliena ab hac sapit, anathema sit" (Again I say that these also according to their own witness, are not mine; for which, as I said, I need not answer: those which I confessed as mine, I affirm to be correct, but those which I did not own, I repudiate according to the judgment of Holy Church, saying anathema to every one who contravenes and contradicts the doctrine of the Holy Catholic Church. For I believe in the Trinity of one substance, and all things according to the doctrine of the Holy Catholic Church; if any one thinks otherwise, let him be anathema): *De Gestis Pelagii*, § 43.

Whereupon the Synod formally acquitted Pelagius and pronounced him to be "within ecclesiastic and Catholic communion." St. Jerome calls it "miserabilis Synodus." [1] St. Augustine when he heard of it, thought it was evidence of Pelagius' retractions ("Forsitan correctus est" [2]), but he was soon disabused of that idea, for he found that Pelagius had not altered one jot of his teaching, but only explained away in private to his disciples the anathemas he had made in public at the Synod.

It is indeed remarkable that he was acquitted, for his language is very ambiguous, and in many cases he only avoided condemnation by an evasion of the real question. The judges were not themselves thoroughly familiar with the subject of dispute, the accusers were absent (as before mentioned), the proceedings were in the Greek language, while the question was really a Latin one, and they had to be conducted through an interpreter. Details, therefore,

[1] *Ep.* 143. [2] *Serm. Fragm.* i. 5.

could not be thoroughly investigated, and on points of interpretation the word of the interpreter had to be taken. The advantage obviously was with Pelagius, and the best construction was put upon his answers, and he was often supposed to have disowned opinions which in reality he still maintained.[1] The real value of this acquittal was nothing whatever, for it was obtained under false pretences. He himself would have been condemned if he had not condemned Pelagianism, and so he resorted to verbal tortuosities and quibbles in order to avoid excommunication and condemnation, and at the same time to maintain his own private opinions. His followers made much of the verdict in their favour, as they professed to regard it; but was it really such a creditable thing? By no means, or they and their master would have had no need to stoop to such unworthy methods as they did, to commend their doctrines to the world.

Soon after the Synod, there came into the hands of St. Augustine a letter which was said to have been written by Pelagius[2] to a presbyter who had previously written admonishing him in a friendly way, to do nothing that might lead any one to separate from the body of the Church. In it he says that his statement that "man can be without sin and easily keep the commandments of God if he will" has been approved by the fourteen bishops, and that their judgment had "covered the whole band of evil conspirators with confusion and broken it up." He boasts of a victory, when he should rather have mourned his own fall. But this account of the acquittal is inadequate. It is quite true that the sentence quoted in this letter was what he had really taught before, but in the accusation before the Synod the word "facile" had been omitted, and of course Pelagius did not remind his judges of the fact. Moreover, adds St. Augustine,[3] in the report of the tenets of the Sicilian Pelagians, given by Hilary, the same omission is made, and Pelagius repeated the phrase at the Synod *without* the "facile," acquiescing in its tacit omission![4]

[1] See *De Gestis Pelagii*, 3, 5, 8, 41, 45; *De Pecc. Orig.* 9, 15, 17; *C. duas Epistolas*, ii. 10; iv. s. 15.

[2] *De Gestis Pelagii*, § 54.

[3] *Ibid.* § 54.

[4] Note that Molina in *Concordia*, disp. 38, says: "Illud observa quod id omne quod allicit, invitat, adjuvatque arbitrium nostrum, ut *facilius* præbeat consensum et co-operetur conversionem, computetur inter auxilia quæ præstantur ad conversionem."

But Pelagius did not stop here, for he had even added, "Non dixi quoniam recepit natura hominis ut impeccabilis sit; sed dixi quoniam qui voluerit pro propria salute laborare et agonizare, ut non peccet et ambulet in præceptis Dei, habere eum hanc possibilitatem a Deo" (I did not say that it was given to human nature to be sinless; but I said that whoever desired to work and strive for his own salvation, obtained the possibility of it from God),[1] and when John, Bishop of Jerusalem, in reply to certain "whisperers" brought forward certain texts to show that St. Paul attributed his labours to God's grace, Pelagius had indicated his agreement and anathematised those who said that man could attain eternal life without God's help [2]; and when Bishop John gave the account of the Jerusalem Synod to the bishops assembled at Cæsarea, Pelagius appears to have consented to his view of the proceedings there, and added that "proprio labore et Dei gratia hominem posse esse sine peccato" (Man can, by his own labour and the grace of God, be without sin). How, then, are we to reconcile "facile" with "laborare et agonizare"? Common sense forbids their reconciliation, for where labour and agony is necessary a thing is not done easily. So the conclusion is, that his statement at the Synod conflicts with his teaching both before and after, and that at the trial he had consciously prevaricated.

That this opinion is correct, is again proved. A certain Charus, a citizen of Hippo, had been ordained deacon of the Church in Palestine. This man brought from Pelagius to St. Augustine a short tractate which is called his "defence"; it purports to be an account of the Synod of Diospolis, and gives Pelagius' replies to the charges against him. St. Augustine had not yet received a full account of the proceedings, but when he perused this account, it seemed at first sight to be incompatible with the language of his consolatory epistle to the widow [3]; moreover, when St. Augustine afterwards received the official "acts," he discovered that Pelagius' account was very unreliable, being very much abbreviated, and that the omitted portions were the very ones which militated against his heresy.

Before long, Pelagius wrote a work in four books, *Pro Libero Arbitrio* (In defence of Free-will), probably about

[1] See note (4) on previous page.
[2] *Vide* p. 200.
[3] *Vide supra*, p. 193.

A.D. 416. In this work he verbally acknowledges grace, but he gives it many meanings, all of them excellent but all equally inadequate to express its reality and efficacy.[1]

Let us pause here and examine the meanings attached by Pelagius to the term "grace." Dionysius of Petau[2] enumerates six senses held by him, as follows :—

1. As equivalent to *nature endowed with free-will.*[3] This was the original idea attached to the phrase in the mouth of Pelagius, and almost exclusively so at the first ; it was only when forced to argue on the point that he widened the extent of his meaning to include the following five senses. He maintained that human nature at its creation received the "possibility" (*possibilitas, posse*) of being good, the capacity for good, given to it by God. But he sharply distinguished between this possibility on the one hand, and "volition" and "action" on the other, asserting these to have their origin entirely with us, and to be altogether within our own power, and *only* in our own power. And he says that the latter are "strong to turn from evil and do good" and therefore do not need the divine assistance, while he allows that the former is helped by "the help of grace,"[4] thus making that part which he attributes to God weaker than that which he attributes to man.

Pelagius attempts to excuse himself by urging that he attributes to God that one of the three which is most important, for the "possibility" might exist and often does exist, without the "volition" and the "action," whereas it is unimaginable that they could in any way exist without it. St. Augustine parries this by reiterating that nevertheless the fact remained that he said that "neither our will nor our actions needed the Divine help, but only the possibility of volition and action, which alone of the

[1] "Pelagius recognises Grace. But Grace nowhere means for him what it meant for the Church. It nowhere means the supernatural influence of the in-dwelling Christ within the soul. What Pelagius finds in human personalities is a 'naturalis sanctitas' of which conscience is an evidence": W. J. Sparrow Simpson, *Letters of St. Augustine*, p. 127. S.P.C.K., 1919.

[2] Commonly referred to as "Petavius": *De Pel. et Semi-Pel.* i., ii.

[3] "Posse sufficere naturam humanam": *De Gestis Pelagii*, § 61.

[4] "Deus qui ipsius voluntatis et operis possibilitatem dedit, quique ipsam possibilitatem gratiæ suæ adjuvat semper auxilio": Pelagius' *Pro Libero Arbitrio*, quoted in St. Augustine, *De Gratia Christi*, § 5.

three he says we derive from God, as if that is weak which God endowed us with; but those two which are our own are so firm and strong and self-sufficient that they do not need His help." [1] But this fancy of Pelagius is easily disposed of by the quotation of the words of St. Paul, "For it is God that worketh in you both to will and to do." [2] These words prove indeed beyond all doubt that God's direct action is necessary in both volition and action, as well as in the God-given capacity for good. Pelagius then proceeds: "Ergo in voluntate et opere bono laus hominis est, imo et hominis et Dei qui ipsius voluntatis et operis possibilitatem dedit" (Therefore the praise in a good will and actions is due to man, or rather to man and to God Who gave the possibility of the will itself and the work). He evidently adds "the praise of God" as an afterthought, a correction, his real idea being that in themselves the will and the action are due to man and therefore the praise, if they are good, are his. But if this be so, we return to the old position, "Gratiam Dei secundum meritum hominum dari" (That the grace of God is given according to man's deserts). This was dealt with above.[3] We find, then, that this sense of the term is an insufficient one; that grace is neither the original capacity for good implanted in human nature at its very creation, nor is it the power of free-will with which man was endowed.[4] The bishops at Diospolis thought he referred "not to that grace whereby we were created as human beings, but to that whereby we have been adopted into a new creation," [5] and so they "ignorantly acquitted a heretic as if he were a Catholic." [6]

2. *The remission of sins.*—We must here repeat what we said above, that all these senses of grace are true, though

[1] In St. Augustine, *De Gratia Christi*, § 6.

[2] Phil. ii. 13.

[3] Pp. 213–216.

[4] This is well shown by Martensen: "Upon the principles of Pelagianism, humanity finds its goal within the limits of nature, *i.e.* of its original creation; free-will possesses within itself, and in the natural gifts of its creation, all necessary sources and means of self-perfection and self-appointment. Man can and must attain his destiny by his own powers, by pious effort and progressive culture; and there was no need that any such miracle as regeneration should interrupt the sure and advancing progress of human development": *Christian Dogmatics*, § 201.

[5] *De Gestis Pelagii*, § 22.

[6] *Ibid.*

inadequate. Grace *does* consist in the remission of sins, but in much else besides. It consists of some definite assistance to avoid a repetition of the offence. But Pelagius limited its effect to the past, "Hanc iste misericordiam et medicinale Salvatoris auxilium tantum in hoc ponit, ut ignoscat commissa præterita, non ut adjuvet ad futura vitanda" (He recognised this mercy and healing assistance of the Saviour only in this, that it pardons past misdeeds, and not that it helps to avoid them in future).[1] Or again: "quod ad se conversis peccata præterita ignoscit" (that to those who are turned to Him He pardons their past sins).[2] But the weakness of human nature needs continual help if it is to live aright, yet, as St. Augustine points out, he can twist this idea of his to meet it, by saying that it can retain in its memory and continually remind itself that its sins are forgiven.[3] But this is not enough, and so Pelagius found he had to widen the meaning of the term. So we pass on to:

3. *The law, preaching and example of Christ.*—We may here remark that Gerhardus Vossius, a Protestant author (in 1618), enumerates only four meanings in Pelagius' use of "grace," of which (1) and (2) above are his two first, his third being "the law and doctrine," and his fourth "the example of Christ," in which he seems to include "internal illumination of mind," which forms Petavius' fourth heading. And this method of division has certainly some support, for St. Augustine seems always to use the expression "in lege et doctrina" when pointing out the insufficiency of this interpretation, while he treats the "exemplum Christi" as a separate matter entirely. Nevertheless we personally retain Petavius' division since we maintain that the life and teaching, the actions and words of our Lord are one indivisible whole, and that His doctrine consists of His acts as well as His words. Moreover, Vossius takes no notice whatever of the ideas which form the fifth and sixth divisions of Petavius' analysis, and therefore we must dismiss Vossius' enumeration as incomplete.

"The law, teaching and example of Christ," is to be

[1] *De Natura et Gratia*, § 39.

[2] *De Gestis Pelagii*, § 61; cf. "gratiam Dei, qua Christus venit in mundum peccatores salvos facere, in sola remissione peccatorum constituat": *De Gratia Christi*, § 2.

[3] *De Gratia Christi*, § 2.

taken in the widest sense of the words. Pelagius seems to have referred to both the Law of Moses and the "New Law" of Christ, under the appellation of "Law," while "teaching" includes both that recorded in the Gospels and the development of the same in the remainder of the New Testament and in the decisions of Councils and the public traditional teaching of the Church. Here, then, we have a sense attached to the term in which it may fairly be said to be in some way continually given, for a practical guide in matters of duty. "Aiunt ideo ista (*sc.* justitia) sine ope divina non fieri, quia et hominem Deus creavit cum libero voluntatis arbitrio, et dando præcepta ipse docet quemadmodum homini sit vivendum; et in eo utique adjuvat, quod docendo aufert ignorantiam, ut sciat homo in operibus suis quid evitare, et quid appetere debeat" (They say that it (righteousness) is not produced without the divine aid both because God created man and endowed him with the power of choice by his will and by giving him commandments taught him how man ought to live; and also because He helps him in that by teaching He takes away ignorance so that man may know what actions he ought to avoid and what to desire to do).[1] Or again, "Gratiam Dei et adjutorium, quo adjuvamur ad non peccandum, aut in natura et libero ponit arbitrio, aut in lege atque doctrina: ut videlicet, cum adjuvat Deus hominem, ut declinet a malo et faciat bonum, revelando et ostendendo quid fieri debeat, adjuvare credatur" (He ascribes the grace of God by which we are helped to avoid sin, either to nature and free-will or to law and teaching: so that when God helps man to turn from evil and do good, He is believed to help him by revealing and showing him what he ought to do).[2] But St. Augustine shows the powerlessness of mere external teaching, however exalted, however divine, to influence the will and the heart. The mind may be greatly impressed, the intellect may be enlightened by the sublimity, the wisdom and the moral worth of the doctrine presented to it, but this is not sufficient to satisfy the Biblical doctrine of the grace of God. The teaching, good in itself and meant to be good, may yet "work death by increasing concupiscence and by heaping up iniquity by transgression"[3] so that "the stream of man's corruptions would

[1] *De Spiritu et Littera*, § 4. [2] *De Gratia Christi*, § 3.
[3] *De Spiritu et Littera*, § 25.

fret and rage more furiously for the obstacle placed in its way, as some mountain torrent foams with fiercer activity round a rock that has fallen in its bed." [1] And in many other forms Pelagius brings in the idea of grace as equivalent to "law and teaching"; for example, in his confession of faith sent to Rome in A.D. 417 he says, "Liberum sic confitemur arbitrium, ut dicamus nos indigere Dei semper auxilio" (We so acknowledge free-will, as to confess that we always need God's help); [2] but when we inquire *what* help we need we find he says "legem doctrinamve Christianam, qua naturalis illa possibilitas adjuvetur." And in many other places, as St. Augustine remarks, "Ipsum vero auxilium, quo possibilitatem naturalem perhibet adjuvari, in lege constituit atque doctrina, quam nobis fatetur etiam Sancto Spiritu revelari, propter quod et orandum esse concedit" (That help, indeed, by which he says our natural capacity is assisted, he places in the law and doctrine, which he even allows to be revealed to us by the Holy Spirit, on which account he concedes that it is to be asked in prayer).[3] But it is still inadequate, for although it is to our advantage "quod adjutorium legis mandatorumque suorum dedit," and it is indeed a help and a God-given help, yet it is not of such great superiority over the possibilities at the command of the pre-Christian Jew as to justify the contrast drawn between the two dispensations by St. Paul and St. John.[4] But there still remains Vossius' fourth idea attached by Pelagius to this term, viz. the example of Christ; "Item quoniam solent dicere, nobis in eo Christum ad non peccandum præbuisse adjutorium, quia juste ipse vivendo justeque docendo reliquit exemplum" (Again they are accustomed to say that Christ gave us a help towards avoiding sin in that by a righteous life and holy teaching, He left us an example).[5]

[1] Trench, *St. Augustine as an Interpreter of Scripture*, p. 127.

[2] *De Gratia Christi*, § 36.

[3] *Ibid.* § 45. In this connection we may mention the strange sect of the "Massalians," also called "Euchites" and "Enthusiasts," which arose in the fourth century; they held the extravagant theory that prayer was the only means of grace, while the effect of grace was an externally perceptible inspiration or enthusiasm, akin to that possessed by the Pythoness. This heresy was condemned by Synods at Side in 383 and Constantinople in 426.

[4] *Vide ibid.* "Hoc adjutorium legis atque doctrinæ etiam propheticis fuisse temporibus."

[5] *Ibid.* § 2.

In his epistle to Demetrias, Pelagius speaks of "naturæ simul et gratiæ bonum"; by the former he means, St. Augustine explains, "ut naturæ bonum intelligamus, quod cum crearemur accepimus"; by the latter, "gratiæ autem, cum Christi intuemur exemplum." And so he portrays the course of the Christian after baptism as "deinde imitatione sui ad perfectam incitat sanctitatem, et vitiorum consuetudinem virtutum vincit exemplo" (then, He entices them to perfect sanctity *by imitation of Him,* and that he may conquer the evil custom by the example of His virtue).[1]

But though it must be conceded that the example of Christ may have great force as an incitement to virtue, yet some greater power is necessary to overcome the weakness of human nature, greater than the power generally given before Christ, not only in degree, but in kind. We now pass on to the next sense of Pelagian "grace."

4. *Interior illumination of the mind.*—As we have said above, Vossius puts this with the example of Christ as his fourth sense of Pelagius' use of the term "grace"; but it differs from that, in the fact that it is inward, whereas that holy pattern is necessarily external.[2] It is to this *internal* illumination that reference is made in the following passage: "Adjuvat enim nos Deus per doctrinam et revelationem suam, dum cordis nostri oculos aperit; dum nobis, ne præsentibus occupemur, futura demonstrat; dum diaboli pondit insidias; dum nos multiformi et ineffabili dono gratiæ cœlestis illuminat" (For God helps us by doctrine and His revelation, when He opens the eyes of our heart; when He shows us the future, so that we may not be too much occupied with the present; when

[1] *De Gratia Christi,* § 43.

[2] "At a later period of his career Pelagius admitted the existence of merely external supernatural graces, such as revelation and the example of Christ and the saints—which led St. Augustine to remark: 'This is the hidden and despicable poison of your heresy that you represent the grace of Christ as His example, not His gift, alleging that man is justified by imitating Him, not by the ministration of the Holy Spirit' (*Opus impf. c. Julian,* ii. 146)"; Pohle-Preuss, *op. cit.* p. 84. "The attitude of the Pelagians towards the illuminating grace of the intellect is in dispute (though they one and all rejected the necessity and existence of the immediate grace of the will). Some theologians (as Petavius, Wirceburg, Palmieri) think the Pelagians admitted, others (as Suarez and Scheeben) that they denied its existence" *ibid.*

He reveals to us the snares of the devil; when He illuminates us with the manifold and ineffable gift of heavenly grace).[1]

Now this is the nearest approach that Pelagius makes to the true Catholic idea of grace, and which Mozley indeed accepts as orthodox, though he seems to be alone in this opinion.[2] But St. Augustine proves without any shadow of doubt that Pelagius by even this interpretation meant nothing more than "doctrine," nothing else "except that doctrine is made clear to us even by divine revelation" (nisi ut nobis doctrina etiam divina revelatione aperiatur).[3] *He does not understand any effect whatever upon the will of man*, which the Catholic doctrine demands in an adequate explanation of grace; it must operate, "not only on the intellect, but also on the affections and the will."[4] Pelagius seems to confine it, even in the passage quoted above, to the interior illumination of the intellect, which he calls by many names, but without introducing any fresh content to the idea. "In all these he does not turn aside from his commendation of 'law and doctrine,' diligently inculcating the opinion that assisting grace is this alone."[5] Even the words of St. Paul, "For it is God who worketh in us both to will and to do" (Phil. ii. 13), are explained by him in a similar way, for he says, "Operatur in nobis velle quod bonum est, velle quod sanctum est, dum nos terrenis cupiditatibus deditos, et mutorum more animalium tantummodo præsentia diligentes, futuræ gloriæ magni-

[1] *De Gratia Christi*, § 8.

[2] He says that they included "those internal Divine impulses and spiritual assistances commonly denoted by the words": *The Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination*, p. 54.

[3] *De Gratia Christi*, § 45.

[4] Bright, *Lessons from the Lives of Three Great Fathers*, p. 292. Cf. also, "Man will learn to know more and more of God—and this is the teaching of history and experience—*not by purely intellectual processes, but by intercourse with Him*, by listening to His voice, and interpreting the signs which He gives of His presence and His will," and "We must look within ourselves for the knowledge of God," also: "If then we are to know God, He must in His own way make Himself known to us, and we on our part must be able to recognise *and to give a personal welcome* to the revelation": Westcott, *The Gospel of Life*, c. iii. Commenting on Rom. i. 19–21, the same writer says: "They lacked in this respect not knowledge, but the will to apply their knowledge: 'Having known God, they did not glorify Him as God'; and from this primal wilful sin flowed the full stream of their degradation": *ibid.* c. vi. § 3.

[5] *De Gratia Christi*, § 8.

tudine et præmiorum pollicitatione succendit; dum revelatione sapientiæ in desiderium Dei stupentem suscitat voluntatem; dum nobis (quod tu alibi negare non metuis) suadet omne quod bonum est" (He worketh in us to will what is good and what is holy, when He inflames us who were given over to earthly desires and loved present concerns only, like dumb animals, with the greatness of future glory and the promise of rewards; when He invigorates our benumbed will to the desire of God by the revelation of wisdom; when He draws us to all good (which you do not fear to deny elsewhere)). At first sight, he seems here to allow some effect upon the will in the words "stupentem suscitat voluntatem"; but it is only deceptive, for he describes the process as brought about by "the revelation of wisdom." But the Apostle St. Paul implies that the greatness of revelations tends to "puff up," to "exalt,"[1] whereas grace does not do so.[2] The argument of St. Augustine is, then, that these revelations, however numerous and however great (and it was allowed on both sides that they were especially numerous and great in the case of St. Paul) are not equivalent to "grace," which he here treats as practically the same as "charity."[3] Grace influences the affections and the will; the "revelation of wisdom" directly influences only the intellect "ut facienda noverimus" (that we may know what we ought to do), and "ut diligenda credamus" (that we may believe what we ought to love), whereas grace assists us "verum etiam ut cognita facianus" (that, also, we may do what we have come to know) and "verum etiam ut credita diligamus" (that we may love those things which we have learnt to believe).[4]

5. *Adoption and Regeneration.*—Pelagius' references to Adoption and Regeneration as synonyms of grace seem to be confined to one only, though on the strength of this Petavius gives it a separate class in his enumeration. But it is certainly the case that the Pelagians baptised infants, and although they denied original sin, and therefore that original sin was remitted in baptism, yet when asked their reason for maintaining the Church's practice, they allowed that infants received "adoption and regeneration"; "tamen illo regenerationis lavacro adoptari ex filiis hominum

[1] 2 Cor. xii. 7–9.
[2] 1 Cor. xiii. 4.
[3] *De Gratia Christi*, § 12.
[4] *Ibid.* § 13.

in Dei filios non negatis; imo etiam prædicatis" (however you do not deny that in that laver of regeneration they are adopted from being children of men into children of God; nay, more, you preach it).[1]

Here again the charge against them on this count is one of insufficiency; the definition is right as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough! Adoption and Regeneration are without any doubt instances (and *primary* instances) of grace, but they do not exhaust its content, and hence cannot serve as a definition; grace is more than they. Nevertheless, they are instances of a working of grace which is (like the last discussed) more inward than his previous attempts at definitions, inasmuch as they are concerned with man's *status* before God, and its alteration by the direct action of God, gratuitously performed by Him. So that it is a true instance of grace, though *only* an instance.

6. The last sense in which grace was understood by the Pelagians was that of *eternal life.*

They made a distinction between "eternal life" and "the kingdom of heaven," reserving the latter, the higher privilege, for those who had been baptised, but allowing that the former might be possessed by some who had never been baptised, as *e.g.* infants who died without baptism but had not committed actual sin, or heathen who had lived good moral lives. St. Augustine complains: "Datis enim eis extra regnum Dei locum salutis et vitæ æternæ, etiamsi non fuerint baptizati" (For you give them a place of salvation and eternal life, outside the kingdom of God, even though they are not baptised).[2] The Catholic Doctor uses an argument which the *consensus* of the Church does not uphold; he says that it is impossible for there to be anything else than "eternal death"[3] apart from the kingdom of heaven since "sine participatione Corporis et Sanguinis Domini æternam vitam habere non possunt" (without participation of the Body and Blood of the Lord they cannot have eternal life) basing his opinion on St. John vi. 53.[4] His reference is, of course, to the then

[1] *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum,* ii. § 11.

[2] *Ibid.* i. § 40.

[3] Yet he calls their condemnation "minima pœna non tamen nulla," and "in damnatione omnium mitissima": *De Pecc. Remiss.* i. 21.

[4] *De Peccato Originalis,* § 19.

recognised practice of Infant Communion,[1] which has long since been abandoned by the Western branches of the Church, but is retained in the East.

But Pelagius said that eternal life was "meritis nostris præcedentibus reddi."[2] Whereas "the kingdom" was a gift of grace, "eternal life" was the reward given to merits. But St. Augustine shows that, even if the reward is given as a reward for merits, nevertheless, those merits themselves are the gifts of God originally and all is therefore due to God's grace. *Grace is something more than any or all of these; in addition to these notions, it must have the indispensable condition of its being the definite work of the Holy Spirit, and of its being a real aid to the will;* "aliqua subministratione virtutis."[3] "This is the hidden, dreadful poison that your heresy infuses," says Augustine; "you would make the grace of Christ consist in His example and not in His life, saying that men are made righteous by imitating Him, not by the supply of the Holy Spirit which leads them to imitate Him—the Spirit which He poured abundantly upon His own.[4]

In his work referred to above (*Pro Libero Arbitrio*) Pelagius explained to his disciples that he had anathematised those who said that the sin of Adam injured himself only, and not his descendants, because he believed that Adam's sin injured them *by example*, not by inheritance; "non quod ex illo traxerint aliquod vitium, qui ex illo propagati sunt, sed quod eum primum peccantem imitati sunt omnes, qui postea peccaverunt" (Not that those who are descended from him inherited any fault from him, but that all who sinned subsequently imitated his first sinful example).[5] In like manner he said that he had condemned those who held that infants are born in that same state in which Adam was before the Fall, because they are born without the use of reason, which he possessed; "quia isti præceptum capere nondum possunt, ille autem potuit; nondumque utuntur rationalis voluntatis arbitrio, quo ille nisi uteretur, non ei præceptum daretur" (because they were not yet able to receive the commandment, but he was able; for they had

[1] See also *Contra d. Epp.* ii. § 7; iv. §§ 4, 8.
[2] See St. Augustine, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, c. vi.
[3] *De Gratia Christi*, § 2.
[4] *Opus Imperfectum contra Julianum*, ii. 146.
[5] *De Peccato Originali*, § 16.

not yet the use of a rational will, which if *he* had not been capable of using, no command would have been given to him).[1] All along he has the ingenuity to frame his terminology, his withdrawals and his repudiations, in such a manner as to leave a loophole for another explanation to be given to his adherents "ita dicit, ut nullo modo a verborum ambiguitate discedat, quam discipulis sic possit exponere" (He said it in such a manner that he in no degree departs from an ambiguity of expression which he could afterwards explain to his disciples).[2]

And by this means he obtained much sympathy in Palestine, but more seem to have sided with St. Jerome, who was a great upholder of the Catholic view, at any rate so far as original sin is concerned and the need of real supernatural assistance. After the Synod of Diospolis, he wrote in A.D. 415 a work of three *Dialogi contra Pelagianos*. In this work, as mentioned above,[3] a conversation is imagined between Critobulus and Atticus, the former of whom represents Pelagius, the latter being Jerome himself. That he thoroughly opposes the Pelagian position may be seen from the following extract :—

> *Atticus*. "Errat ergo, qui Dei gratiam tollit."
>
> *Critobulus*. "Errat. Quin potius arbitrandus est impius: cum Dei nutu omnia gubernentur: et hoc, quod sumus, et habemus appetitum propriæ voluntatis, Dei conditoris sit beneficium. Ut enim liberum possideamus arbitrium: et vel ad bonam, vel ad malam partem declinemus propria voluntate; eius est gratiæ, qui nos ad imaginem et similitudinem sui tales condidit."
>
> (*Atticus*. He errs, then, who destroys the grace of God.
>
> *Critobulus*. Yes. Or rather he is to be esteemed ungodly, since all things are ruled by the will of God: and the very fact that we exist, and have a desire of our own will is the gift of God the Creator. For it is of His grace Who made us such, after His own image and similitude, that we possess a free choice, and can turn by our own will in either a good or an evil direction.) [4]

[1] *De Peccato Originali*, § 16.
[2] *De Gratia Christi*, § 45.
[3] *Vide supra*, p. 197.
[4] St. Jerome, *Opera*, i. 822 (Ed. Migne).

The bold unqualified statement of Atticus must be contrasted with the very much attenuated assent given to it by Critobulus, if we would observe the difference between the position of St. Jerome and that of Pelagius.

But that St. Jerome's opinions leave much to be desired, it is sufficient to quote the words of a learned writer in the *Catholic Encyclopædia :*

> "Accurate as to the doctrine of original sin, the author is much less so when he determines the part of God and of man in the act of justification. In the main his ideas are Semi-Pelagian : man merits first grace ; a formula which endangers the absolute freedom of the gift of grace." [1]

On account of his fierce anti-Pelagian polemic, some of the extreme Pelagians in A.D. 416 made an attack upon the monastery at Bethlehem where St. Jerome lived, and killed a deacon, set fire to the monastic buildings and very nearly slew St. Jerome.[2]

But some time previous to this Orosius had departed for Carthage bearing a letter from St. Jerome to St. Augustine,[3] and also one written to him by Heros and Lazarus, the accusers of Pelagius.

In A.D. 416, about midsummer, a second Synod of the Bishops of Proconsular Africa was summoned at Carthage to deal with this question. Sixty-eight bishops were present, but *not* including St. Augustine, whose see, Hippo, belonged to the province of Numidia. The letter of Heros and Lazarus was read at the Synod, and it was then decided that Cœlestius and Pelagius should be anathematised unless they anathematised their errors. A Synodal epistle was then drawn up, addressed to Pope Innocent I., asking him to strengthen the decision of the Provincial Council with the authority of the Apostolic see.[4]

Cœlestius had gone to Ephesus, where he was ordained to the priesthood, and then went to Constantinople, from

[1] Prof. Saltet (of Toulouse), s.v. "Jerome."

[2] *De Gestis Pelagii*, § 66.

[3] Jerome, *Ep.* 134.

[4] In this letter we have a good example of the misinterpretation by Pelagius of quite orthodox formulæ. The Bishops complain : "If we, in giving benediction, say over our people, 'Grant them, O Lord, to be strengthened with might by Thy Spirit,' they pretend that we deny free-will."

whence, expelled by Bishop Atticus, as Marius Mercator informs us, he departed shortly to Rome, where he seems to have been residing when this Synodal letter arrived from Carthage.

In the same year sixty-one bishops of Numidia, including St. Augustine, met in Synod at Milevum, and wrote to Pope Innocent, in the same manner as the Synod of Carthage. It is recorded by Fleury that this Synod drew up the first draft of the nine canons which were finally ratified at the African General Synod at Carthage in 418, and Denzinger agrees in this opinion, as also Hefele seems to do.[1] But, on the other hand, Petavius [2] and the Benedictines think it a mistake, saying that the canons in question were not heard of until the Carthaginian Council of 418. To the present author, however, the former opinion seems to bear most weight.

Besides these weighty epistles, St. Augustine, Aurelius of Carthage, and Alypius of Thagaste, Evodius of Uzala and Possidius of Calama, three other bishops of these provinces, wrote a letter (*litteras familiares* [3]) to the Pope in which they informed him as to the inadequate senses of the term "grace" as used by Pelagius, and requested him to demand an absolute denial of his error from Pelagius either in writing or at a personal interview. They enclosed a copy of Pelagius' work *De Natura* with their letter. It quotes Pelagius' statement that "God made us men, we made ourselves righteous," which, Augustine points out, rendered a Saviour superfluous.

About the same time also, the report reached St. Augustine that some persons at Nola had declared their readiness to "forsake and despise Pelagius because he had anathematised what he previously taught, rather than give up that doctrine," *i.e.* they were adherents of the doctrine, not of the man. St. Augustine wrote to the aged bishop of Nola, Paulinus, a very friendly letter which has become a classic of the subject.[4] The following is the outline of this work :—

I. Historical outline of the contention.

[1] Denzinger, *Enchiridion Symbolorum, Definitionum et Declarationum*, § 101 ; Hefele, *History of the Councils of the Church*, ii. § 119.
[2] *Op. cit.* c. i.
[3] Augustine, *Ep.* 186, § 2 ; *De Peccato Originali*, § 10.
[4] *Ep.* 186.

II. Theological treatment.
(*a*) "First grace" cannot be merited.
(*b*) After justification, faith may merit further grace.
(*c*) Predestination = the absolute selection of a certain number of individuals out of the "massa perditionis" justly condemned in Adam.
(*d*) Predestination the necessary explanation of the non-salvation of children dying unbaptised.
III. Historical outline (*continued*).

But what about the Imperial City? Had the poisonous heresy penetrated almost to the steps of St. Peter's throne? Many of the Roman Christians charitably believed, as St. Augustine had done earlier, that Pelagius did not really hold the opinions attributed to him, but others seem to have been carried away by him. But these latter seem to have been but few in number, for Innocent in his letter says that he was not aware of any Pelagians in his diocese. It is true that Pelaguis claimed to have the patronage of a priest of Rome, Sixtus by name, who was afterwards raised to the Papacy, but this seems to be unsupported by any real evidence and is, indeed, denied.[1] Sixtus, it was true, had been somewhat friendly towards the Pelagians, but became disgusted with them, and in 417 or 418 he boldly proclaimed himself a Catholic, whereupon Augustine wrote him a letter [2] congratulating him, and sending him some points which would be useful in arguing with Pelagians and their objections. In this letter we note a rather fuller development of his hard predestinarian theory.

However this may be, Pope Innocent, after calling a Synod, and obtaining its authority, wrote the letter *In requirendis Dei rebus* [3] to the bishops of Africa on January 27, 417. In this epistle he began by laying it down that no matter ought to be finally settled until the Roman see had been consulted.[4] He then threw the whole weight of his authority on the side of the orthodox opinion, upholding the reality and necessity of grace,[5] and confirmed

[1] St. Augustine, *Ep.* 191, 194.
[2] *Ep.* 194.
[3] Innocent, *Ep.* 29.
[4] "Ut quidquid . . . non prius ducerent finiendum, nisi ad huius Sedis notitiam perveniret, ut tota huius auctoritate, justa quæ fuerit pronuntiatio firmaretur, indeque sumerent ceteræ ecclesiæ": *ibid.*
[5] *E.g.* "Throughout the whole of the Psalter, David proclaims

the sentence of excommunication pronounced in Africa against Pelagius and Cœlestius,[1] until they recanted; and he threatened their followers with the same treatment. At the same time he did not pronounce upon the decision of the Council of Diospolis, for he seems to have had his doubts as to the correctness of the document which had been given to him, purporting to be the official "gesta" of that Synod. This was all the more remarkable, as neither St. Augustine nor any of his comprovincials had as yet received the official "acts" of the Council, and St. Augustine's suspicions were aroused by this studied delay, as it seemed to him.[2]

St. Augustine, however, wished to get to the bottom of the matter, and for this purpose he sent a letter to Bishop John of Jerusalem, and asked for a copy and at the same time warned the aged prelate against the duplicity of Pelagius, and asked him to observe the contradiction between the "defence"[3] of Pelagius and his book *De Natura*. Augustine enclosed a copy of Pelagius' *De Natura* and of his own *De Natura et Gratia*.

The Bishop of Jerusalem seems to have sent the desired official record, and from it St. Augustine found that his suspicions were correct, and that the heretic had contradicted himself all along the line, and had unhesitatingly denied and anathematised his own previous (and subsequent) teaching, and that, too, with his eyes open, for the Council had previously condemned his positions, so that Pelagius had, in effect, anathematised himself.

In the same year (A.D. 417) Augustine wrote a work, addressed to Aurelius, the Metropolitan and Archbishop of Carthage, entitled *De Gestis Palæstinis*.[4] The outline of this work is very simple indeed; it consists of a history of the doings at the Council of Diospolis, interspersed with St. Augustine's comments on them. The charges against

the need of grace," and "Through the cleansing of a new regeneration, Christ washed away man's former guilt in the laver of His baptism; and while establishing his condition, that he might walk on more erect and stedfast, yet denied not His grace for the time to come."

[1] "Be they absent from the courts of the Lord"; "Lo, this is the man that took not God for his help."

[2] *De Gestis Pelagii*, § 55.

[3] *Vide supra*, p. 220.

[4] This work, however, is usually cited as *De Gestis Pelagii*.

Pelagius are dealt with mainly in the order given above, except that the one numbered II. 4 is omitted from that position, but occurs directly after together with III. 1 and a repetition of I. 6.[1] After this, I. 10, which had, in its proper place, been dismissed with a mere mention, is then fully dealt with, and the normal order is then resumed. All this occupies up to the end of § 47, with the exception of § 39, which is a digression, treating of Pelagius' exposition of Rom. ix. 16, in his Commentary on St. Paul's Epistles. The remainder of the work is taken up with the discussion of some details, especially documents, reserved until the end. Of this we must now give an analysis:

(1) Letter of Timasius and James to St. Augustine,[2] and the latter's remarks thereupon (§§ 48, 49).

(2) St. Augustine's letter to Pelagius,[3] and the explanation of some phrases used therein (§§ 50–53).

(3) Pelagius' letter after the Council to "a certain presbyter, a friend of his"[4] and Augustine's criticism of it (§§ 54–56).

(4) Pelagius' "defence"[5] and St. Augustine's opinion of it (§§ 57, 58).

(5) St. Augustine's reason for penning this work (§ 59).

(6) His final summary of the position (§§ 60–65).

(7) Pelagian violence at Bethlehem (§ 66).

Thus ends this great work, one of the most logical and clear-cut of all the great works of this great writer, and one which gives, even to the casual reader, a good general idea of the landmarks of this thorny question.

But now events took a new, and, as it seemed at the time to the Catholic party, a dangerous turn. As we recorded before,[6] Cœlestius had gone to Rome about the end of A.D. 416. Early in the next year the firm, uncompromising Pope Innocent died, and his successor, Zosimus, proved to be of rather a different stamp, weak and hesitating, and, on account of his Greek birth and education, unaccustomed to the intricacies of Latin theology. Cœlestius seems to have thought this a favourable opportunity for pressing his case, and accordingly he approached the new Pontiff with an appeal for a new hearing of his case, which was

[1] § 23.
[2] *Vide* p. 195.
[3] See p. 190.
[4] See p. 219.
[5] See p. 220.
[6] P. 233.

granted. He therefore laid before the Pope a paper containing his profession of faith "a Trinitate unius Deitatis usque ad resurrectionem qualis futura est mortuorum, de quibus eum nullus interrogaverat" (ranging from the Triune Deity to the resurrection of the dead and how that shall happen, things that nobody asked him about).[1] He nevertheless expressed his approval of infants being baptised "for the remission of sins," but said that he did not by that imply that he believed in any transmission of sin, for it could not be sin, unless it was personal and individual. But he added that he was ready to submit his views to correction by the Apostolic see ("vestri Apostolatus offerimus probanda esse judicio").[2] A Synod of the Roman Church was then held in the Church of St. Clement, on the Cœlian Hill, some time in A.D. 417.

Cœlestius would not condemn the doctrines attributed to him by the deacon Paulinus at Carthage in 412, but maintained the doctrine regarding Original Sin and the Fall there enunciated by him. But at the same time he did not dare to say anything against the letters of Pope Innocent, but promised that "whatever the Apostolic See should condemn, he also would condemn."[3] These letters referred more to the action of grace than to original sin, and might quite possibly, by means of mental reservations, be held together with his heretical doctrines on sin. The Pope many times asked Cœlestius if his "profession of faith" was perfectly sincere, and being assured on this ground, he accepted the formula as Catholic, because it was "good, plain and explicit," and because Cœlestius was a man of sincere faith, although somewhat given to speculation. But the case was adjourned for two months, the final decision being promised at the end of that period, after the African bishops should have sent a representative to argue the case with Cœlestius in the presence of the Pope. A letter was written by him, then, requesting the presence of such a person, but at the same time Heros and Lazarus were condemned without any show of trial.

But Pelagius had written a letter to Pope Innocent, which did not arrive until after the death of Innocent, and was therefore attended to by Zosimus. Pelagius' letter had the *imprimatur* of Bishop Praylius of Jerusalem, which,

[1] *De Peccato Originali*, § 26.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] *Ibid.* § 8.

in the eyes of a Greek Pope, would be a great recommendation. Pelagius said that he was charged with "rejecting the baptism of infants and promising the kingdom of heaven to some, apart from Christ's redemption."[1] To this, he replied that he did not deny baptism to infants, and insisted that he held them to need redemption; his words were: "Quis ille tam impius est, qui cujuslibet ætatis parvulo interdicat communem humani generis redemptionem?" (Who is there so irreligious as to deny to a child of any age a share in the redemption common to mankind?)[2] But the ambiguity in these words is perceived by St. Augustine to lie in the meaning of redemption; is it "from evil to good, or from good to better"? For Cœlestius at Carthage acknowledged the redemption of children, while denying any taint of sin in them.[3]

St. Augustine confesses also that the Pelagians did not promise the kingdom of heaven to any apart from Christ's redemption, but at the same time he accuses them of promising "eternal life" apart from Christ, for they made a distinction between the two, "quasi præter regnum cœlorum habere nisi æternam mortem possint" (as if they could have anything else than eternal death apart from the kingdom of heaven).[4]

Pelagius also, in this letter, said that he was accused of saying that grace was not necessary to avoid sin, that it could be avoided by free-will alone. In responding to this, he allowed that free-will always stood in need of the help of grace. "But," says the Catholic Doctor, "again we ask, 'of what grace?' And again he would answer, 'of law and Christian doctrine.'"[5]

Concluding his letter, Pelagius asks the Pope to turn to the following writings of his, for confirmation of his views:—

(*a*) His *Defence of Free-will*.[6]

In this work (Bk. III.) the following passage occurs: "quem ab hoc consuetudinis malo dicit liberandum esse per Christum, qui credentibus sibi primo omnia per Baptismum peccata dimittit, deinde imitatione sui ad

[1] *De Gratia Christi*, § 32; *De Peccato Originali*, § 19. See Appendix B, at end of volume.
[2] *De Peccato Originali*, § 21.
[3] *Ibid.*
[4] *Ibid.* § 19.
[5] *De Gratia Christi*, § 33.
[6] See p. 220.

perfectam incitat sanctitatem, et vitiorum consuetudinem virtutum vincit exemplo" (whom he (*i.e.* the Apostle St. Paul in Rom. vii. 15, 23), says can be freed from this evil custom by Christ, Who first forgives by Baptism all the sins of those who believe in Him, and then incites them to perfect holiness by imitation of Him, and conquers the evil custom by His virtuous example), where we see that he explains grace as either the remission of sins in Baptism or the example of Christ.[1]

But the very best summary of the whole of this work is to be found in the words of St. Augustine, after he had read through its four books. For the benefit of the general reader we must quote the passage:

"But even in these four books whatever he seems to say on behalf of grace by which we are assisted to avoid evil and do good, he says in such a manner as in no wise to depart from an ambiguity of words, which he might so explain to his disciples as to preclude their believing in any assistance of grace by which our natural capacity is helped, except in the way of law and doctrine; so that he thinks even our very prayers themselves ought to be applied to nothing else (as he openly affirms in his writings) than that the doctrine may be made evident to us by divine revelation, and not that the mind of man may be helped so that by love and action he may accomplish what he has learned ought to be done. And he does not withdraw at all from that well-known dogma of his, where he establishes these three—possibility, will, and action; and says that the possibility alone is always assisted by divine help, but thinks that the volition and action stand in need of no Divine assistance. And he places that help itself by which he says our natural capacity is assisted, in law and doctrine, which he confesses is revealed to us by the Holy Spirit, on which account he allows it to be prayed for. But this help of the law and doctrine was available even in prophetic times; but the assistance of grace, properly so-called, is supposed to be in the example of Christ; which you see belongs just as much to the category of the doctrine which is preached to us in the gospel; so that, namely, it is as if the way in which we ought to walk having been pointed out to

[1] *De Gratia Christi*, § 43.

us, we are sufficient of ourselves by the powers of free-will (which needs no external help) to keep in the way; and although he maintains that the way itself may be found by nature alone, yet it can be found more easily if we are helped by grace." [1]

(*b*) His letter to Paulinus of Nola,[2] in which, he says, "nearly 300 lines are occupied with nothing else than confessing the grace and help of God," but by this he seems to mean only the faculty and possibility of nature, while genuine Christian grace is only mentioned once!

(*c*) His letter to "the holy bishop Constantius," which St. Augustine had not read, and as it is not now extant, we cannot even surmise anything as to its contents apart from Pelagius' own mention of it in this letter, "ubi breviter quidem, sed plane libero hominis arbitrio Dei gratiam auxiliumque conjunxi" (where briefly, 'tis true, but plainly, I have joined together the grace and help of God, and man's free will).[3]

(*d*) His letter to Demetrias.[4] In this letter he says, for example, "divinam mereamur gratiam, et facilius nequam spiritui, Sancti Spiritus auxilio resistamus" (that we deserve the divine help and more easily resist the evil spirit by the assistance of the Holy Spirit), showing here that he held, in spite of his anathema at Diospolis, that "grace is given according to our deserts," and also, by the insertion of "facilius," that we are able by our own unaided strength, to resist the devil, though with difficulty, but by grace can do it *more* easily! [5] So also in other places in this same letter, when he speaks of the assistance of grace, he understands by it "the revelation of doctrine" [6] or else "remission of sins, and the example of Christ." [7]

With his letter, he sent to the Pope a "fidei suæ librum," *i.e.* his profession of faith. This document, like the corresponding one of Cœlestius mentioned above,[8] was very lengthy in its recital of articles not in question, but passed very briefly over the very points which were necessary to

[1] *De Gratia Christi*, § 45.
[2] See p. 181.
[3] *De Gratia Christi*, § 39.
[4] *Ibid.* §§ 23, 40–42, 44.
[5] *Ibid.* § 23.
[6] *Ibid.* §§ 40, 41, 44.
[7] *Ibid.* § 42
[8] See p. 237.

clear himself from suspicion.[1] For example, when he comes to the subject of Baptism he deems it sufficient to say: "et Baptisma unum tenemus, quod iisdem Sacramenti verbis in infantibus, quibus etiam in majoribus, dicimus esse celebrandum" (and we hold one Baptism, which we say ought to be celebrated with the same sacramental words in the case of infants as in that of adults).[2] But have the words the same meaning to him in both cases? No, says St. Augustine, for if you ask him *what* sins he believes are remitted to infants in baptism, he would say "They have none!" He would agree with the "profession of faith" of Cœlestius, who expressed belief that "parvules et baptizari in remissionem peccatorum," but at the same time denied "ullum habere originale peccatum!"[3]

Again, in his "profession of faith," Pelagius said, "Liberum sic confitemur arbitrium, ut dicamus nos indigere Dei semper auxilio." But this left the meaning of the "auxilium" completely open; it might be "law and doctrine" or any of the other meanings attached to it by Pelagius. In conclusion he asks that anything wrong in it may be set right by him "who held both the faith and the seat of Peter."

In a Synod at Rome, to consider this matter, Zosimus and the assembled clergy declared themselves satisfied as to the orthodoxy of both Pelagius and Cœlestius, and accordingly their previous condemnation was annulled. Zosimus wrote a letter, "Postquam a nobis,"[4] to the bishops of Africa, *i.e.* both of Proconsular Africa and of Numidia. In this letter he conveys this decision and blames the African bishops for their haste and severity, and he severely condemns Heros and Lazarus, the accusers of Cœlestius.[5]

But meanwhile, on Sunday, September 23, 417, St. Augustine in his sermon in the basilica of St. Cyprian at Carthage said: "The results of two Councils on this matter have been sent to the Apostolic See, and replies have

[1] This work was long considered an orthodox work, and was included among the works of St. Jerome.

[2] *De Gratia Christi*, § 35; *De Peccato Originali*, §§ 1, 24.

[3] *De Gratia Christi*, § 36.

[4] Zosimus, *Ep.* 4.

[5] "Rejoice in learning that these men, whom false judges have accused, have never been separated from our body and from Catholic truth."

come from thence. The cause is ended. Would that the error might one day end." [1] The bishops of Africa considered the matter as finally settled, but how surprised they would be when the letter of Zosimus arrived on November 2! But though they were thoroughly respectful to the Roman See, they stood up against the decision and took their stand upon the decision of the previous Pope. A Council met in January, 418, at Carthage.[2] Two letters were dispatched to the Pope. In the one they made a formal protest against a premature decision, and in the other they say that "they had determined that the sentence given by Innocent should hold good until Pelagius and Cœlestius should distinctly acknowledge that for every good action we need the help of the grace of God through Jesus Christ, our Lord; and this not only to perceive what is right, but also to do it, so that without it we can neither have, think, speak, nor do anything that is good or holy." [3] And, they added, Cœlestius must do more than give a general acceptance to the letter of Innocent, he must anathematise his particular errors, lest people of small intelligence should think that he had even infected the Apostolic See with the poison of his heresy.[4]

These made the Pope very uneasy, and on March 21, 418, he replied in the letter "Quamvis Patrum traditio," [5] in which he claimed the right of the Papacy to give the final decision, but that he had as yet done nothing decisive, being anxious to consult them first, and that he would forward to them all the data, for their consultation. This letter reached Carthage on April 29, and on the next day the Emperor Honorius stepped into the arena, with a rescript issued by him at Ravenna, condemning the denial

[1] *Sermon*, 131.

[2] The *fifth* Anti-Pelagian Council, according to Vossius. The previous ones were: (1) Carthage, 412, (2) Diospolis, 414, (3) Carthage, 416, (4) Milevum, 416: *Historiæ Pelagianæ*, vii. pp. 101–130.

[3] "Constituimus in Pelagium et Cœlestium per venerandum episcopum Innocentium de beatissimi Apostoli sede prolatam manere sententiam, donec apertissima confessione fateantur gratiam Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum, non solum ad cognoscendam verum etiam ad faciendam justitiam nos per actus singulos adjuvare; ita ut sine illa nihil veræ sanctæque pietatis habere, cogitare, dicere, agere valeamus": In Prosper, *Contra Collatorem*, p. 890.

[4] *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum*, ii. § 5.

[5] *Ep.* 10.

of Original Sin and ordering Pelagius and Cœlestius to be turned out of Rome, and their followers also. On the day after, the bishops of Africa, about 200 in number, met at Carthage for their sixteenth General Council, the so-called "General Council of Africa." [1] This Council passed, or ratified, the nine canons against Pelagianism referred to above,[2] as drafted at Milevum in 416. So important are these that we must give the full text of them, with a translation for the help of the general reader.

Canon I.—"Placuit omnibus episcopis . . . in sancta Synodo Carthaginensis ecclesiæ constitutis: Ut quicunque dixerit, Adam primum hominem mortalem factum, ita, ut, sive peccaret, sive non peccaret, moreretur in corpore, hoc est de corpore exiret non peccati merito, sed necessitate naturæ, anathema sit."

(It seemed good to all the bishops . . . congregated in the holy Synod of the Church of Carthage: that if any man says that Adam, the first man, was created mortal, so that, whether he sinned or not, he would have died, *i.e.* departed from the body, not as the wages of sin, but through the necessity of nature, let him be anathema.)

Canon II.—"Item placuit, ut quicunque parvulos recentes ab uteris matrum baptizandos negat, aut dicit in remissionem quidem peccatorum eos baptizari, sed nihil ex Adam trahere originalis peccati, quod lavacro regenerationis expietur, unde sit consequens, ut in eis forma baptismatis 'in remissionem peccatorum' non vera, sed false intelligatur, anathema sit. Quoniam non aliter intelligendum est quod ait Apostolus: 'Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum (et per peccatum mors), et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt' (Rom. v. 12), nisi quemadmodum Ecclesia catholica ubique diffusa semper intellexit. Propter hanc enim regulam fidei etiam parvuli, qui nihil peccatorum in se ipsis adhuc committere potuerunt, ideo in peccatorum remissionem veraciter baptizantur, ut in eis regeneratione mundetur, quod generatione traxerunt."

(Again, it seemed good, that if any man says that new-born children need not be baptised, or that they

[1] Vossius' Sixth Council.

[2] See p. 233.

should indeed be baptised for the remission of sins, but that they have in them no original sin inherited from Adam which must be washed away in the laver of regeneration, so that in their case the formula of baptism "for the remission of sins" must not be taken literally, but in an unreal sense, let him be anathema. Because that which the Apostle says, "Through one man sin entered into the world (and death through sin) and so passed unto all men, in whom all sinned" (Rom. v. 12), must not be understood in any other way than as the Catholic Church throughout the world has always understood it. On account, therefore, of this rule of faith even children who cannot yet themselves commit any actual sin, are truly baptised for the remission of sins, to the end that the stain they received in their generation may be cleansed by regeneration.)

Canon III.[1]—"Item placuit, ut si quis dicit, ideo dixisse Dominum: 'In domo Patris mei mansiones multæ sunt' (John xiv. 2), ut intelligatur, quia in regno cœlorum erit aliquis medius aut ullus alicubi locus, ubi beati vivant parvuli, qui sine baptismo ex hac vita migrarunt, sine quo in regnum cœlorum, quod est vita æterna, intrare non possunt, anathema sit. Nam cum Dominus dicat: 'Nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aqua et Spiritu Sancto, non intrabit in regnum cœlorum' (John iii. 5), quis catholicus dubitet participem fore diaboli eum, qui coheres esse non meruit Christi? Qui enim dextra caret, sinistram procul dubio partem incurret."

(Again, it seemed good that if any man says that

[1] This canon is omitted in the majority of MSS. and editions, and is not recognised by Isidore or Dionysius, but it appears in the very reliable codex of the Ballerini, and they appeal to the authority of Photius and Ferrandus on behalf of its genuineness (pp. xcvi. *sqq.*). There can be no reasonable doubt that the cause of the omission of this canon by many editors and transcribers is a *subjective* one. As we have said, the subject is one in which the general *consensus* of the Church has not supported its great Doctor. As we shall show later, conclusions reached by St. Augustine (or any other foremost Catholic doctor) are not ratified wholesale, so as to be *de fide*, and that certain modifications of the Augustinian position are necessary. On this point, *e.g.* the whole Western Church, as well as the separated Protestant bodies, is at variance with St. Augustine, and even if not holding the direct contradictory, has decided to leave the matter an open question.

the Lord said 'In my Father's house are many mansions' (John xiv. 2), because that in the kingdom of heaven or elsewhere there is a certain middle place where children who depart this life live in bliss, even though unbaptised, without which they cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven, which is life eternal, then let him be anathema. For when the Lord saith: 'Except a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven' (John iii. 5), what Catholic will doubt that he who did not become co-heir of Christ, will be a partaker with the devil? For he who is missing from the right hand, doubtless will be found on the left.)

Canon IV. (*or III.*).—"Item placuit, ut quicunque dixerit, gratiam Dei, qua justificatur homo per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum, ad solam remissionem peccatorum valere, quæ iam commissa sunt, non etiam ad adjutorium, ut non committantur, anathema sit."

(Also it seemed good that if any man says that the grace of God, by which man is justified through Jesus Christ our Lord, is only effectual for the remission of sins already committed, but is not also of assistance for avoiding future sin, let him be anathema.)

Canon V. (*or IV.*).—"Item, quisquis dixerit, eandem gratiam Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum propter hoc tantum nos adjuvare ad non peccandum, quia per ipsam nobis revelatur et aperitur intelligentia mandatorum, ut sciamus, quid appetere, quid vitare debeamus, non autem per illam nobis præstari, ut quod faciendum cognoverimus, etiam facere diligamus atque valeamus, anathema sit. Cum enim dicat Apostolus: 'Scientia inflat, charitas vero ædificat' (1 Cor. viii. 1), valde impium est, ut credamus, ad eam, quæ inflat, nos habere gratiam Christi, et ad eam, quæ ædificat, non habere, cum sit utrumque donum Dei, et scire quid facere debeamus, et diligere ut faciamus, ut ædificante charitate scientia nos non possit inflare. Sicut autem de Deo scriptum est: 'Qui docet hominem scientiam' (Ps. xciii. 10), ita etiam scriptum est: 'Charitas ex Deo est' (1 John iv. 7)."

(Again, if any man says that this grace of God which is through our Lord Jesus Christ, only helps us to avoid sin in the sense that by it we obtain a better insight

into the Divine commands and learn to know what we should desire and what to avoid, but does not at the same time give us the power and the delight to do and fulfil what we discover ought to be done, let him be anathema. For when the Apostle says: 'Knowledge puffeth up, but charity edifieth' (1 Cor. viii. 1), surely it is impious to believe that we have the grace of Christ for that which puffs up and not for that which edifies, when both to know what we ought to do and to love to do it are the gift of God, so that when charity edifies knowledge cannot puff us up. And just as it is written of God: 'Who teacheth man knowledge (Ps. xciv. 10), so also it is written: 'Charity is of God'(1 John iv. 7).)

Canon VI. (*or V.*).—"Item placuit, ut quicunque dixerit, ideo nobis gratiam justificationis dari, ut, quod facere per liberum jubemur arbitrium, facilius possimus implere per gratiam, tamquam et si gratia non daretur, non quidem facile, sed tamen possimus etiam sine illa implere divina mandata, anathema sit. De fructibus enim mandatorum Dominus loquebatur, ubi non ait: 'sine me *difficilius* potestis facere,' sed ait: 'sine me nihil potestis facere' (John xv. 5)."

(Again, it seemed good that if any man says that the grace of justification was given to us in order that we might the more easily do through grace that which we are commanded to do by the power of free-will, so that we could, even without grace, if it were withheld, fulfil the Divine commands, only not *so easily*, let him be anathema. For the Lord was speaking of the fruits of his commandments, when He said, not: "without me ye can do things *with greater difficulty*," but: "without me ye can do nothing" (John xv. 5.).)

Canon VII. (*or VI.*).—"Item placuit, quod ait Sanctus Ioannes Apostolus: 'Si dixerimus, quia peccatum non habemus, nos ipsos seducimus, et veritas in nobis non est' (1 John i. 8): quisquis sic accipiendum putaverit, ut dicat propter humilitatem oportere dici, nos habere peccatum, non quia vere ita est, anathema sit. Sequitur enim Apostolus et adjungit: 'Si autem confessi fuerimus peccata nostra, fidelis est et justus, qui remittat nobis peccata et mundet nos ab omni iniquitate' (1 John i. 9). Ubi satis apparet, hoc non tantum humiliter, sed etiam veraciter dici. Poterat enim Apostolus dicere:

Si dixerimus: non habemus peccatum, nos ipsos extollimus, et humilitas in nobis non est. Sed cum ait: nos ipsos decipimus, et veritas in nobis non est: satis ostendit eum, qui se dixerit non habere peccatum, non verum loqui, sed falsum."

(Also it seemed good, that if any man supposes the words of the Apostle St. John, "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves and the truth is not in us" (1 John i. 8), to mean that we must acknowledge ourselves to be sinners only out of humility, not because we really are so, let him be anathema. For the Apostle proceeds to say, "But if we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins and cleanse us from all unrighteousness" (1 John i. 9). From whence it is sufficiently clear, that this is to be said not only out of humility, but because it is true. For the Apostle could have said, If we say we have no sin, we exalt ourselves and humility is not in us. But since he said, we *deceive* ourselves and *the truth* is not in us, he sufficiently shows that he who says he has no sin, speaks falsely, not truly.)

Canon VIII. (*or VII.*).—"Item placuit, ut quicunque dixerit, in oratione dominica ideo dicere sanctos, 'Dimitte nobis debita nostra' (Matt. vi. 12) ut non pro seipsis hoc dicant, quia non est eis jam necessaria ista petitio, sed pro aliis qui sunt in suo populo peccatores; et ideo non dicere unumquemque sanctorum: Dimitte mihi debita mea, sed: Dimitte nobis debita nostra; ut hoc pro aliis potius, quam pro se, justus petere intelligatur, anathema sit. Sanctus enim et justus erat Apostolus Iacobus, cum dicebat: 'In multis enim offendimus omnes' (Jas. iii. 2). Nam quare additum est 'omnes,' nisi ut ista sententia conveniret et Psalmo, ubi legitur: 'Ne intres in judicium cum servo tuo, quia non justificabitur in conspectu tuo omnis vivens' (Ps. cxliii. 2). Et in oratine sapientissimi Salomonis: 'Non est homo qui non peccavit' (Eccl. vii. 21). Et in libro sancti Iob: 'In manu omnis hominis signat, ut sciat omnis homo infirmitatem suam' (Job xxxvii. 7). Unde etiam Daniel sanctus et justus, cum in oratione pluraliter diceret: 'peccavimus, iniquitatem fecimus' (Dan. ix. 5, 15), et cætera quæ ibi veraciter et humiliter confitetur; ne putaretur, quemadmodum quidam

sentiunt, hoc non de suis, sed de populi sui potius dixisse peccatis, postea dixit: 'Cum . . . orarem et confiterer peccata mea et peccata populi mei' (Dan. ix. 20). Domino Deo meo, noluit dicere: peccata nostra, sed peccata populi sui dixit et sua, quoniam futuros istos, qui tam male intelligerent, tamquam propheta prævidit."

(It seemed good, also, that if any man says that in the Lord's Prayer, the saints say "forgive us our trespasses," not for themselves (because this petition is unnecessary for them), but for others among their company, who are sinners; and that therefore they do not each say "forgive me my trespasses" but "forgive us our trespasses"; so that every just man is understood to ask on behalf of others rather than for himself, let him be anathema. For the Apostle James was holy and just when he said: "For in many things we offend all" (Jas. iii. 2). For why was the word "all" put in, unless to make the saying agree with the Psalm, where it is said: "Enter not into judgment with thy servant, for in thy sight shall no man living be justified" (Ps. cxliii. 2). And in the prayer of Solomon, the wisest man: "There is no man who hath not sinned" (Eccl. vii. 21). And in the book of holy Job: "He sealeth in the hand of every man, that every man may know his weakness" (Job xxxvii. 7).[1] Whence also the holy and righteous Daniel, when in his prayer he repeats, many times over, "we have sinned, we have worked iniquity" (Dan. ix. 5–15), and the other things which he sincerely and humbly confesses there, lest it should be thought that he said this not about his own but rather of his people's sins, as some suppose, went on to add, "When . . . I was praying and confessing my sins and the sins of my people (Dan. ix. 20) to the Lord my God," he did not wish to say *our* sins, but the sins of his people and his own, because the prophet foresaw there would be some who would thus misunderstand it.)

Canon IX. (*or VIII.*).—"Item placuit, ut quicunque ipsa verba dominicæ orationis, ubi dicimus: 'dimitte nobis debita nostra' (Matt. vi. 12), ita volunt a sanctis dici, ut humiliter, non veraciter hoc dicatur, anathema sit. Quis enim ferat orantem et non hominibus, sed

[1] The text is the "Old Latin"; the Vulgate reads "opera sua" for "infirmitatem suam."

ipsi Domino mentientem, qui labiis sibi dicit dimitti velle, et corde dicit, quæ sibi dimittantur, debita non habere?"

(It seemed good also, that if any man says that the saints only pronounce these words, "Forgive us our trespasses" (Matt. vi. 12) out of humility and not in their literal meaning, let him be anathema. For who would dare to pray and in that very prayer to lie, not to men but to the Lord Himself by saying in his heart that he has no trespasses, while at the same time he expresses with his lips the wish for them to be forgiven?)

These canons, it will be observed, are in three divisions of three each (which seems to make for the genuineness of the third). The first triad deals with original sin, the second with grace, and the third with sinlessness. Thus the main points of Pelagianism were unequivocally condemned by the whole of the African Church. Besides these canons the Council also proceeded to make other regulations on Church discipline and order. A very important rule was upon the subject of appeals; it laid down that appeals might be made against the decisions of any bishop, with his consent, to neighbouring bishops, or beyond them to their primates or to African councils, but not to "a court beyond the sea," on pain of perpetual excommunication. This, of course, had special reference to the case of Cœlestius and Pope Zosimus, but was still more far-reaching in its effects than was realised at the time.

The decrees of the Council were forwarded to the Pope, who thereupon cited Cœlestius to appear for re-examination. He refused, and left Rome in accordance with the rescript of the Emperor Honorius. But it is said that he haunted the vicinity of Rome again about three years later, and was expelled a second time by Imperial decree.[1] In A.D. 425 he petitioned for an audience with Pope Celestine I. But this was refused and the appellant banished.[2] He went to the court of Nestorius at Constantinople, about 428, but was banished by the Emperor Theodosius II. in 430. Apart from this condemnation at Ephesus in the following year, this is the last we hear of Cœlestius in history.

After the departure of Cœlestius, moved probably by the Imperial decree and the strong feeling now manifested in Rome against the Pelagians, as well as the uncompromising

[1] *Patrologia Latina*, xlv. 1750. [2] *Ibid.* li. 271.

attitude of the African Church, the Pope changed his mind, and in spite of his former decree and that of his predecessor upon the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff, he admitted his mistakes. It is only fair, however, in this connection, to point out that the infallibility thus claimed was only on points of faith and morals, not on questions of fact, and to the present day it is thus limited. The Pope might pronounce infallibly that a particular doctrine was heretical, or a particular action morally wrong, but he might always be mistaken as to the fact of any individual person or persons holding the doctrine thus condemned or performing the actions deprecated. And this is precisely what happened in the instance before us. Zosimus seems to have had no intention of disputing the fact that the doctrines condemned were heterodox, and he himself seems to have held the correct doctrine on these points, but where he erred was in maintaining for a time that neither did Pelagius and Cœlestius hold them either; in other words, he was himself deceived by the evasions and ambiguities of these heretics. This matter does not really affect the question of Papal Infallibility at all.[1]

Pope Zosimus then issued a long letter entitled, "Epistola Tractoria" (A Judicial Letter), in which he solemnly confirmed the decrees of the Council, and, quoting the works of Pelagius at great length, condemned both him and his disciples as heretics, and, finally, asserted the necessity of real grace, the transmission of original sin, and the need of baptism for every age and condition of person. "He taught," says Canon Bright, "that all the redeemed had previously been captives; every one, until he was baptised, was held bound by the 'handwriting' against us, derived from Adam. In every condition of human existence, Christ's baptism had the same fulness in a *real* remission of sins. He was equally emphatic on the need of grace."[2]

Somewhere about the time of the issue of this letter three Roman citizens, Pinianus, his wife Melania and his mother-in-law Albina, friends of St. Augustine, and now

[1] Nor was the Pope the only notable person who was momentarily betrayed into holding with Pelagianism; another was Sulpicius Severus, the pupil, friend, and biographer of St. Martin of Tours. Sulpicius imposed upon himself the punishment of silence to the end of his life, though his defection had been only of brief duration.

[2] Canon Bright, *Church History*, p. 291.

exiled from Rome and living in Palestine, met Pelagius there and asked him to condemn in a book the heretical opinions ascribed to him. He did not accede to their request, but made a verbal answer only. But in this answer he made the closest approach he ever made to the Catholic doctrine; for, after referring to his "profession of faith" he read to them the part regarding Baptism,[1] and was asked by his questioners, whether he held that baptism was administered to infants for the remission of sins, and to this he gave an affirmative answer ("infantes in remissionem peccatorum percipere Baptismum"[2]). But he went further, and said to them: "Anathematizo qui vel sentit vel dicit, gratiam Dei qua Christus venit in hunc mundum peccatores salvos facere, non solum per singulas horas, aut per singula momenta, sed etiam per singulos actus nostros non esse necessariam; et qui hanc conantur auferre, pœnas sortientur æternas" (I anathematise those who either think or say that the grace of God, by which Christ came into this world to save sinners, is not necessary, not only every hour or every moment, but also for our every action; and those who attempt to gainsay this, shall be rewarded with eternal punishment).[3] Imagine the delight of these pious souls at hearing such a statement! But yet they thought it good, for some reason unknown to us, to consult St. Augustine on the mattter.[4] He wrote a reply to them, in haste, in the midst of the very busy life which he was leading at this particular time.[5] That reply is the treatise in two books, known to us as *De Gratia Christi et De Peccato Originali, contra Pelagium et Cœlestium*, written in A.D. 418. The purpose of the work was to identify the teaching of Pelagius and Cœlestius. Owing to the sharp dealing of Pelagius such as that which we have seen he practised at Diospolis and elsewhere, the idea seems to have gained currency that his doctrines were not so pestilent as were those of his bolder disciple. It was to combat these ideas that this work was written by St. Augustine; he wished to show that their doctrine was radically the same, however much their ways of expressing it might differ. "If you are in doubt what Pelagius means," says St. Augustine in effect, "then ask Cœlestius." The only difference, in

[1] *De Pecc. Orig.* §§ 1, 5.
[2] *De Gratia Christi*, § 35.
[3] *Ibid.* § 2.
[4] *De Pecc. Orig.* § 5.
[5] *De Gratia Christi*, § 1.

fact, that St. Augustine finds between the two is, in his own words, "quod ille apertior, iste occultior fuit; ille pertinacior, iste mendacior; vel certe ille liberior, hic astutior" (that the one (viz. Cœlestius) was more open, the other (viz. Pelagius) more guarded; the one more bold, the other more deceitful; the one, to say the least, more straightforward, the other more cunning).[1] The analysis of this work is as follows:—

I. *De Gratia Christi.*

1. Introduction (§ 1).
2. Contrast between Pelagius' verbal reply and his work *Pro Libero Arbitrio* (§§ 2, 3).
3. Distinction between "capacity," "volition," and "action" (4–6).
4. Grace as equivalent to nature (7).
5. Grace as equivalent to law and doctrine (8–11).
6. Grace as equivalent to "revelation of wisdom" (12, 13).
7. Grace is the infusion of love (14, 15).
8. Return to distinction between "capacity" and "volition and action" (16–18).
9. Pelagius' position of equal capacity for good and evil (19–21).
10. Good will is the same as "charity" (22).
11. Grace according to precedent merits (23–25).
12. Summary of foregoing (26).
13. Against the statement that grace is to make the work of free-will *easier* (27–31), quoting Pelagius' letter to Demetrias and his *Pro Libero Arbitrio.*
14. Cœlestius also teaches that grace is either nature or law and doctrine (32*a*).
15. Parallels in Pelagius' letter to Pope Innocent and his "confession of faith" (32*b*–35).
16. These explained by Cœlestius' language (36).
17. St. Augustine's examination of documents referred to by Pelagius:
    - (*a*) Letter to Paulinus (38).
    - (*b*) Letter to Constantius (39).
    - (*c*) Letter to Demetrias (40–44).
    - (*d*) Treatise *Pro Libero Arbitrio* (45).
18. Examination of Pelagius' appeal to St. Ambrose (46–55).

[1] *De Pecc. Orig.* § 13.

II. *De Peccato Originali.*

1. Pelagius' verbal reply regarding infant baptism (1).
2. Narrative of proceedings at Carthaginian Synod of 412 (2–3).
3. Transmission of sin not confessed by him (4).
4. Same idea in his book written at Rome (5–6).
5. Cœlestius' professed willingness for correction by the Pope (7–8).
6. The letters from the African bishops to the Pope and his reply (9–10).
7. How Pelagius deceived the judges at Diospolis (11–17).
8. Wish for Pelagius' repentance (18).
9. Pelagius falsely says he is accused of denying Infant Baptism, and promising the kingdom of heaven to some apart from Christ (19).
10. His ambiguous reply to the former of these charges (20–23).
11. The same ambiguity in his "profession of faith" (24).
12. The duty of Catholics in this matter (25).
13. Cœlestius' contention that "it is not a question of faith" (26, 27).
14. But this *is* a matter of the faith (28).
15. Old Testament saints also lived by "the grace of the Mediator," the Second Adam (29–37).
16. The question of the lawfulness of marriage (38–42).
17. Yet the sinful taint remains, even in the offspring of Christian parents (43–44*a*).
18. This taint washed away in Baptism (44*b*, 45).
19. Why does God allow His work to be ruined? (46).
20. Pelagius' misuse of St. Ambrose exposed (47, 48).

Such is the analysis of this dual work, which, although written in haste, shows a remarkable grasp of the chief points of Pelagius' *Defence of Free-will*, and of his letter to Demetrias, and though not lending itself to such a clear logical division as does the *De Gestis*, yet its course of thought is well-connected and his point of view is clearly put.

Before leaving this work, one or two important points must be somewhat enlarged upon. First we would remark that early in the work, the writer lays his finger upon the great defect of the Pelagian idea of grace; he shows that

"aliqua subministratione virtutis" (some supply of strength) is necessary to the true Catholic idea of grace, and this is precisely what Pelagius would not admit.[1]

And so he shows next that Pelagius sees the action of grace "revelando et ostendendo quid fieri debeat. . . . non etiam co-operando et dilectionem inspirando, ut id quod faciendum esse cognoverit faciat" (in revealing and showing what ought to be done . . . not also in assisting and infusing charity, so that he (man) may do that which he has recognised ought to be done).[2] Here, again, the difference between the two is in the lack of that same factor —"some supply of virtue."

So he proceeds to show the fallacy in Pelagius' triple division of a good action. Pelagius' words are: "Primo loco 'posse' statuimus, secundo 'velle,' tertio 'esse.' Posse in natura, velle in arbitrio, esse in effectu locamus. Primum illud, id est, posse, ad Deum proprie pertinet, qui illud creaturæ suæ contulit: duo vero reliqua, hoc est, velle et esse, ad hominem referenda sunt, quia de arbitrii fonte descendunt" (In the first place we set "possibility," in the second place "volition," in the third "accomplishment." We locate the possibility in nature, the volition in choice, the accomplishment in the effect. The first, that is, the possibility, properly belongs to God, Who conferred it on His creature: the other two, *i.e.* volition and action, are to be attributed to man, since they spring from the source of his choice). And then Pelagius proceeds to say that the "possibility" is helped by grace, but that the other two are due to man's own efforts. But St. Augustine points out that:

1. It conflicts with St. Paul's words in Phil. ii. 12, 13, who says, "It is God who worketh in you," not "to be able" but "to will and to do" (§ 6).

2. It represents God as the author of the weakest part, *i.e.* that one of the three that needs assisting, while man is the author of those two which are stronger and stand in no need of assistance (§ 6).

The next section we desire to emphasise is that in which St. Augustine shows what is the true idea of grace, which he wishes to hear from the lips of Pelagius. "Sed nos eam gratiam volumus iste aliquando fateatur, qua

[1] *De Gratia Christi*, § 2. [2] *Ibid.* § 3.

futuræ gloriæ magnitudo non solum promittitur, verum etiam creditur et speratur; nec solum revelatur sapientia, verum et amatur; nec solum suadetur omne quod bonum est, verum et persuadetur" (But we wish him to confess sometime that grace by which the greatness of future glory is not only promised, but also believed and hoped for; by which wisdom is loved, not only revealed, and what is good is not only made attractive but thoroughly convinced).[1] And shortly after he puts it more positively thus: "Hæc gratia si doctrina dicenda est, certe sic dicatur, ut altius et interius eam Deus cum ineffabili suavitate credatur infundere, non solum per eos qui plantant et rigant extrinsecus, sed etiam per se ipsum qui incrementum suum ministrat occultus, ita ut non ostendat tantummodo veritatem, verum etiam impertiat charitatem. Sic enim docet Deus eos qui secundum propositum vocati sunt, simul donans et quid agant scire, et quod sciunt agere" (If this grace must be termed doctrine it must be so called in the higher and more interior sense that God is believed to fill it (the soul) with His ineffable sweetness, not only through those who plant and water externally, but also by Himself, Who secretly supplies His increase, so that He not merely shows the truth, but infuses love. For God thus teaches those who are "called according to purpose," at the same time both granting them to know what they ought to do, and to do what they know they ought).[2]

We must next note that in this work St. Augustine unconsciously replies to some who object that his theology annuls the freedom of the human will and makes men into mere pawns on a chess-board. He asks, "Quis enim non videat, et venire quemquam, et non venire, arbitrio voluntatis?" (For who does not see that, either a man's coming or his not coming, is by the choice of his will?)[3] And with this may be paralleled a passage, which I have been unable to verify, in his later work, *De Prædestinatione Sanctorum:* "credere, vel non credere, esse in arbitrio voluntatis humanæ."[4] We observe that, in spite of his

[1] *De Gratia Christi*, § 11. [2] *Ibid.* § 14. [3] *Ibid.* § 15.

[4] "Consentire vocatione Dei vel ab ipsa dissentire propriæ voluntatis est": *De Sp. et Lit.* 34; "neque enim voluntatis arbitrium ideo tolliter, quia juvatur, sed ideo juvatur, quia non tollitur": *Ep.* 157, 2, 10. But his fullest treatment of the matter of the self-determination of the human will is found in his *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, which will be considered later.

calumniators, he still reserves a very real choice on the part of the will of man, fallen as he is, and attributes to him the power to accept or to refuse the assistance of grace. So also, in his work *Contra Felicem*, one of his anti-Manichæan writings, he says, "Peccare quemque, si velit: non peccare, si nolit. . . . Qui legem servare non vult, in potestate ejus esse servare si velit" (Every one can sin, if he wishes to, and avoid sin, if he be unwilling to do it. . . . He who does not wish to keep the law, has it in his power to keep it, if he wished to). But, of course, he does not mean in the power of unassisted nature, but by the assistance of grace. "Sed hoc arbitrium potest esse solum, si non venit: non autem potest nisi adjutum esse, si venit; et sic adjutum, ut non solum quid faciendum sit sciat, sed quod scierit etiam faciat" (But this choice may be unassisted, if he does not come: but cannot be otherwise than helped, if he comes; and helped, too, in such a manner as not only to know what the man ought to do, but also to do what he has learnt).[1] And he adds: "Non est autem consequens ut qui potest venire, etiam veniat, nisi id voluerit atque fecerit. Sed 'omins qui didicit a Patre,' non solum potest venire, sed 'venit'; ubi jam et possibilitatis profectus, et voluntatis affectus, et actionis effectus est" (But it does not follow that he who *can* come, does also come, unless he both willed and did it. But "every one who hath learned of the Father," not only *can* come but "cometh"; where, then, is both the putting forth of the possibility, the movement of the will and the production of the act). So also he points out that "by His wonderful and ineffable power God works in the hearts of men, not merely true revelations, but in addition good wills."[2] Let this suffice for the present, but we must resume it when we treat the matter dogmatically.

A passing mention must be made also of the punning allusion to Pelagius' name in the last words of § 50 of *De Gratia Christi*, where the conduct of the heretic is contrasted with that of St. Peter. Here appears also St. Augustine's interpretation of "the Rock" in St. Matt. xvi. 18, as our Lord Himself.

Another noteworthy point is his answer to the objection, "Why did the Divine Goodness create that which the malignity of the devil obtains possession of?" And he carefully distinguishes between the nature which is God's

[1] *De Gratia Christi*, § 15. [2] *Ibid.* § 25.

creation and the vice which is the addition of the human will. "Quid ergo mirum est vel iniquum, ut immundo spiritui subdatur homo, non propter naturam, sed propter immunditiam suam, quam non ex opere divino, sed ex humana voluntate venientem in originis labe contraxit; cum et ipse spiritus immundus bonum sit, quod spiritus; malum, quod immundus?" (Why, then, is it wonderful or unjust, that man should be subject to the machinations of the unclean spirit, not on account of his nature, but on account of his uncleanness, which he contracted in the taint of his generation, having its origin not from the Divine work, but from the human will; since even the vile spirit himself is good, in that he is a spirit; but evil, since he is unclean?) The former is indeed from the Divine work, the latter from his own will. And the purpose of it is that the pride of the devil, the possessor of an angelic nature, and therefore superior to man, may be conquered by the humility of the Redeemer Who took human infirmity upon Himself and in it conquered.[1]

Another chapter of the controversy now begins, and another combatant enters the arena. Eighteen Italian bishops refused to subscribe to the *Epistola Tractoria* of Pope Zosimus, and in consequence were dispossessed of their sees by the Imperial power in A.D. 418. The leader of these was Julian, Bishop of Æculanum or Eclanum, near Beneventum in Campania; he was the son of Memorius, Bishop of Capua, with whom St. Augustine had corresponded.[2] Julian was clever, and learned, and, withal, so eloquent that he was popularly called "the Roman Demosthenes," and he proved himself to be the ablest opponent of the Augustinian theology. He was very verbose, but at the same time clearly logical, being a devotee of the Aristotelian philosophy. He was bold and also fully conscious of his rhetorical prowess, and assumes that all sound thinkers agreed with him, which led him to despise his opponents; St. Augustine calls him "a very confident young man."[3] Julian had become a Pelagian some time before the death of Pope Innocent, but the first we hear of him is his forwarding to Zosimus his "profession of faith" (which is still extant, in an appendix to the works of St. Augustine, vol. x.), and his shortly following deposition

[1] *De Pecc. Orig.* § 46. [2] Augustine, *Ep.* 131.
[3] *Contra Julianum*, ii. 30.

by Zosimus, as an upholder of the opinions condemned in the *Tractoria*. We know from his opponent, Marius Mercator, that he wrote another letter to Zosimus in which he makes some very ambiguous concessions.

We have seen in *De Peccato Originali*, §§ 38–42, that some Pelagians seem to have accused the Catholics of throwing aspersions upon marriage. St. Augustine gave a full answer to this objection in a work in one book, entitled *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*, which he wrote early in A.D. 419, and addressed it to Count Valerius, a devout and intellectual officer of the court of the Emperor Honorius, who had apparently brought this Pelagian calumny to St. Augustine's notice. In reply to this, Julian wrote "four thick books" *ad Turbantium*, which are not now extant, nor do we find them quoted, so as to give us any idea of their arguments.

At this time an anonymous letter reached Rome, addressed apparently to all the Christians there, with the purpose, according to St. Augustine, "ut per illam, quos posset, suos aut inveniret, aut faceret" (in order that by it he might find whom he could of his party, or else make converts to it).[1] This letter was from the first supposed to have been written by Julian, but he afterwards tried to evade owning its authorship. However, as he had referred in the letter to his having written four books in reply to Augustine's treatise on marriage, he could not well succeed in his attempt, and all knew that he was certainly the author. The chief purpose of the letter was to make an accusation of Manichæanism against the Catholics. This is the first occasion of its formal charge, but it had previously been hinted at in the fourteenth of the Ratiocinations attributed to Cœlestius and found in the forefront of *De Perfectione Justitiæ Hominis*. This reads, "Iterum quærendum est, si natura hominis bona est, quod nullus negare nisi Marcion aut Manichæus audebit, quomodo igitur bona est, si malo ei carere non est possibile? Omne enim peccatum malum esse quis dubitet?" (Again, it is to be asked, if human nature is good, which no one except Marcion and Manichæus will dare to deny, how it *can* be good if it is impossible for it to be without evil? For every one will allow that all sin is evil). Here, then, it is attempted by a scarcely veiled insinuation, to place the Catholic

[1] Augustine, *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum*, § 3.

doctrine of original sin on the same platform as that of Marcion and Manes on the inherent evil of matter, a doctrine justly deprecated by the Church. But in the letter of Julian to Rome, it is more boldly advanced. He says, "Dicunt illi Manichæi, quibus modo non communicamus" (These Manichæans with whom we are not now in communion say ——).[1] And the reason of the charge, says St. Augustine, is that "eos videri volebat accusatores vel damnatores esse nuptiarum" (they wished them to appear to be defamers and slanderers of marriage). And what made the charge more telling was the fact that before his conversion, St. Augustine had been a member of the Manichæan sect, and Julian wished the assumption to be made that he still had many ideas in common with them and was really striving to naturalise them in the Church. But the Pelagians were really confusing two different ideas, viz. that of a tainted human nature, and that of the absolute and ineradicable evil of the material. The letter accused the Catholics of saying that fallen man was utterly and entirely destitute of free-will,[2] that marriage was not of divine ordinance,[3] and that baptism was of very little value, since it did not cleanse from *all* sin, but "left its roots in the evil flesh."[4] Then, in seven "antitheses," the writer proceeds to set forth the Pelagian view as opposed to the Catholic, and finally asks for a new Council to settle the case, which, however, was regarded by Catholics as already settled (at Carthage and Rome) and needing no further controversy.

But another letter written about the same time (*i.e.* early in A.D. 419) demands attention. This was sent by the eighteen recusant Pelagian bishops mentioned above, to Rufus, Bishop of Thessalonica. The holder of this see was *ex officio* legate of the Roman See, holding powers over the bishops of Achaia and Macedonia. The position of these dioceses was rather anomalous. Formerly they had been part of the Western Empire, but about twenty years previous to the time of which we are treating they had been handed over to the Eastern Emperor. Ecclesiastically, however, they were still part and parcel of the Western Patriarchate, and consequently subject to the Bishop of Rome. He therefore appointed the holder of the see of

[1] *Contra d. Epp. Pel.* i. § 4.
[2] *Ibid.* §§ 5–8.
[3] *Ibid.* §§ 9–11.
[4] *Ibid.* § 26.

Thessalonica his deputy concerning this part of his patriarchate. But in this portion of the Western Patriarchate the decree of Honorius did not run, and the Eastern Emperor, Theodosius II., had not yet "shown his hand" with regard to these opinions. It was thought by Julian and his friends to be an eminently favourable opportunity to gain two whole provinces over to their beliefs, and so they decided to approach the most influential ecclesiastic in those parts, none other than the Roman Legate himself.

In this epistle they first repeat the charge of Manichæanism against the Catholics, and then proceed to utter calumnies against the Roman clergy as shameless turncoats, who had left their first and more correct opinions and now pronounced human nature to be evil.[1] They then accused the Catholics of:

1. Fatalism (*Contra d. Epp. Pel.* ii. §§ 10–12).
2. Charging God with "respect of persons" (ii. §§ 13–23).
3. Disparaging the Old Law (iii. §§ 2, 3).
4. Disparaging the effect of Baptism (§§ 4, 5).
5. Limiting the work of the Holy Spirit to the New Testament (§§ 6–13).
6. Belittling the righteousness of Prophets and Apostles (§§ 14, 15).
7. Imputing sin to Christ (§ 16).
8. Holding that men do not begin to keep God's commands here (§§ 17–23).

They next belauded the excellence of Creation, of Marriage, of the Law, of Free-will, and the holiness of the saints,[2] and concluded by complaining that a new doctrine was grown up in the West, which was affirmed by bishops who knew nothing about it, in their arm-chairs, and forced by them on their people, without any ruling of a Council.

By some means unknown to us these two letters got into the possession of some earnest Churchmen at Rome, who promptly delivered them to Pope Boniface I. At

[1] *Contra d. Epp. Pel.* § 5.

[2] Julian said "that all God's laws could be fulfilled by the grace of Christ, which assisted every good act, and by free will," that "grace would neither follow the rebellious, nor forsake the obedient," that "we are sinners, not because we cannot help it, but because we are neglectful," and that "our nature, as made by God, is good and perfect."

this time, there was in Rome, Alypius, the friend of Augustine, who had been converted with him, and was now Bishop of Thagaste, near to Hippo. To him the Pope delivered these two letters to convey to Augustine, and he received also from Count Valerius a document containing a series of quotations from Julian's "four thick books" on Marriage.[1]

In reply to this latter St. Augustine at once wrote a second book of the work *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*, without waiting to see the whole treatise, and consequently Julian does not forget to inquire, "Why didn't he wait till he had seen the whole work?"

St. Augustine next wrote *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum*, addressing it to Pope Boniface. In his address he not only pays his respect to the Pope as the occupant of the Throne of St. Peter, but also to his personal holiness as "full of the grace of God." He divides his work into four books, in the first dealing with Julian's letter to Rome, and in the other three with that of the eighteen bishops to Thessalonica. An analysis of these books is now appended:

(Book I.) 1. Introductory address to Pope Boniface (§§ 1–3).

2. Julian calls Catholics "Manichæans" (4).

3. Julian's seven calumnies against Catholics: That the Catholics say:

(*a*) Free-will lost by Adam's sin (5–8).

But, St. Augustine asks, "quis autem nostrum dicat quod primi hominis peccato perierit liberum arbitrium de humano genere? Libertas quidem periit per peccatum, sed illa quæ in paradiso fuit, habendi plenam cum immortalitate justitiam; propter quod natura humana divina indiget gratia, dicente Domino, 'Si vos Filius liberaverit, tunc vere liberi eritis': utique liberi ad bene justeque vivendum. Nam liberum arbitrium usque adeo in peccatore non periit, ut per illud peccent, maxime omnes qui cum delectatione peccant et amore peccati; hoc eis placet quod eos libet" (Who of us says that by the first man's sin free-will perished from mankind? A liberty did indeed perish through sin, but that liberty which was in Paradise, which consisted in the possession of a complete righteousness, joined

[1] *De Nupt. et Concup.* ii. § 2.

with immortality; on which account human nature stands in need of Divine grace, as the Lord says, "If the Son shall make you free, then shall ye be free indeed": altogether free to live well and righteously. For free-will has so far not perished in sinners, that by it they sin, and particularly all those who sin with a delight in and love of the sin; this is pleasing to them [the Pelagians] since it agrees with their opinions). So also in another place he says: "Numquid tam multa, quæ præcipiuntur, in lege Dei, ne fornicationes et adulteria committantur, indicant aliud, quam liberum arbitrium? Neque enim præciperentur, nisi homo haberet propriam voluntatem, qua divinis præceptis obediret" (Is it not the case also, that the fact that it is so many times in the law of God commanded to abstain from fornication and adultery, indicates nothing else but (the possession of) free-will? For it would not be commanded, unless man had a will of his own wherewith to obey the divine precepts).[1] But the will, though both free and powerful, to turn to evil, is not in the same sense, he says, free to good, since it lacks altogether *in itself* the power to turn to the good. "Sed hæc voluntas quæ libera est in malis, quia delectatur malis, ideo libera in bonis non est, quia liberata non est" (But the will which is free toward evil, because it delights in evil, is not therefore free towards good, since it is not yet freed). So he says that the will is only really free, in any commendable sense of that word, when it has been definitely freed by the grace of God ("Non est aliud arbitrium laudabiliter liberum, nisi quod fuerit Dei gratia liberatum." *Opus Imperfectum contra Julianum*, i. 71). In the *Enchiridion* (c. xxx.) he says, "For it was by the evil use of his free-will that man destroyed both it and himself. For, as a man who kills himself must, of course, be alive when he kills himself, but after he has killed himself ceases to live, and cannot restore himself to life; so, when man by his own free will sinned, then sin being victorious over him, the freedom of his will was lost. 'For of whom a man is overcome, of the same is he brought in bondage" (2 Pet. ii. 19).[2]

[1] *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, c. iv.

[2] "Libero arbitrio male utens homo, et se perdidit et ipsum. Sicut enim qui se occidit, utique vivendo se occidit; sed se occidendo

At first this may seem to contradict what he says in *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum*, i. 5–8, but if we rightly understand his meaning, it is not really so, as Petavius reminds us in these words: "Libertas illa, quæ periisse dicitur ab Augustino, non est naturalis eligendi potestas: sed laudabilis quidam illius status, quo ad bonum propensa sit; quod nemo, ac ne ipse quidem Calvinus diffiteri audeat." [1]

(*b*) Marriage not ordained by God (9).

(*c*) Conjugal intercourse condemned (10, 11).

(*d*) Old Testament saints were not free from sin (12).

(*e*) St. Paul and the other Apostles were stained by lust (13–24).

(*f*) Even Christ was not free from sins (25).

(*g*) All sins are not remitted in Baptism (26–28).

4. Positive statement of the belief of the Pelagians:

(*a*) Free-will unimpaired in all (29).

(*b*) Marriage instituted by God (30). That is what Catholics say too!

(*c*) Conjugal intercourse instituted by God (31–35).

Yes, but shame is consequent on the Fall. St. Augustine allows that in Paradise before the Fall, sexual appetite probably existed, but was only aroused when a chaste prudence showed intercourse to be necessary.

(*d*) Man is the work of God, and is not by His power compelled to do either good or evil, but chooses either by his own will, and having chosen good is always helped by God's grace, but is incited to evil by the suggestions of the devil (36–38).

Yes, says St. Augustine, but, if left to himself, man deservedly chooses the evil, while if God helps him he is turned to good, though undeserving of it. But though Julian says man is incited to evil by the suggestions of the devil, he does *not* say that he is incited to good by the grace of God, but only that he is helped by it after he has chosen!

non vivit, nec seipsum potest resuscitare cum occiderit; ita cum libero peccaretur arbitrio, victore peccato amissum est et liberum arbitrium."

[1] That "libertas" which is said by Augustine to have perished, is not the natural power of choosing; but a certain laudable state of it, by which it is favourably disposed towards good; which no one, not even Calvin himself, will dare to deny: *De Opificio Sex Dierum*, iv. xii. 7.

(*e*) Old Testament saints having perfected righteousness here, passed to eternal life, for by the consideration of virtue they renounced sin and amended their lives (39).

Yes, but they were saved by the blood of Christ then, as now, says St. Augustine.

(*f*) We confess that the grace of Christ is necessary for all and anathematise those who say that children born of baptised parents need not be baptised (40).

Yes, but you say it, not according to Paul the Apostle, but according to Pelagius the heretic. You confess baptism is necessary, but only for the kingdom of heaven, and not for the remission of sins and eternal life.

(*g*) We condemn their opinion, for we know that a full cleansing is conferred in baptism (41).

Yes, we say so too, says St. Augustine, but you do *not* say that the bands of original sin are loosed therein to children.

5. In conclusion, he commends them for anathematising the Manichæans, but says that the Pelagians are just as rightly to be condemned, being enemies of the grace of God, and denying that infants need a Saviour.

(Book II.) 1. Manichæanism imputed to Catholics by Pelagians (§ 1).

2. Manichæan and Pelagian heresies opposed to one another, but both condemned by the Catholic Church :

Manichæans say—	*Pelagians say—*	*Catholics say—*
1. God is not the creator of all Nature.	God is not the cleanser, saviour and liberator for men of every age.	God is creator, cleanser, saviour and liberator of all.
2. Concupiscence of the flesh is not a vicious accident, but an evil nature.	Not a vice at all, but a good nature.	It is an evil, however not from God, but the world.
3. Good man cannot have origin of evil in him.	Evil man can have origin of good in him.	"God made man upright" (Eccles. vii. 30). "If the Son make you free, ye shall be free indeed" (St. John viii. 36).

Manichæans say—	*Pelagians say—*	*Catholics say—*
4. Soul is part of God and contracts evil from union with an evil nature.	Righteous soul is creature of God, but even in this life can refrain from sin.	"Either make the tree good and his fruit good, or else make the tree evil and his fruit evil" (St. Matt. xii. 33). "If we say that we have no sin we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us" (1 John i. 8).
5. Divine grace unnecessary through merits of a good nature.	Same through merits of a good will.	Divine grace necessary to all.
6. Water in baptism superfluous, as no advantage to an evil heart.	Inward grace unnecessary, as no sin in infants to be remitted.	Both visible element and invisible grace are necessary.
7. Dishonour the Flesh of Christ by blaspheming the Virgin Birth.	Do the same by making our flesh equal in honour to His, holding both sinless.	Both honour the Virgin Birth and mark difference between His Flesh and ours.

The argument that because Manichæanism is wrong, therefore its contrary (Pelagianism) must be right, is an unsound one; "both are to be held in detestation, since both are contrary to truth. And, moreover, the Manichæans may with equal justice use the converse of that argument. But the Church condemns both, and prays for their healing" (§§ 2–4).

3. Calumny against Roman Church (5–8) that they had altered their opinion on this matter. This is disproved, and even Pope Zosimus' temporary mistake is shown to be unduly pressed by the Pelagians. It is also argued that, by the words of Pope Innocent in explanation of St. John vi. 54, was meant that infants who had not been baptised and "eaten the flesh of the Son of Man and drunk His blood had no life in themselves," and therefore there was no other conceivable consequence but that they had "eternal death." As Cœlestius expressed his adherence to the "definitions of Innocent, of blessed memory," then he must agree that infants had contracted original sin, or else reject

the conclusion to the argument above. It has been questioned whether St. Augustine understands the passage quoted (St. John vi. 54) to refer to Baptism only, or to Holy Communion as well. We will leave to a subsequent occasion the summary of St. Augustine's Eucharistic teaching, and will confine ourselves here to the simple question as to the application of the quotation before us. In this section (ii. 7) the "participation of the Body and Blood of Christ" is certainly referred to as meaning, in the Papal Epistle, a further gift following upon Baptism. In iv. 4 there seems no doubt that the Holy Communion is referred to in the words "per Sacramentum carnis hujus et sanguinis." But over against this we must set the passage in *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione*, iii. 8, where he says that infants are made "partakers of the Flesh of Christ" by their incorporation into His Mystical Body, which of course refers it to Baptism. The words in i. 40 are rather doubtful, and might conceivably be interpreted either way, as also might those in iv. 8. But as we know, from independent evidence, that Infant Communion was a constant usage of the Early Church, we may conclude, I believe, that the reference is really to this practice. But though the practice has ceased, and the argument drawn therefrom to the doctrine of original sin is necessarily obsolete, yet the doctrine itself does not depend upon this argument alone and so is really in no way weakened.

4. The calumnies of the Pelagians against the Catholics, answered in detail (ii. 9–iii. 23).

General Introduction (§ 9).

(*a*) The Charge of Fatalism (10–12). "Sub nomine gratiæ ita fatum asserunt, ut dicant, quia nisi Deus invito et reluctanti homini inspiraverit boni, et ipsius imperfecti, cupiditatem, nec a malo declinare, nec bonum possit arripere" (Under the name of grace, they put *fate* forward in such a way as to say that unless God inspires the unwilling and reluctant man with the desire of good [and that, forsooth, imperfect] he is not able to avoid evil or incline to the good). St. Augustine argues that what they call "fate" in the Catholic view is really God's eternal purpose of predestination. And then he proceeds to retort the charge on the Pelagians, as follows: You say you confess the need of baptism for all, not for

the remission of sins in infants, however, you say, but for the conferring upon them of some good, and not a small or a moderate one, but great.—Well, then, suppose the case of children, born of Christian parents, dying before baptism; and, conversely, the children of heathen parents cast off by their unnatural parents, but by the kindness of Christians brought to Holy Baptism. How, on your theory, do you account for it? They have no merits of their own and their being baptised or not is obviously not dependent upon the merits or otherwise of their parents, for the reward and the punishment are evidently transposed! Your theories exclude the hypothesis of predestination by God, and the only other alternative is that of which you have accused us, but which fits your opinions far more exactly, viz. the doctrine of "fatalism." We Catholics prefer to this the more probable and certainly more religious hypothesis that both the due retribution of the merits of evil men and the undeserved good of good men are not "per stellarum temporale consortium, sed per suæ severitatis et bonitatis æternum altumque consilium" (by a chance conjunction of the stars, but by the eternal and high counsel of His severity and goodness). So, then, it is really you, not we, who call by the name of "fate" what the Apostle calls "grace."

(*b*) Charging God with "acceptance of persons" (13–23). But where the case is of two persons, both unworthy, to one of whom the debt is remitted, but not to the other, there is no iniquity, no unfairness, for the one has what is justly due to him and the other is given what he has no claim whatever to, but only receives from the exceeding goodness of the creditor. Take the case, says the Catholic Doctor, of two children, twins, of whom one is baptised, the other not; but both die in infancy. It cannot be explained by the parents' merits, for they had the same parents, but a different fate; it cannot be any foreseen future merits or demerits of their own, for God would foresee that they both would have no opportunity of either, that they would have no "future" in this life; the only conclusion, then, is that it is a predestination according to God's good purpose [1] (§ 16).

[1] He acknowledges that it is a "horror of profundity" (§ 15), "a difficult question" (*ibid.*); but says we must leave it there.

But more, the very beginnings of a good desire, be that good however imperfect, are yet gifts of grace, and not from a man himself; for St. Paul says, "Not that we are sufficient to think anything as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God" (2 Cor. iii. 5), and "to think" is less than "to desire." And if we *could* "desire" of ourselves, then grace would be given according to our "deserts."

St. Augustine then explains two texts wrongly used by the Pelagians: Prov. xvi. 1 and Ps. lxxxi. 11. The former, touching man's preparation of his heart, is interpreted as referring to the *second* stage and not the *first*, for God must "touch" the heart and then only can man "prepare" it. As for the latter passage, he opposes to it Ps. li. 17, where God is said to "open the lips."

He, finally, lays it down that the elect are those called "according to purpose," *i.e.* God's purpose. The Pelagians had confessed "gratiam quoque adjuvare uniuscujusque bonum propositum, non tamen reluctanti studium virtutis immittere" (grace helps the good purpose of every one, but does not infuse the desire of virtue into the unwilling); showing that, like the majority of the Greek commentators, they understood the *κατὰ πρόθεσιν* in Rom. viii. 28 to refer to *man's* purpose or choice. This was a relic of the controversy with the Gnostics on the subject of Fatalism *v.* Free-will. But there can be no doubt, from the context, that as St. Augustine and the Westerns point out, the purpose is the eternal purpose of God. But St. Augustine goes further, and maintains that a distinction is implied here between those simply "called," and those "called according to purpose," or "elect." His words are: "Non enim omnes vocati 'secundum propositum' sunt vocati: quoniam multi vocati, pauci electi. Ipsi ergo secundum propositum vocati, qui electi ante constitutionem mundi" (For not all the called are called "according to purpose": since many are called, few chosen. Those, then, are called according to purpose, who were elect before the foundation of the world). But this is, as Sanday and Headlam say, "a strained interpretation."[1] Nevertheless his main contention remains true: "sicut

[1] *In loc.*

nemo potest bonum perficere sine Domino, sic nemo incipere sine Domino" (just as no one can perform any good without the Lord, so no one can begin any without His help).[1]

(Book III.) 4 (*continued*).

(*c*) Charge of disparaging the Old Law (iii. §§ 2, 3). "Legem veteris Testamenti nos dicere non ob hoc datam fuisse, ut justificaret obedientes, sed ut gravioris fieret causa peccati" (that we [*i.e.* the Catholics] say that the law of the Old Testament was not given to justify those who obeyed it, but to make the cause of sin more grievous). This is really, St. Augustine affirms, a misunderstanding of St. Paul and not of us only. The purpose of the Law was to show what God wanted to be done, but the purpose of grace to assist them to do it. The Law, then, is not disparaged by grace, but fulfilled by it.

(*d*) Charge of disparaging the effect of Baptism (§§ 4, 5). "Baptisma quoque non vere homines novos facere asserunt, id est, non plenam dare remissionem peccatorum; sed ex parte filios Dei fieri, ex parte autem filios sæculi, id est, diaboli, remanere contendunt" (Baptism also, they say, does not really make new men, that is, does not give *full* remission of sins, but they maintain that they partly become children of God and partly remain children of the world, that is, of the devil). St. Augustine's answer to this is startling, "They lie, they insinuate, they shuffle! We do *not* say so." "Children of the world" and "Children of the devil" are not synonymous terms. The children of God always remain children of this world so long as they are in the flesh. We are fully washed from sins, whether original or actual, in Baptism, but there still remains an infirmity, which the regenerate man has to strive against. So, then, in reply to the question, "whether we were saved by Baptism?" he says we must, with St. Paul, answer in the affirmative; but in reply to that, "whether He has by that same washing made us in every way saved?" we must answer "No!" for it depends upon the avoidance of sin by the use of grace.

(*e*) Charge of limiting the action of the Holy Ghost to New Testament times (6–13). "Spiritum Sanctum

[1] *Contra d. Epp. Pel.* ii. § 23.

adjurotem virtutis in veteri Testamento non fuisse" (That the Holy Spirit, the helper of virtue, was not, under the Old Covenant). In reply to this St. Augustine argues that the New was prefigured in the Old. And he calls the Covenant of Promise made with Abraham, part of the *New* Covenant, not of the Old, though the Law belonged to the Old. And so "Sive igitur Abraham, sive ante illum justi sive post eum usque ad ipsum Moysen, per quem datum est Testamentum a monte Sina in servitutem generans, sive cæteri Prophetæ post eum et sancti homines Dei usque ad Joannem Baptistam, filii sunt promissionis et gratiæ secundum Isaac filium liberæ, non ex lege, sed ex promissione hæredes Dei, cohæredes autem Christi" (Whether, therefore, Abraham or the saints before him, or after him up to the time of Moses through whom the Covenant from Mount Sinai gendering unto bondage, was given; or the rest of the prophets and holy men after him, to the advent of John the Baptist—they all are children of the promise and of grace, according to Isaac the son of the free-woman; and not of the law, but of promise, heirs of God and co-heirs with Christ). But if the objector replies, "Quomodo vetus appellatur, quod post quadringentos et triginta annos factum est per Moysen; et novum dicitur, quod ante tot annos factum est ad Abraham?" (How can that be termed "old" which was given through Moses four hundred and thirty years after; and that entitled "new," which was made with Abraham so many years before?), the answer is "revelationes eorum considerantur in his nominibus, non institutiones" (In these titles, their revelations and not their institutions are considered). And so the conclusion of the argument is that the saints and holy men of the Old Testament really belong to the New, because their hope was in Christ, and because the Holy Spirit was their helper, and also the giver of virtue to them, as the Psalmist says, "I will love thee, O Lord, my virtue" (A.V. strength, Ps. xviii. 1).

(*f*) Charge of belittling the righteousness of the Prophets and Apostles (14, 15). "Quod omnes Apostoli vel prophetæ non plene sancti definiantur a nobis, sed in comparatione pejorum minus malos eos fuisse dicamus; et hanc esse justitiam cui Deus testimonium

perhibet, ut quomodo dicit propheta, justificatam Sodomam comparatione Judæorum, sic etiam nos criminosorum comparatione dicamus sanctos aliquam exercuisse virtutem" (that all the Apostles or Prophets are not said by us to be properly holy, but that we call them so as being less evil in comparison with those who are worse; and that this is the righteousness to which God bears witness, as the prophet says, by justifying Sodom in comparison with the Jews; so also we say that, compared with the guilty sinners, the saints did exercise a certain virtue). We do not say so, says Augustine, but this is either crass ignorance or a wilful perversion of our position. The Catholic faith discriminates between the just and the unjust, not by works but by the law of faith "which worketh by love." And so a Christian whose life is certainly not in any degree vicious, but which, judged by a merely moral standard, is lower than another's who lives on the very highest plane moral; yet, if the former has the foundation of faith, while the latter lacks it, the former is "just" while the latter is "unjust." [1] The Prophets and Apostles, then, always need to say, "Forgive us our debts," yet because the basis of their lives is faith, they are just, even if excelled by the upright heathen in moral virtue.

(*g*) The charge of imputing sin to Christ (16), that Christ "carnis necessitate mentitum" (from the necessity of the flesh He uttered falsehood). No, though we say that in the likeness of sinful flesh and for sin, he condemned sin in the flesh, but He Himself had no sin, either in soul or in flesh. This obscurity of the Apostle's may be solved in two ways; either by supposing that "sin" means merely the same as "in the likeness of sinful flesh"; or, that "sin" is an abbreviation, as in the Hebrew idiom, for "sin-offering"; he expresses his preference for the latter interpretation.

(*h*) Charge as to fulfilment of commands in the future life (17–23). "Quod post resurrectionem tales processus futuros esse dicamus, ut ibi incipiant homines, quæ hic noluerint, Dei mandata complere" (that we say that the course of events after the resurrection will be

[1] Cf. "Nemo computet bona opera sua ante fidem: ubi fides non erat bonum opus non erat": *In Psalmum* xxxi. *Enarratio*, ii. § 4.

that men will begin to do there what they have been unwilling to do here, viz. fulfil God's commandments), and that because we say that there shall be no sin there, nor struggle with any sinful desire! as if *they* would dare to deny that! What we mean is that they who here were desirous of obeying God's commands (that is, of that charity which is "the fulfilling of the law") but were hindered by the infirmity of the flesh, will there be able to do perfectly what here they could do but imperfectly, because they shall then "see face to face," who here saw but "through a glass, in an enigma."

5. Brief summary of the Pelagian heresy (§ 24a).

(*a*) That they deny original sin.

(*b*) That they say that justifying grace is not given freely, but "according to our deserts."

(*c*) That they deny the need of the remission of sins after Baptism, for good men.

6. Five "clouds" set adrift by the Pelagians to hide their heresy (§ 24b). (*See also* 9 *below*.)

7. Catholic truth is a "via media" between the Manichæan and Pelagian heresies, in all these five matters (25).

8. Pelagians also raise an unnecessary question as to the origin of the soul. Pelagius was an ardent Creationist, but St. Augustine does *not* accept its opposite and thinks it is not necessary to decide one way or the other [1] (26).

(Book IV.) 9. What the five "clouds" are (§ 2). They fall into three groups, as regards the three main points of their heresy (see 5 above).

(A) Denial of original sin:

(*a*) Extolling of the Creation.

(*b*) Extolling of Marriage.

(B) Denial of grace given *freely*:

(*c*) Extolling of the Law.

(*d*) Extolling of Free-will.

(C) Denial of its necessity for all:

(*e*) Extolling of the Saints.

Catholics extol all in such a way as to condemn both Pelagians and Manichæans (3).

(*a*) *De laude creaturæ* (4–8).

They say, on this point:

"Quod nescentium conditor Deus sit, filiique hominum

[1] Cf. also *De Anima*, i. § 17 *sqq.*, and *vide supra*, p. 138.

opus sint Dei; et peccatum omne non de natura, sed de voluntate descendat."

"Quod omnibus ætatibus dicunt esse Baptismum necessarium, ut illa creatura in Dei filios adoptetur; non quod aliquid ex parentibus trahat, quod sit lavacro regenerationis expiandum."

"Quod Christum Dominum nulla macula peccati fuisse respersum, quantum attinet ad ejus infantiam."

"Ex Adam nihil mali transisse per cæteros, nisi mortem; quæ non semper est malum, cum et martyribus sit causa præmiorum, et vel bonam vel malam dici faciat non resolutio corporum, quæ excitabuntur in omni genere hominum, sed meritorum diversitas, quæ de humana libertate contingit."

(That God is the Maker of all that are born, and the children of men are the work of God; and every sin comes, not from nature but from will.

That they (the Pelagians) say Baptism is necessary to men of every age, in order that the creature itself may be adopted as children of God; not because they inherited anything from their parents that should need to be expiated at the font of regeneration.

That Christ the Lord was defiled with no stain of sin, as far as concerns his infancy. That nothing evil passed from Adam to his descendants, except death; which is not always evil, since both to the martyrs it is the cause of rewards, and also that it is not the dissolving of the body [which is the common experience of all men], but the difference of deserts which arises from humane freedom, which makes it to be termed good or evil).

Both Pelagians and Manichæans extol the Creation, but both allow the work of God in an infant to perish; for the latter destroy the reality of the redeeming Flesh and Blood of Christ, while the former assert that there is nothing in infants to need Their application to it. Both also destroy Baptism, since the Manichæans say it is superfluous in all persons, while the Pelagians say it is so at any rate as regards the remission of sin in infants. Both, again, make Christ's Infancy equal to that of the children of men, the Manichæans making both equally impure, the Pelagians both equally pure. Both alike, again, agree that original sin did not pass from Adam to his descendants, the Manichæans making the flesh to

have been always evil and the soul to have come into the body because of its former sins, while the Pelagians deny any transmission, except of death, from Adam to the rest of mankind. In support of Catholic doctrine, St. Augustine relies upon a mistaken translation and interpretation of Rom. v. 12, reading "in quo" with the Latin version and referring it to "Adam" as its antecedent. In this he follows Origen and Ambrosiaster, quoting this latter writer as "sanctus Hilarius."

(*b*) *De laude nuptiarum* (9), and they proceed to quote St. Matt. xix. 4, combined with Gen. i. 28. The words themselves are quite evangelical, but the purpose with which they are used quite wrong. They hope by lauding marriage to convey the idea that on this account there is no need for infants to be reconciled to God through Christ, since they are not "born in sin." But marriage, says St. Augustine, "is not an unfair defence of faults, but an honourable intercourse of the sexes."

(*c*) *De laude legis* (10, 11).

"Veterem legem, secundum Apostolum justam et sanctam et bonam, custodientibus mandata sua, ac per fidem juste viventibus, sicut Prophetis et Patriarchis omnibusque sanctis vitam potuisse conferre perpetuam" (The old Law was, according to the Apostle, just and holy and good, and able to confer eternal life on those who keep its commands and live righteously by faith, such as the Prophets and Patriarchs and all the saints). And so they wish to prove that grace is given according to deserts, and so is "no more grace." But the law, as the same Apostle St. Paul points out, never did and never could give life, but "faith which worketh by love" does. And then a catena of passages is quoted: Gal. ii. 21, iii. 18; Rom. iv. 14; Gal. iii. 11, 12; Lev. xviii. 5. And he proceeds: "Verum ergo dicit lex: 'Qui fecerit ea, vivet in illis.' Sed ut faciat ea et vivat in eis, non lex quæ hoc imperat, sed fides est necessaria, quæ hoc impetrat. Quæ tamen fides, ut hæc accipere mereatur, ipsa gratis datur" (Truly indeed does the law say, "Whosoever doeth these things shall live by them." Not the law, however, which commands these things, but faith which obtains them, is necessary in order that one may do them and live by them. Which faith itself, nevertheless, in order

that it may deserve to receive them, must be given freely).

(*d*) *De laude liberi arbitrii* (12–16).

"Liberum arbitrium non periisse, cum loquatur Dominus per prophetam, 'Si volueritis et audieritis me, quæ bona sunt terræ edetis: si nolueritis et non audieritis, gladius vos comedet.' Ac per hoc et gratiam uniuscujusque bonum propositum adjuvare, non tamen reluctandi studium virtutis immittere, quia personarum acceptio non est apud Deum" (Free-will has not been destroyed, since the Lord says, by the prophet, "If ye are willing and listen to me, ye shall eat the good of the land; but if ye are unwilling and will not listen, the sword shall devour you" (Isa. i. 19–20). And so grace assists the good purpose of every man, but does not infuse into the unwilling the desire of virtue, because there is no respect of persons with God). Yes, Catholics will accept this, if no merit is attributed to the "good purpose," but it is understood to be the result of preceding grace, the "good will" having been "prepared by the Lord." The "desire of virtue" is certainly not infused into a heart "reluctant," but into a heart which was once reluctant but subsequently called by the Divine grace and now no more "reluctant." But why one is called and not another, is a mystery we cannot solve; but it must suffice to know that "there is no iniquity with God."

(*e*) *De laude sanctorum* (17–19).

"Baptisma perfecte homines innovare: siquidem Apostolus testis sit, qui per lavacrum aquæ Ecclesiam de Gentibus sanctam fieri immaculatamque testatur. Sanctum quoque Spiritum mentes bonas in antiquis adjuvisse temporibus, dicente propheta ad Deum, 'Spiritus tuus bonus deducet me in viam rectam.' Omnes quoque Prophetas et Apostolos vel sanctos, tam novi quam veteris Testamenti, quibus Deus testimonium perhibet, non in comparatione sceleratorum, sed regula virtutum justos fuisse; in futuro autem tempore mercedem esse tam bonorum operum, quam malorum. Cæterum neminem posse, quæ hic contempserit, illic mandata perficere; quia dixerit Apostolus, 'Oportet nos manifestari ante tribunal Christi, ut reportet unusquisque propria corporis, secundum quod gessit, sive bonum, sive malum'" (Baptism renews men perfectly;

if indeed the Apostle is a witness, for he testifies that the Church from among the Gentiles becomes holy and undefiled by the washing of water. And the Holy Spirit assisted good minds in olden times, as the prophet says, speaking to God, "Let Thy good Spirit lead me forth into the right way." [1] And all the Prophets and Apostles or saints, also, both of the Old and the New Testament, to whom God bears witness, were not righteous merely in comparison with criminals, but by the standard of virtues; so in the time to come there shall be a reward both of good works and of evil. And further, no one who despised the commandments here will be able to fulfil them there, since the Apostle says, "We ought to be made manifest before the judgment-seat of Christ, that each may receive the due reward of the body, according to what he hath done, whether good or bad").[2]

But their purpose, he says, in thus lauding the saints, is to raise a prejudice in favour of their absolute sinlessness and to bring in again the Pelagian statement that the Church on earth is without spot or wrinkle; against which the testimonies of the Lord in the prayer given by Him, and of St. John (1 John i. 8) are to be placed.

10. Witness of Catholic writers against the Pelagians (§§ 20–31).

(*a*) St. Cyprian:

(i.) On Original Sin (21–24).

(ii.) On the Grace of God (25, 26).

(iii.) On the Imperfection of our Righteousness (27, 28).

(*b*) St. Ambrose:

(i.) On Original Sin (29).

(ii.) On the Grace of God (30).

(iii.) On the Imperfection of our Righteousness (31).

11. These testimonies before the arising of the heresy (32, 33).

12. Assembling of a Council unnecessary (34).

To this work Julian replied in a work of eight books, of which we do not even know the title, though some fragments of the contents are preserved in the work of St. Augustine, written in reply to them. This treatise of the

[1] Ps. cxliii. 10.

[2] 2 Cor. v. 10.

Catholic Father was never completed; he was at work upon it when he died, and it is known as his *Opus Imperfectum contra Julianum;* it consists of extracts from Julian's last treatise and notes upon them. The last chapter of St. Augustine's *De Hæresibus*, written in A.D. 428, also forms a brief reply to this last work of Julian's. Julian seems to have gone with Cœlestius to visit Theodore of Mopsuestia,[1] and to have remained with him until his death in 428. They then left Cilicia, and were next seen in company with the exiled Bishops Florus, Orontius, and Fabius in 429, at the court of Nestorius, the newly appointed Patriarch of Constantinople, whose sympathies they desired to enlist. Marius Mercator, late in 429, wrote a *Commonitorium super nomine Cœlestii adversus Pelagianos*, which he addressed to the Emperor Theodosius II., who thereupon decreed the banishment of the Pelagian bishops (A.D. 430). Prosper tells us that Julian feigned repentance and tried to get restored to his see of Eclanum. Marius Mercator then wrote, in A.D. 431, a *Librum Subnotationum adversus Julianum Pelagianum*. Pope Sixtus III. frustrated Julian's plans, and he died in the reign of Valentinian III. in Sicily, about A.D. 454, without restoration to Catholic communion. He wrote, in addition to the works referred to above, a treatise *de Amore*, also *de Bono Constantiæ*, also a *Commentarium in Salomonis Cantica*, all of which we know only from their mention by the Venerable Bede in the preface to his Commentary on the Song of Solomon.

Pelagius is reported to have gone to Palestine on the death of the Emperor Honorius and is no more heard of afterwards.

Cœlestius, as we have said above,[2] is heard of once more, namely, in connection with Nestorius and his heresy. Cœlestius, we saw, was welcomed to Constantinople by Nestorius in 428. But this is by no means the first time that the Pelagian and Nestorian heresies had met; they had been united about six or seven years before this in the

[1] Theodore attacked St. Jerome, calling the doctrine of original sin "this sickness which has appeared in the West." He wrote a book, entitled *Against those who say that man falls by Nature, and not by Sentence*. He went even further than the Pelagians and denied the transmission not only of sin, but even of physical death, from Adam to his descendants. See also *supra*, pp. 177–78.

[2] See pp. 249–50.

opinions of one *Leporius*, a priest and monk of Gaul. Leporius said "that Christ was not God, but a man who had so used his natural free-will as to be sinless, and thus had merited a close union with the Son." So we say that he was a Nestorian before Nestorius, for he believed, with Nestorius, that Christ had complete Humanity, but was not personally Divine, though He afterwards merited it as a reward. And he was also a definite follower of Pelagius, as is borne out by his holding that Christ *as man*, was able to merit grace by the use of his natural powers of choice, and so, in His case (and we have no reason to suppose that he believed other men to be any different *ab initio*), grace was given "secundum merita." Leporius was admonished by Cassian in Gaul, with what measure of success we do not know, and then seems to have gone to Africa, where he met St. Augustine, and was converted by him, and wrote his "libellum suæ emendationis sine fidei professionem," which he laid before a Synod at Carthage in A.D. 426, which sent it to the Bishops of Gaul. But Bishop Hefele tells us that there is no mention whatever of Pelagianism in his retractation, or in his positive confession on the subject of grace, though both Cassian and Gennadius distinctly call him a Pelagian.[1]

To return to Nestorius: Hefele says that he "showed much zeal against heretics. . . . The Pelagians alone found favour with him, since he seems to have regarded as correct their doctrine of the sufficiency of man's free-will for the accomplishment of what is good; but not their views on original sin. He received Julius, Bishop of Eclanum, Cœlestius, and other exiled leaders of the Pelagians, and interceded for them, in the year 429, with the Emperor, and also with Pope Celestine.[2] The Western layman, Marius Mercator, however, who at that time resided in Constantinople, made the Emperor acquainted through a memorial (*Commonitorium*), still extant, with the true state of affairs, and with the fact that the Pelagians had already been condemned by Western Synods and Popes,

[1] See Gennadius, *De Scriptoribus Ecclesiasticis*, 420; Vigilius Thapsiensis, *De Trinitate*, ii.; Oudin, *De Scriptis et Scriptoribus Ecclesiastici*, i. 1003; Quesnel, *In Notis ad Epist.* 134 *Sancti Leonis Papæ*; Hefele, *op. cit.*, ii. § 126.

[2] Marius Mercator (ed. Garnier, republished by Migne), pp. 61, 174, 179, 181, 185, 187, 203 note.

whereupon Theodosius commanded them to leave the capital. The sympathy which Nestorius had with them is shown by his letter to Cœlestius, the well-known friend of Pelagius, in which he bestows upon him the highest titles of honour, and compares him with John the Baptist, with Peter and with Paul, as the object of unrighteous persecution." [1] Although there is no doubt that Nestorius favoured the Pelagian teaching, we must not fail to observe the distinction pointed out above by the good Bishop of Rottenburg, that it was only to *part* of their system that he inclined, while he opposed the other part, though this course was no doubt exceedingly illogical. For example, he preached a sermon (No. 7) against Pelagianism, in the course of which occur the words: "From a woman was the debt, from a woman the absolution. . . . Thou art wroth with me because of the sin of Adam." And from his recently discovered treatise *The Bazaar of Heraclides* we would quote two passages: "For as the guilt of Adam established all under guilt, so did His victory (or acquittal) acquit all" (p. 62). "But though overthrown he (Satan) remains, as it were for his own manifest condemnation and theirs who consented to him, since he no longer has the same power to lead astray. And (that he remains), it is for the sake of the victory of those who do not consent to him; for 'no man,' it says, 'is crowned except he strive lawfully.' And hence he (Satan) remained (as a factor) in the Christian discipline, even after the victory (of Christ) and the abolition of death—that discipline which had been abolished by Christ—that those also who are in Christ may conduct themselves after His likeness; not through the grace of the resurrection alone, but also by individual works and conduct" (p. 63).[2]

Yet he shows plainly enough that he holds the Pelagian position held by Leporius as to the power and merit of the human free-will in Christ. "Now when," he says, "any one is exempt from the things which are the sources of disobedience, it is self-evident that he is without sin. For

[1] Hefele, *op. cit.* iii. § 128.

[2] "*I.e.* [adds Bethune-Baker] the grace which comes by virtue of Christ's resurrection and victory over death does not remove individual responsibility, or abolish the contest. Satan has to be overcome by each and all." I take these extracts from *The Bazaar* from the notable work of Prof. Bethune-Baker's *Nestorius and his teaching*.

this reason He (Christ) took a nature which had sinned, for fear that, if He took a nature incapable of sin, it might seem as if His sinlessness were the result of His nature, and not of obedience. But although He took all the things which go to make up our nature—anger, desire, and thought—and that these grew with the growth and progress belonging to advancing years, He kept Himself steadfast in the principles of obedience" (*Ibid.* p. 53).

Commenting on this extract, Canon Mason says: "There was no victory over the forces of evil if the victory was won by Divine might and not by a loyal human will. How the human will was aided to be loyal does not come within the scope of Nestorius's inquiry. The connection between a Nestorian view of Christ and a Pelagian view of man has often been observed—it was observed by Prosper in Nestorius's own life-time." [1] "The Nestorian Christ," said Prosper, "is a fitting Saviour of the Pelagian man," or, as another writer observes, "bad Christology leads to bad anthropology." But the victory cannot be won by any might that is less than Divine, as regards its source and its efficacy, though to be really available it must be appropriated and made his very own by man.[2] And this is the true bearing of the Incarnation, and the controversies regarding it, on the Pelagian controversy. It is quite in vain that Dr. Samuel Green [3] and others declare that there is "no real connection between the two; probably some natural fellow-feeling between men accused of heresy drew them together." But it cannot be merely accidental, when the phenomenon has already appeared in the case of Leporius and was hereafter to appear again in the welter of heresies which marked the Reformation era. The Anabaptists, and particularly John Denke, said that man could earn salvation by his own good actions; Christ was a man, though the purest of our race, and in Him God was manifest

[1] Mason, *The Chalcedonian Doctrine of the Incarnation*, p. 25.

[2] Hence the appropriateness of Mr. Lacey's warning in *The Christian Idea of Grace* in *Church Quarterly Review*, Oct. 1907, pp. 82–83: "Divine favour is the source of divine beauty in man; but the Man, Jesus Christ, is not thought of as attaining that beauty through effort following an arbitrary bestowal of favour. If from one point of view the child Jesus grew in Grace before God and man, from another point of view the Incarnate Son was conceived as coming into the world full of Grace and truth."

[3] *A Handbook of Church History*, p. 314.

in a peculiarly perfect way, but He was not to be termed "Saviour."[1] There *must* be some very real, though subtle, connection between the two, to account for the continually recurring conjunction between them. This is best shown in the words of Cassian, who writes: "Alioquin si non idem Christus ex Maria est, qui ex Deo natus, duos absque dubio Christos facis: secundum illud scilicet Pelagianæ impietatis scelus, quæ solitarium hominem ex Virgine natum adferens, eruditorem eum dixit humani generis magis, quam redemptorem fuisse; quia non redemptionem vitæ hominibus, sed vivendi dederit exemplum: videlicet ut sequentes eum homines dum similia agerent, ad consimilia pervenirent. Una ergo impietatis vestræ origo, eadem errorem radix est. Illi solitarium hominem ex Maria natum adferunt; et tu idem. Illi filium hominis a filio Dei separant et tu idem. Illi ergo Salvatorem aiunt per baptisma Christum esse factum: tu in baptismo templum esse factum" (Otherwise, if He Who was born of Mary was not the same Christ as He Who was born from God, without doubt you make two Christs: like that impious sin, viz. the Pelagian, which, postulating a solitary man born of the Virgin, says that he was the Teacher of the human race rather than its Saviour: because he gave to men an example of living, and not redemption of life: forsooth, that men who follow Him, while they perform similar actions, attain to a similar character. For there is but one beginning of your impiety, and the same error is its root. *They* (the Pelagians) hold a solitary man to have been born of Mary; and you (Nestorius) do the same. *They* separate the son of man from the Son of God, and you do the same.[2] *They*, therefore, say that through

[1] Ranke, *Reform.* iii. 559; Hardwick, *Articles*, p. 91.

[2] Nestorius really took up the cudgels against Apollinarianism, in defence of "the man" in Christ, and in just the same way Pelagius believed himself to be defending "the man" in man, against what seemed to him the Apollinarian exaggeration of the power of God in man, which was taught by Augustine and others. Canon Mason, in the afore-mentioned work, asks us "whether Catholic Christians have ever really given full attention to certain great tracts of apostolic teaching which concern the merits and the reward of Christ?" Commenting on Phil. ii. he says: "St. Paul goes on to speak of a truly human life, a truly human obedience, a truly human success, which deserved, and was recognised by God as deserving, exaltation to a height above all other creatures, a height for which no description can be found": *Op. cit.* pp. 60, 61.

baptism the Saviour became the Christ: you say that in baptism He became a temple).[1]

The real underlying connection between them, then, is "that natural human pride or self-will which refuses to receive a revelation of the Divine Nature or mode of working which does not accord with its own predetermined theories It is to this rationalising spirit of intellectual haughtiness that Arianism, Nestorianism, and Pelagianism must be chiefly referred." [2]

Nestorius, then, favoured Pelagius and his companions, though not wholly agreeing with them, and, to do him justice, after Marius Mercator's account of the doctrine of Cœlestius, Nestorius professed in a letter to Pope Celestine at Easter, A.D. 429, that he was unacquainted with all the facts of the case. But this did not avail to save them from condemnation, along with their patron, at the Third General Council at Ephesus in 431. In this Council, which dealt primarily with the heresy of Nestorius, two canons were passed against Pelagianism, the text of which we here reproduce:

Canon I.—*Εἴ τις μητροπολίτης τῆς ἐπαρχίας ἀποστατήσας τῆς ἁγίας, καὶ οἰκουμενικῆς συνόδου, προσέθετο τῷ τῆς ἀποστασίας συνεδρίῳ, ἢ μετὰ τοῦτο προστεθείη, ἢ τὰ Κελεστίου ἐφρόνησεν, ἢ φρονήσῃ οὗτος κατὰ τῶν τῆς ἐπαρχίας ἐπισκόπων διαπράττεσθαί τι οὐδαμῶς δύναται, πάσης ἐκκλησιαστικῆς κοινωνίας ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη ὑπὸ τῆς συνόδου ἐκβεβλημένος καὶ ἀνενέργητος ὑπάρχων.*

(If any metropolitan of the eparchy have departed from the holy and œcumenical Synod, and have taken a place on the Council of the apostates, or shall hereafter do so, or has embraced or shall embrace the opinions of Cœlestius, he shall no more have power to proceed against the bishops of the province, but is already excommunicated and rendered incapable of legal action by the Synod. . . .)

Canon IV.—*Εἴ δέ τινες ἀποστατήσαιεν τῶν κληρικῶν, καὶ τολμήσαιεν ἢ κατ' ἰδίαν, ἢ δημοσίᾳ τὰ Νεστορίου ἢ τὰ Κελεστίου φρονῆσαι, καὶ τούτους εἶναι καθῃρημένους, ὑπὸ τῆς ἁγίας συνόδου δεδικαίωται.*

(If any of the clergy shall apostatise and dare, either privately or in public, to side with the opinions of Nestorius or those of Cœlestius, it has been judged by the Sacred Synod that these men also are deposed.)

[1] *De Incarnatione adversus Nestorium*, c. xiv.
[2] Bindley, *The Œcumenical Documents of the Faith*, p. 10.

And also, at the close of the Council, a Synodal Letter was addressed to Pope Celestine, who was absent, though he sent his legate, and in it the following passage occurs :

Ἀναγνωσθέντων δὲ ἐν τῇ ἁγίᾳ συνόδῳ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων τῶν πεπραγμένων ἐπὶ τῇ καθαιρέσει τῶν ἀνοσίων Πελαγιανῶν καὶ Κελεστιανῶν, Κελεστίου, Πελαγίου, Ἰουλανίου, Περσιδίου, Φλώρου, Μαρκελλίνου, Ὀρεντίου, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τούτοις φρονούντων, ἐδικαιώσαμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἰσχυρὰ καὶ βέβαια μένειν τὰ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὡρισμένα παρὰ τῆς σῆς Θεοσεβείας· καὶ σύμψηφοι πάντες ἐσμέν, καθῃρημένους ἔχοντες αὐτούς.

(When the records were read in the Holy Synod, of the things done towards the deposition of the impious Pelagians and Cœlestians, of Pelagius, Cœlestius, of Julian, Persidius, Florus, Marcellinus, Orentius and those who agree with them, we thought good that the decisions of Your Holiness should remain firm and steadfast ; and we unanimously agreed to hold those persons as deposed.)

Here, then, ends the history of pure Pelagianism, as distinct from the modified form which now arose, and which we hope to deal with in a succeeding volume. Pelagianism has been slain :

(A) In the West, by the united action of :
- (1) The Episcopal Synods (chiefly in Africa).
- (2) The Apostolic See and the whole Roman Church, and
- (3) The Imperial power, "which," says Augustine, "by the favour of God, is Christian." [1]

And (B) in the East, by :
- (1) The individual repudiation of Pelagians.
- (2) The Council of Ephesus.

And the result was that :

A. The East and West declared themselves at one with Augustine on :
- (1) The need of Grace, in view of
- (2) Original Sin.

B. There was now a Catholic doctrine of Sin and Grace.

But we have left to the end the story of Pelagianism in Britain, though prior to the time of the Ephesine Council. As we saw above, Pelagius was a Briton, and so it was *a priori* likely that his doctrines would spread rapidly in Britain. Tradition ascribes its spread to the work of "Agricola, son of Severianus, a Pelagian Bishop," as is recorded for

[1] *De Pecc. Orig.* § 18.

us by the Venerable Bede in his *Historia Anglicana*, lib. i. c. 17. But Vossius argues that it is really a corruption for "a husbandman, leaving a son," etc., and that the son is really nameless. But Caspari edits some writings of a British Pelagian and ascribes them to Agricola.[1] Canon Bright also attaches credence to Bede's reading, as, too, does Prof. Pöhle in his article on Pelagius in *The Catholic Encyclopædia*, who says that the chief pupils of Pelagius in Britain were Agricola and Fastidius, the latter becoming a bishop (of London) and being suspected of Pelagianism, in spite of his having composed a treatise in which he urged that a Christian's hope should be fixed wholly on Christ. The former probably became a bishop also.

The Church in Britain was so troubled with the extent, both numerical and influential, of Pelagianism, that it sent for help to the neighbouring Church of Gaul. At a Synod held at Troyes, A.D. 429 (Vossius' "Seventh" Anti-Pelagian Synod, the Eighth being the General Council at Ephesus), on the suggestion of Palladius, a deacon,[2] and with the full recommendation of Pope Celestine, two bishops were deputed to go to their assistance, Germanus of Auxerre and Lupus of Troyes, brother of St. Vincentius of Lerins. They, on their arrival, held a Synod at Verulam (St. Alban's), which Bede calls a conference "between divine faith and human presumption,"[3] and by their arguments and their authority silenced the heretical party. Pelagius and Agricola were anathematised, and the Pelagians owned themselves defeated. But they seem to have recovered their influence to some extent later, for in A.D. 447 Germanus visited these shores once more, accompanied this time by Severus (who afterwards became Bishop of Treves), for Lupus was now dead. Another attempt was made by St. David, Bishop of Menevia, at the Synod at Llanddewi Brefi, in Cardiganshire, to extirpate the heresy, and with great success, we are told. At the close of the Synod he was elected Primate of Cambria, on the resignation of Dubritius; he then called another Synod at Caerleon-upon-Usk, which completely extirminated Pelagianism in Britain. For many years after this, however, the

[1] In his *Briefe, Abhandlungen und Predigten aus den zwei letzten Jahrhunderten des kirchlichen Alterthums.*

[2] Prosper, *Chronicle*, s.a. 429 (*Patro. Lat.* li. 598).

[3] *Hist. Ang.* i. 17.

commentary of Pelagius was very popular in Ireland, but for full evidence concerning this we must refer the reader to Prof. Souter's admirable article referred to by us once before.[1] The heresy seems to have been generally condemned, although the commentary was in great esteem.

We will now close this chapter, and with it the first volume of this work.

[1] See *The Expositor*, May, 1907.

APPENDIX A (p. 189)

ST. AUGUSTINE'S IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION

DOES he understand δικαιοῦσθαι to mean "making just" or "reckoning just"?

In *De Spiritu et Littera*, § 45, he says: "Quid est enim aliud 'justificati,' quam 'justi facti,' ab illo scilicet qui justificat impium, ut ex impio fiat justus? Si enim ita loqueremur, ut diceremus, 'Homines liberabuntur'; hoc utique intelligeretur, eis qui jam homines essent accedere liberationem: si autem diceremus, 'Homines creabuntur'; non utique intelligeretur eos creari qui erant, sed ipsa creatione homines fieri. Ita si dictum esset, 'Factores legis honorabuntur'; non recte acciperemus nisi honorem illis qui jam essent factores legis accedere: cum vero dictum est 'factores legis justificabuntur'; quid aliud dictum est quam, 'justi justificabuntur?' factores enim legis utique justi sunt. Ac per hoc tantumdem est ac si diceretur, 'Factores legis creabuntur, non qui erant, sed ut sint'; ut sic intelligerent etiam Judæi legis auditores, indigere se gratia justificatoris, ut possint esse factores. Aut certe ita dictum est, 'justificabuntur,' ac si diceretur 'juste habebuntur, justi deputabuntur,' sicut dictum est de quodam, 'Ille autem volens se justificare'; id est, ut justus haberetur et deputaretur. Unde aliter dicimus, 'Deus sanctificat sanctos suos'; aliter autem, 'Sanctificetur nomen tuum.' Nam illud ideo, quia ipse illos facit esse sanctos, qui non erant sancti: hoc autem ideo, ut quod semper apud se sanctum est, sanctum etiam ab hominibus habeatur, id est, sancte timeatur." He here considers the possibility of its meaning either "making just" or "reckoning just," precisely as "sanctify" may be either "making holy" or "reckoning holy." Both interpretations are to be found in Patristic writings, Origen, *e.g.*, holding the "imputation" theory, and Chrysostom the "infusion" theory. But the majority of the Fathers from the time of Origen (before whose time there was no discussion of the subject!) to that of Augustine, seem to hold the "infusion" theory.

And in this St. Augustine really follows them; taking his stand upon Rom. i. 17, he says that the righteousness is that

which has its source with God, but is imparted to man ("hæc est justitia Dei, quæ in Testamento Veteri velata, in Novo revelatur; quæ ideo justitia Dei dicitur, quod *impertiendo eam justos facit*," *De Spiritu et Littera*, § 18; "hæc est justitia Dei, quam non solum docet per legis præceptum, verum etiam dat per Spiritus donum," *Ibid.* § 56; "credenti, inquit, in eum qui justificat impium deputatur fides eius ad justitiam. Si justificatur impius ex *impio fit justus*." *Enarratio*, § 6). Faith is, then, to St. Augustine, the first gift of grace, and it is IMPARTED to man, not merely imputed, and so is efficient to produce as its fruit good works, which are really righteous, and so acceptable to God. Upon this idea is built up the whole of the Catholic theory of grace, and the writer who contributed most, after St. Augustine, to its perfecting, was St. Thomas Aquinas. See further in Sanday and Headlam, *Romans*, pp. 30, 36, 122 ff., 147 ff.

APPENDIX B (pp. 187, 238)

THE ARGUMENT FROM BAPTISM

St. Augustine is very fond of using the customs and ceremonies of the Church as arguments against his opponents, and prominent among such are the manifold arguments drawn from the Church's practice of Baptism. We have thought it well, therefore, to summarise the references in his Pelagian controversies to this Sacrament and its administration.

The Church maintained the necessity of the Sacrament for all, and Cœlestius at Carthage allowed this: "Infantes semper dixi egere Baptismo, ac debere baptizari: quid quærit aliud?" (*De Pecc. Orig.* § 3). So also Julian in his letter to Rome said, "Gratiam Christi omnibus necessariam et majoribus et parvulis confitemur; et eos qui dicunt de duobus baptizatis natum non debere baptizari, anathematizamus" (*Contra d. Epp. Pel.* § 40).

The Pelagians did not reject Infant Baptism, but neither did they draw the correct inference from its allowed necessity ("non ideo baptizari parvulos, ut remissionem accipiant peccatorum, sed ut sanctificentur in Christo," *De Pecc. Mer.* iii. 6). "Though the Pelagians," says Neander, "might have been easily induced by their principles to ascribe a merely symbolical significance to baptism as an external rite, yet in this, as well as in many other respects, they could not develop their system in entire independence of the ecclesiastical tradition of their age; they endeavoured, therefore, to reconcile it in the best possible manner with their principles, which owed their origin to quite different causes" (*Kirchengeschichte*, ii. § 1389).

But while both Catholics and Pelagians held in some way its *necessity*, they were not at all agreed as to its *effects*.

1. Regeneration and adoption. The Pelagians accepted this, but as the *only* effect of baptism, "quoniam propter accipiendum regnum cœlorum tantummodo eos baptizandos esse contendunt" (*De Pecc. Orig.* § 19; *Contra d. Epp. Pel.* § 40). They, like the Catholics, commonly used the term "lavacrum regenerationis" (*De Gestis*, § 28), "illo regenerationis lavacro adoptari ex filiis hominum in Dei filios non negatis; imo etiam prædicatis" (*Contra d. Epp. Pel.* ii. 11; cf. iii. 5). But, according to Neander (ii. § 1385), St. Chrysostom is stated by Julian to have said: "Hac de causa etiam infantes baptizamus, cum non sint coinquinati peccato, ut

eis addatur sanctitas, justitia, adoptio, hæreditas, fraternitas Christi, ut ejus membra sint."

2. The gift of the Holy Spirit. (See *De Natura et Gratia*, § 61.) But whether the Pelagians accepted or denied this, we have no means of knowing, except in so far as it is included in the next division:

3. Remission of Sins. The Pelagians seem to have accepted this, so far as it referred to adults, *i.e.* for the remission of *actual* sins. But their whole position was that there was no transmission of original sin, *i.e.* of any sinful tendency. But St. Augustine opposes to him the Church's practice of administering Baptism to infants as well as to adults, and with precisely the same words (*De Grat. Chr.* § 35; *De Pecc. Orig.* § 24) (which even Pelagius allowed), and that this must connote a belief in the *need* of cleansing and remission of sin, which therefore must have existed (*De Sp. et Litt.* § 59; *De Perf. Just.* §§ 16, 35; *De Gestis Pel.* § 28; *De Pecc. Orig.* § 44; *Contra d. Epp. Pel.* iv. § 17).

Because of this last effect it is, that St. Augustine maintains so strongly that there are only two possible alternatives as the condition of those who depart this life: if baptised, eternal life; if unbaptised, eternal death (*Contra d. Epp. Pel.* § 40; *De Pecc. Orig.* §§ 19, 22). This, then, is the final reason for the absolute necessity of Baptism for all, viz. that all who die unbaptised were held to be undoubtedly lost; a conclusion which the charity of the Church in later ages has not seen fit to endorse. But St. Ambrose had taught the possible exception of infants dying before committing actual sin being allowed a certain "secret immunity from punishment," though he doubted whether they should have the honour of the kingdom (*De Abrah.* ii. 11), and St. Augustine himself at first had said that their condemnation was "tolerabilior" (*De Pecc. Mer.* i. § 28, A.D. 412) and "mitissima" (*Ep.* 186, § 37, A.D. 416), though, as we have already seen, he opposed the distinction made by Pelagius between "the kingdom of heaven" and "eternal life" (see pp. 245, 264). But his views stiffened, later, in accordance with his developing theory of predestination. But Pelagius also added that if both parents had been baptised, then their children were certainly born free from taint. To which Augustine replied that in original sin were two elements: (1) Concupiscence, which was its substance, and (2) guilt. Of these, the latter was wholly remitted in Baptism, but the former, though partly neutralised by the germ of grace, yet partly remains and is therefore transmitted to the children, who in their turn require the remission of sin obtained in Baptism (*Contra d. Epp.* i. 27; iii. 5). To this our Article agrees when it says: "And this infection of nature doth remain, yea in them that are regenerated" (Art. IX.).

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